In re Application of Moraine Wind, L.L.C.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In re Application of Moraine Wind, L.L.C., Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-3103.] NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-3103 IN RE APPLICATION OF MORAINE WIND, L.L.C., FOR CERTIFICATION AS AN ELIGIBLE OHIO RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCE GENERATING FACILITY; CARBON SOLUTIONS GROUP, L.L.C., APPELLANT; PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, APPELLEE; AVANGRID RENEWABLES, L.L.C., ET AL., INTERVENING APPELLEES; BLUE DELTA ENERGY, L.L.C., INTERVENING APPELLEE; NORTHERN INDIANA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, L.L.C., INTERVENING APPELLEE. [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In re Application of Moraine Wind, L.L.C., Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-3103.] Public utilities—Public Utilities Commission’s order approving applications of six out-of-state wind farms as eligible Ohio renewable-energy-resource- generating facilitates is not against the manifest weight of the evidence or contrary to law—Commission’s order affirmed. (No. 2024-0098—Submitted June 25, 2025—Decided August 18, 2026.)  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO APPEAL from the Public Utilities Commission, Nos. 21-516-EL-REN, 21-517-EL- REN, 21-531-EL-REN, 21-532-EL-REN, 21-544-EL-REN, and 22-380-EL-REN. ____________________ DORRIAN, J., authored the opinion of the court, which KENNEDY, C.J., and DEWINE, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ., joined. FISCHER, J., concurred in part and dissented in part, with an opinion joined by WILLAMOWSKI, J. JULIA L. DORRIAN, J., of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, sat for BRUNNER, J. JOHN R. WILLAMOWSKI, J., of the Third District Court of Appeals, sat for DETERS, J. DORRIAN, J. {¶ 1} In the proceedings below, six wind farms located in four different states in the Upper Midwest filed applications with appellee, the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (the “commission” or “PUCO”), to be certified as eligible Ohio renewable-energy-resource-generating facilities. The six wind farms are intervening appellees Moraine Wind, L.L.C., Rugby Wind, L.L.C., Elm Creek II Wind, L.L.C., Buffalo Ridge II Wind, L.L.C., Barton Windpower 1, and Barton Windpower, L.L.C. (collectively, “the applicants”). The wind farms are wholly owned subsidiaries of intervening appellee, Avangrid Renewables, L.L.C. {¶ 2} The commission approved each application and issued a certificate to each wind farm as an eligible Ohio renewable-energy-resource-generating facility. Under Ohio law, once a generating facility is certified as a qualifying renewable- energy resource, it can sell renewable energy in Ohio. {¶ 3} Appellant, Carbon Solutions Group, L.L.C. (“CSG”), whose clients include Ohio-based renewable-energy developers and facilities, appealed the commission’s order issuing the certificates. CSG argues that the record does not support the commission’s findings that the facilities meet the criteria to be certified as a renewable-energy resource and that the commission violated R.C. 4903.09 when it failed to address CSG’s claim that the record lacked sufficient evidence 2  January Term, 2026 supporting the decision to issue the certificates. CSG also argues that the commission failed to follow certain statues and rules governing the proceeding. We find that CSG’s arguments lack merit. Therefore, we affirm the commission’s order. I. CRITERIA TO BE A QUALIFYING RENEWABLE-ENERGY RESOURCE {¶ 4} R.C. 4928.64(B)(1) requires electric-distribution utilities and electric- services companies supplying retail-electric service in Ohio to provide a portion of the electricity supplied to retail customers from a “qualifying renewable energy resource,” such as solar power or wind energy, see R.C. 4928.01(A)(37) (defining “renewable energy resource” to include solar power and wind energy); R.C. 4928.64(A)(1) (indicating that as used in R.C. 4928.64, a “qualifying renewable energy resource” is defined in R.C. 4928.01). Electric-distribution utilities may purchase renewable-energy resources from both in-state and out-of-state qualifying generating facilities through contracts with electric suppliers or through the purchase of renewable-energy credits. R.C. 4928.64(B)(1) and (3); R.C. 4928.645; Adm.Code 4901:1-40-04(C).1 A generating facility seeking to supply renewable- energy resources in Ohio must file an application with the commission to be certified as a qualifying renewable-energy resource. See Adm.Code 4901:1-40- 04(D). 