Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Burgum
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketCivil Action No. 2026-1116
JudgeJudge Rudolph Contreras
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE :
COUNCIL, INC., :
:
Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 26-1116 (RC)
:
v. : Re Document Nos.: 28, 37
:
DOUG BURGUM, Secretary of the :
Interior, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING FEDERAL DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
I. INTRODUCTION
This case concerns an obscure, and scarcely convened, government committee
colloquially named the “God Squad” because of its unique authority to grant exemptions from
the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), potentially leading to the extinction of entire species. In
1973, Congress passed the ESA to prevent species from going extinct. Five years later, Congress
amended that legislation, concluding that some extreme cases might require exemptions from the
ESA’s requirements. So it established the Endangered Species Committee (the “Committee”),
which it authorized to grant exemptions to certain ESA requirements. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e).
Particularly relevant to this case, Congress mandated that the Committee must grant an
exemption if the Secretary of Defense found it “necessary for reasons of national security.” Id.
§ 1536(j). 1
1
Last year, the President authorized the Secretary of Defense to use a secondary title of
Secretary of War. See Restoring the United States Department of War, Exec. Order No. 14,347,
§ 2(a), 90 Fed. Reg. 43,893, 43,893 (Sep. 5, 2025) (“The Secretary of Defense is authorized the
In the almost half century between the Committee’s inception and the events underlying
this case, the Committee had granted only two exemptions. And the Secretary of Defense had
never found that national security made an exemption necessary.
In early 2026, that changed. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth found that national
security required an exemption for certain oil and gas activities in the Gulf of Mexico, also
referred to as the Gulf of America. Although no agency or private entity involved in those
activities had applied for an exemption, the Committee quickly convened and granted one
anyway.
In response, Plaintiff National Resources Defense Council, Inc. (“NRDC”) sued to stop
the exemption. NRDC argues that the Committee’s decision violated the very statute that
created it because, among other things, the Committee cannot issue an exemption without a valid
application. Moreover, NRDC warns of dire consequences from the exemption. According to
NRDC, oil and gas activity in the Gulf has already threatened the extinction of many species,
including Rice’s whale—currently one of the most endangered species of whale in the world and
one native only to the Gulf.
Recognizing that the Committee’s decisions implicate grave issues like these—weighing
the existential risk to species against important national interests—Congress implemented robust
guardrails for the Committee’s decisions and created a path to challenge those decisions in
federal court. But not in this Court. Congress directed all challenges to the Committee’s
exemption decisions to the federal courts of appeals. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(n). If NRDC wishes
use of this additional secondary title—the Secretary of War . . . .”). Some of the documents in
this case use that title, but the Court uses Secretary of Defense in this opinion for clarity because
it is the title Congress used in the relevant statute.
2
to pursue its challenge to the Committee’s exemption decision, it must start there. The Court
therefore grants Federal Defendants’ 2 motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 3
II. BACKGROUND
The Court draws the following factual background from NRDC’s allegations in the
Amended Complaint, ECF No. 22. The Court assumes the truth of these allegations for purposes
of this motion, as it must. See Wright v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found., 68 F.4th 612, 619
(D.C. Cir. 2023).
A. Statutory Framework
Congress enacted the ESA “to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved.” 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). It
declared a policy that “all Federal departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered
species and threatened species.” Id. § 1531(c)(1).
To effectuate these goals, Congress required that federal agencies “consult[ ]” with the
the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Commerce to ensure “that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
any endangered species or threatened species.” Id. § 1536(a)(2); see also id. § 1532(15)
(defining the term “Secretary”). The act also made it “unlawful” to harm endangered species.
2
The Court uses “Federal Defendants” to refer collectively to Defendants Secretary of
the Interior Doug (Douglas) Burgum, Secretary of Agriculture Brooke Rollins, Acting Secretary
of the Army Adam R. Telle (substituted for former Secretary of the Army Daniel P. Driscoll),
Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors Stephen Miran (substituted for Acting Chair of the
Council of Economic Advisers Pierre Yared), Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency Lee M. Zeldin, Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Neil Jacobs, and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, all acting in their official capacities.
