For a Better Bayou v. FERC

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Argued March 24, 2026 Decided August 25, 2026 No. 24-1291 FOR A BETTER BAYOU, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, RESPONDENT VENTURE GLOBAL CP EXPRESS, LLC AND VENTURE GLOBAL CP2 LNG, LLC, INTERVENORS Consolidated with 24-1292, 25-1157 On Petitions for Review of Orders of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Nathan Matthews argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the joint briefs were Megan Gibson, Spencer T. Gall, Clara Derby, Caroline Reiser, Thomas Zimpleman, Gillian Giannetti, and Rebecca McCreary.  2 Scott R. Ediger, Attorney Advisor, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Robert H. Solomon, Solicitor. Susanna Y. Chu, Senior Attorney, entered an appearance. Eric Konopka argued the cause for intervenors in support of respondent. With him on the brief were Gregory G. Garre, Joel P. Nevins, Peter Prindiville, Halle H. Edwards, and Sandra Snyder. Before: HENDERSON and MILLETT, Circuit Judges, and GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge. Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge GINSBURG.  3 I. Background ...................................................................... 4 A. Relevant Statutes ...................................................... 4 B. Commission Proceedings ......................................... 9 II. Analysis ......................................................................... 11 A. Challenges under the NGA ..................................... 12 1. The Commission’s interpretation of the NGA ................................................................ 13 2. The Commission’s application of the NGA .... 17 a. The project’s harms .................................. 17 b. The Terminal’s benefits ........................... 19 c. The authorization of the Pipeline ............. 20 B. Challenges under the NEPA ................................... 23 1. The Terminal’s cumulative effects .................. 23 a. New model ............................................... 24 b. Magnolia Terminal. .................................. 25 c. Marine vessels serving other terminals .................................................................. 27 2. The Commission’s use of NAAQS in the cumulative effects analysis.............................. 30 3. The Moss Lake Compressor Station’s cumulative effects ........................................... 33 4. The harm to the commercial fishing industry ............................................................ 37 a. Temporary harm................................... 37 b. Localized harm..................................... 38 III. Conclusion ..................................................................... 41  4 GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge: In December 2021 Venture Global CP2 LNG and Venture Global CP Express, the Intervenors here, sought authorization from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for the siting, construction, and oper- ation of a terminal and pipeline for the exportation of liquefied natural gas (LNG). A long review process followed, resulting in two environmental impact statements, an initial authoriza- tion order, three rehearing orders and, in 2025, the FERC’s approval of the project. The petitioners are individuals and advocacy groups seek- ing review of those orders. Leaving no stone unturned, they improbably allege the Commission committed no fewer than eleven errors under the Natural Gas Act (NGA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Because these arguments lack merit, we deny the petitions for review. I. Background This appeal implicates not only the NGA and the NEPA, but also the Clean Air Act (CAA). We begin by discussing the relevant provisions of these laws before turning to the proce- dural history of the case. A. Relevant Statutes The NGA regulates “the business of transporting and selling natural gas for ultimate distribution to the public.” 15 U.S.C. § 717(a). It prohibits the export of natural gas by any entity “without first having secured an order of the Commission authorizing it to do so.” § 717b(a). A party must also obtain prior authorization before constructing a natural gas terminal or a pipeline. See Big Bend Conservation All. v. FERC, 896 F.3d 418, 420 (D.C. Cir. 2018).  5 The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has dele- gated authority to the FERC to “[a]pprove or disapprove” the siting, construction, and operation of particular facilities used to export natural gas, including LNG terminals. DOE, Delegation Order No. S1-DEL-FERC-2006, § 1.21A (2006); see § 717b(e)(1); see also § 717a(11) (defining “LNG terminal”). 