Full Opinion

****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecti- cut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Con- necticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be repro- duced and distributed without the express written per- mission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** CARL SHANAHAN v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ET AL. (SC 18575) Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, McLachlan, Eveleigh and Harper, Js. Argued January 5—officially released July 24, 2012 James A. Wade, with whom was John P. Casey, for the appellant (plaintiff). Mary K. Lenehan, assistant attorney general, with whom were David Wrinn, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, George Jepsen, attorney general, and Carmel Motherway, assistant attorney general, for the appellees (defendants). Opinion HARPER, J. This appeal raises several issues regard- ing the scope of the jurisdiction of the named defendant, the department of environmental protection (depart- ment),1 to regulate activity ‘‘in the tidal, coastal or navi- gable waters of the state waterward of the high tide line.’’ General Statutes § 22a-359 (a);2 see General Stat- utes § 22a-361 (a) (1).3 The plaintiff, Carl Shanahan, appeals4 from the trial court’s judgment denying his administrative appeal contesting the department’s order directing the plaintiff to remove a seawall that he had constructed on his property along Long Island Sound without having obtained a permit in accordance with § 22a-361. The plaintiff specifically contends that: (1) the trial court improperly concluded that substantial evidence supported the department’s determination that the seawall lies ‘‘waterward of the high tide line’’ and is thus within the jurisdiction of the department; (2) the trial court improperly concluded that ‘‘high tide line,’’ as defined in § 22a-359, is not unconstitutionally vague; (3) the trial court improperly denied the plain- tiff’s motion to obtain discovery with respect to his claim of unconstitutional vagueness; and (4) even if substantial evidence shows that portions of the seawall were built waterward of the high tide line, the trial court improperly failed to consider whether the department’s jurisdiction to order the plaintiff to remove the seawall extends to portions of the seawall that have not been shown to be ‘‘waterward of the high tide line.’’ We conclude that the trial court properly concluded that substantial evidence shows at least part of the plaintiff’s seawall was constructed waterward of the high tide line, properly concluded that § 22a-359 is not unconsti- tutionally vague as applied to the plaintiff’s seawall, and properly denied the plaintiff’s discovery request. We further conclude that, in the absence of a finding by the department that the entire seawall was constructed waterward of the high tide line, the trial court improp- erly determined that the department had jurisdiction under § 22a-361 to order removal of the entire seawall. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s judgment with direction to remand the case to the department for further proceedings. To provide context for the claims raised in the present case and the specific facts relevant to those claims, we begin by briefly outlining the contours of the statutory scheme governing activities along the Connecticut coastline in order to protect coastal resources. First, the legislature has enumerated several activities that are subject to regulation by the department if conducted ‘‘waterward of the high tide line.’’ General Statutes § 22a-359 (a); see General Statutes § 22a-361 (a) (1). Specifically, § 22a-361 (a) (1) directs a property owner seeking, inter alia, to ‘‘erect any structure,’’ ‘‘maintain any structure’’ or ‘‘carry out any work incidental thereto’’ along the Connecticut coast ‘‘waterward of the high tide line’’ to obtain a permit from the commissioner of environmental protection (commissioner) and agree to carry out any conditions deemed necessary to the implementation of that permit. See footnote 3 of this opinion. Any violation of this provision is considered a public nuisance for which the department may issue a cease and desist order.5 General Statutes §§ 22a-362 and 22a-363f. The term ‘‘high tide line’’ as used in § 22a- 361 (a) is statutorily defined as ‘‘a line or mark left upon tide flats, beaches, or along shore objects that indicates the intersection of the land with the water’s surface at the maximum height reached by a rising tide. The mark may be determined by (1) a line of oil or scum along shore objects, (2) a more or less continuous deposit of fine shell or debris on the foreshore or berm, (3) physi- cal markings or characteristics, vegetation lines, tidal gauge, or (4) by any other suitable means delineating the general height reached by a rising tide. The term includes spring high tides and other high tides that occur with periodic frequency but does not include storm surges in which there is a departure from the normal or predicted reach of the tide due to the piling up of water against a coast by strong winds such as those accompanying a hurricane or other intense storm.’’ General Statutes § 22a-359 (c). In addition to the requirements of § 22a-361, coastal activity may also be subject to regulation under the Coastal Management Act (act), General Statutes § 22a- 90 et seq. Among the act’s goals is the management of coastal bluffs, which play an integral role in maintaining a balanced pattern of erosion and sedimentation along the coastline. General Statutes § 22a-92 (b) (2) (A). In addition to providing a significant source of sediment for other coastal features, bluffs also support unique plant communities, provide wildlife habitats, and pro- tect against coastal flooding. The act’s policies specifi- cally declare that the natural contours of bluffs should be preserved and that activities altering the natural supply of sediment from bluffs should be disapproved. General Statutes § 22a-92 (b) (2) (A). The act establishes a ‘‘coastal boundary’’; General Statutes § 22a-94 (b); and requires property owners wishing to construct, inter alia, any shoreline flood and erosion control structure that is within the coastal boundary to submit a coastal site plan for approval by the local zoning authority.6 General Statutes § 22a-109. With this regulatory framework in mind, we turn to the specific facts as found by the department or revealed by the record and the procedural history rele- vant to this appeal. The plaintiff’s residence property, which lies along Long Island Sound in the city of Stam- ford (city), sits on top of a prominent bluff that rises approximately forty feet from sea level. In 1995, at the plaintiff’s request, a department analyst visited the property and informed the plaintiff that his land, which at the time was partially protected by an existing sea- wall running along approximately 125 of its 290 feet of waterfront, had been subject to significant erosion over the past several decades. The department analyst fur- ther indicated that, although the plaintiff’s house was not presently in danger and the policies articulated in the act discouraged structural erosion control measures under such circumstances, a structural solution may be appropriate in the plaintiff’s case. The analyst recom- mended that the plaintiff hire a consulting engineer to further analyze the conditions at the site in preparation for a preapplication meeting with the department regarding potential solutions to the erosion problem. In 2004, the plaintiff hired Rocco V. D’Andrea, Inc. (D’Andrea), and Ocean and Coastal Consultants, Inc. (Coastal Consultants), to survey the property and to design an erosion control plan, respectively. The first aspect of the resulting plan was to seek a permit from the department to repair the existing seawall, situated at the north end of the plaintiff’s property, which undis- putedly lies waterward of the high tide line. A survey accompanying the permit application depicted a ‘‘high tide line’’ at an elevation of 5.7 feet;7 the survey further reflected this line meeting the existing seawall at its southern edge and following an irregular course south- ward.8 The 5.7 foot elevation number, drawn from data published by the United States Army Corps of Engi- neers, reflected the predicted height of the highest yearly occurring tidal flood. The department approved the proposed repairs and included a copy of the survey in its certificate of permission. Following the approval of repairs to the existing sea- wall, the plaintiff, representatives from D’Andrea and Coastal Consultants, a department liaison, and a mem- ber of the city’s zoning board (board) met on the plain- tiff’s property to discuss further erosion control measures. After the meeting, the department liaison informed the plaintiff that the erosion control measure proposed by Coastal Consultants, which involved armoring the bluff with large rocks arranged in tiers to form a slope, was inconsistent with the requirements of the act because it would not preserve the existing contours of the bluff and would significantly reduce the natural rate of erosion, thereby failing to maintain the natural relationship between erosion and deposit of material. Subsequent to this exchange, the plaintiff, again aided by D’Andrea and Coastal Consultants, developed an erosion control plan that did not revise the structure to remedy the defects identified by the department liai- son but instead was intended to strategically position the stone structure landward of the high tide line and thus outside of the department’s jurisdiction. In devel- oping this plan, D’Andrea conducted an additional sur- vey of the plaintiff’s property, which reflected a high tide line consistent with the 5.7 foot elevation figure on which the plaintiff previously had relied.9 According to D’Andrea, this high tide line reflected the ‘‘predicted’’ or ‘‘mathematical tides, which under average weather conditions we should expect to see’’ as extrapolated from nineteen years of observed tidal data provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. D’Andrea concluded that the level of atmospheric pres- sure could cause actual water levels to depart several inches above or below the predicted tidal level, such that a shift from low to high atmospheric pressure could result in a swing in water levels of up to one foot. The nineteen years of data taken from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, however, effectively ‘‘smoothes out’’ these meteorological variances, which, according to D’Andrea, are treated as ‘‘storm surge’’ that should not be factored into the definition of the high tide line. In accordance with this view that all departures from the predicted tide level represent dis- qualified storm surge, D’Andrea characterized the observation based means of measuring the high tide line contemplated by § 