3
Intervenor Defendant American Petroleum Institute joined Defendants’ motion to
dismiss. See Notice Joinder Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 34.
3
Id. § 1538(a) (declaring it “unlawful” to “take” listed endangered species of fish, wildlife, or
plants); see id. § 1532(19) (defining the term “take” to include harm).
Five years after Congress enacted the ESA, the Supreme Court wielded the statute to
“halt[ ] work on a dam that had cost $100 million (in 1978 dollars) to save ‘a relatively small
number of three-inch fish among all the countless millions of species extant.’” Maine
Lobstermen’s Ass’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 70 F.4th 582, 596 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (quoting
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172 (1978)). That decision prompted multiple
amendments to the ESA, one of which is relevant here. See id.
As part of its amendments to the ESA, Congress created a Committee empowered to
grant exemptions to certain of the ESA’s requirements. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e). Because the
ability to grant an exemption to the ESA’s safeguards for endangered species allowed the
Committee to effectively consign those species to extinction, the Committee is “known popularly
as ‘The God Squad.’” Portland Audubon Soc. v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534,
1536 (9th Cir. 1993). The Committee is comprised of five permanent members, all heads of
government agencies, and two rotating members appointed by the President based on the
particular action in question. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(3). Congress made the Committee
responsible for “review[ing] any application submitted to it . . . and determin[ing] . . . whether or
not to grant an exemption from the requirements of subsection (a)(2),” id. § 1536(e)(2)—
meaning exempting the action from the ESA’s requirement that agencies ensure their actions are
“not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species,” id. § 1536(a)(2).
The exemption would also free anyone working on the projects from liability for harming
endangered species if the harm came from activity “necessary to carry out” the exempted project.
Id. § 1536(o)(1).
4
Because exemptions provide such sweeping relief from the ESA’s requirements,
Congress created a rigorous process for applicants before the Committee may grant an
exemption. The process begins, at least generally, with the ordinary consultation with the
Secretary of the Interior or of Commerce to determine whether the project is likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of an endangered species in the first place. See id. § 1536(g)(1). If it is,
project participants may apply “for an exemption.” Id. They must submit the application in
writing “not later than 90 days after the completion of the consultation process.” Id.
§ 1536(g)(2)(A). The Secretary then determines whether the applicant has met certain threshold
requirements—completing the consultation process in good faith, conducting a biological
assessment, and “refrain[ing] from making any irreversible or irretrievable commitment[s] of
resources” to the project. Id. § 1536(g)(3)(A). If the applicant fails any of these requirements,
then the Secretary may unilaterally “deny the application,” and the applicant may seek judicial
review of that denial. Id. § 1536(g)(3)(B).
If the applicant passes these threshold requirements, however, they move on to the
Committee. See id. § 1536(g)(4). The Secretary, “in consultation with the Members of the
Committee,” must “hold a hearing on the application” and “prepare [a] report” for the
Committee. Id. The Committee then “shall make a final determination whether or not to grant
an exemption.” Id. § 1536(h)(1). It may grant the exemption if it determines, based on the
evidence, that (1) “there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action”;
(2) “the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the benefits of alternative courses of action” and
the “action is in the public interest”’; (3) “the action is of regional or national significance”; and
(4) “neither the Federal agency concerned nor the exemption applicant made any irreversible or
irretrievable commitment of resources.” Id. § 1536(h)(1)(A). The Committee must also
5
establish “reasonable mitigation and enhancement measures . . . as are necessary and appropriate
to minimize the adverse effects of the agency action upon the endangered species.” Id.
§ 1536(h)(1)(B). The Committee’s “meetings and records . . . shall be open to the public.” Id.
§ 1536(e)(5)(D).
