Center for Biological Diversity v. Burgum
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketCivil Action No. 2026-0940
JudgeJudge Rudolph Contreras
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERISTY, :
:
Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 26-940 (RC)
:
v. : Re Document No.: 24
:
DOUGLAS BURGUM, Secretary of the :
Interior, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING FEDERAL DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Center for Biological Diversity (the “Center”) brings this action against Federal
Defendants 1 challenging the Endangered Species Committee’s issuance of an exemption for
certain oil and gas activities in the Gulf of Mexico, also known as the Gulf of America. The
Center’s lawsuit closely tracks two related cases in front of this Court, and the Court recently
granted a motion to dismiss in one of those cases. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Burgum
(“NRDC”), No. CV 26-1116 (RC), 2026 WL 3521211, at *12 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2026). In that
case, the Court concluded that Congress has channeled claims challenging the Endangered
Species’ Committee’s decisions to the courts of appeals, the Court lacked jurisdiction over such
1
“Federal Defendants” refers collectively to Defendants Secretary of the Interior Douglas
Burgum, Secretary of Agriculture Brooke Rollins, Acting Secretary of the Army Adam R. Telle
(substituted for former Secretary of the Army Daniel P. Driscoll), Chair of the Council of
Economic Advisers Christopher Phelan (substituted for Acting Chair of the Council of Economic
Advisers Pierre Yared), Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency Lee M. Zeldin,
Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Neil Jacobs, and
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, all acting in their official capacity.
claims. See id. at *7. Here, the Federal Defendants likewise move to dismiss the Center’s
amended complaint, arguing that the Center should have brought its claims in the courts of
appeals, and the Court grants the motion for similar reasons. 2
II. BACKGROUND
The Court has already recounted the factual and legal background for this case in greater
detail in its recent decision in the related case. See NRDC, 2026 WL 3521211, at *2–5.
Although the Center’s amended complaint here differs somewhat, the factual allegations are
quite similar. The Court therefore does not retread all the ground covered in the NRDC decision.
A. Statutory Framework
Congress designed the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) “to conserve endangered species
and threatened species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1); see also id. § 1531 et seq. The act generally
requires federal agencies to ensure “that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such
agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species,” Id. § 1536(a)(2), and it generally makes it “unlawful” to harm endangered
species, id. § 1538(a) (declaring it “unlawful” to “take” listed endangered species of fish,
wildlife, or plants); see id. § 1532(19) (defining the term “take” to include harm).
But Congress created a pathway to exemptions from these requirements through the
Endangered Species Committee (the “Committee”). See id. § 1536(e). Congress charged the
Committee with “review[ing] any application submitted to it . . . and determin[ing] . . . whether
or not to grant an exemption,” which would exempt the agency or licensee from liability for the
aforementioned ESA requirements. Id. § 1536(e)(2); see also id. § 1536(o)(1).
2
Intervenor Defendant American Petroleum Institute joined Defendants’ motion to
dismiss. See Notice Joinder Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 32.
2
Before granting an exemption, the Committee, at least typically, must follow certain
procedural steps under 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h). These requirements under subsection (h) include,
but are not limited to, reviewing the evidence from a formal hearing to determine whether
(1) “there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action”; (2) “the benefits of
such action clearly outweigh the benefits of alternative courses of action” and the “action is in
the public interest”’; (3) “the action is of regional or national significance”; and (4) “neither the
Federal agency concerned nor the exemption applicant made any irreversible or irretrievable
commitment of resources.” Id. § 1536(h)(1)(A). In addition, all the Committee’s “meetings and
records” must be left “open to the public.” Id. § 1536(e)(5)(D).
Two provisions of this statutory scheme are especially relevant to this case. First,
Congress gave the Secretary of Defense the power to force the Committee’s hand in certain
cases. “Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the Committee shall grant an
exemption for any agency action if the Secretary of Defense finds that such exemption is
necessary for reasons of national security.” Id. § 1536(j) (emphasis added). 3 Second, Congress
provided an avenue for judicial review of Committee decisions. “Any person . . . may obtain
judicial review, under [the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)], of any decision of the
Endangered Species Committee under subsection (h) in the United States Court of Appeals.” Id.
§ 1536(n) (emphasis added).