1. A renewable-energy credit is created for each megawatt hour of electricity generated by a renewable-energy resource. Adm.Code 4901:1-10-01(AA). Once electricity generated from a renewable-energy resource is delivered to the power grid, it becomes indistinguishable from electricity generated from traditional resources, such as coal or natural gas. A [renewable-energy credit] is a nontangible, tradable commodity that serves as a mechanism for utilities and regulators to track renewable-energy purchases. In re Rev. of Alternative Energy Rider Contained in Tariffs of Ohio Edison Co., 2018-Ohio-229, ¶ 6. 3  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 5} To be certified as a qualifying renewable-energy resource, one of the criteria a facility located outside Ohio must prove is that the renewable energy generated “can be shown to be deliverable into this state.” R.C. 4928.64(B)(3)(b). For facilities that are in states not contiguous to Ohio, the commission’s rules define “[d]eliverable into this state” to “include electricity originating from other locations, pending a demonstration that the electricity is physically deliverable to the state.” Adm.Code 4901:1-40-01(F). {¶ 6} Because tracking energy from a generating facility to a specific load location would be impossible, the commission adopted a test in 2011 that it uses to determine whether energy from a facility in a noncontiguous state is deliverable into Ohio. See generally In re Application of Koda Energy, L.L.C., PUCO No. 09- 555-EL-REN, 2011 WL 1144649 (Mar. 23, 2011). In Koda, the commission utilized distribution-factor (“DFAX”) or power-flow studies conducted by PJM Interconnection (“PJM”) and the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (“MISO”), which were the two regional-transmission organizations (“RTO”) operating in Ohio at that time.2 Id. at *2. A DFAX analysis is a computer model of the transmission system that measures the change in power flows across a transmission line caused by a generating facility’s adding power onto the transmission system. The commission uses these studies to determine whether power flows modeled within PJM and MISO from generating facilities located outside Ohio and its contiguous states have an impact on power flows over transmission lines within Ohio. Id. {¶ 7} Under the test developed in Koda, the generating facility must have a “significant impact” on a transmission line in Ohio, which the commission defined 2. MISO and PJM are two RTOs that are designated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to coordinate the movement of wholesale electricity within an assigned region. See Ohio Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 2006-Ohio-5853, ¶ 5-6. MISO no longer operates in Ohio, and PJM is currently the sole manager of the wholesale-electricity market in Ohio. See Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cleveland, 2021-Ohio-4463, ¶ 5. 4  January Term, 2026 as exceeding a threshold DFAX value of greater than 5 percent and the megawatt equivalence3 of the impact is greater than one megawatt. Id. Thus, a facility located in a noncontiguous state can prove that its renewable energy is physically deliverable into Ohio by presenting an RTO’s power-flow study that shows a significant impact to an Ohio transmission line, i.e., one that exceeds a DFAX value of 5 percent and the megawatt equivalence of the impact is greater than one megawatt. Id. at *2-3. II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY {¶ 8} The applicants are six out-of-state wind-energy-generating facilities. The Moraine Wind and Elm Creek II Wind facilities are in Minnesota, Rugby Wind’s facility is in North Dakota, Buffalo Ridge II Wind’s facility is in South Dakota, and the two Barton facilities are in Iowa. Each applicant filed an application with the commission to be certified in Ohio as a qualifying renewable- energy resource. CSG intervened and opposed each application. Avangrid Renewables and two interested companies, intervening appellees Blue Delta Energy, L.L.C., and Northern Indiana Public Service Company, L.L.C. (“NIPSCO”), also intervened and supported each application. {¶ 9} The commission held a three-day evidentiary hearing in December 2022. At the hearing, the commission heard testimony from witnesses on behalf of the applicants, CSG, and the commission’s staff. The parties filed initial and posthearing briefs in early 2023. {¶ 10} In September 2023, the commission issued an order approving all six applications. PUCO Nos. 21-516-EL-REN, 21-517-EL-REN, 21-531-EL- REN, 21-532-EL-REN, 21-544-EL-REN, and 22-380-EL-REN, 2023 WL 6247423, ¶ 1, 62 (Sept. 20, 2023). The commission reviewed the applications to determine whether each facility satisfied three statutory criteria: (1) R.C. 3. The megawatt equivalence of the impact is calculated by multiplying the DFAX value by the facility’s nameplate capacity. Koda at *2. 