Although the Committee is the only entity authorized to grant an exemption, Congress
constrained the Committee’s authority to grant or deny exemptions in specific circumstances
implicating disasters or foreign affairs. If the Secretary of State “certifies” that granting an
exemption would result in a “violation of an international treaty obligation or other international
obligation,” the Committee “shall be prohibited from considering” the application. Id. § 1536(i).
Or, if the President declares “a major disaster area . . . , the President is authorized to make the
determinations required by subsections (g) and (h)” for projects in those areas and “the
Committee shall accept th[ose] determinations” “[n]otwithstanding any other provision.” Id.
§ 1536(p). Finally, and most relevant to this case, “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this
chapter, the Committee shall grant an exemption for any agency action if the Secretary of
Defense finds that such exemption is necessary for reasons of national security.” Id. § 1536(j)
(emphasis added).
To enforce the exemption process’s various requirements, Congress expressly created a
path to judicial review of Committee decisions. “Any person . . . may obtain judicial review,
under [the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)], of any decision of the Endangered Species
Committee under subsection (h) . . . .” Id. § 1536(n) (emphases added). But Congress directed
that plaintiffs must bring those challenges “in the United States Court of Appeals.” Id.
6
B. Factual Background
The exemption at issue in this case concerns oil and gas activity in the Gulf of Mexico.
See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1–2. NRDC alleges that the Gulf is “among the most productive and
biodiverse ecosystems in the United States, providing a home to thousands of species.” Id. ¶ 2.
It “is the exclusive home of the critically endangered Rice’s whale, of which fewer than 100
individuals remain on Earth.” Id. ¶ 54. According to NRDC, “the loss of even a single breeding
female could drive the species into extinction.” Id.
Oil and gas activities in the Gulf threaten the continued survival of Gulf species like the
Rice’s whale. In 2025, a government report from the National Marine Fisheries Service
concluded that “a federal oil and gas program in the Gulf [was] ‘likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of the Rice’s whale.’” Id. ¶ 69 (internal quotation omitted). The report
proposed alternatives that would allow the program to proceed without risking extinction of the
Rice’s whale. See id. ¶ 70. Unsatisfied with the report, and similar reports by other agencies,
both environmental and industry groups sued over the manner and scope of oil and gas activities
in the Gulf. See id. ¶¶ 73–74.
This ESA litigation prompted Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth to send a letter in March
2026 to the Committee asserting that the litigation was “threaten[ing] to halt oil and gas
production in the Gulf.” Id., Ex. E at 1, ECF No. 22-5. He declared that this, in turn,
“threaten[ed] national security by preventing the agencies that regulate oil and gas activities from
realizing the Gulf’s full developmental potential.” Id. He therefore “found it necessary for
reasons of national security to exempt Gulf oil and gas activities from the ESA’s requirements”
and “request[ed] that the Endangered Species Committee . . . grant an exemption for” the oil and
gas activities in the Gulf. Id.
7
Secretary Hegseth’s letter included an attached memorandum with national security
findings. See id. at 4. The memorandum explained that “[t]he United States relies on domestic
oil production to support military operations and readiness” and that disrupting the supply would
“benefit our adversaries and hurt our allies” by allowing “countries like Russia and Iran [to]
generate more revenue from their own oil exports,” thereby “blunt[ing] U.S. sanctions efforts
and bolster[ing] these countries’ economies and geopolitical standing.” Id. at 5.
Three days after Secretary Hegseth sent his letter, the Committee gave notice that it
would convene a meeting at the end of the month to address the request. Am. Compl. ¶ 115.
Although the relevant agencies engaged in the consultation required by 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2),
NRDC alleges that no designated agency concluded that both the “proposed agency action would
likely ‘jeopardize’ the continued existence of listed species or critical habitat[s], and that no
‘reasonable and prudent alternatives’ to the proposed action exist to avoid jeopardy.” Id. ¶ 116.