1 The Congress has laid down different standards for the approval of an LNG export terminal than it has for the approval of a pipeline used to transport natural gas. Under Section 3 of the NGA the FERC “shall issue” an order author- izing an LNG export terminal “unless” it finds the terminal “will not be consistent with the public interest.” § 717b(a). By contrast, under Section 7 the FERC may not authorize the con- struction and operation of a pipeline unless it determines the pipeline “is or will be required by the present or future public convenience and necessity.” § 717f(e). Although the FERC exercises authority over the approval of LNG terminals, the DOE has “retained for itself the authority to authorize exports . . . of natural gas.” Sierra Club v. DOE (Alaska Gasline), 134 F.4th 568, 570 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2025). Any exportation of gas to a country with which the United States has “a free trade agreement requiring national treatment for trade in natural gas[] shall be deemed to be consistent with the public interest, and applications for such . . . exportation shall be granted without modification or delay.” § 717b(c). The FERC follows its longstanding Certificate Policy Statement when it reviews an application for the construction 1 “Commission” as used in the NGA refers to the Federal Power Commission, § 717a(9), the predecessor to the FERC. In 1977 the Congress “transferred to” the Secretary of Energy “the function of the Federal Power Commission.” 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b), who as just mentioned, has delegated some of those functions to the FERC.  6 of a pipeline. See Certification of New Interstate Nat. Gas Pipeline Facilities, 88 FERC 61227 (1999), clarified, 90 FERC 61128 (2000), further clarified, 92 FERC 61094 (2000). The Commission first considers whether there is a “market need” for the project by asking whether it can proceed without subsi- dies from the applicant’s existing customers. Env’t Def. Fund v. FERC, 2 F.4th 953, 961 (D.C. Cir. 2021). If it finds there is a market need for the pipeline, then the FERC determines whether the pipeline will have an adverse effect on the appli- cant’s existing customers, pipelines in the same market and their captive customers, or landowners and communities sur- rounding the project. Id. If the pipeline will cause an adverse effect, then the FERC balances that effect against the pipeline’s public benefits. Id. In doing so, the Commission will “consider all relevant factors reflecting on the need for the project.” Id. Under the NEPA, the FERC must prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) if it determines that the approval of a terminal or pipeline would constitute a “major federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); see § 4336(b)(1). The NEPA, however, “imposes no substantive environmental obligations or restrictions.” Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle Cnty., 605 U.S. 168, 173 (2025). It is “a purely procedural statute that, as relevant here, simply requires an agency to prepare an EIS — in essence, a report.” Id. The NEPA does not require the Commission “to weigh environmental consequences in any particular way. Rather, an agency may weigh environmental consequences as the agency reasonably sees fit under its governing statute and any relevant substantive environmental laws.” Id. “The goal of the law is to inform agency decisionmaking, not to paralyze it.” Id. Still, the FERC must “look hard at the environmental effects” of the action. Sierra Club v. FERC (Cumberland),  7 153 F.4th 1295, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 2025). Accordingly, an EIS must consider the “reasonably foreseeable environmental effects of the proposed agency action,” including any adverse effects “which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented.” § 4332(2)(C)(i)-(ii). Under regulations in effect at the time of the proceedings here under review, the FERC would consider the cumulative environmental effects of a proposed project as part of its NEPA analysis. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.1(g)(3) (2023); see also 90 Fed. Reg. 10610, 10611 (2025) (final rule promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality repealing the regulations implementing the NEPA, including § 1508). The FERC defined cumulative effects as “the incremental effects of the action when added to the effects of other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable actions.” § 1508.1(g)(3). Two standards set by the Environmental Protection Agency are relevant to the FERC’s analysis of cumulative effects on air quality. First, the EPA has identified significant impact levels (SILs) for certain air pollutants, “below which the EPA considers [the] source to have an insignificant effect on ambient air quality.