22a-359—including observation of debris lines, marks on rocks and direct observation of water levels—as disfavored determinants of last resort. Relying on D’Andrea’s survey, Coastal Consultants developed a plan that called for building a new seawall directly south of the existing seawall, but set back ten feet landward from the waterward edge of the existing seawall, at an elevation of 6.8 feet. Because the southern end of the existing seawall was situated at an elevation of 5.7 feet, the plan called for the two seawalls to be joined by an additional wall running landward from the southern edge of the existing seawall to the northern edge of the new seawall. The plaintiff thereafter filed Coastal Consultants’ coastal site plan with the board for its approval. In accordance with General Statutes § 22a-109 (d), a copy of the site plan was referred to the department for its comments and recommendations. In response, the department liaison sent a letter to the board, copied to Coastal Consultants, urging the board to reject the proposed plan due to its numerous inconsistencies with the act. The letter also disputed the high tide line reflected on the plan, citing tide gauge records showing that high tides in the area of the plaintiff’s property rose to a much higher elevation than indicated on the plaintiff’s plans and contended that the high tide line would have to be reevaluated on the basis of actual conditions at the site. At a subsequent meeting of the board, the department liaison spoke against the plan, again expressing a view that the plaintiff’s plans under- estimated the location of the high tide line, which, according to the department’s data and observations, was likely actually to lie at an elevation of 6.5 or 7 feet rather than 5.7 feet as reflected in the plaintiff’s plans. Following this meeting, the plaintiff had conversa- tions with certain members of the board that led him to believe the board would approve the site plan. The board in fact drafted a motion approving the plaintiff’s plan, but that approval was to be subject to a number of conditions, including that the plaintiff submit revised plans placing the structure at an elevation of at least 6.8 feet, that the plaintiff’s design engineer certify that the plans meet certain criteria, that the design engineer supervise the construction and certify that it conforms to the approved plan, and that the plaintiff reimburse the city for a peer review of the final plans by an inde- pendent consulting engineer. Although the plaintiff claimed to have seen the motion shortly after it was produced, the board never approved the motion or sent notice to the plaintiff of a decision on his site plan.10 Approximately one month after the board meeting, apparently in anticipation of the board’s approval of the site plan, the plaintiff commissioned D’Andrea to place a line of stakes at an elevation of 6.8 feet in the southern part of his property where the plan called for the new seawall to be built and to produce a survey reflecting this line.11 Shortly thereafter, despite the fact that he had not yet received written notice of the board’s decision, the plaintiff authorized a construction con- tractor, E.T. Kennedy Coastal Construction (Kennedy), to begin construction of the seawall. In constructing the seawall, Kennedy plainly disregarded Coastal Con- sultants’ site plan for which the plaintiff anticipated receiving approval. Kennedy had refused to build the seawall to the plan’s specifications partially on the ground that, in its view, the ten foot setback from the existing seawall called for would have created sharp angles that would have been vulnerable to a strong storm surge. According to Kennedy, the seawall it con- structed waterward of that depicted in Coastal Consul- tants’ plan, with the plaintiff’s permission, was structurally superior because it curved gradually sea- ward to meet the existing wall at its southern seaward edge. The new seawall also differed from Coastal Con- sultants’ plan of armoring the bluff with large rocks arranged in tiers to form a slope in that it is composed of interlocking boulders weighing five to eight tons, and is steeply pitched, but not vertical. For additional protection, large boulders also were placed on the waterfront side of the seawall. Kennedy recognized that it had built the seawall at, or landward of, the stakes placed by D’Andrea at an elevation of 6.8 feet. Kennedy did not have finalized drawings from which it built the seawall, it did not have an engineer at the site during construction,12 and it did not utilize any survey while building the seawall. Several months after the board meeting—and after the plaintiff had begun the unauthorized construction of the new seawall—an independent consulting engineer hired by the board issued its peer review report of the coastal site plan submitted by the plaintiff for the board’s approval. The report concluded, inter alia, that the high tide line at the plaintiff’s property lies at a much higher elevation than the 5.7 feet indicated in the plaintiff’s site plan and that historic tidal records indicate that tide heights exceeded 5.7 feet approxi- mately twenty-two times during the previous year. According to the report, this historic data, coupled with observation of shoreline debris, indicated that the high tide line would be more appropriately placed at an elevation of approximately 6.8 feet.13 Soon after issuing this report to the board, a member of the