NRDC also alleges that the Committee never “receive[d] an ‘application’ for an exemption.” Id.
Because there was no application, the relevant secretary did not make any initial determination
about the threshold requirements for an application under 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(2), nor did the
secretary submit a report to the Committee under 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(5). Id. ¶ 117.
Before the Committee convened to discuss the exemption, NRDC sent Secretary of the
Interior Douglas Burgum two letters explaining why, in NRDC’s view, the Committee could not
convene, much less grant the requested exemption. See id. ¶¶ 118–19. Apparently unpersuaded
by NRDC’s analysis, six members of the Committee convened alongside Secretary Hegseth and
unanimously voted in favor of granting the requested exemption. Id. ¶¶ 120, 124. Multiple
Committee members explained that, in their view, Secretary Hegseth’s national-security finding
precluded them from making any other decision, although they clarified that they agreed with his
8
finding in any event. See id. ¶ 122. No one mentioned a report or the considerations enumerated
in Section 1536(h)(1). See id. ¶ 123.
In its order, the Committee “grant[ed] an exemption for Gulf of America Oil and Gas
Activities,” which referred to “all oil and gas exploration, development, and production activities
associated with” various federal programs in the Gulf. Endangered Species Committee Decision
and Order, 91 Fed. Reg. 16,966, 16,966–67 (Apr. 3, 2026); see also Am. Compl. ¶ 134.
Although the Committee granted the exemption, it insisted that the activities must still adhere to
the “avoidance or minimization measures described” in prior federal reports, which were aimed
at mitigating harm to endangered species. 91 Fed. Reg. at 16,967.
The Committee explained that it granted the exemption “pursuant to subsection (h)” and
thus “the federal agencies implementing” the programs would not be “required to comply with
the section 7(a)(2) procedural consultation and substantive ‘jeopardy’ and ‘adverse modification
mandates.’” Id. at 16,966. Nor would “any action that would ordinarily be considered a take . . .
be prohibited under the Endangered Species Act,” a reference to subsection (o)(2). Id. The
Committee expressly “recognize[d] that the Endangered Species Act sets out a process for the
Committee to consider for an exemption and standards for the Committee to apply when
considering an application.” Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g), (h)(1)). But the Committee
concluded “that these other provisions of Section 7, including the application requirements and
standards, do not apply when the Secretary of War finds that an exemption is necessary for
reasons of national security.” Id. The Committee then explained that any person seeking
judicial review could do so “exclusively in the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth or Eleventh
Circuits.” Id. at 16,967.
9
After granting the exemption, the Committee published four documents relating to its
decision. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 126–30. These are the only documents the Committee made
public. Id. ¶ 131. NRDC alleges that the Committee never undertook an analysis under the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and did not prepare an environmental impact
statement for the exemption. See id. ¶¶ 132–33.
C. Procedural Posture
The Committee’s exemption decision generated much litigation. Even before the
Committee made its final decision, one environmental group sued in this Court seeking a
temporary restraining order enjoining the Committee from even holding its meeting. See Pl.’s
Mot. TRO, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Burgum, No. 26-cv-940, ECF No. 9 (D.D.C. Mar. 19,
2026). This Court denied that motion. See Order Denying Pl.’s Mot. TRO, Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. Burgum, No. 26-cv-940, ECF No. 17 (D.D.C. Mar. 27, 2026). The plaintiff then
amended its complaint and raised similar claims to those that NRDC brings here; and other
environmental groups brought yet another case before this Court covering similar ground,
bringing the total to three cases (including the present action). See Am. Compl., Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. Burgum, No. 26-cv-940, ECF No. 18 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2026); Am.
Compl., Healthy Gulf v. Burgum, No. 26-cv-1118, ECF No. 19 (D.D.C. May 26, 2026).
