Steer v. Town of Los Gatos

Filed 9/3/26; certified for publication Monday, 10/5/26 (order attached) IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ALISON STEER, H053166 (Santa Clara County Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 24CV429584) v. TOWN OF LOS GATOS et al., Defendants and Respondents, DARAN GOODSELL et al., Real Parties in Interest and Respondents. In 2023, the Town of Los Gatos (the Town) approved a lot line adjustment for three adjacent residential parcels, one of which contained an existing house, and two of which were unimproved. As a condition of the approval, the Town also agreed to accept an offer of dedication of property for a new cul-de-sac at the end of an existing street, to allow new ingress and egress for the two unimproved parcels and to satisfy the Town’s zoning code frontage requirements. The Town did not conduct review pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) 1 in connection with its approval, instead posting a notice of exemption on the basis that the project was statutorily exempt from CEQA as a 1 Pub. Resources Code § 21000, et seq. ministerial project in accordance with Public Resources Code section 21080, subdivision (b)(1), and CEQA Guidelines section 15268. 2 An adjacent homeowner—petitioner and appellant Alison Steer—filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the approval, arguing that the project was not ministerial because it included acceptance of the property dedication, which involved the exercise of discretion by the Town, and therefore was subject to CEQA. The trial court denied the petition, agreeing with the Town that the lot line adjustment was ministerial and exempt from CEQA. Steer appealed. We hold that, although a lot line adjustment is typically ministerial, the project approved here included a discretionary component—acceptance of the dedication of property—and therefore does not qualify for the ministerial exemption relied on by the Town. Accordingly, we reverse. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Lot line adjustment application The initial lot line adjustment application at issue in this case was submitted to the Town on April 19, 2023, by real party in interest Tony Jeans, an architect acting on behalf of the owners of the subject properties, real parties Daran Goodsell, as trustee, and Mark von Kaenel (together, real parties). The application, as subsequently revised, proposed to reconfigure the lot lines for three adjacent residential parcels located in the R1-20 zone within the Town. It also included a condition of approval requiring the 2 “CEQA is ‘implemented by an extensive series of administrative regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Natural Resources Agency.’ [Citation.] These regulations can be found at title 14, division 6, chapter 3 of the California Code of Regulations, and will be referred to as the ‘CEQA Guidelines.’ ” (Protecting Our Water & Environmental Resources v. County of Stanislaus (2020) 10 Cal.5th 479, 488, fn. 3 Protecting Our Water).) 2 landowners to make an offer of dedication to the Town of an easement for a cul-de-sac to satisfy ingress and egress and frontage requirements. 3 Under the existing configuration before the adjustment, the three parcels had the following lot sizes: 74,832 square feet (parcel 1), 11,226 square feet (parcel 2), and 48,112 square feet (parcel 3). Parcel 1 is improved with a single-family home, while parcels 2 and 3 are unimproved. Under the existing configuration, only parcel 1 has frontage to a street. Prior to the adjustment, parcels 2 and 3 were non-conforming with respect to several elements of the Town’s general plan, applicable specific plan, and zoning code. For instance, as relevant to this appeal, the R1-20 zone mandates a minimum lot size of 20,000 square feet, larger than parcel 2 before the adjustment. In addition, parcels in the R1-20 zone are required to have street frontage of at least 100 feet, or 30 feet for properties that front on a cul-de-sac bulb. The proposed reconfiguration would resolve these nonconformities. The adjustment would result in the following parcel sizes: 62,172 square feet (parcel 1), 27,073 square feet (parcel 2), and 44,925 square feet (parcel 3), thereby exceeding the minimum 20,000-square foot threshold for the R1-20 zone. To address the lack of adequate street frontage for parcels 2 and 3, the application proposed to make an offer of dedication to the Town of an easement for cul-de-sac right- of-way purposes at the end of an existing street. If the Town were to accept the 3 The April 19, 2023, application was the second lot line adjustment application submitted for these parcels by the same applicants. Although the record does not include any documents related to the initial application, it does refer to it, and states that the initial application was submitted in November 2020, and that the 2023 application sought to “cure the absence of certain factual information and the presence of certain procedural flaws in the Town’s” December 2021 approval of the initial application, which Steer had also challenged in court. According to the Town, its subsequent approval of the 2023 application superseded the initial application, and it obtained a stay in Steer’s first lawsuit. Because only the Town’s approval of the 2023 application is at issue in this appeal, we need not address the initial application further. 