3
Last year, the President authorized the Secretary of Defense to use a secondary title of
Secretary of War. See Restoring the United States Department of War, Exec. Order No. 14,347,
§ 2(a), 90 Fed. Reg. 43,893, 43,893 (Sep. 5, 2025) (“The Secretary of Defense is authorized the
use of this additional secondary title—the Secretary of War . . . .”). Some of the documents in
this case use that title, but the Court uses Secretary of Defense in this opinion for clarity because
it is the title Congress used in the relevant statute.
3
B. Factual Background
The Center “is a national conservation organization that advocates for the protection of
threatened and endangered species and their habitats.” First Am. Compl. Decl. & Injunc. Relief
(“Am. Compl.”) ¶ 19, ECF No. 18. It alleges that oil and gas projects in the Gulf can be “lethal”
to endangered species living there, “including the critically imperiled Rice’s whale.” Id. ¶ 21.
Indeed, the federal government recognized as much in 2025 when it released a biological opinion
finding “that these activities were likely to adversely affect ESA-listed species including Rice’s
and sperm whale, hawksbill, Kemp’s ridley, leatherback, and loggerhead sea turtles, and Gulf
Sturgeon.” Id. ¶ 65.
Nonetheless, in March 2026, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth notified Secretary of the
Interior Doug Burgum that he “found it necessary for reasons of national security to exempt from
the [ESA’s] requirements all Gulf of America oil and gas exploration and development activities
associated with” certain federal programs. Id. ¶ 79 (alteration in original) (quoting declaration).
In the Secretary of Defense’s view, environmental litigation surrounding these federal programs
could delay projects and thereby undermine national security. See id. ¶ 83. The Committee
convened on March 31, 2026, and unanimously voted to grant the requested exemption. Id. ¶ 81.
The Committee purported to grant the exemption “pursuant to subsection (h).” Endangered
Species Committee Decision & Order, 91 Fed. Reg. 16,966, 16,966 (Apr. 3, 2026). Although the
Committee “recognize[d] that the Endangered Species Act sets out a process for the Committee
to consider an application for an exemption,” it concluded “that these other provisions of
Section 7, including the application requirements and standards, do not apply when the Secretary
of War finds that an exemption is necessary for reasons of national security.” Id. at 16,966.
4
Finally, the Committee explained that those seeking judicial review must do so “exclusively in
the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth or Eleventh Circuits.” Id. at 16,967.
The Center alleges that the Committee did not “ma[k]e available to the public prior to or
during the meeting” any “documents regarding the meeting.” Am. Compl. ¶ 81. Moreover,
while the meeting was scheduled to begin at 9:30 a.m., “the public stream did not begin until
10:00 a.m.,” from which the Center infers “that the Committee had an unlawful closed session
prior to convening the public meeting.” Id. ¶ 82. The Center alleges that, in granting the
exemption, “the Committee followed none of the procedures and made none of the discretionary
findings provided for under [subsection (h)]. The sole basis on which the exemption was granted
was the ‘exemption’ invoked by Secretary Hegseth.” Id. ¶ 85.
C. Procedural Posture
As noted above, this is one of three cases before the Court involving environmental
groups challenging the Committee’s exemption decision. See NRDC, 2026 WL 3521211, at *5;
Am. Compl., Healthy Gulf v. Burgum, 26-cv-1118, ECF No. 19 (D.D.C. May 26, 2026). There
are also parallel proceedings in the Fifth Circuit. See Consolidation Order, Am. Energy v.
Burgum, 26-60240, ECF No. 9 (5th Cir. Apr. 21, 2026) (consolidating petitions from both
industry and environmental groups).
Earlier in this case, before the Committee even made its exemption decision, the Center
sought a temporary restraining order enjoining the Committee from convening to vote on the
exemption. See Pl.’s Mot. TRO at 1, ECF No. 9. This Court denied that motion, concluding that
the Court “likely lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction over the claims [the Center] assert[ed]” and
the Center had “not shown that the action it [sought] to challenge [was] likely a ‘final agency
action.’” Order Denying Pl.’s Mot. TRO at 1–2, ECF No. 17 (D.D.C. Mar. 27, 2026).