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 705 F.3d 458, 461 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see May 2025 Rehearing Order, 191 FERC 61153, ¶ 5 n.25 (discussing EPA guidance documents on the SILs for, as relevant here, NO2 and PM2.5). Second, the CAA requires the EPA to set national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for each air pollutant for which the EPA has issued air quality criteria. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a). The EPA must set primary NAAQS at a level “requisite to protect the public health” with “an adequate margin of safety.” § 7409(b). The CAA prohibits the construction of a “major emitting facility” unless the applicant demonstrates the facility “will not cause, or contribute to, air pollution in excess of” any NAAQS. § 7475(a)(3). The EPA has delegated authority to enforce this  8 provision to state agencies, here the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (the LDEQ). When analyzing the cumulative effects of a proposed pro- ject on air quality, the FERC applied a three-step framework in accordance with EPA guidelines for evaluating a project’s emissions: 1. Preliminary screening: The FERC first compares the project’s predicted emis- sions to the SILs for those emissions. If the FERC predicts the emissions will fall below the SILs, then the emissions are “insignificant” and the FERC’s analysis is at an end. 2. Cumulative effects: If the FERC predicts the emissions will exceed a relevant SIL, then the FERC adds the emissions from the source under review to those from sources already existing in the area and compares the cumulative emissions to the NAAQS. In doing so, the FERC may rely upon an emissions inventory maintained by a state agency such as the LDEQ. If the cumulative effects of the emissions do not exceed the NAAQS, then the FERC ends its analysis. 3. Cause and contribution: If the predicted cumulative emissions will exceed a NAAQS, then the FERC con- siders whether the predicted SIL exceedance and the predicted NAAQS exceedance will occur simultaneously at  9 the same receptor. If it will not, then the project is deemed to “not cause or contribute to the potential NAAQS exceedance.” May 2025 Rehearing Order, 191 FERC ¶¶ 5-6 (citing 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, app. W). B. Commission Proceedings In December 2021 the Intervenors sought the FERC’s authorization for the siting, construction, and operation of a new LNG terminal on the Calcasieu Ship Channel in Cameron Parish, Louisiana and of a natural gas pipeline running 85 miles from East Texas to the Terminal. The Pipeline will also include the Moss Lake Compressor Station. In July 2023 FERC staff completed the EIS, which ran more than 600 pages plus appendices. 2 The EIS predicted the project would cause some adverse environmental effects and recommended more than 100 measures to reduce those effects. As for the cumulative effects analysis of the Terminal and the Compressor Station, the EIS predicted there would be exceed- ances of the SILs and NAAQS for PM2.5 and NO2, but it concluded that those exceedances would not occur simultaneously and the project therefore would not cause or contribute to any NAAQS exceedances. The EIS also con- cluded that the project would not cause significant harm to the commercial fishing industry. In June 2024 the FERC issued an order authorizing the Terminal and the Pipeline. 187 FERC 61199, ¶¶ 199-200. For 2 The Congress has since imposed a general 150-page limit for an EIS and a 300-page limit for an EIS “for a proposed agency action of extraordinary complexity.” 42 U.S.C. § 4336a(e)(1).  10 a Better Bayou, other advocacy groups, and several individuals (together, Bayou), filed a request for rehearing, which the FERC granted in part. November 2024 Rehearing Order, 189 FERC 61148, ¶ 2. Out of concern that our decisions in Healthy Gulf v. FERC, 107 F.4th 1033 (2024), and City of Port Isabel v. FERC, 111 F.4th 1198 (2024), may have undermined part of its cumulative effects analysis, the FERC set aside its analysis of the project’s NO2 and PM2.5 emissions and ordered an addi- tional environmental review. Id. ¶ 185. The FERC also said it would address “other air quality issues raised by” Bayou in a future order; it otherwise rejected Bayou’s arguments. Id. In May 2025 FERC staff issued the Supplemental EIS (SEIS). Unlike the original EIS, which had predicted SIL and NAAQS exceedances for the Terminal and the Compressor Station, the SEIS predicted no NAAQS exceedances for the Terminal and no SIL exceedances for the Compressor Station. The SEIS