3 dedication, it would result in street frontage on a cul-de-sac bulb of 40 feet for parcel 2, and 60 feet for parcel 3. B. Lot line adjustment approval The Town’s development review commission approved the lot line adjustment application on August 15, 2023. The approval included certain conditions, most notably the offer of dedication by the property owners, and the requirement that the Town engineer accept the offer of dedication within 30 days. Steer appealed the development review commission’s decision to the Town’s planning commission, which denied the appeal on October 25, 2023. Steer then appealed that decision to the Town Council, which heard the matter on December 19, 2023. Steer argued, among other things, that approval of the lot line adjustment application was not ministerial, but rather was discretionary because it “required the exercise of judgment and imposition of conditions,” including the offer of dedication for the cul-de-sac, the acceptance of which would effectively create a new city street without environmental review. According to Steer, the Town violated CEQA because it had “made no effort to analyze the environmental impacts associated with the cul-de-sac, including for example, how many trees would have to be cut to make room for the-cul- de-sac, or how much grading, or how the new street would impact the site’s hydrology, storm drainage, traffic, etc.” Prior to the hearing, the staff report presented to the Town Council rejected Steer’s argument on the ground that Government Code section 66412, subdivision (d), “authorizes the Town to impose conditions of approval to ensure Zoning Code compliance and consistency.” 4 Because actual construction of the cul-de-sac was not 4 As discussed further below, Government Code section 66412, subdivision (d), provides in pertinent part that the Subdivision Map Act is inapplicable to a “lot line adjustment between four or fewer existing adjoining parcels, where the land taken from one parcel is added to an adjoining parcel, and where a greater number of parcels than (continued) 4 proposed or required as part of the lot line adjustment application—and any future construction purportedly would require discretionary environmental review—the staff report concluded that the Town’s decision was strictly ministerial. According to the staff report, “[t]he courts have determined that lot line adjustments pursuant to Government Code Section 66412(d) are ministerial approvals,” and it recommended that Steer’s appeal be denied. The Town acknowledged that a “line on the map will be added, showing dedication of a cul-de-sac to the Town, showing that each lot meets the minimum street frontage.” However, the Town added, the “Town Code does not require that property or street frontage be met only on fully developed roadways [and] … [¶] … no construction is proposed. No tree removals are proposed. No grading is proposed. This is a lot line adjustment application that simply shows how the properties will be accessed if and when development is proposed in the future.” The staff report also recommended modifying the language regarding the dedication of property for the cul-de-sac to provide that, within 90 days of approval of the lot line adjustment, the property owners of parcels 2 and 3 “shall make irrevocable offers of dedication of easement to the Town of the ‘Cul-De-Sac Area’ for right-of-way purposes (as that Cul-De-Sac Area is specifically delineated in the New Lot Line Adjustment Application (M-23-001) materials), and to the satisfaction of the Town Engineer, to ensure compliance with the minimum Town street frontage standards for cul-de-sacs.” Further, within 30 days of that dedication, the Town Engineer “shall accept such dedication(s) on behalf of the Town.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the Town Council denied the appeal and approved the lot line adjustment application. C. Notice of exemption originally existed is not thereby created, if the lot line adjustment is approved by the local agency, or advisory agency.” 5  On December 20, 2023, the Town filed a notice of exemption pursuant to Public Resources Code sections 21152 and 21080, subdivision (b)(1). 5 The Town included an attachment with the notice of exemption, in which it set forth its findings and determinations in support of the claimed exemption. The Town determined that the lot line adjustment application “requires ministerial project approval pursuant to CEQA as the application is only for ministerial approval of a lot line adjustment pursuant to Section 66412(d) of the Subdivision Map Act.” Specifically, it found that the application “does not include any additional requests for other Town permits, approvals, or entitlements, whether discretionary or ministerial.” Instead, the Town concluded that the application involved “only the proposed lot line adjustment of three existing and adjoining parcels… which, after adjustment, will result in three adjoining parcels with newly adjusted lot lines ….” According to the Town, its review and approval authority under Government Code section 66412, subdivision (d), is limited to “a determination of whether or not the parcels resulting from the lot line adjustment will conform to the local general plan, any applicable specific plan, any applicable coastal plan, and zoning and building ordinances.” The Town described that as a “prototypical ministerial approval process, where the fixed approval standards delineate objective approval criteria that simply require the hearing body to make certain factual determinations regarding the number of parcels involved, whether they are adjoining, whether they are four or fewer in number, 5 Public Resources Code section 21152, subdivision (b), provides: “If a local agency determines that a project is not subject to this division pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 21080, and the local agency approves or determines to carry out the project, the local agency or the person specified in subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 21065 may file a notice of exemption with the county clerk of each county in which the project will be located and with the State Clearinghouse in the Office of Planning and Research.” Public Resources Code section 21080, subdivision (b), provides that CEQA does not apply to “[m]inisterial projects proposed to be carried out or approved by public agencies.” 