5  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 4928.64(B)(3)(b)’s requirement that the facility’s generation resources be deliverable into Ohio, (2) the requirement that the facility be recognized as a renewable-energy resource in accordance with R.C. 4928.64(A)(1) and 4928.01(A)(37), and (3) R.C. 4928.64(A)(1)(a)’s requirement that the facility was placed in service on or after January 1, 1998. No party challenged the second or third statutory criteria, so the only issue before the commission was whether the renewable energy generated by the facilities was “shown to be deliverable into this state” as required by R.C. 4928.64(B)(3)(b). {¶ 11} To decide this issue, the commission relied on dictionary definitions to determine the plain meaning of the word “deliverable” because no technical definition is provided in the Revised Code. 2023 WL 6247423 at ¶ 45. For purposes of R.C. Ch. 4928, the commission defined “‘deliverable’ as being capable of delivery.” Id. According to the commission, it “appears to be undisputed in these proceedings” that “the statutory language is clear and unambiguous in that it requires that the generation produced from a facility to be capable of being delivered into Ohio.” Id. The commission further noted that its prior interpretation of “deliverable” “has aligned with the statutory language by requiring a study [of facilities in noncontiguous states] to ‘demonstrate that some portion of the facility’s generation is capable of being physically delivered to the state.’” Id. at ¶ 46, quoting In re Adoption of Rules for Alternative and Renewable Energy Technology, Resources, & Climate Regulations, PUCO No. 08-888-EL-ORD, 2009 WL 1759671, 22-23 (June 17, 2009). {¶ 12} In its order, the commission reaffirmed the use of the Koda test as the method for determining whether generation produced by an out-of-state facility is deliverable into Ohio as required by R.C. 4928.64(B)(3)(b). 2023 WL 6247423 at ¶ 48-49. The commission applied that test to each of the six applications and, based on power-flow studies conducted by PJM, determined that each facility met the thresholds established in Koda. Id. at ¶ 49-50. Accordingly, the commission 6  January Term, 2026 determined that each applicant’s wind farm satisfied the statutory requirement that the generation produced by the facility be physically deliverable into Ohio and issued a certificate to each wind farm. Id. at ¶ 49-51. On January 17, 2024, CSG filed a notice of appeal with this court from the commission’s September 2023 order.4 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW {¶ 13} “R.C. 4903.13 provides that a PUCO order shall be reversed, vacated, or modified by this court only when, upon consideration of the record, the court finds the order to be unlawful or unreasonable.” Constellation NewEnergy, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 2004-Ohio-6767, ¶ 50. The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the commission’s order is unlawful or unreasonable. AT&T Communications of Ohio, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 51 Ohio St.3d 150, 154 (1990). {¶ 14} A commission order is unlawful if it rests on an erroneous interpretation of the law or if the commission fails to follow procedures prescribed by statute or commission rule. In re Application of Firelands Wind, L.L.C., 2023- 4. CSG applied to the commission for rehearing on October 20, 2023. On November 16, the commission issued an entry granting CSG’s rehearing application “for the limited purpose of further consideration of the matters specified therein.” PUCO Nos. 21-516-EL-REN, 21-517-EL-REN, 21- 531-EL-REN, 21-532-EL-REN, 21-544-EL-REN, and 22-380-EL-REN, 2023 WL 8118256, ¶ 19 (Nov. 16, 2023). CSG’s appeal to this court from the commission’s September 2023 order was filed while CSG’s rehearing application was under further consideration by the commission. The commission filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the matter was still pending before it on rehearing. CSG filed a response in opposition, claiming that its rehearing application was denied by operation of law under R.C. 4903.10 and that the appeal was therefore ripe for review. In August 2024, we held that the commission is prohibited from granting a rehearing application for the limited purpose of further considering the matters raised in the application. In re Application of Moraine Wind, L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-3224, ¶ 2-3 (“Moraine Wind I”). We