independent consulting firm alerted the department that the plaintiff had begun construction work on the seawall. In response to this information, a department liaison visited the plaintiff’s property and observed that sub- stantial portions of the seawall had already been com- pleted, that the seawall being built was waterward of the location indicated in the coastal site plan submitted to the board and that water could be seen up against the seawall. The department liaison took a number of photographs, some of which show pools of water touch- ing the part of the seawall depicted or seaweed at the base of the part of the seawall depicted. Approximately one week later, a second department official visited the plaintiff’s property and determined, based on the water level and the presence of a line of debris against the seawall and tidally influenced vegetation on either side of the property, that the seawall had been constructed waterward of the high tide line. Photographs taken by the department at this time also show water touching the part of the seawall depicted and the presence of plant matter lodged in the seawall. Following these events, the department official issued a notice of violation instructing the plaintiff to submit ‘‘a plan for review and approval to remove the unauthorized stone seawall and restore the pre-existing vegetated bluff . . . .’’ In response, the plaintiff submit- ted two surveys of the newly constructed seawall, asserting that these surveys were evidence that the wall had been constructed at an elevation of 6.8 feet, land- ward of the high tide line, and was therefore outside of the department’s jurisdiction. Despite this assertion, both surveys plainly depict a portion of the new seawall lying waterward of the marked high tide line of 5.7 feet; one of the surveys, conducted two months after the first, depicts a significant portion of the seawall— approximately 90 of the 160 feet—as lying waterward of the marked high tide line.14 Department officers also conducted several site visits subsequent to the issuance of the notice of violation; photographs taken on these occasions depict water touching the seawall for much of its length, which, in the department’s view, confirmed that the seawall lay waterward of the high tide line. On one occasion, a department official observed water, approximately 1 foot deep, along 80 to 100 feet of the seawall. Correspondence from the plaintiff’s counsel following the department’s issuance of the notice of violation contended that any portions of the seawall then below an elevation of 6.8 feet had been built out- side of the department’s jurisdiction but that the eleva- tion of portions of the property in front of the seawall had been altered postconstruction by changes in the contours of the shoreline and by certain actions the plaintiff had undertaken following visits by the depart- ment officials.15 Approximately one month after the issuance of the notice of violation, the department issued an order directing the plaintiff to submit for review and approval a written plan for removal of the seawall and restoration of the site. As the source of its jurisdiction and authority, the order cited General Statutes §§ 22a-616 and 22a-361 (a) (1).17 The plaintiff appealed from the removal order, and an administrative hearing ensued. At the hearing, the plaintiff asserted that the seawall was built land- ward of the high tide line and thus outside of the depart- ment’s jurisdiction, that the definition of high tide line in § 22a-359 conferred an unreasonable degree of dis- cretion on the department, that the department had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in determining that the seawall was located waterward of the high tide line, and that, even if part of the seawall does lie waterward of the high tide line, the department’s jurisdiction does not extend to portions of the seawall that are not water- ward of the high tide line. The department hearing officer sustained the order. In concluding that the department had jurisdiction to issue the order, the officer first found that the seawall had been built substantially waterward of the high tide line, citing testimony by department officials and photo- graphic evidence credibly establishing that ‘‘water comes in contact with almost the entire wall on a regular basis,’’ as well as the plaintiff’s own surveys demonstra- ting that 70 to 92 feet of the 120 foot seawall lies water- ward of the high tide line. The hearing officer did not credit either the plaintiff’s testimony that the seawall had been built at the planned elevation of 6.8 feet or that topographical shifts after construction were responsible for causing water to reach the seawall. The hearing officer declined to consider the plaintiff’s con- stitutional challenge to the statute; see Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Groton, 262 Conn. 45, 64, 808 A.2d 1107 (2002) (citing ‘‘well established common-law principle that administrative agencies lack the authority to deter- mine constitutional questions’’); and further concluded that the department did not act arbitrarily. Finally, the hearing officer concluded that the department’s juris- diction was not limited to only those portions of the seawall waterward of the high tide line on the ground that, in light of work performed during construction of the entire wall waterward of the high tide, the depart- ment can exercise jurisdiction pursuant to the ‘‘work incidental