6 whether a greater number of parcels are created than were existing (after adjustment), and whether the resulting parcels conform to local law—e.g., general plan, specific plan, any coastal plan, and building and zoning code provisions—given the facts presented in the application.” As a result, the Town concluded, it had “no ability to exercise discretion to mitigate environmental impacts; and as such, the Town hearing body’s consideration of, and action on, [the lot line adjustment application] is a ministerial project proposed to be carried out or approved by the Town, and therefore is exempt from the requirements of CEQA.” With respect to the dedication and acceptance of property for the cul-de-sac, the Town stated that “the applicant is proposing a dedication of land as an easement for cul- de-sac right-of-way purposes, which is included as [a condition of approval]. Once this condition of approval is complied with and the Town accepts dedication of this area for the future cul-de-sac,” the adjusted parcels will comply with the minimum street frontage requirements in the Town’s zoning ordinance. D. Petition for writ of mandate Steer filed a petition for writ of mandate against the Town on January 22, 2024 (petition), naming Goodsell, Von Kaenel, and Jeans as real parties in interest. As relevant to this appeal, the petition alleged that the Town violated CEQA by approving the lot line adjustment application and failing to conduct CEQA review. According to the petition, the Town’s approval of the lot line adjustment was not ministerial “because it required exercise of discretion and imposition of conditions whose implementation requires exercise of judgment and could result in significant impacts.” Specifically, the petition alleged that the Town’s approval was not ministerial because “it required the applicant to dedicate an easement to the Town in order to create a new cul-de-sac (i.e., street) to ensure the resulting lots have adequate frontage on a Town street,” and that “[t]he creation of a new street was a discretionary decision which the 7 Town required without any consideration of potential environmental impacts or consistency with applicable General Plan policies or other regulations.” E. Hearing and order Following briefing, the matter came on for a hearing in the trial court on December 11, 2024. On January 17, 2025, the trial court issued its order denying the petition (order). The trial court addressed Steer’s argument that the Town’s approval was not ministerial because it had exercised its discretion by accepting the dedication of land for a cul-de-sac easement. The trial court rejected the argument for two reasons. First, it concluded that, even if acceptance of the dedication were considered to be discretionary, “it was unrelated to environmental impacts and therefore the approval remained ministerial for CEQA purposes under [Protecting Our Water & Environmental Resources v. County of Stanislaus (2020) 10 Cal.5th 479].” According to the trial court, Government Code section 66412, subdivision (d), “does not grant the Town discretion to address environmental concerns unless an applicable ‘local general plan,’ ‘applicable specific plan,’ or an applicable ‘zoning and building ordinance’ does so.” Relying on Sierra Club v. Napa County Board of Supervisors (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 162 (Sierra Club), the trial court stated that Government Code section 66412, subdivision (d), “describes a prototypical ministerial approval process, and indeed approval of a lot line adjustment application has been characterized as involving “only a ministerial decision,” as contrasted with a subdivision proposal. In other words, “the regulatory function of the approving agency is strictly circumscribed by the Legislature in a lot line adjustment, with very little authority as compared to the agency’s function and authority in connection with a subdivision.” ’ ” According to the trial court, the staff reports and the Town’s findings in support of the notice of exemption explained that “the purpose of the dedication of land for an easement (which does not require or establish that any cul-de-sac will ever be 8 constructed) was to make the [lot line adjustment] conform to Zoning Code requirements.” Second, the trial court stated, it was “not clear that the Town had any discretion to refuse an offer that would bring the [lot line adjustment] into compliance with a zoning requirement,” noting that the Town argued “it was required to accept the offered dedication.” Therefore, the trial court concluded, reviewing the matter as a “factual dispute over the applicability of an exemption, at a minimum the staff reports and the findings in the [notice of exemption] … constitute substantial evidence in the record supporting the finding that the [lot line adjustment] approval was ministerial and exempt from CEQA.” F. Judgment and appeal