determined that rehearing applications granted for this limited purpose—and that are not otherwise granted within 30 days of filing—are denied by operation of law under R.C. 4903.10. Id. at ¶ 3. Accordingly, we concluded that CSG’s appeal was timely filed and denied the commission’s motion to dismiss. Id. at ¶ 28. Before we issued that decision, the commission issued a second rehearing entry on February 21, 2024, in which it substantively addressed the issues raised in CSG’s application for rehearing. However, given that we held in Moraine I that CSG’s application for rehearing was denied by operation of law 30 days after it was filed, the February 21, 2024 entry is a nullity and unreviewable on appeal. 7  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Ohio-2555, ¶ 12. This court conducts a de novo review of questions of law. Id. at ¶ 13. This court has “complete and independent power of review as to all questions of law” in appeals from the commission. Ohio Edison Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 1997-Ohio-196, ¶ 16. {¶ 15} A commission order is unreasonable when it is manifestly contrary to the evidence in the record or when the evidence is clearly insufficient to support the order. Firelands at ¶ 16. Likewise, an order is unreasonable when it is internally inconsistent. Id., citing Ridgeview Ctr., Inc. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision, 42 Ohio St.3d 30, 31 (1989). {¶ 16} In adjudicating whether a commission order is unreasonable, we do not reweigh the evidence or second-guess the commission on questions of fact. In re Complaints of Lycourt-Donovan v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 2017-Ohio- 7566, ¶ 35, citing Ohio Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 2007-Ohio-4276, ¶ 29. We will not disturb the commission’s factual determinations when the record contains sufficient probative evidence to show that the commission’s order was not “‘manifestly against the weight of the evidence and is not so clearly unsupported by the record as to show misapprehension, mistake or willful disregard of duty.’” Monongahela Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 2004-Ohio-6896, ¶ 29, quoting AT&T Communications of Ohio, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 2000-Ohio-422, ¶ 27. Finally, an order is unreasonable when the commission’s exercise of its discretion in making determinations within broad statutory criteria falls outside the zone of permissible statutory construction. Firelands at ¶ 15. IV. ANALYSIS {¶ 17} CSG raises two propositions of law on appeal. Under its first proposition of law, CSG challenges the commission’s determination that the applicants’ generating resources are deliverable into Ohio. In its second proposition of law, CSG argues that the commission failed to follow certain statutes and rules governing the certification proceeding. The commission has filed a merit 8  January Term, 2026 brief in defense of the commission’s order. Two briefs urging affirmance of the commission’s order were filed—one by the applicants and Avangrid Renewables and one by Blue Delta Energy and NIPSCO. A. CSG’s first proposition of law: Whether the commission’s determination that the applicants’ generation resources are “deliverable into this state” is against the manifest weight of the evidence and contrary to law {¶ 18} CSG argues that the commission erred in finding that the generation resources from each applicant’s out-of-state wind farm are deliverable into Ohio. 1. The commission’s determination that deliverability criteria had been met {¶ 19} In the proceedings below, each applicant provided the commission’s staff with a DFAX power-flow report performed by PJM for its generating facility. The staff reviewed the DFAX reports and determined that each facility met the deliverability thresholds established in Koda. Accordingly, the staff concluded that the generation resources were physically deliverable into Ohio and recommended that the commission grant each application. {¶ 20} CSG challenged the commission staff’s recommendations, arguing that the applicants had failed to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating that their renewable energy is deliverable into Ohio as required by R.C. 4928.64(B)(3)(b). CSG asserted that because the applicants’ wind farms are located in areas where MISO administers transmission assets—while PJM manages transmission assets in Ohio—the applicants had to submit evidence showing how their renewable energy is deliverable from their generation facilities in MISO into the PJM-transmission region and then into Ohio. CSG questioned the reliability of the applicants’ DFAX