accordingly ended its cumulative effects analysis at step one for the Compressor Station and at step two for the Terminal, concluding that “there would be no significant cumulative air quality impacts.” Two weeks later the FERC issued an order again authoriz- ing the Terminal and the Pipeline, based upon the conclusions in the EIS and the SEIS. May 2025 Rehearing Order, 191 FERC ¶¶ 92-93. Bayou filed another request for rehearing, which the Commission denied. August 2025 Rehearing Order, 192 FERC 61157, ¶ 2. After the Initial Authorization Order issued in June 2024, the FERC had authorized limited construction activities. Bayou sought a stay of those activities, which was twice denied by the FERC and by this court.  11 II. Analysis We have jurisdiction over Bayou’s petitions for review under 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b). 3 Insofar as Bayou’s challenges raise questions of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412-13 3 Bayou filed its first petition for review in September 2024 — after its request for rehearing had been denied by operation of law but before the Commission set aside part of its order in the November 2024 Rehearing Order. A request for rehearing will be denied by operation of law if the Commission does not act on it within thirty days, but the Commission may still modify or set aside the initial order until “the record in [the] proceeding shall have been filed in a court of appeals.” § 717r(a). One month after the Commission issued the November 2024 Rehearing Order, Bayou filed a motion to clarify whether the November 2024 Rehearing Order was encompassed by its existing petition for review and, if necessary, to amend its petition to seek review of that order. We dismiss that motion as moot. After Bayou filed the motion, the FERC issued the May 2025 Rehearing Order that modified the Commission’s discussion in the first two orders and addressed Bayou’s “original claims on rehearing of the Authorization order regarding air quality.” 189 FERC ¶ 2. After the Commission denied Bayou’s request for rehearing of the May 2025 Rehearing Order, Bayou filed a petition seeking review of the November 2024 and the May 2025 Rehearing Orders. Based upon those subsequent events, we have no reason to decide precisely which orders were covered by Bayou’s initial petition for review. We have Article III jurisdiction. Bayou has associational standing on behalf of its members who reside and fish near the project. Because “at least one [petitioner] has standing,” we “may proceed” to the merits of its petitions. Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 489 (2023); see also Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 446-47 (2009); Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United States, 948 F.3d 363, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2020).  12 (2024). We review the FERC’s exercise of its discretion under the NGA and its NEPA analysis under the familiar arbitrary- and-capricious standard of the Administrative Procedure Act. See Vecinos para el Bienestar de la Comunidad Costera v. FERC, 6 F.4th 1321, 1327, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 2021). We will set aside the Commission’s action if it “has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before [it],” or has reached a result that “is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); see Cumberland, 153 F.4th at 1305 (“We review FERC’s public convenience and necessity determination for whether it was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment” (cleaned up)). Under the NGA, “the finding of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” § 717r(b). A. Challenges under the NGA Bayou first challenges the FERC’s authorization of the Terminal and the Pipeline under the NGA. To reiterate: Under Section 3 of that Act, the Commission “shall” authorize a ter- minal “unless” it finds the terminal “will not be consistent with the public interest.” § 717b(a); under Section 7, the Commission will authorize a pipeline only if it determines the pipeline “is or will be required by the present or future public convenience and necessity.” § 717f(e). “Section 3 is in this respect the reverse of [Section 7].” Panhandle Producers & Royalty Owners Ass’n v. Econ. Regul. Admin., 822 F.2d 1105, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Whereas Section 3 “requires an affirmative showing of inconsistency with the public interest to  13 deny an application,” Section 7 “requires an affirmative showing of public convenience and necessity to grant one.” Id.; see also Vecinos, 6 F.4th at 1326 (similar). Bayou argues that the Commission’s interpretation of Section 3 was arbitrary and unlawful and that its application of both Section 3 and Section 7 was arbitrary and capricious. These arguments all lack merit. 