thereto’’ part of § 22a-361 (a) (1). The plaintiff then appealed from the department’s decision to the Superior Court, naming the department and the attorney general as defendants and claiming that: in light of evidence that properly could be deemed probative, substantial evidence did not support the department’s determination; the ‘‘high tide line’’ stan- dard under § 22a-359 is unconstitutionally vague, as evidenced, inter alia, by the more concretely objective standard under its federal counterpart; and the removal order should be held in abeyance pending a determina- tion of what parts of the seawall are waterward of the high tide line because the department lacks jurisdiction over those parts of the seawall that are landward of the high tide line. While that appeal was pending, the plaintiff moved for permission to take a deposition of certain department employees in order to supplement the record and to develop a factual background for his claim that § 22a-359 is unconstitutionally vague. The court denied the motion on the ground that the record already contained sufficient testimony and documen- tary evidence with respect to the relevant statutes. On appeal to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183 (a), the court concluded that the depart- ment had produced substantial evidence supporting its jurisdiction. In so concluding, the court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that determination of the location of the high tide line required expert testimony and that the department was estopped from claiming that the high tide line lies above 5.7 feet because the department had accepted this figure in an earlier application submit- ted by the plaintiff relating to the existing seawall. The court further concluded that § 22a-359 is not unconstitu- tionally vague because a person of ordinary intelligence would know, based on the objectively obvious indicia referred to in the statute, where the high tide line hit and that the department’s requisite site visits would provide concrete confirmation of that fact. With respect to the issue of the department’s jurisdiction over those portions of the seawall that are landward of the high tide line, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s claim that proceedings could not continue until the depart- ment determined which portions of the seawall lie waterward of the high tide line was premature because the plaintiff had not yet submitted a plan to the depart- ment that would determine the extent of the removal of the wall required. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. I The plaintiff first claims that the trial court improp- erly concluded that substantial evidence supported the department’s determination that the plaintiff’s seawall was constructed waterward of the high tide line and therefore falls within the department’s jurisdiction. The plaintiff specifically contends that: (1) substantial evi- dence shows the seawall was not constructed water- ward of the high tide line and evidence to the contrary is not reliable; (2) the department improperly rejected expert testimony presented by the plaintiff; and (3) the department should be estopped from asserting that the high tide line lies anywhere other than an elevation of 5.7 feet in light of its approval of the plaintiff’s applica- tion to repair the preexisting seawall that reflected that high tide line elevation. We disagree with the plaintiff. Before addressing the substance of the plaintiff’s claims, we reiterate the well established standards gov- erning our highly deferential review of administrative agency decisions regarding questions of fact. ‘‘The sub- stantial evidence rule governs judicial review of admin- istrative fact-finding under [the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act]. General Statutes § 4-183 (j) (5) and (6). Substantial evidence exists if the administrative record affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. . . . This substantial evidence standard is highly deferential and permits less judicial scrutiny than a clearly erroneous or weight of the evidence standard of review. . . . The reviewing court must take into account [that there is] contradic- tory evidence in the record . . . but the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evi- dence does not prevent an administrative agency’s find- ing from being supported by substantial evidence . . . . The burden is on the [plaintiff] to demonstrate that the [department’s] factual conclusions were not supported by the weight of substantial evidence on the whole record. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 266 Conn. 108, 124–25, 830 A.2d 1121 (2003). A The plaintiff’s primary contention on appeal is that the newly constructed seawall on his property was not built waterward of the ‘‘ ‘high tide line’ ’’ as defined by § 22a-359 (c). At the outset, we note that, even if we were to assume that all of the plaintiff’s contentions regarding the location of the high tide line and the location of his seawall are correct, this very evidence appears to place a portion of the seawall waterward of the high tide line. In his application to repair the existing seawall, work that he acknowledged would occur waterward of the high tide line, the plaintiff indicated that the southern edge of the existing seawall met the high tide line of 5.7 feet. The new seawall constructed by the plaintiff, as indicated by the plaintiff’s subsequent surveys