reports, asserting that the data in those reports was incomplete because PJM did not model power flows on transmission lines within MISO but instead assumed that the energy from the generation facilities was deliverable across MISO to the PJM border. In making this argument, CSG relied on the cover letters that PJM had attached to the DFAX reports, which state that the power-flow values in the reports 9  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO represent impacts to Ohio transmission lines by the generation facilities “if they were to deliver their energy into PJM.” (Emphasis added.) Absent evidence that the generating facilities are capable of delivering energy from MISO into PJM, CSG maintained that the DFAX reports do not show that the renewable-energy resources have any impact on transmission lines in PJM, let alone Ohio. {¶ 21} The commission rejected CSG’s allegation that the DFAX reports “assum[ed] that energy would be able to flow from MISO into PJM as opposed to proving the energy would flow into PJM.” 2023 WL 6247423 at ¶ 48. The commission also noted that the Koda test requires only “a power flow study to be performed by an RTO, with no additional requirement as to which RTO performs the study and certainly no requirement that multiple studies be produced.” Id. The commission then determined that the applicants had provided the necessary information for the commission staff to determine deliverability. Id. {¶ 22} The commission proceeded to adopt its staff’s recommendations, agreeing that the applicants had provided power-flow studies from PJM showing that each facility met the thresholds established in Koda. Id. at ¶ 50-51. According to the commission, no party contested the impact values from the PJM power-flow studies during the hearing, and its staff relied on these values in determining that the facilities met the deliverability requirement. Id. at ¶ 50. Accordingly, the commission determined that the applicants satisfied the statutory requirement that the generation produced by the facilities be physically deliverable into Ohio, and it approved the applications for certification. Id. at ¶ 50-51, 62-63. 2. CSG’s two-fold argument in support of its first proposition of law {¶ 23} CSG presents two arguments in its merit brief to support its first proposition of law. First, CSG contends that the DFAX reports do not support the commission staff’s deliverability findings and recommendations. More specifically, CSG contends that the DFAX values in the reports that the staff used to calculate the Koda deliverability thresholds are “meaningless” and do not show 10  January Term, 2026 “real transmission line impacts” from MISO to PJM to Ohio and, instead, show only hypothetical impacts between PJM and Ohio. Second, CSG contends that the commission’s order fails to address the “evidence of non-deliverability.” a. CSG’s contention that the evidence does not support the commission staff’s deliverability findings and recommendations is without merit {¶ 24} We first address CSG’s argument that the DFAX reports performed by PJM do not support the commission staff’s deliverability findings and recommendations. {¶ 25} The commission’s order states in relevant part: As reflected above, Staff notes that Applicants provided power flow studies, performed by PJM, that show the facilities have met the thresholds established in Koda. These values were not contested during the hearing and Staff relied on these values, among other things, in its ultimate determination that the facilities met the deliverability requirement. (Staff Ex. 3 at 2; Staff Ex. 4 at 2; Staff Ex. 5 at 2; Staff Ex. 6 at 2; Staff Ex. 7 at 2; Staff Ex. 8 at 2). Therefore, the Commission finds that the applications satisfy the statutory requirement that the generation produced by the facilities be physically deliverable to Ohio. 2023 WL 6247423 at ¶ 50. {¶ 26} Paragraph 50 of the commission’s order references six exhibits, which are the commission staff’s review and recommendation approving each applicant’s facility application. On the second page of each exhibit, the commission staff stated regarding each respective application that “[a]s the Facility satisfies both the 5 percent and 1 [megawatt] criteria, Staff concludes that the Facility is physically deliverable to the state of Ohio.” (Emphasis added.) 11  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 27} As noted above, the commission’s order states that its staff relied on the provided values. 