The trial court entered a judgment of dismissal on March 18, 2025. Steer timely appealed. II. DISCUSSION Steer argues on appeal that the Town’s approval of the lot line adjustment was not ministerial because it included the dedication of property and the creation of a new street. The Town violated CEQA, she contends, by failing to conduct environmental review in connection with this approval and improperly relying on the claimed exemption. Further, she argues, the Town made “an irrevocable commitment to the eventual construction of the cul-de-sac” and acknowledged that such construction would result in environmental impacts that require CEQA review. Notwithstanding that, she argues, the Town improperly deferred environmental analysis of the project as a whole, thereby foreclosing consideration of possible alternatives and mitigation measures related to the cul-de-sac. The Town argues that it lacked the discretion to deny or tailor the lot line adjustment application based on environmental concerns, so its reliance on the claimed ministerial exemption from CEQA was appropriate. 9  A. Applicable law We begin with a brief overview of the following areas of substantive law relevant to this appeal: (1) CEQA; (2) Government Code section 66412, subdivision (d); and (3) dedication and acceptance of property. 1. CEQA a. General principles The Legislature enacted CEQA to “(1) inform the government and public about a proposed activity’s potential environmental impacts; (2) identify ways to reduce, or avoid, those impacts; (3) require project changes through alternatives or mitigation measures when feasible; and (4) disclose the government’s rationale for approving a project.” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 488, citing California Building Industry Assn. v. Bay Area Air Quality Management Dist. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 369, 382.) The statutory scheme “prescribes how governmental decisions will be made whenever an agency undertakes, approves, or funds a project.” (Protecting Our Water, supra, at p. 488, citing Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1171, 1185 (Medical Marijuana Patients).) “Under CEQA, an agency uses ‘a multistep decision tree.’ ” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 488, quoting Medical Marijuana Patients, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1185; see also, CEQA Guidelines, § 15002, subd. (k).) “Once an activity is determined to be a project, the next question is whether the project is exempt. [Citations.] Many types of projects, as well as all ministerial ones, are exempted.” (Protecting Our Water, supra, at p. 488, citing Pub. Resources Code, § 21080, subd. (b)(1) [exemption for ministerial projects]; CEQA Guidelines, § 15268, subd. (a) [same]; see also, Sunflower Alliance v. Department of Conservation (2026) 20 Cal.5th 22, 41 [only if a proposed activity qualifies as a project does the agency then “proceed to the second step of the CEQA decision tree” to determine whether it is exempt from CEQA], citing California 10 Building Industry Assn. v. Bay Area Air Quality Management Dist. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 369, 382.) b. Definition and scope of a “project” CEQA defines a “project” as “an activity which may cause either a direct physical change in the environment, or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment, and which is any of the following: [¶] (a) An activity directly undertaken by any public agency[;] [¶] (b) An activity undertaken by a person which is supported, in whole or in part, through contracts, grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of assistance from one or more public agencies[;] or [¶] (c) An activity that involves the issuance to a person of a lease, permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for use by one or more public agencies.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21065.) Under this definition, there are two essential elements of a project for purposes of CEQA. First, there must be some exercise of powers by a public agency, including, as relevant here, approval of private activities. Second, the activity must cause either a direct, or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change, in the environment. In other words, an exercise of powers by a public agency that does not have the potential to cause a physical change in the environment is not a project and is not subject to CEQA. (Medical Marijuana Patients, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1186; see also, Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372, 380 (Muzzy Ranch Co.) [“An activity that is not a ‘project’ as defined in the Public Resources Code (see § 21065) and the CEQA Guidelines (see § 15378) is not subject to CEQA.”].) The CEQA Guidelines further define “project” as the “whole of an action.” (CEQA Guidelines, § 15378, subd. (a).) Courts have interpreted the term “project” broadly to ensure that “ ‘the requirements of CEQA “cannot be avoided by chopping up proposed projects into bite-size pieces” which, when taken individually, may have no significant adverse effect on the environment.’ ” (Tuolumne County Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Sonora (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1223, citations 11 omitted (Tuolumne County Citizens).) “A public agency is not permitted to subdivide a single project into smaller individual subprojects in order to avoid the responsibility of considering the environmental impact of the project as a whole.” (Orinda Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 1145, 1171.) c. Exemptions Even if a public agency activity has the potential to cause a physical change in the environment—and is therefore a project—it may nevertheless be exempt from CEQA on various grounds. First, CEQA expressly exempts numerous types of projects by statute. (See, e.g., Muzzy Ranch Co., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 380; Pub. Resources Code, § 21080, subd. (b)(1), (2); CEQA Guidelines, §§ 15061(b)(1), 15260.) One such statutory exemption is for ministerial projects. (Pub. Resources Code, § 21080, subd. (b)(1).) Second, the CEQA Guidelines list various categorical exemptions or “classes of projects” which have been “determined to be exempt per se because they do not have a significant effect on the environment.” (Muzzy Ranch Co., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 380; CEQA Guidelines, § 15300 et seq.) Third, “[a] project that qualifies for neither a statutory nor a categorical exemption may nonetheless be found exempt under what is sometimes called the ‘common sense’ exemption, which applies ‘[w]here it can be seen with certainty that there is no possibility that the activity in question may have a significant effect on the environment.’ ” (Muzzy Ranch Co., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 380, citing CEQA Guidelines, § 15061, subd. (b)(3); Davidon Homes v. City of San Jose (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 106, 113–118.) If an agency concludes that a project is exempt from CEQA, “it may file a notice of exemption, citing legal and factual support for its conclusion.” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 488, citing Pub. Resources Code, § 21152, subd. (b); CEQA Guidelines, § 15062, subd. (a).) “If the project is discretionary and does not qualify for any other exemption, the agency must conduct an environmental review.” (Protecting 12 Our Water, supra, at p. 488, citing Medical Marijuana Patients, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1186.) d. Ministerial vs. discretionary projects In Protecting Our Water, the California Supreme Court provided a thorough overview of the distinction between ministerial and discretionary projects in a CEQA context. In determining whether a project is ministerial or discretionary, the “ ‘key question is whether the public agency can use its subjective judgment to decide whether and how to carry out or approve [the] project.’ ” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 493, quoting CEQA Guidelines, §§ 15357, 15002, subd. (i).) “ ‘Whether an agency has discretionary or ministerial controls over a project depends on the authority granted by the law providing the controls over the activity.’ ” (Protecting Our Water, supra, at p. 493, quoting CEQA Guidelines, § 15002, subd. (i)(2).) “Ministerial projects are those in which the agency merely determines ‘conformity with applicable statutes, ordinances, regulations, or other fixed standards.’ ” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 493, quoting CEQA Guidelines, § 15357.) “If the law requires an agency ‘to act on a project in a set way without allowing the agency to use its own judgment,’ the project is ministerial.” (Protecting Our Water, supra, at p. 493, quoting CEQA Guidelines, § 15002, subd. (i)(1).) “Courts have developed a functional test to further refine this distinction.” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 493, citing Friends of Juana Briones House v. City of Palo Alto (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 286, 302 (Friends of Juana Briones House).) “The ‘touchstone’ is whether the relevant ‘approval process ... allows the government to shape the project in any way [by requiring modifications] which could respond to any of the concerns which might be identified’ by environmental review.” (Protecting Our Water, supra, at p. 493, citing Friends of Westwood, Inc. v. City of Los 13 Angeles (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 259, 267 (Friends of Westwood); Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Commission (1997) 16 Cal.4th 105, 117 (Mountain Lion).) If the government agency can shape the project in that manner, it is discretionary. (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 493.) On the other hand, “a project is ministerial ‘when a private party can legally compel approval without any changes in the design of its project which might alleviate adverse environmental consequences.’ ” (Id. at pp. 493–494, quoting Friends of Westwood, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 267.) “The statutory distinction between discretionary and purely ministerial projects implicitly recognizes that unless a public agency [is authorized to] shape the project in a way that would respond to concerns raised in an EIR, or its functional equivalent, environmental review would be a meaningless exercise.” (Mountain Lion, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 117.) Thus, “even if a statute grants an agency some discretionary authority over an aspect of a project, the project is ministerial for CEQA purposes if the agency lacks authority to address environmental impacts.” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 494, citing McCorkle Eastside Neighborhood Group v. City of St. Helena (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 80, 94 (McCorkle) [“agency’s power to conduct an aesthetic design review did not make a project discretionary because the agency ‘lack[ed] ... any discretion to address environmental effects’ ”].) “Conversely if the agency is empowered to disapprove or condition approval of a project based on environmental concerns that might be uncovered by CEQA review, the project is discretionary.” (Protecting Our Water, supra, at p. 494.) 