Beyond proceedings in this Court, there are also parallel proceedings in the courts of
appeals. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated those petitions into a single
proceeding. See Consolidation Order, Am. Energy v. Burgum, No. 26-60240, ECF No. 9 (5th
Cir. Apr. 21, 2026). That consolidation included, on the one hand, petitions by industry groups
seeking to expand the exemption by attacking the mitigation requirements that the Committee
implemented when it granted the exemption and, on the other, a protective petition filed by
10
NRDC in the D.C. Circuit seeking to undo the exemption altogether. See id. at 2. NRDC
ultimately dismissed its petition voluntarily. See Clerk Order, Am. Energy v. Burgum, 26-60240,
ECF No. 92 (5th Cir. June 30, 2026).
In this case, NRDC, an environmental group with a mission “to safeguard the earth,”
sued the Federal Defendants in district court to challenge the Secretary of Defense’s national-
security finding and the Committee’s exemption decision. See id. ¶¶ 1, 12. The Federal
Defendants, in response, move to dismiss all of NRDC’s claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1),
arguing that NRDC needed to raise them in the appropriate courts of appeals, not here. See
Defs.’ Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mot.”) at 1, ECF No. 28-1. 4
III. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), the plaintiff “must state a
plausible claim” that this Court has jurisdiction over the case. Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v.
Vilsack, 797 F.3d 4, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2017). While determining whether the plaintiff’s claim is
plausible, the Court must “accept[ ] the allegations of the complaint as true.” Banneker
Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015). But the Court need “not
assume the truth of legal conclusions.” Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 913
(D.C. Cir. 2015). The Court may therefore resolve contested issues of statutory interpretation
without deference to either side. See Kōloa Rum Co. v. Noem, 822 F. Supp. 3d 8, 34 (D.D.C.
2026).
4
After ordinary briefing completed, NRDC sought “leave to file a brief surreply
addressing Defendants’ claim preclusion argument.” Pl.’s Mot. Leave File Surreply Opp’n
Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 37. Because the Court does not reach the claim-preclusion
argument, the surreply is unnecessary, and the Court denies NRDC’s motion. See
UnitedHealthcare Ins. v. Azar, 316 F. Supp. 3d 339, 349 (D.D.C. 2018).
11
IV. ANALYSIS
The jurisdictional dispute in this case centers on whether the Committee granted the
exemption under subsection (h) or subsection (j). If the Committee acted under subsection (h),
then NRDC must challenge that decision in the courts of appeals. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(n).
Otherwise, review might lie in this Court.
A.
Before even reaching that threshold issue, however, NRDC attempts to forestall the
Court’s jurisdictional determination by arguing that even this preliminary question is premature.
See Pl. NRDC’s Mem. P. & A. Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 11–13, ECF
No. 32. It argues that (1) the determination is not truly jurisdictional and (2) even if the
determination were jurisdictional, it is too intertwined with the merits for resolution now. See id.
The Court disagrees.
First, the issue of whether the Committee acted under subsection (h) or not bears
jurisdictional weight. Congress placed challenges to decisions made under subsection (h) within
a special statutory review scheme. Under that scheme, rather than allowing plaintiffs to proceed
in district court first, Congress provided that a plaintiff “may obtain judicial review . . . of any
decision of the Endangered Species Committee under subsection (h) in [a specified] United
States Court of Appeals.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(n). Although Congress wrote only that plaintiffs
“may obtain judicial review” in the courts of appeals, courts have long interpreted such
provisions to mean that a plaintiff may bring their challenges in the court of appeals and not
elsewhere. See Wagner v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 717 F.3d 1007, 1012–13 & n.5 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (per curiam) (holding that a similarly worded provision conferred exclusive jurisdiction on
the en banc court and therefore ousted other tribunals of jurisdiction) (collecting cases).
