TexasChemistry Council v. EPA
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket24-60193
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
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United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
November 19, 2026
No. 24-60193 Thomas B. Plunkett, III
____________ Clerk
Texas Chemistry Council; American Chemistry
Council; Georgia Chemistry Council; Asbestos Disease
Awareness Organization; United Steel, Paper and
Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied
Industrial and Service Workers International Union,
AFL-CIO; Ohio Chemistry Technology Council,
Petitioners,
versus
United States Environmental Protection Agency,
Respondent,
consolidated with
_____________
No. 24-60281
_____________
American Public Health Association; Collegium
Ramazzini; Local F-116 (Vandenberg Professional
Firefighters), International Association of Fire
Fighters; Local F-253 (Fort Myer Professional
Firefighters), International Association of Fire
Fighters; The FeelGood Foundation; Henry A.
Anderson, Medical Doctor; Brad Black, Medical Doctor; Barry
Castleman, Doctor of Science; Raja Flores, Medical Doctor;
Arthur Frank, Medical Doctor, Doctor of Philosophy; Phil
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Landrigan, Medical Doctor, Master of Science; Richard Lemen,
Doctor of Philosophy, Master of Public Health; Steven Markowitz,
Medical Doctor, Doctor of Public Health; Jacqueline Moline, Medical
Doctor, Master of Science; Celeste Monforton, Doctor of Public
Health, Master of Public Health; Christine Oliver, Medical Doctor,
Master of Public Health, Master of Science; Andrea Wolf, Medical Doctor,
Master of Public Health,
Petitioners,
versus
United States Environmental Protection Agency; Lee
Zeldin, Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency,
Respondents.
______________________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the Environmental Protection Agency
Agency Nos. 40 CFR Part 751,
89 Fed. Reg. 21970
______________________________
Before Clement, Southwick, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Kurt D. Engelhardt, Circuit Judge:
Several Petitioners challenge an EPA rule that bans certain uses of
asbestos. Because no Petitioner has standing, we DISMISS the petitions for
lack of jurisdiction.
I.
The Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”) requires EPA to
regulate chemicals that pose an “unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment.” 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a). Pursuant to this authority, EPA issued
a rule banning several uses of chrysotile asbestos, exposure to which EPA
determined can cause lung cancer, mesothelioma, larynx cancer, and ovarian
cancer, as well as non-cancer respiratory diseases, such as asbestosis.
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Asbestos Part 1; Chrysotile Asbestos; Regulation of Certain Conditions of
Use Under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 89 Fed. Reg.
21970-01, 21993 (Mar. 28, 2024) (“Final Rule”).
After EPA issued the Final Rule, a slew of petitions for review were
filed in several different circuit courts, and they were consolidated here by
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. Petitioners Ohio Chemistry
Technology Council, American Chemistry Council, Georgia Chemistry
Council, and Texas Chemistry Council (“Industry Petitioners”) 1 argue that
the asbestos ban went too far and that EPA failed to comply with TSCA’s
procedural requirements. They ask us to vacate the portions of the Final Rule
impacting the chlor-alkali and chemical-production industries.
Two other sets of Petitioners argue that EPA did not go far enough in
preventing unreasonable risk. The United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber,
Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International
Union, AFL-CIO (“USW”) argues that EPA violated the TSCA by failing
to impose interim protections for workers in the general chemical-production
industry while providing such protections for titanium-dioxide workers. And
a group of Petitioners comprising public health organizations—including the
Asbestos Disease Awareness Organization (“ADAO”) and the American
Public Health Association (“APHA”)—two firefighter unions, and several
researchers and doctors (“Advocacy Petitioners”) contend that, among
other things, EPA improperly failed to ban other asbestos types and uses that
present unreasonable risk. 2
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1
Olin Corporation consolidated its suit with Industry Petitioners, but it later
voluntarily dismissed its Petition.
2
We refer to Industry Petitioners, USW, and Advocacy Petitioners collectively as
“Petitioners.”
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A few days before oral argument, we notified the parties that they
should be prepared to discuss standing, even though EPA did not initially
raise the issue. See Nat’l Religious Broads. v. FCC, 138 F.4th 282, 290 (5th
Cir. 2025) (“[T]he court has an ‘obligation to assure itself of its own
jurisdiction, sua sponte if necessary.’” (quoting Elldakli v. Garland, 64 F.4th
666, 669 (5th Cir. 2023))). Following oral argument, we required the parties
to submit supplemental briefing on standing. The parties complied, and each
Petitioner submitted declarations to support standing.