1. The Commission’s interpretation of the NGA In its first rehearing request, Bayou argued that the Commission had failed to explain how it balanced the Terminal’s benefits against its harms to determine whether the Terminal would be inconsistent with the public interest. The Commission responded in the November 2024 Rehearing Order that Bayou’s balancing argument was “misplaced” because “section 3 of the NGA does not charge the Commission with demonstrating that the benefits of a proposal outweigh its potential harms.” 189 FERC ¶ 41 (quoting Alaska Gasline Dev. Corp., 172 FERC 61214, ¶ 16 (2020)). Later in that order the Commission reiterated that it “does not weigh the public benefits against potential harms in its NGA section 3 public interest determination.” Id. ¶ 158 n.647. Bayou says this was wrong for several reasons. First, the Commission’s position is not the “best” interpretation of Section 3. Second, the Commission offered no explanation as to the standard it applies under Section 3. Third, the Commission had previously engaged in balancing under Section 3, but it departed from its precedents without any explanation. The Commission responds that these arguments are foreclosed by our precedent or not properly before us. We agree with the Commission.  14 We start, as usual, with the text of the statute: As we have said, the Commission “shall” authorize the construction and operation of a terminal “unless” doing so “will not be consistent with the public interest.” § 717b(a). This statute is “not neutral” but rather demonstrates a clear congressional preference for authorization. Alaska Gasline, 134 F.4th at 572. Consequently, we have long held that Section 3 establishes a “presumption” in favor of authorization. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. FERC (Saguaro), 145 F.4th 74, 87 (2025); Alaska Gasline, 134 F.4th at 572-73; Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. FERC, 67 F.4th 1176, 1188 (2023); Sierra Club v. DOE (Freeport), 867 F.3d 189, 203 (2017); EarthReports, Inc. v. FERC, 828 F.3d 949, 953 (2016); W. Va. Pub. Servs. Comm’n v. DOE, 681 F.2d 847, 856 (1982). This long-standing presumption conflicts with Bayou’s attempt to read Section 3 as imposing a balancing requirement on the Commission. As the Intervenors explain, an ordinary balancing test would require the Commission to start its review from “equipoise,” with “the scales tip[ping] in favor of a particular outcome” based upon the evidence presented. Not so here. The Commission begins its review from the position that it will — indeed, that it must — authorize a terminal unless the presumption is rebutted. Bayou acknowledges this presumption but says it rebutted it by producing some evidence of harm, at which point the Commission needed to balance that evidence against the Terminal’s benefits. If the presumption were that easy to dis- pel, then it is hard to imagine a case in which an opponent would fail to do so. Unsurprisingly then, our case law provides a different answer: The petitioner must “show, affirmatively, that approving the [terminal] is inconsistent with the public interest.” Saguaro, 145 F.4th at 87. Satisfying that standard requires a petitioner to do more than simply produce some  15 evidence of harm. See, e.g., Freeport, 867 F.3d at 203 (holding the petitioner “fail[ed] to overcome the presumption in favor of exports” even assuming the environmental effects of the exports were “significant”); Saguaro, 145 F.4th at 87 (rejecting argument that the Commission “treated adverse impacts versus benefits inconsistently” and reaffirming its reliance upon the presumption in favor of authorization). 4 Bayou next argues the Commission did not offer an adequate explanation of what Section 3 requires. It character- izes the Commission’s approach to reviewing a terminal for inconsistency with the public interest as meaning “we’ll know it when we see it.” We disagree. Relying upon our precedent, the Commission cited the presumption in favor of authorization and explained that Bayou bore the burden of making an “affirmative showing” that the Terminal would be inconsistent with the public interest. Initial Authorization Order, 187 FERC ¶ 23; November 2024 Rehearing Order, 189 FERC ¶ 36. It then 4 After entirely ignoring Saguaro in its opening brief, Bayou argues in its reply brief that requiring it “not only to produce evidence of harm, but to prove themselves that the Terminal was inconsistent with the public interest” is “unsupported.” To make that argument Bayou attempts to rewrite our precedent, claiming Saguaro did not establish that a petitioner’s burden “entails anything more than producing evidence of harm” because the petitioners in that case did not produce any evidence of direct harm. Saguaro did not, however, even mention a lack of evidence of direct harm when discussing the petitioners’ burden. The petitioners argued that the Commission had “asymmetrically considered benefits downstream of the [proposed facility] while dismissing adverse impacts upstream.” 