12
NRDC counters that this statutory review scheme addresses only whether it pleaded a
valid cause of action than whether this Court maintains jurisdiction over the case, Pl.’s Opp’n
at 12, but the Supreme Court has held otherwise. When Congress creates “[a] special statutory
review scheme” like this one by “specifying a different method to resolve [certain] claims about
agency action,” such as providing review directly in the courts of appeals, it “implicitly”
“preclude[s] district courts from exercising jurisdiction over [those] challenges.” Axon Enter.,
Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 598 U.S. 175, 185 (2023). In other words, these schemes implicitly
“oust[ ] district courts of jurisdiction.” Id. at 186. Because Congress divested this Court of
jurisdiction through its special statutory review scheme, rather than merely cutting off a cause of
action, the determination of whether that statutory review scheme covers NRDC’s claims here
implicates the Court’s jurisdiction. 5
Second, the Court cannot defer deciding the jurisdictional question. NRDC claims that
the Court should not determine its jurisdiction on a motion to dismiss because the jurisdictional
question is “so closely interwoven with the merits.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 12. But that practice of
deferring a jurisdictional decision applies only when the court would be required to “rule on
disputed jurisdictional facts.” Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(emphasis added). In this decision, the Court does not rule on any disputed facts. Rather, it
assumes the truth of NRDC’s alleged facts. For example, the Court takes as true NRDC’s
allegations that the Committee did not receive a valid application for an exemption, that the
Secretary of the Interior “did not make the initial determinations as to whether the agencies
5
NRDC makes much of the fact that the Federal Defendants do not dispute NRDC’s
standing. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 11. But standing is not the only jurisdictional constraint on federal
courts. Congress may also divest federal courts of jurisdiction. See Hain Celestial Grp., Inc. v.
Palmquist, 607 U.S. 421, 424 (2026) (“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and
generally can resolve only the cases that Congress grants them power to hear.”).
13
carried out their consultation responsibilities” or issue an initial report, and that the Committee
did not consider alternatives. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 116–17, 123.
The only aspect of NRDC’s claim that the Court analyzes at this stage is NRDC’s legal
conclusion that the Committee’s decision was not made under subsection (h). Courts need not
accept “legal conclusions” on a motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
And NRDC’s claim about the statutory authority undergirding the Committee’s decision is a
legal conclusion because, as the analysis below demonstrates, it turns entirely on statutory
interpretation, which the Court may resolve on a motion to dismiss. See Kōloa Rum Co. v.
Noem, 822 F. Supp. 3d 8, 34 (D.D.C. 2026) (resolving a dispute at the motion-to-dismiss stage
because it “turn[ed] on the interpretation of a century-old statute”).
B.
Having concluded that it may (indeed, must) do so, the Court now addresses the
jurisdictional issue: whether the Committee granted the exemption under subsection (h), in
which case only the courts of appeals may review the Committee’s decision, and this Court lacks
jurisdiction over NRDC’s claims. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(n). The parties agree that the reason the
Committee granted the exemption is because the Secretary of Defense found that an exemption
was “necessary for reasons of national security,” and, when that happens, subsection (j) requires
the Committee to grant the exemption. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(j). In other words, the rule of decision
(that the exemption must be granted) came from subsection (j).
But the parties dispute under which authority the Committee granted the exemption. The
Federal Defendants argue that the Committee’s only authority to grant an exemption comes from
subsection (h), so when the Committee grants an exemption it necessarily does so under
subsection (h) or not at all. See Defs.’ Mot. at 13 (“The only exemption in Section 7 is the
14
exemption in Section 7(h).”). NRDC, however, contends that Congress created multiple paths
for the Committee to grant an exemption, including both subsections (h) and (j). See Pl.’s Opp’n
at 25. In NRDC’s telling, because the Committee relied on subsection (j) and did not follow any
of the procedures required under subsection (h), it cannot have made its decision under
subsection (h), and this Court therefore has jurisdiction. See id. at 19.
1.
The Court concludes that the Federal Defendants have the better argument. Although
subsection (j) provides the rule of decision for the Committee in cases involving a national-
security determination by the Secretary of Defense, subsection (h) is the only legal authority
under which the Committee actually grants exemptions. NRDC must therefore challenge the
Committee’s decision in the courts of appeals.