5
After the Committee granted the exemption, the Center amended its complaint. See
generally Am. Compl. The amended complaint now raises four claims: (1) challenging under
the APA the Committee’s exemption decision, (2) challenging under the APA the allegedly
unlawful withholding of information regarding the exemption process, (3) seeking a writ of
mandamus compelling the Committee to release certain public records, and (4) challenging
under the APA Secretary Hegseth’s national-security finding. See id. ¶¶ 87–106. The Federal
Defendants move to dismiss all counts under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), arguing that all these
claims must be brought in the courts of appeals, if at all. See Defs.’ Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot.
Dismiss at 2, ECF No. 24-1.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive the motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), the Center “must state a
plausible claim” that this action falls within the Court’s jurisdiction. Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v.
Vilsack, 797 F.3d 4, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2017). “[A] district court considering a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction accepts the allegations of the complaint as true.” Banneker
Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015). But the Court may resolve
legal issues, such as issues of statutory interpretation, without assuming the truth of the
complaint’s legal conclusions. See Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 913
(D.C. Cir. 2015); Kōloa Rum Co. v. Noem, 822 F. Supp. 3d 8, 34 (D.D.C. 2026).
IV. ANALYSIS
The Center alleges four claims, three of which fall under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706, and
one of which seeks mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 87–106. The Court
concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over all the Center’s claims because Congress has required
plaintiffs to bring APA claims like the Center’s in the courts of appeals rather than in district
6
court, see 16 U.S.C. § 1536(n), and the mandamus claim is unavailable because the Center has
an adequate alternative remedy in the form of the Freedom of Information Act.
A.
The Center’s first claim (Count I) challenges the “adoption of an exemption” by the
Committee. Am. Compl. ¶ 97. If the Committee, in adopting the challenged exemption, acted
under Section 1536(h), then the Center must challenge that decision in the courts of appeals,
rather than here in district court. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(n) (allowing challenges to “any decision
of the Endangered Species Committee under subsection (h) in the United States Court of
Appeals” (emphasis added)); see also Wagner v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 717 F.3d 1007, 1012–
13 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (holding that a similarly worded jurisdictional provision
conferred exclusive jurisdiction in the en banc court and therefore ousted other tribunals of
jurisdiction) (collecting cases). Whether this Court has jurisdiction of the Center’s claim, then,
turns on whether the Committee made its decision under subsection (h). The Court concludes
that it did.
As the Court recently explained, the Committee acted under subsection (h) when it
granted the exemption because “subsection (h) is the only legal authority under which the
Committee actually grants exemptions.” NRDC, 2026 WL 2026 WL 3521211, at *7; see 16
U.S.C. § 1536(e)(2) (authorizing the Committee to “determine . . . whether or not to grant an
exemption” but only “in accordance with subsection (h)”). Therefore, the Center must raise its
challenge in the courts of appeals and this Court lacks jurisdiction over its claim.
The Center counters that the Committee’s actions reveal that it cannot have made its
decision “under subsection (h)” within any sense of the word. See Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. Opp’n
Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 20, ECF No. 29 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(n)). The
7
Center interprets “under” to mean “subject to” or “governed by.” Id. (quoting Ardestani v. INS,
502 U.S. 129, 135 (1991)). The Center therefore argues that because the Committee’s exemption
decision here did not comply with the procedural requirements of subsection (h), its decision was
not “under subsection (h)” as required to divest this Court of jurisdiction. Id. at 20–23.
The Court disagrees. The Committee’s authority to grant an exemption still falls under
subsection (h)—or, as the Center puts it, is still subject to or governed by subsection (h)—
whether or not the Committee complies with those requirements. See NRDC, 2026 WL
3521211, at *11 (addressing a similar argument). Congress, not the Committee, decides which
statutory provisions govern the Committee’s actions. See id. After all, courts routinely hold that
a statute governs an agency’s decision even if the agency did not comply with it. See, e.g., Nat.
Res. Def. Council v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (reversing in part agency
decision for “fail[ing] to follow the appropriate statutory procedure”). Indeed, that is exactly
what the Center is asking the Court to do here on the merits. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 88–97.