145 F.4th at 87. In response, we said the petitioner needed to make “an affirmative showing of inconsistency with the public interest” and affirmed the Commission’s reliance upon the presumption in favor of authorization. Id. To the same effect, see Freeport, 867 F.3d at 203. Bayou makes no attempt to distinguish our discussion of this burden in Freeport.  16 discussed specific benefits and harms it had considered and concluded that Bayou had not satisfied its burden. See below at 18-20; Initial Authorization Order, 187 FERC ¶¶ 23-32; November 2024 Rehearing Order, 189 FERC ¶¶ 37-46. Insofar as Bayou seeks something akin to a bright-line rule for when a terminal will be inconsistent with the public interest, it is out of luck. Whether a terminal will be inconsistent with the public interest is a fact-bound inquiry that does not easily lend itself to bright-line rules. This does not mean the Commission’s discretion is limitless; as relevant here, its orders must still be “reasonable and reasonably explained, and its factual findings must be supported by substantial evidence.” Saguaro, 145 F.4th at 80 (cleaned up); see § 717r(b). Those requirements have been applied by this court on many occa- sions and provide a sufficient standard against which to review the Commission’s orders. See, e.g., Vecinos, 6 F.4th at 1331; Wash. Gas Light Co. v. FERC, 532 F.3d 928, 932-33 (2008). The FERC was required to provide an explanation that was “clear enough that its path may reasonably be discerned,” Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 221 (2016) (cleaned up), which it did here. That leaves Bayou with its argument that the Commission departed from its own precedent without explaining its decision to do so. We do not reach this argument because, as the Commission and the Intervenors point out, Bayou did not raise this argument to the Commission. See § 717r(b) (“No objection to the order of the Commission shall be considered by the court unless such objection shall have been urged before the Commission in the application for rehearing unless there is reasonable ground for [the] failure so to do”). Although Bayou argued the Commission was required to engage in balancing, it did not argue that the Commission’s own precedent required it to do so. See Port Isabel, 111 F.4th at 1217-18 (holding that  17 § 717r(b) prevents courts from considering “specific argu- ments” that were not raised to the Commission on rehearing). Bayou argues it had a reasonable ground for not raising this argument earlier, namely, that the Commission had not dis- claimed a balancing approach under Section 3 until the November 2024 Rehearing Order. But that is not correct. In an order issued nearly four years before the Initial Authorization Order in this case, the Commission stated that “section 3 of the NGA does not charge the Commission with demonstrating that the benefits of a proposal outweigh its potential harms.” Alaska Gasline Dev. Corp., 172 FERC ¶ 16. Although Bayou contends other sections of that order suggest the Commission did in fact engage in balancing, the order nonetheless put Bayou on notice that the Commission took a contrary position as to what Section 3 required. In sum, the Commission’s interpretation of Section 3 was neither unlawful nor arbitrary. 2. The Commission’s application of the NGA Bayou next argues that the Commission’s application of the NGA was unlawful and arbitrary in three ways: The Commission incorrectly dismissed the project’s harms as insig- nificant or inconsequential; failed to explain how the Terminal’s benefits would outweigh its harms; and did not meaningfully balance the Pipeline’s benefits and harms because it placed undue weight on a precedent agreement between the Intervenors. a. The project’s harms Bayou claims the Commission failed to give proper weight to the evidence of the Terminal’s harms or to explain its rea- sons for discounting them. In Bayou’s view, the FERC did not  18 take a “hard look” at the project’s effects on air quality, com- mercial fishing, or climate change. Bayou’s arguments regarding air quality and commercial fishing overlap substantially with its NEPA claims, to the mer- its of which we turn below. Because its NEPA claims fail, so too do these arguments. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 67 F.4th at 1188 (holding that a petitioners’ meritless NEPA challenges “fare[d] no better when framed as NGA challenges”). Bayou’s argument that the Commission simply dismissed the project’s contributions to climate change is without merit. The Commission cited the project’s estimated greenhouse gas emissions and the social cost of those emissions, Initial Authorization Order, 187 FERC ¶¶ 165, 168; compared the project’s greenhouse gas emissions to the existing national and state levels, id. ¶¶ 171-73; and approved mitigation measures proposed by the Intervenors, which responded to recommenda- tions made by the EPA, id. ¶¶ 176-77. The Commission also explained that it would not characterize the project’s emissions as significant or insignificant because “there currently are no accepted tools or methods for [it] to use to determine significance,” but it had still “taken the required ‘hard look’” at the evidence. Id. ¶¶ 179-80; see also November 2024 Rehearing Order, 189 FERC ¶¶ 90-99. Although Bayou says the Commission should have done more to explain why the project’s greenhouse gas emissions did not warrant the denial of the project, we have previously approved similar analyses by the Commission. See, e.g., Citizens Action Coal. of Ind., Inc. v. FERC, 125 F.4th 229, 240-42 (2025); Food & Water Watch v. FERC, 104 F.4th 336, 346-47 (2024); Ala. Mun. Distribs. Grp. v. FERC, 100 F.4th 207, 214-15 (2024); Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 67 F.4th at 1183-84. Bayou has not provided any reason we should not do the same here.  19 b. The Terminal’s benefits Insofar as the Commission attempted to balance the Terminal’s benefits against its harms, Bayou argues the record does not support the Commission’s decision to authorize the Terminal. For the reasons discussed above at 14-15, the Commission did not bear that burden; it was Bayou that needed to make an affirmative showing that the Terminal would be inconsistent with the public interest. See Saguaro, 145 F.4th at 87. In any event, the Commission explained why the Terminal would not be inconsistent with the public interest. In addition to invoking the presumption in favor of authorization, the Commission cited § 717b(c), which provides that the exporta- tion of gas to any country with which the United States has entered into a free trade agreement “shall be deemed to be consistent with the public interest.” Initial Authorization Order, 187 FERC ¶ 23; November 2024 Rehearing Order, 189 FERC ¶¶ 39, 46. Here the DOE had authorized the Terminal to export LNG to such countries. Initial Authorization Order, 187 FERC ¶ 8. Bayou attempts to minimize the significance of these con- siderations, but the Commission was obligated to consider them. See Saguaro, 145 F.4th at 87; § 717b(c). The Commission also acknowledged the potential adverse effects of the Terminal, but it found that those effects “would not be significant or would be reduced to less-than-significant levels with the implementation of avoidance, minimization, and mitigation measures recommended in the EIS and adopted by the [Commission].” Initial Authorization Order, 187 FERC ¶ 29. The Commission therefore concluded that Bayou had not made “the affirmative showing of inconsistency with the public interest that [was] necessary to overcome the presumption in section 3.” Id.; see November 2024 Rehearing Order, 189  20 FERC ¶ 37. That conclusion was reasonable, reasonably explained, and supported by substantial evidence. c. The authorization of the Pipeline As we have said, the Commission will issue a certificate for the construction of a pipeline only if the pipeline “is or will be required by the present or future public convenience and necessity.” § 717f(e). Recall that the Commission follows a three-step approach under Section 7, asking whether there is a “market need” for the pipeline; whether the project will cause certain adverse effects; and if so, whether the pipeline’s bene- fits are greater than its adverse effects. Env’t Def. Fund, 2 F.4th at 961. Bayou primarily takes issue with the Commission’s analysis at the first and third steps. In Bayou’s telling, the Commission relied “almost exclusively on a single precedent agreement between two Venture Global subsidiaries” to take the Pipeline’s full capacity. A precedent agreement is a “preconstruction contract[] . . . for the natural gas the pipeline would transport.” Id. at 959. Bayou argues the Commission’s reliance upon the precedent agreement was arbitrary because the benefits of the Pipeline identified by the Commission depended upon the Terminal, the approval of which was itself arbitrary, and the Commission did not explain why those ben- efits outweighed the harms caused by the Pipeline. We can easily dispose of Bayou’s first argument. For the reasons explained above at 13-20, the Commission’s approval of the Terminal complied with the NGA. Consequently, it could consider the benefits stemming from the Terminal when considering the application for the Pipeline. As for Bayou’s second argument, we see no error in the Commission’s weighing of the Pipeline’s benefits and harms.  