2023 WL 6247423 at ¶ 50. The order also stated that commission’s staff explained its analysis of the deliverability requirement, “which involved reviewing the DFAX study completed by PJM and examining the DFAX values from transmission lines where at least one segment is located within Ohio to determine if the value on the lines is greater than five percent.” Id. at ¶ 33. {¶ 28} In support of its determination that the deliverability requirement had been met, the staff submitted the prefiled testimony of commission staff members Jason A. Cross and Kristin Clingan. Cross and Clingan also testified in person at the evidentiary hearing. {¶ 29} In his prefiled testimony, Cross was asked whether “the facilities applying for certificates in [the] cases meet the Commission approved deliverability standard.” Cross answered, “Yes.” When questioned by CSG’s attorney at the hearing, Cross confirmed that he was the person who had reviewed each of the PJM cover letters and spreadsheets and determined the values that the staff considered. He further testified that he reviewed the DFAX report that was provided by the applicant and did his own analysis to make sure the values meet the deliverability requirements. Specifically, Cross confirmed when asked by the hearing examiner that he based his analysis on the full DFAX study rather than the one-to-two-page narrative provided by the applicants. {¶ 30} In her prefiled testimony, Clingan stated that “it is staff’s understanding that PJM has, or is able to obtain, all the requisite information it needs to run power flow studies across RTOs (e.g., a source in MISO and a sink in PJM).” When cross-examined by CSG at the hearing about how she formed her belief to make that statement, Clingan testified, “Because PJM runs the power flow study and if they need inputs to that study, they would obtain it or else they wouldn’t be able to run the model.” 12  January Term, 2026 {¶ 31} CSG argues that “the Commission may not base its decision solely on its Staff’s recommendations or reports.” However, we have held that if the commission finds that a staff recommendation contains sufficient factual findings and conclusions of law, it may adopt the same. See In re Application of FirstEnergy Advisors for Certification as a Competitive Retail Elec. Serv. Power Broker & Aggregator, 2021-Ohio-3630, ¶ 22 (noting that the commission can adopt reports prepared by its staff into its order if the reports contain sufficient factual findings and conclusions of law). The commission noted that “the testimony presented by Staff witnesses Clingan and Cross demonstrate Staff’s intimate familiarity with these types of applications and the use of . . . power flow studies like DFAX reports to assist with its deliverability analysis.” 2023 WL 6247423 at ¶ 46. {¶ 32} In light of Cross’s testimony and his independent analysis of the DFAX reports, rather than the cover letter, and Clingan’s testimony, specifically that PJM would not have been able to run the model if it did not have the inputs required, we find no merit in CSG’s contention that the evidence does not support the staff’s deliverability findings and recommendations. There is sufficient evidence in the record to show that the commission’s order is not manifestly against the weight of the evidence and is not so clearly unsupported by the record to show misapprehension, mistake, or willful disregard of duty. See Lycourt-Donovan, 2017-Ohio-7566, at ¶ 35. b. CSG’s contention that the commission’s order fails to address evidence of nondeliverability is without merit {¶ 33} We next address CSG’s argument that the commission’s order failed to address evidence of nondeliverability. In support of this argument, CSG asserts that the commission (1) did not apply the Koda test correctly, and (2) did not address the evidentiary gap as required under R.C. 4903.09. We begin with whether the commission correctly applied the Koda test. 13  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO i. The commission correctly applied the Koda test {¶ 34} The commission’s order states as follows: We continue to find that Staff’s methodology, including the use of [the Koda] threshold, represents a reasonable method for determining whether the generation produced at a facility located in a state non-contiguous to Ohio has a significant impact on power flows over the transmission lines located within Ohio and, thus, demonstrates deliverability pursuant to R.C. 4928.64(B)(3). 