II.
“Like a plaintiff who files a complaint, a petitioner who seeks review
of agency action ‘invok[es] federal jurisdiction’ and therefore ‘bears the
burden of establishing’ standing.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 937
F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). “The familiar elements of standing are
(1) an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of
the respondent, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.” Shrimpers & Fishermen of RGV v. Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality,
968 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Each Petitioner relies on
associational standing, which requires them to show that “(1) their members
would independently have Article III standing to sue, (2) the interests they
seek to protect are germane to their purposes, and (3) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual
members.” Id.
“[I]n direct appellate review of a final agency action, ‘the petitioner
carries a burden of production’ with respect to standing that is ‘similar to
that required at summary judgment.’” Shrimpers, 968 F.3d at 423 (quoting
Sierra Club v. EPA, 793 F.3d 656, 662 (6th Cir. 2015)). “This means that a
petitioner’s claim of standing cannot rest on ‘mere allegations,’ but must
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instead be supported by citations to specific facts in the record.” Id. (quoting
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 412 (2013)); see also Nat’l
Religious Broads., 138 F.4th at 291 (noting that petitioners “must support
their claims for standing with record evidence,” such as affidavits).
“Arguments in favor of standing, like all arguments in favor of
jurisdiction, can be forfeited or waived.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 937 F.3d
at 542. “A party forfeits an argument by failing to adequately brief the
argument in its opening brief.” Smith v. Sch. Bd. of Concordia Par., 88 F.4th
588, 594 (5th Cir. 2023) (citation modified) (quoting Rollins v. Home Depot
USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021)); see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A)
(requiring that a petitioner’s opening brief contain its “contentions and the
reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on
which the [petitioner] relies”). 3 Parties can fail to adequately brief an
argument in a multitude of ways, such as “failing to offer any supporting
argument or citation to authority,” JTB Tools & Oilfield Servs., L.L.C. v.
United States, 831 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 2016); neglecting to “identify
relevant legal standards and any relevant Fifth Circuit cases,” id. (citation
modified); omitting supporting record citations, United States v. Rojas, 812
F.3d 382, 407 n.15 (5th Cir. 2016); and raising an argument only in a footnote,
Smith, 88 F.4th at 596.
For the following reasons, we conclude that Industry Petitioners,
USW, and Advocacy Petitioners failed to comply with these requirements. 4
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3
This briefing rule applies to appeals and reviews of agency actions alike. Fed. R.
App. P. 20.
4
Another panel of this court recently decided East Fork Enterprises v. EPA, 192
F.4th 391 (5th Cir. 2026), which vacated a similar EPA rule on the merits. Because we do
not reach the merits of the Petitioners’ claims here, we do not discuss East Fork’s
implications for future challenges of agency actions.
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A.
In their opening brief, Industry Petitioners write that
[e]ach Industry Petitioner filed in a Circuit Court in which it,
or its members, transact business that is directly affected by the
Final Rule. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–52
(1992) (“[T]here is ordinarily little question” that a directly
regulated entity has standing to “challeng[e] the legality of
government action or inaction.”).
Besides that, they say nothing about standing.
Because Industry Petitioners are a collection of associations, this
leaves us guessing about their theory of standing, what the legal standard is,
how that standard is met, who any of the associations’ members are, how
their members are injured, or the imminency of the purported harm. In the
typical case, we would hold Industry Petitioners’ arguments forfeited and
summarily dismiss their petitions for failure to establish jurisdiction. See Ctr.
for Biological Diversity, 937 F.3d at 542 (holding that the petitioners forfeited
an argument in favor of standing “by failing to include it in their opening
brief”).
But Industry Petitioners now aver that they were not required to
comply with our usual rules because their standing was self-evident. 5 See
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5
The self-evident-standing exception originates most directly from a former D.C.
Circuit rule requiring that, “[w]hen the appellant’s or petitioner’s standing is not apparent
from the administrative record, the brief must include arguments and evidence establishing
the claim of standing.” D.C. Cir. R. 28(a)(7) (2024) (amended 2025); see also Entergy
Ark., LLC v. FERC, 134 F.4th 576, 582 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (“The ‘self-evident’ exception
is based on [Rule 28(a)(7)] itself, which textually only applies when the ‘petitioner’s
standing is not apparent from the administrative record.’” (quoting D.C. Cir. R.