and his contractor’s testimony, also meets the existing seawall at its southern edge and slopes land- ward more gradually than the high tide line depicted in the surveys. Thus, as all of the ‘‘as-built’’ surveys presented by the plaintiff indicate, a length of seawall of at least approximately twenty feet lies seaward of the high tide line claimed by the plaintiff.18 We therefore find substantial evidence, even in the plaintiff’s own submissions, that a portion of the seawall was con- structed waterward of the high tide line. Further demonstrating that at least portions of the seawall lie waterward of the high tide line, the depart- ment has provided testimony and photographic and video evidence, obtained from multiple site visits, not only of debris and plant matter lodged in the seawall, but also of seawater coming into direct contact with the seawall. Because these facts are consistent with the criteria deemed relevant under § 22a-359, these facts objectively demonstrate that portions of the new sea- wall are waterward of the high tide line. See General Statutes § 22a-359 (c) (‘‘‘[H]igh tide line’ means a line or mark left upon tide flats, beaches, or along shore objects that indicates the intersection of the land with the water’s surface at the maximum height reached by a rising tide. The mark may be determined by [1] a line of oil or scum along shore objects, [2] a more or less continuous deposit of fine shell or debris on the fore- shore or berm, [3] physical markings or characteristics, vegetation lines, tidal gauge, or [4] by any other suitable means delineating the general height reached by a ris- ing tide.’’). In response to this evidence, the plaintiff makes two objections, which we consider in turn. First, the plaintiff claims that the visual observations of department offi- cials, which were made at several discrete moments in time, lack sufficient context to provide substantial evidence of the location of the high tide line, particularly in the face of competing long-term statistical data pre- sented by the plaintiff. We agree with the plaintiff that the observed height of the water at any given moment is not sufficient to determine ‘‘the maximum height reached by a rising tide’’; General Statutes § 22a-359 (c); but the plaintiff fails to appreciate that the uncertainty operates only in one direction: the maximum height of the water might always be higher than what is observed, but it must be at least as high as what is observed under nonextreme weather conditions.19 By its plain meaning, the term ‘‘high tide line’’ as used in § 22a-359 refers to the highest point at which the water’s surface intersects with the land over the course of the entire yearly tidal cycle, excluding only the extraordinary conditions created by a hurricane or other intense storm. The definition expressly extends the line landward to include locations that come into contact with the ocean only during the single highest tide of the year. Further, the provision’s explicit exclu- sion of intense storms from the calculation belies any suggestion that water heights associated with more ordinary meteorologically influenced variability are also implicitly excluded. From this definition we draw the inescapable inference that if, absent intense storm activity, the water level at high tide ever reaches a given location, that location is necessarily waterward of the high tide line as defined by § 22a-359 (c). The photo- graphic and video evidence presented by the depart- ment provides sufficient context to show that no hurricane or other intense storm was responsible for the water levels observed on those site visits. Because the plaintiff’s argument is predicated on the improper assumption that ordinary meteorological variations that affect water level are not excluded from the statutory definition of the high tide line, his argument that the department’s observations cannot constitute substan- tial evidence similarly fails. Second, the plaintiff asserts that changes over time have altered the elevation of the land at which the seawall was built and that these changes call into ques- tion the probative value of the department’s observa- tions of water coming into contact with the seawall. Although the plaintiff’s own submissions similarly indi- cate that seawater comes into contact with the sea- wall—indeed, as-built surveys submitted by the plaintiff show approximately seventy to ninety feet of the sea- wall waterward of even the high tide line claimed by the plaintiff—he contends that the seawall was in fact built outside of the department’s jurisdiction and that it was not until the plaintiff undertook action at the direction of the department that water ever reached the seawall. The record reveals the following evidence proffered by the plaintiff with respect to this issue. According to testimony by the plaintiff, Jeff Westermeyer, a depart- ment official, visited the plaintiff’s property approxi- mately one month prior to his issuance of the notice of violation. Westermeyer called the plaintiff following that visit and informed him that some large boulders that had been placed in front of the seawall were clearly waterward of the high tide line and would have to be removed. The plaintiff then instructed his contractor to remove the boulders. Following this removal of material and some storm activity, the plaintiff claims, the topog- raphy of the land in front of the seawall shifted, allowing water to come into contact