2023 WL 6247423 at ¶ 49. {¶ 35} As a preliminary matter, we note that CSG has argued in its merit brief that this court need not address whether the Koda test continues to be reasonable or whether additional modifications are necessary. It states that “for purposes of this appeal, the Court may presume that the Koda test is a proper framework for demonstrating this capability even if other methods discussed by CSG’s expert would also satisfy R.C. 4928.64.” (Emphasis in original.) We will accept CSG’s concession and focus instead on its argument that the commission erroneously applied Koda to the facts of this case. {¶ 36} As referenced above and explained in more detail below, CSG argues that the DFAX reports in this case were insufficient to show deliverability under the Koda test because the studies were conducted solely by PJM. CSG argues, and its expert witness, Travis Stewart, testified, that the commission should have also required a DFAX report conducted by MISO or some other method to demonstrate deliverability from each applicant’s facility to the PJM region and then to Ohio. {¶ 37} But Stewart specifically testified that the purpose of his testimony was not to make a specific recommendation to replace the Koda test but, rather, to 14  January Term, 2026 note for the commission that other options were available. He noted several options to demonstrate deliverability in addition to an “affected system study,” including a “Firm Point to Point Transmission Service Reservation,” a series of interconnection studies, and historical settlement data based on a contract or a financial transaction. {¶ 38} The commission disagreed and concluded that the DFAX studies performed by PJM and submitted by the applicants were sufficient for the commission staff to determine deliverability. 2023 WL 6247423 at ¶ 48. The commission noted its “well-established precedent [that] requires a power flow study to be performed by an RTO, with no additional requirement as to which RTO performs the study and certainly no requirement that multiple studies be produced.” Id. The commission also noted that “even [CSG] agrees that the Koda test is an appropriate means to determine deliverability [by] acknowledging . . . that ‘power flow studies, including DFAX reports, may be used to figure out whether energy is physically deliverable from one area to another.’” Id. at ¶ 47, quoting CSG’s initial posthearing brief, 14. It explained, “[CSG] provides no basis to question the long- standing precedent, or the methodology utilized therein, to determine whether a facility complies with the statutory criteria set forth in R.C. 4928.64(B).” Id. {¶ 39} Additionally, the commission expressly addressed in its order what is meant by “deliverable into this state” for purposes of R.C. 4928.64(B)(3)(b). In particular, the commission noted CSG’s admission that “it is impossible to trace electrons in order to show deliverability” and its concession that “‘it is possible to predict and measure the impact that electrons generated in a specific location will have on transmission lines in a different location.’” 2023 WL 6247423 at ¶ 45, quoting CSG’s initial posthearing brief at 5. The commission also noted that its staff “acknowledged the impossibility [of] physically track[ing] energy from a specific generating facility to a specific load location, thus, necessitating a method to discern whether a facility’s generation has an impact on transmission lines located in Ohio.” Id. The commission concluded that R.C. 4928.64(B)(3)(b) 15  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO requires that the generation resources produced from a facility “be capable of being delivered into Ohio,” id., and that conclusion appears to be undisputed in these proceedings. The commission noted that CSG had conceded that R.C. 4928.64(B)(3)(b) “does not require a demonstration of actual delivery, but rather that the generation produced is capable of being physically delivered into Ohio.” Id. at ¶ 48. {¶ 40} Despite its concession, CSG appears to challenge the adequacy of the DFAX reports to determine deliverability of energy from one RTO to another. But the commission in its order outlined the arguments regarding the interregional transmissibility of resources between RTOs, including: (1) the applicants’ contention that “a DFAX study is still accurate when modeling power flows between regional transmission organizations,” which CSG’s “witness seemed to admit,” 2023 WL 6247426 at ¶ 31; (2) the explanation by Blue Delta and NIPSCO that “the physical structure of and electricity flow through the electric grid was unchanged by the change in RTOs,” id. at ¶ 34; (3) the explanation by Blue Delta and NIPSCO that “PJM can obtain all of the requisite information it needs to run power flow studies across RTOs,” id.; and (4) the statement by Blue Delta and NIPSCO in their posthearing reply brief “that PJM modeled more than 3,000 transmission facilities, and specifically facilities with only one endpoint in Ohio, thereby transporting electricity into the state,” which “exceeds the modeling