28(a)(7) (2024)). But see Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 899–901 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(tracing the exception to Lujan). The D.C. Circuit now requires that “the brief of the
appellant or petitioner must set forth the basis for the claim of standing. . . . includ[ing]
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Texas v. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 78 F.4th 827, 835 (5th Cir. 2023)
(“Generally, a petitioner is required ‘to present specific facts supporting
standing through citations to the administrative record or affidavits or other
evidence attached to its opening brief, unless standing is self-evident.’”
(quoting Sierra Club, 793 F.3d at 662)), rev’d on other grounds, 605 U.S. 665
(2025); Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 937 F.3d at 542 n.4 (“[W]e overlook
Petitioners’ decision to include only a cursory discussion of standing because
we assume they had a good-faith (though mistaken) belief that standing
would be both undisputed and easy to resolve.”). They ask us to hold that
they have standing notwithstanding the lack of supporting evidence, or
alternatively, to allow them to submit supplemental materials because
“nothing in the record alerted [them] to the possibility that their standing
would be challenged.” Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 78 F.4th at 835 (quoting Am.
Libr. Ass’n v. FCC, 401 F.3d 489, 492 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
Even assuming standing may be considered self-evident for some
petitioners, such as entities directly regulated by the challenged agency
action, the self-evident-standing exception cannot save Industry Petitioners
because they could not have reasonably believed it applied on these facts.
This is because this exception would excuse a petitioner’s failure to comply
with our usual standing requirements only when a petitioner “‘reasonably
assumes’ that its standing was self-evident from the administrative record.”
Entergy Ark., 134 F.4th at 582 (citation modified) (quoting Sierra Club v.
DOE, 107 F.4th 1012, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2024)); see also Twin Rivers Paper Co.
LLC v. SEC, 934 F.3d 607, 612 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (similar, but also excusing
forfeiture when a party “reasonably, but mistakenly, believed” that its initial
pleadings were sufficient). That’s not the case here. Most obviously, the
_____________________
arguments and evidence establishing by a ‘substantial probability’ the claim of standing.”
D.C. Cir. R. 28(a)(7) (2025).
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administrative record does not establish who Industry Petitioners’ members
were at the “commencement of the suit” when “standing is determined,”
so they could not have believed any member’s standing was self-evident from
the record. In re Technicool Sys., Inc., 896 F.3d 382, 386 (5th Cir. 2018)
(citation modified). Nor do Industry Petitioners argue that their opening brief
adequately established standing, rather than the administrative record itself.
From these precedents, a rule emerges: Petitioners who fear the
administrative record doesn’t establish their standing to sue may supplement
the record with affidavits and other evidence, but it must be done at the time
of their opening brief. Industry Petitioners didn’t do that here. Instead, in
briefing submitted after argument, they argue that they have standing to sue
on behalf of Olin Corporation and Occidental Chemical Corporation. But
they admit that Olin was not a member of Petitioner American Chemistry
Council (“ACC”) at the outset of the suit—though it apparently now is—
and they identify no evidence in the record showing that another Petitioner
had Olin on its membership roll when the petitions were filed. And while
there’s some evidence that Occidental was a member of ACC during the
rulemaking process in 2022 and 2023, there’s no evidence that it was a
member of ACC or any other Industry Petitioner when they filed their
Petitions in 2024. We are left speculating about Occidental’s membership
status—and, therefore, Industry Petitioners’ standing. But on direct review
of agency actions, we don’t fill in the blanks for petitioners or give them the
benefit of the doubt. We require evidence. See Shrimpers, 968 F.3d at 423;
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
The fact that Olin—a directly regulated entity—originally joined
Industry Petitioners’ brief does not exempt them from our well-established
standing and briefing requirements. While it’s true that “[t]he presence of
one party with standing is sufficient to authorize our review,” Texas v. United
States, 50 F.4th 498, 514 (5th Cir. 2022), that means only that Industry
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Petitioners’ standing may not have been an issue had Olin remained in the
suit, not that Industry Petitioners themselves established standing. Once Olin
dismissed its petition and Industry Petitioners could no longer rely on Olin’s
standing, they bore the burden of proving their own. Since their standing was
never self-evident, they were required to provide substantiating evidence,
such as affidavits, at the time of their opening brief. Nat’l Religious Broads.,
138 F.4th at 291; Shrimpers, 968 F.3d at 423–24. But they failed to do so until
after we alerted them to our concerns—more than three weeks after Olin
withdrew its petition—and they have not shown good cause for not
immediately requesting an opportunity to supplement the record. 6
For this reason, we decline to consider Industry Petitioners’
post-argument evidentiary submissions. Allowing a Petitioner to supplement
the record this late in the proceeding would not only contravene our
forfeiture rules and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, but it would
also unfairly prejudice EPA and waste judicial resources. We agree with the
D.C. Circuit that “[r]equiring the petitioner to establish its standing at the
outset of its case is the most fair and orderly process by which to determine
whether the petitioner has standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court.”
Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 901. Certainly we would not allow a party to proffer
additional evidence on a merits issue once it discovered we were dubious. We
see no reason to treat standing—a “bedrock constitutional requirement”—
any differently. 7 FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 378 (2024)
(quoting United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 675 (2023)).
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6
We express no view on whether supplementation should be allowed in these
circumstances.
7
We likewise reject the declarations USW and Advocacy Petitioners submitted
after oral argument.
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Because Industry Petitioners failed to preserve their arguments in
favor of standing, those arguments are forfeited. With very limited
exceptions, we do not consider forfeited issues. Rollins, 8 F.4th at 398. Those
exceptions do not apply here, and we “cannot grant special absolutions, no
matter our view of the underlying merits.” Smith, 88 F.4th at 596. So we
dismiss their petitions.
B.
USW’s opening brief mentions standing only once, in a footnote. 8 In
its entirety, that footnote reads:
USW represents thousands of workers in the chemical
manufacturing industry who are directly exposed to asbestos
when installing new gaskets or removing old gaskets, or when
working in the same vicinity as those directly installing or
removing these gaskets. Indeed, USW is the largest union
representing workers in the chemical manufacturing industry.
The lack of protections against asbestos exposure puts USW
members at risk. USW therefore has standing in this
proceeding. See Air Alliance Houston v. EPA, 906 F.3d 1049,
1058–59 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (finding USW had standing to
challenge EPA regulation based on its members’ exposure).
USW’s attempt to establish standing runs into many of the same
problems as Industry Petitioners. USW does not identify the theory of
standing on which it relies, neglects to cite binding authority, and omits
record citations. What’s more, “[w]e have repeatedly cautioned that
arguments appearing only in footnotes are ‘insufficiently addressed in the
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8
USW also mentions facts supporting standing in its petition for review, writing
that EPA’s interim protections fail to extend to “workers exposed when handling asbestos
sheet gaskets,” “thousands” of whom are represented by USW. But again, USW fails to
tell us who any of these workers are.
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body of the brief’ and are thus forfeited.” Smith, 88 F.4th at 596 (quoting
Arbuckle Mountain Ranch of Tex., Inc. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 810 F.3d
335, 339 n.4 (5th Cir. 2016)).
As with Industry Petitioners, this would normally result in summary
dismissal. But also like Industry Petitioners, USW now asserts that it
reasonably believed its standing was self-evident. And as with Industry
Petitioners, this argument fails because USW could not have reasonably held
this belief.
But that’s beside the point, because USW never told us who any of
its members are. Though it describes its members, USW does not give us the
“concrete evidence” we need to determine standing. Shrimpers, 968 F.3d at
425; see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 498 (2009)
(discussing the “requirement of naming the affected members” and finding
an affidavit provided to establish standing “insufficient because it did not
name the individuals who were harmed”). With nothing in the record to back
up its allegations—or at least none that we are aware of—USW’s standing
plainly cannot be self-evident.
In short, USW was required to cite specific facts in the record proving
standing or to submit supplemental evidence no later than the filing of its
opening brief. See Shrimpers, 968 F.3d at 423 (“[A] petitioner’s claim of
standing cannot rest on ‘mere allegations,’ but must instead be supported by
citations to specific facts in the record.” (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 412)).
In failing to do so, it forfeited its arguments in favor of standing. We therefore
dismiss USW’s petition for lack of standing.
C.
Only Advocacy Petitioners made any effort to establish standing at the
appropriate time. They submitted arguments and declarations on behalf of
three individual petitioners, IAFF Local F-253, APHA, and ADAO. But
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they still fall short because they did not demonstrate that any of them suffered
a cognizable injury in fact.
1.
IAFF Local F-253 is a firefighter union based in Northern Virginia.
Local F-253’s president, Mike Jackson, explained in his declaration that
“[a]sbestos is a significant risk factor for fire fighters because it is pervasive
in residential, government, and commercial buildings, equipment and our
transportation and distribution system and is frequently released during fires
and other hazardous events to which fire fighters respond.” Jackson cites a
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health study that found that
“the population of fire fighters in the study had a rate of mesothelioma two
times greater than the rate in the U.S. population as a whole.”