Unsatisfied, the Center insists that the Committee’s alleged disregard for the applicable
procedures means that review cannot lie in the courts of appeals because the lack “of prior,
detailed administrative fact-finding and review” without those procedures “undermines a
common central rationale for Congress’s inclusion of special statutory review provisions.” Pl.’s
Opp’n at 27. But Congress created no such off-ramp for its remedial scheme. As this Court has
previously concluded, “nothing in the text of Congress’s review scheme hinges on the record the
Committee created. And if an appellate court concludes that it needs a more robust record to
review the Committee’s decision, it may remand the decision for the Committee to conduct
further proceedings.” NRDC, 2026 WL 3521211, at *12 (citation omitted); see, e.g., Portland
Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1536–37 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding
8
that the Endangered Species Committee failed to provide the full record and “remand[ing] the
matter to the Committee for an evidentiary hearing”); see also, e.g., CSI Aviation Servs., Inc. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 637 F.3d 408, 416 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Where we cannot evaluate the
challenged agency action on the basis of the record before us, the proper course is to remand to
the agency for additional investigation or explanation.” (cleaned up)).
B.
The Court’s conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction over the Center’s direct challenge to the
Committee’s exemption decision does not necessarily resolve Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Defendants move to dismiss all the Center’s claims, which also includes (1) an APA claim that
the Committee has “unreasonably delayed and unlawfully withheld” certain records of its
proceedings, (2) a mandamus claim seeking to “compel Defendants to provide the Center with
access” to the withheld information, and (3) another APA claim challenging Secretary Hegseth’s
national-security determination as arbitrary and capricious. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 98–106. As
explained below, however, the Court lacks jurisdiction over these remaining claims as well.
1.
The Court first addresses the two remaining APA claims, Counts II and IV, and
concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over both claims because both are subsumed within the
Center’s challenge to the Committee’s exemption decision and therefore fall under
subsection (n). Subsection (n) incorporates the APA by reference. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(n).
And the APA generally limits plaintiffs to challenging only final agency actions. See Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177 (1997). To be final, the agency action must satisfy two conditions.
“First, the action must mark the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process—it must
not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be one by
9
which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.”
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. 590, 597 (2016) (quoting Bennett, 520 U.S.
at 177–78). Here, neither count challenges a final agency action. 4
Starting with Count II, the Court finds that the Committee’s decisions not to release
certain records or hold a public hearing before voting on the exemption were not final agency
actions. Admittedly, in some sense the Committee made a final decision to not release the
records, and the Center’s ability to access those records flowed from that decision. But such
“subsidiary decisions merge into the final agency action, which is then subject to review.”
Mullin v. Doe, 609 U.S. 324, 344 (2026) (holding certain preliminary decisions fell under a no-
review provision that covered the ultimate decision). Because this Court cannot review the final
agency action, it cannot review the subsidiary determinations either. See id. (“If the final agency
action is unreviewable, then so too are subsidiary determinations.”).
The Center does not dispute this. It argues only that it may challenge these information
requirements as part of its challenge to the exemption decision. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 30–32.
Because the Court has already concluded that it lacks jurisdiction over challenges to the
exemption decision, the Center’s arguments for the related procedural challenge under the APA
fare no better.
4
Ordinarily, whether the Center challenges a final agency action would not raise a
jurisdictional issue. See Fund for Animals, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 460 F.3d 13, 18
n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that district court erred by dismissing claim that challenged a
nonfinal agency action “for lack of subject matter jurisdiction”). In this case, however, finality
and jurisdiction intermix because it is the final-agency-action requirement that pushes claims
which might otherwise escape subsection (n) to fall within its reach, and the applicability of
subsection (n) is jurisdictional. See NRDC, 2026 WL 3521211, at *6 (concluding that whether a
claim falls within subsection (n)’s remedial scheme “bears jurisdictional weight”).
10
Count IV, the Center’s challenge to the Secretary of Defense’s national-security
determination, is more complicated. Although “an agency’s subsidiary decisions merge into the
final agency action,” Mullin, 609 U.S. at 344, the Secretary of Defense is not generally part of
the Committee and therefore is not part of the same agency, see 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(3).
But even though the Secretary of Defense acts as part of a different agency from the
Committee, the Court still concludes that Committee’s exemption decision subsumes the
national-security finding. The Court draws this conclusion from the Supreme Court’s decision in
Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994). 5 There, the respondents challenged a decision that arose
from collaboration between multiple different agencies: the closure of a naval base. See id. at
464. “The decision to close [a base] was the end result of an elaborate selection process,”
involving, among other things, an independent commission recommending which bases to close
and the President approving or disapproving the report. Id. at 464–65. After the process
unfolded and the President decided to close a naval base in Philadelphia, the respondents sued to
prevent the closure, challenging, among other things, alleged failures by the Secretary of Defense
and the independent commission to follow certain “procedural mandates.” See id. at 466, 469.