done in Koda,” id. at ¶ 38. Additionally, the commission noted in its order that the applicants pointed out that MISO and PJM have “a joint operating agreement [that] allows the two organizations to share information and coordinate interconnections.” Id. at ¶ 36. {¶ 41} Taking all this into consideration, we conclude that on the facts of this case, the commission correctly applied the Koda test to the applicants’ DFAX reports and determined that the energy generated by the applicants’ facilities met the deliverability criteria. We acknowledge the commission’s agreement with its 16  January Term, 2026 staff that CSG’s “proposed alternatives are not viable” and that the commission had “already rejected adding financial or contractual requirements to the deliverability assessment and . . . expressly recognized that physical deliverability is not determined by contractual arrangements.” 2023 WL 6247423 at ¶ 47. We also acknowledge that the commission noted that “[the commission’s] well-established precedent requires a power flow study to be performed by an RTO, with no additional requirement as to which RTO performs the study and certainly no requirement that multiple studies be produced.” Id. at ¶ 48. In this particular case, we find that it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence or contrary to law for the commission to determine that the deliverability standard was met without a MISO DFAX study or other evidence. However, at this time, we do not wish to preclude the commission in future cases from requiring DFAX studies from multiple RTOs, evidence in the form of an alternative affected system study, or other evidence as it determines may be necessary when considering whether the deliverability standard is met. {¶ 42} This observation is supported by the plain language of Koda, which reads: A demonstration of deliverability may include a power flow study performed by the transmission operator(s) which offers evidence of any significant impact on power flows over transmission lines located in the state of Ohio and serving loads connected to distribution lines located in Ohio due to electricity produced at the renewable generating facility’s location. Koda, 2011 WL 1144649, at *2. (Emphasis added.) 17  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO ii. The commission complied with R.C. 4903.09 in addressing the evidentiary gap {¶ 43} We turn now to the question whether the commission’s order meets the requirements of R.C. 4903.09, which provides: In all contested cases heard by the public utilities commission, a complete record of all of the proceedings shall be made, including a transcript of all testimony and of all exhibits, and the commission shall file, with the records of such cases, findings of fact and written opinions setting forth the reasons prompting the decisions arrived at, based upon said findings of fact. {¶ 44} “The purpose of R.C. 4903.09 is to provide the court with sufficient details to enable it to determine how the commission reached its decision.” Allnet Communications Servs., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 1994-Ohio-460, ¶ 27. “In order to meet the requirements of R.C. 4903.09, . . . the PUCO’s order must show, in sufficient detail, the facts in the record upon which the order is based, and the reasoning followed by the PUCO in reaching its conclusion.” MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 32 Ohio St.3d 306, 312 (1987). However, “[s]trict compliance with the terms of R.C. 4903.09 is not required.” Tongren v. Pub. Util. Comm., 1999-Ohio-206, ¶ 7. {¶ 45} CSG references Stewart’s testimony to support its argument that an evidentiary gap existed. As relevant here, Stewart testified: Q: Okay. So when there is an impact, a DFAX study impact that’s greater than a certain percentage, the one RTO has to notify the other RTO; is that correct? A: Yeah. Inside that process, I believe the threshold that [was previously identified during the hearing] was 3 percent and to 18  January Term, 2026 my understanding that is—that’s accurate. And what happens is MISO informs PJM that they have identified an impact on PJM’s system, and PJM performs what is referred to as an affected system study. And there is no affected system studies associated with these MISO-based facilities inside of these applications. Q: Sure. And is—is that required by Ohio law or the Commission’s rules, the second study that you are talking about? A: If you are demonstrating deliverability and you would like to comply with Koda to provide your power flow studies, if an affected system study was triggered, then it should have been provided. {¶ 46} In support of its argument tha