Local F-253 asserts that two aspects of the Final Rule harm its
members. First, as to EPA’s determination that the distribution of asbestos
in commerce does not present an unreasonable risk, Local F-253 says this
“increases health risks to Local 253’s members who respond to spills,
derailments, fires and other emergencies within their areas of responsibility.”
Second, it argues that the Rule improperly bans only a small number of
asbestos uses, leaving Local F-253’s members at risk from other uses that are
“now occurring or could be foreseen to be introduced in the future.”
But Local F-253 does not explain how these alleged harms are actual
or imminent. It contends merely that asbestos-containing materials
(including “unknown” materials) “may be present” when its members are
fighting fires and that they are at an “increased risk” due to the lack of
additional protections in the Final Rule. This vague conjecture is insufficient
to show “certainly impending harm or a substantial risk of harm.” Shrimpers,
968 F.3d at 424 (quotation omitted); see also id. (“Increased-risk claims—
even when they are particularized—often cannot satisfy the ‘actual or
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imminent’ requirement.”). And Local F-253 fails to present evidence
showing “the extent to which . . . risks would be increased” for its members.
Id. at 425. Therefore, Local F-253 failed to establish standing.
2.
APHA is a public health organization that has 23,000 members,
including “physicians, nurses, epidemiologists, educators, first responders,
industrial hygienists and public health professionals in the public and private
sectors who work at health and environmental agencies, universities, non-
profit organizations and unions.” According to APHA’s Executive Director,
“[a]sbestos has long been a priority for APHA because of its extreme risks
to public health.”
APHA contends that it has associational standing 9 because its
members “may be exposed to asbestos during their jobs,” and they “may be
at risk” due to the Final Rule’s inadequate protections. APHA further
asserts that its members would be “handicapped” in preventing the harmful
effects of asbestos if the Final Rule stands. But each of these assertions falls
far short of alleging a harm that is “actual or imminent, [and] not conjectural
or hypothetical,” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016), as revised
(May 24, 2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560), because they do not
demonstrate that harm is “certainly impending” or that APHA’s members
face a “substantial risk” of harm. Shrimpers, 968 F.3d at 424 (quoting
Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414 & n.5). And APHA fails to show that its members
in particular face an increased risk of harm from asbestos because of the Final
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9
In its opening brief, APHA appeared to assert that it had organizational standing
as well, arguing that the Final Rule would force it to divert its resources to address the
Rule’s deficiencies. But APHA has since disclaimed organizational standing, and in any
event, its diversion-of-resources theory is foreclosed. See United States v. Texas, 173 F.4th
659, 665 (5th Cir. 2026) (en banc).
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Rule. See id. (“We do not recognize the concept of ‘probabilistic standing’
based on a non-particularized ‘increased risk’—that is, an increased risk that
equally affects the general public.”). This means APHA also lacks standing.
3.
ADAO has a “network of more than 50,000 people and organizations
dedicated to protecting public health from the known dangers of asbestos.”
ADAO contends that it has associational standing 10 to sue on behalf of its
supporters because the Final Rule does not address all types and uses of
asbestos, potentially increasing the risk of asbestos exposure to those
supporters.
But because ADAO does not have traditional members, it can
establish associational standing only by “proving that it has ‘indicia of
membership’: its members elect leadership, serve as the organization’s
leadership, and finance the organization’s activities, including the case’s
litigation costs.” Funeral Consumers All., Inc. v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, 695 F.3d
330, 344 n.9 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert.
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 344–45 (1977)); see also Students for Fair Admissions,
Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harv. Coll., 600 U.S. 181, 200–01 (2023). ADAO
does not attempt to satisfy this standard, other than by asserting—without
evidence—that its supporters are “involved in and contribute to its
programs,” so it failed to show that it can rely on associational standing.
Further, even if ADAO could assert associational standing, it failed
to demonstrate that the Final Rule poses some concrete, particularized, and
actual or imminent harm to any supporter. Its generalized contention that
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10
ADAO asserted organizational standing in its opening brief based on a diversion-
of-resources theory, but it has since abandoned that claim, which would be foreclosed
anyway. See Texas, 173 F.4th at 665.
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deficiencies in the Rule increase the risk of asbestos exposure does not
establish a cognizable injury in fact. See Shrimpers, 968 F.3d at 424–25.
Accordingly, ADAO has not met its burden to establish standing.
* * *
Because no Petitioner has shown that we have jurisdiction, all
petitions for review are DISMISSED.
15