To understand which authority the Committee used to grant the exemption, look first to
the portion of the statute where Congress created the Committee and established its authority to
grant exemptions. Subsection (e) “establishe[s] a committee to be known as the Endangered
Species Committee.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(1). In the next paragraph, the statute describes the
Committee’s central task. “The Committee shall review any application submitted to it pursuant
to this section and determine . . . whether or not to grant an exemption from the requirements of
subsection (a)(2)”—meaning the requirements to avoid harming endangered or threatened
species. Id. § 1536(a)(2), (e)(2). When founding the Committee, Congress did not empower it
to grant any other types of exemptions. The Committee can only grant exemptions to “the
requirements of subsection (a)(2).” Id. § 1536(e)(2). So when subsection (j) contemplates the
Committee “grant[ing] an exemption for an agency action” but does not specify what kind of
15
exemption, id. § 1536(j), it naturally speaks of an exemption to the requirements of subsection
(a)(2).
That raises the question of how the Committee grants an exemption to subsection (a)(2).
It does so exclusively through subsection (h). The same provision that establishes the
Committee’s authority to grant exemptions in the first place insists that the Committee may grant
the exemptions only “in accordance with subsection (h).” Id. § 1536(e)(2). And
subsection (a)(2) reiterates the point. Its requirements apply “unless [the] agency has been
granted an exemption for [its] action by the Committee pursuant to subsection (h).” Id.
§ 1536(a)(2). Both the provision establishing the Committee’s power to grant exemptions and
the provision covering the requirement being exempted refer expressly, and exclusively, to
subsection (h).
These repeated references to subsection (h) should be unsurprising because
subsection (h), helpfully titled “Grant of exemption,” sets forth the only procedures for granting
an exemption in all of Section 1536. It establishes a timeline (“within 30 days of receiving the
report of the Secretary”), a voting scheme (“a vote of not less than five of its members voting in
person”), and other procedures. Id. By contrast, subsection (j) says nothing about the process
for granting an exemption. See id. § 1536(j). The absence of any details in subsection (j) makes
sense if Congress assumed that exemptions implicating subsection (j) would still proceed
through subsection (h), which already had a built-in process for exemptions. But it would raise a
host of unanswered questions if, as NRDC posits, Congress intended to establish a parallel
exemption process through subsection (j) divorced from subsection (h)’s procedures. See Pl.’s
Opp’n at 25 (arguing that “subsection (j) creates an additional path wholly independent of
subsection (h)”).
16
Thus, all roads lead to subsection (h). The only exemptions the Committee can grant are
exemptions from the requirements of paragraph (a)(2), and it may only grant those exemptions
“in accordance with subsection (h).” Id. § 1536(e)(2). Subsection (h), in turn, contains the only
process that the statute establishes for granting exemptions. So when the Committee grants an
exemption, it necessarily does so under subsection (h).
Two nearby provisions confirm this interpretation. First, even where Congress has
lowered the procedural requirements for exemptions, such as in cases of emergency, it still routes
those exemptions through subsection (h). Under subsection (p), Congress allows the President to
quickly grant exemptions in areas afflicted by a “major disaster” in “an emergency situation
which does not allow the ordinary procedures of this section to be followed.” 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(p). But in doing so, Congress specified that the President was “authorized to make the
determinations required by subsections (g) and (h).” Id. That language makes sense only if
Congress assumed that it would otherwise be necessary for the Committee to make those
determinations, meaning it assumed the exemption would otherwise run through subsection (h).
And as the Federal Defendants point out, Congress made this assumption even though, much like
subsection (j), Congress instructed that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision in this section, the
Committee shall accept the determinations of the President.” Id.; see Fed. Def.’s Reply Supp.