21 At the first step — identifying a “market need” — the Commission cited the long-term precedent agreement between the Venture Global subsidiaries to take the Pipeline’s full capacity. See Initial Authorization Order, 187 FERC ¶¶ 37-38; November 2024 Rehearing Order, 189 FERC ¶¶ 48-51. “As a general rule,” we have held that the “FERC may find market need by relying solely on a precedent agreement.” Cumberland, 153 F.4th at 1309. True, as Bayou notes, we had previously said that a precedent agreement is not “always sufficient” to show market need. Env’t Def. Fund, 2 F.4th at 972. As we have since clarified, however, that decision pro- vided only a narrow exception to the general rule “when an agreement involves affiliated entities and there is plausible evidence of self-dealing.” Cumberland, 153 F.4th at 1309 (cleaned up). As the Commission found below and the Intervenors note on appeal, Bayou has not presented evidence of — or even alleged — self-dealing by the Intervenors. See November 2024 Rehearing Order, 189 FERC ¶ 48 (“Here, there is no evidence of impropriety or self-dealing to indicate anti-competitive behavior or affiliate abuse”). “[A]bsent self- dealing, FERC was entitled to rely on the precedent agreement without considering additional evidence.” Cumberland, 153 F.4th at 1310. Bayou also argues the Commission used the precedent agreement as “a proxy for the foreign sales the Terminal would enable,” which was inappropriate because the DOE exercises exclusive authority over those exports. The Congress has already settled this issue by declaring that exports to countries with which the United States has a free trade agreement are “consistent with the public interest.” § 717b(c). Accepting Bayou’s position would “thwart Congress’ directive and intent, as expressed in Section 3.” City of Oberlin v. FERC, 39 F.4th 719, 727 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). Accordingly, we have held “[n]othing in Section 7 prohibits considering export  22 precedent agreements in the public convenience and necessity analysis.” Id. at 726. In Oberlin we upheld the Commission’s approval of a pipeline precisely because the Commission had relied upon a precedent agreement for the exportation of gas to a free-trade-agreement country. See id. at 726-27. “We would be hard pressed,” we explained, “to conclude that FERC’s reliance on [the] clear statutory directive [in § 717b(c)] was unjustified.” Id. at 727. So too here. It was reasonable for the Commission, when determining whether to approve the Pipeline, to consider how the Pipeline would support the Terminal and, hence, the exports authorized by the DOE. See November 2024 Rehearing Order, 189 FERC ¶ 58; above at 19. At the third step, Bayou claims the Commission did not adequately explain how the benefits of the Pipeline outweighed the adverse effects. We find the Commission’s explanation suf- ficiently clear. In the November 2024 Rehearing Order the FERC addressed Bayou’s argument about the Pipeline’s adverse effects on landowners, noting that Venture Global CP Express had already taken steps to mitigate those effects, such as by revising the route of the Pipeline. 189 FERC ¶ 63. As for the Pipeline’s benefits, the Commission cited not only the prec- edent agreement; it also found the project would “provide domestic public benefits, including: adding new transportation options for producers and shippers; boosting the domestic economy and the balance of international trade; and supporting domestic jobs in gas production and transportation.” Id. ¶ 68; see also id. ¶ 69 (citing “an increase in the local population, increased employment opportunities, increased demand for housing and public services, and an increase in state and local government revenues” as other benefits associated with the Pipeline). The Commission also cited “minor positive economic impacts” that would occur during the construction of the project, including increased employment and spending. Id. ¶ 69 & n.299. That the Commission considered some of these  23 benefits to be “minor” compared to the precedent agreement is of no moment because it was obligated to consider “all relevant factors.” Env’t Def. Fund, 2 F.4th at 959; see Atl. Refin. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 360 U.S. 378, 391 (1959) (Section 7 “requires the Commission to evaluate all factors bearing on the public interest”).