The Supreme Court held that these decisions by the Secretary of Defense and the
independent commission were not final agency actions even though they marked the final actions
of those agencies. See id. at 469–70. The Court explained that the Secretary’s and commission’s
actions “carr[ied] no direct consequences for base closings.” Id. at 469 (cleaned up). Only the
5
The Supreme Court is currently considering a similar issue in Dep’t of the Air Force v.
Guahan, 146 S. Ct. 1794 (2026) (granting writ of certiorari). But no party has asked the Court to
stay consideration of this case pending the Supreme Court’s decision there, and the Court
believes it is unlikely that Guahan will be dispositive in this case.
11
President’s decision would “directly affect” the respondents. Id. (quoting Franklin v.
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 797 (1992)).
Most important for this case, the Court rejected the respondents’ argument that the
independent commission’s actions should be considered final because the President had “little
authority regarding the closure of bases” after the commission gave its recommendation. Id. at
470. The Supreme Court reasoned first that the respondents “underestimated the President’s
authority,” but “[s]econd, and more fundamentally,” that the argument “ignore[d] the core
question for determining finality.” Id. at 470 (cleaned up). The “crucial” consideration was that
“the President, not the Commission, t[ook] the final action that affect[ed] the military
installations.” Id. (cleaned up). The Court precluded review of the other agencies’ actions even
though it went on to hold that the President’s decision was also unreviewable, effectively
insulating the entire decisionmaking process from judicial review. See id. at 476–77.
Applying that reasoning here, the Secretary of Defense’s national-security finding is not a
final agency action for purposes of APA review. Although the Secretary of Defense’s decision
requires the Committee to ultimately grant the exemption, up until the Committee actually does
so, the Secretary of Defense’s decision carries “no direct consequences” for the Center. Id. at
469 (quoting Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798). It is the Committee who grants the exemption. See 16
U.S.C. § 1536(j) (“[T]he Committee shall grant an exemption . . . .”). “[T]he fact that the
[Committee], not the [Secretary], takes the final action that affects” the Center is dispositive for
purposes of finality. Dalton, 511 U.S. at 470 (cleaned up). 6
6
Challenging the Secretary of Defense’s national-security finding may raise another
jurisdictional issue. The D.C. Circuit recently concluded that district courts lack jurisdiction
over claims in a similar situation involving a plaintiff’s simultaneous challenge to two agencies’
decisions: the decision by one agency to place him on the Terrorist Watchlist, and the decision
by another agency to place him on the No Fly List. See Khalid v. Blanche, 172 F.4th 876, 879
12
2.
Finally, the Court also lacks jurisdiction over the Center’s mandamus claim (Count III).
To bring a mandamus claim, a plaintiff must overcome three jurisdictional hurdles: they must
show that “(1) the plaintiff has a clear right to relief; (2) the defendant as a clear duty to act; and
(3) there is no other adequate remedy available to plaintiff.” Muthana v. Pompeo, 985 F.3d 893,
910 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Baptist Mem’l Hosp. v. Sebelius, 603 F.3d 57, 62 (D.C. Cir.
2010)). Because this Court lacks jurisdiction if the Center fails even one of these requirements,
the Court addresses only the final requirement and concludes that it lacks jurisdiction because the
Center has other adequate remedies. See id.
The Center focuses on whether it has an adequate remedy through a challenge to the
exemption decision in the courts of appeals through a challenge to the Committee’s ultimate
(D.C. Cir. 2026). The two designations were highly interrelated, albeit not mutually exclusive.
An individual could be on the Terrorist Watchlist without being on the No Fly List, but they
could not “be designated for the No Fly List unless [they were] already on the Terrorist
Watchlist.” Id. at 880. Thus, a decision vacating the first agency’s decisions to put the plaintiff
on the Terrorist Watchlist would necessarily set aside the second agency’s decision to place him
on the No Fly List. See id. at 886. Yet Congress created a review scheme whereby only district
courts could review designations on the Terrorist Watchlist while only courts of appeals could
review designations on the No Fly List. See id. at 882. Because of both the interplay between
the two designations and the two different judicial-review schemes, the D.C. Circuit held that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to consider a challenge to Terrorist Watchlist designation until
the D.C. Circuit first addressed the separate challenge to the No Fly List designation, lest the
district court “usurp” the circuit court’s “jurisdiction.” Id. at 886.