Mot. Dismiss at 9, ECF No. 35. In Congress’s eyes, the Committee’s limited substantive role
did not change whether the exemption ultimately traveled through subsection (h).
NRDC draws the opposite conclusion from subsection (p). It argues that because
subsection (p) explicitly provides that the President must make the necessary determinations
under subsection (h), while subsection (j) never mentions subsection (h), the Court should infer
from subsection (j)’s silence that it does not run through subsection (h). See Pl.’s Opp’n at 28.
17
That argument might work if subsection (p) expressly stated that it was “subject to
subsection (h)” or must be “in accordance with subsection (h).” But it does not. It merely
specifies who must make the determinations required by subsection (h), a clarification that is
only necessary because Congress assumed, without needing to say so, that subsection (h) applied
in the first place and therefore the default would have been for the Committee to make those
determinations. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(p). In contrast, that clarifying language is unnecessary in
subsection (j) because, to the extent any such determinations are necessary, they are still made by
the Committee, as is the default.
The second neighboring provision confirming that all Committee exemption decisions
run through subsection (h) is subsection (o). In that provision, Congress tied vital protections for
exempted activities to subsection (h) and only subsection (h). It provides that “any activity
which is necessary to carry out” “any agency action for which an exemption is granted . . . shall
not be considered to be a taking of any endangered species or threatened species.” Id.
§ 1536(o)(1). In simpler terms, it protects anyone acting under a valid exemption from liability
for harming endangered species, among other things. See id.; see, e.g., id. § 1538(a)(1)(B)–(C)
(two provisions protected against by subsection (o) which make it unlawful to “take” certain
endangered and threatened species). But subsection (o) protects only “exemption[s] granted
under subsection (h).” Id. § 1536(o)(1). So if, as NRDC would have it, an exemption granted
because of national-security concerns were not an exemption granted under subsection (h),
anyone working on a project would still risk liability for harming endangered species even
though they were covered by the exemption. That would seem to defeat the point of
subsection (j), which Congress drafted to allow projects of great national-security importance to
proceed notwithstanding their effect on endangered species.
18
NRDC attempts to reconcile this provision with its interpretation by arguing that it
“makes sense” that subsection (o)(1) would not apply to exemptions granted under subsection (j)
because the Secretary of Defense “could find that . . . a full exemption for every species that
might be affected is not necessary.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 27. Nothing in subsection (h) prevents the
Secretary of Defense, or perhaps the Committee, from appropriately limiting the scope of the
exemption so that it does not cover every species if doing so is not necessary. They could simply
craft the exemption in a way that specifies what counts as an “activity which is necessary to
carry out” the exempted action. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o)(1). But unless the “exemption is granted
under subsection (h),” the exemption covers no takings of any endangered species because the
only authority for insulating participants from such liability comes from subsection (o)(1), which
applies only to exemptions granted under subsection (h). Id.
2.
Despite this statutory scheme, NRDC raises three counterarguments for why this Court
may review the Committee’s decision. The Court addresses each in turn.
First, NRDC argues that Congress’s statutory scheme does not channel all exemption
decisions through subsection (h) but rather empowers the Committee to grant exemptions under
subsections (h), (j), or (p). See Pl.’s Opp’n at 24–25. The Court has already addressed this
interpretation, but NRDC’s subsection (j) argument merits further discussion. By its terms,
subsection (j) restricts the Committee’s authority, forcing the Committee to grant exemptions it
might otherwise deny. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(j) (providing that “the Committee shall grant [the]
exemption”). NRDC, however, interprets this provision to expand the Committee’s power,
vesting the Committee with newfound authority to grant exemptions outside the carefully limited
authority that Congress granted it in the subsection creating the Committee. See id. § 1536(e)(2)
19
(authorizing the Committee to decide “whether or not to grant an exemption” but only “in
accordance with subsection (h)”). Because Congress never mentioned this purported power
anywhere in the subsection creating the Committee, or anywhe