with the seawall. This con- tention is supported by the testimony of the plaintiff’s contractor that water did not ever touch the seawall during construction, but that, after the removal of the boulders and the subsequent storm activity, water did begin to touch the seawall when the project was nearly complete. The plaintiff’s surveyor, D’Andrea, also sub- mitted surveys purporting to show that shifting topogra- phy waterward of the seawall was responsible for the elevation changes claimed by the plaintiff. We agree with the plaintiff that a structure originally built outside of the department’s jurisdiction would not become subject to a removal order simply because shift- ing topography brought the structure waterward of the high tide line;20 however, the hearing officer was free to properly conclude that such is not the case here. Photographic evidence presented by the department demonstrates that water and debris could be seen up against the seawall even during the relatively early stages of its construction, prior to the claimed disrup- tion of the land in front of the seawall. This photo- graphic evidence is consistent with the plaintiff’s survey, taken while the seawall was being constructed, that shows a portion of the seawall waterward even of the high tide line marked on that survey. These facts alone are sufficient to render the plaintiff’s theory regarding the shifting topography in front of the seawall irrelevant to the question of whether a portion of the seawall was built waterward of the high tide line. More- over, in light of the evidence provided by the depart- ment consistently showing water touching the seawall, the hearing officer was free to—and did—reject the plaintiff’s evidence of topographic shifts as uncon- vincing. To the extent that the developments surrounding the plaintiff’s placement and subsequent removal of boul- ders waterward of the high tide line are relevant, they are only to exemplify why a regulatory permitting pro- cess provides necessary environmental safeguards. As the plaintiff’s contractor acknowledged, in removing the offending boulders with an excavator bucket, which he described as ‘‘not dentistry,’’ he displaced preex- isting material on the shoreline. When asked whether he could state with precision how much shoreline material was moved, he replied, ‘‘[n]o precision, I can’t tell you.’’ By contrast, the notice of violation, issued several weeks after the plaintiff claimed he had the boulders removed, specifically instructed the plaintiff to submit ‘‘a plan for review and approval to remove the unautho- rized stone seawall and restore the pre-existing vege- tated bluff . . . .’’ Had the plaintiff’s project complied with planning and review requirements at any point, he would not have proceeded in such a destructive and incautious manner. B The plaintiff also claims that the administrative hear- ing officer improperly rejected the expert testimony he presented regarding the location of the high tide line, when the department presented no expert testimony to conclusively establish that fact. The plaintiff specifi- cally contends that, in order to determine the depart- ment’s jurisdiction, there first must be a determination of the high tide line, which is a technically complex matter requiring expert evidence, and then that line must be related to the location of the seawall. Only when supported by such technical determinations, according to the plaintiff, would visual observations of physical evidence, such as pools of water and tidal vegetation on the seawall, be relevant. We disagree. The plaintiff’s argument originates from a mistaken premise: the critical question in the present case is not, as the plaintiff suggests, ‘‘where is the high tide line?’’ but, rather, ‘‘was this seawall constructed waterward of the high tide line?’’ In this case, the numerous photo- graphs showing direct evidence of water coming into contact with the seawall and the multitude of surveys of the plaintiff’s property consistently showing at least part of the seawall waterward of even the 5.7 foot eleva- tion claimed by the plaintiff to be the high tide line provide more than sufficient nontechnical evidence to determine that the seawall lies waterward of the high tide line. We recognize that, although the statutorily approved indicators of the high tide line—including oil or scum along shore objects, more or less continuous deposits of fine shell or debris, physical markings or characteris- tics, vegetation lines and tidal gauge—do not necessar- ily require specialized expertise for determination, in some cases technical sophistication may be required to evaluate conflicting evidence regarding the ambiguous implications of these indicators, particularly when it is not possible directly to observe that water comes into contact with a given spot. Had the plaintiff’s seawall been constructed ten feet landward of the existing sea- wall, as proposed in the plans submitted to the board, we would perhaps be faced with such a hard case. In the case of the seawall as actually built, we plainly are not. Thus, although the parties in this case presented conflicting evidence, some of which was technical in nature, regarding the presence of tidal vegetation at the location where the seawall was built and regarding the reliability of several tidal measurements offered by the department indicating a high tide line well above 5.7 feet, the hearing officer did not need to rely on such evidence t