That same reasoning may apply here too. A decision from this Court setting aside the
Secretary of Defense’s national-security determination would likely also vacate the Committee’s
exemption decision, which only the courts of appeals have jurisdiction to do. It may be the case,
then, that under Khalid a district court must await the meritorious challenge to the Committee’s
decision before considering a challenge to the Secretary of Defense’s national-security
determination, assuming it were a final agency action. The Court need not decide that question
here, however, because the parties do not raise it, and there is another jurisdictional ground
which resolves the claim.
13
decision. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 34–37. 7 The Center insists that such a remedy would be inadequate
because, among other things, relief should not “be contingent on pursuit of a substantive
challenge to a Committee ‘order’ granting an exemption.” Id. at 36. But the Federal Defendants
also argue—albeit briefly and obliquely—that the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)
provides an adequate alternative remedy. See Def.’s Mot. at 22. The Center offers no response
to this argument.
In broad strokes, FOIA requires federal agencies to provide requesting individuals with
government records. See 5 U.S.C. § 522. That is precisely what the Center is demanding that
the Federal Defendants do through its mandamus claim. See Am. Compl. ¶ 104; Pl.’s Opp’n at
37 (arguing “that the Committee is in ongoing violation of its express mandatory duty to make
‘all’ of its records ‘open to the public’”). “[A] near unanimous chorus” of “courts in this circuit
have rejected plaintiffs’ attempts to use a writ of mandamus to compel agencies to turn over
government records because FOIA gives them an adequate remedy.” Chaverra v. U.S. Immigr.
& Customs Enf’t, No. CV 18-289 (JEB), 2018 WL 4762259, at *6 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 2018)
(collecting cases); see also Am. First Legal Found. v. U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, No. 23-CV-
02765 (DLF), 2024 WL 3967243, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 2024) (similar).
It does not matter whether FOIA “is less efficient or less effective than mandamus relief
would be.” Nat’l Sec. Couns. v. C.I.A., 898 F. Supp. 2d 233, 267 (D.D.C. 2012) (dismissing
mandamus claim because FOIA provided adequate alternative remedy), aff’d, 969 F.3d 406
(D.C. Cir. 2020). It still provides an adequate remedy and therefore “preclude[s]” mandamus
7
As described in its brief, the Center focuses exclusively on the lack of access to records,
not the failure to participate in the meeting. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 32 (“The Center’s claim alleges
that the Committee is in violation of this mandatory duty because ‘the Committee has yet to
make all of its records available to the public.’” (quoting Am. Compl. ¶ 103)).
14
relief. Id. Despite the Federal Defendants referencing FOIA as an adequate alternative in their
opening brief, the Center provides no explanation as to why FOIA is inadequate, and it is not
obvious that it would be. Compare Phang v. Blanche, 836 F. Supp. 3d 90, 108 (D.D.C. 2026)
(granting mandamus and finding that FOIA was not an adequate remedy because the requested
records would very likely fall within an exemption to FOIA), appeal filed, No. 26-5299 (D.C.
Cir.), with Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. U.S. S.E.C., 916 F. Supp. 2d 141, 152
(D.D.C. 2013) (“The fact that Plaintiff’s APA claim has failed in these circumstances does not
prevent the APA from being an ‘adequate means to attain relief’ for mandamus purposes.”). The
Center has therefore failed to carry its burden of establishing that no adequate alternative exists
and therefore that this Court has jurisdiction over its mandamus claim. 8
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss in
its entirety. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and
contemporaneously issued.
Dated: November 20, 2026 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS
United States District Judge
8
None of the cases that the Center cites in support of its argument that other courts in this
Circuit have granted mandamus relief “[i]n functionally identical circumstances” addressed the
availability of FOIA as an adequate alternative. Pl.’s Opp’n at 34; see Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v.
Nat’l Sec. Comm’n on A.I., 466 F. Supp. 3d 100, 122 (D.D.C. 2020) (considering only whether
an adequate remedy existed under the APA); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 736 F.
Supp. 2d 24, 31 (D.D.C. 2010) (permitting mandamus to continue without addressing adequate
alternative remedies). The Court need not evaluate whether the outcomes in these cases were
correct because, here, it suffices to conclude that the Center has not met is burden of establishing
that FOIA is not an adequate alternative.
15