2. Government Code section 66412, subdivision (d) The Subdivision Map Act is set forth in Government Code sections 66410 through 66499.41. (Cox v. City of Oakland (2025) 17 Cal.5th 362, 368 (Cox).) “The Subdivision Map Act ‘is the “primary regulatory control” governing the subdivision of real property in California.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Gardner v. County of Sonoma (2003) 29 Cal.4th 990, 996 (Gardner).) “In general, the [Subdivision Map Act] requires a landowner wanting to 14 divide real property to first seek local governmental approval of a map detailing various aspects of the proposed subdivision.” (Cox, supra, at p. 368, citing Gardner, supra, at p. 997.) The purpose of the Subdivision Map Act “is to give the legislative bodies of local agencies the power to regulate and control the design and improvement of subdivisions [Gov. Code, § 66411], with consideration for, among other matters, the location and size of required easements and rights of way for access for the use of the lot owners and local neighborhood traffic [Gov. Code, §§ 66418, 66419] and the design of street alignments, grades and widths. [Gov. Code, §§ 66418.]” (Mikels v. Rager (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 334, 354 (Mikels).) Government Code section 66412 specifies certain activities to which the Subdivision Map Act does not apply. For instance, subdivision (d) of that statute, as relevant here, provides that the Subdivision Map Act does not apply to: “A lot line adjustment between four or fewer existing adjoining parcels, where the land taken from one parcel is added to an adjoining parcel, and where a greater number of parcels than originally existed is not thereby created, if the lot line adjustment is approved by the local agency, or advisory agency. A local agency or advisory agency shall limit its review and approval to a determination of whether or not the parcels resulting from the lot line adjustment will conform to the local general plan, any applicable specific plan, any applicable coastal plan, and zoning and building ordinances. An advisory agency or local agency shall not impose conditions or exactions on its approval of a lot line adjustment except to conform to the local general plan, any applicable specific plan, any applicable coastal plan, and zoning and building ordinances, to require the prepayment of real property taxes prior to the approval of the lot line adjustment, or to facilitate the relocation of existing utilities, infrastructure, or easements. No tentative map, parcel map, or final map shall be required as a condition to the approval of a lot line adjustment. The 15 lot line adjustment shall be reflected in a deed, which shall be recorded.” (Gov. Code, § 66412, subd. (d).) As one court has explained, “according to the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the statute, the Legislature has excluded from the Subdivision Map Act lot line adjustments meeting the following criteria: (1) the adjustment is between four or fewer parcels; (2) the parcels must be adjoining; (3) the adjustment does not result in more parcels than originally existed; and (4) the lot line adjustment is approved by the local agency.” (Sierra Club, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 173.) The Sierra Club court further described the statute as “exemp[ting] from discretionary reviews, exactions and conditions those lot line adjustments that fit the specifications of section 66412(d). Local agency review is expressly limited to determining whether the resulting lots will conform to the local general plan, any applicable specific or coastal plan, and building and zoning ordinances. [Citation.] Section 66412 describes a prototypical ministerial approval process, and indeed approval of a lot line adjustment application has been characterized as involving ‘only a ministerial decision,’ as contrasted with a subdivision proposal.” (Sierra Club, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 179, quoting Loewenstein v. City of Lafayette (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 718, 721.) “In other words, ‘the regulatory function of the approving agency is strictly circumscribed by the Legislature in a lot line adjustment, with very little authority as compared to the agency’s function and authority in connection with a subdivision.’ ” (Sierra Club, supra, at p. 179, quoting San Dieguito Partnership v. City of San Diego (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 748, 760 (San Dieguito Partnership).) 3. Dedication and acceptance of property A dedication is “the transfer of an interest in real property to a public entity for the public’s use.” (Fogarty v. City of Chico (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 537, 543, citing Branciforte Heights, LLC v. City of Santa Cruz (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 914, 927 & fn. 7; Rohn v. City of Visalia (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1463, 1470; see also, Gov. Code, § 66475 16 et seq. [regulating various types of dedications].) A dedication of property “means that a private landowner transfers an interest in real property to the public.” (Prout v. Department of Transportation (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 200, 212 (Prout), citing Scher v. Burke (2017) 3 Cal.5th 136, 141.) “Private land may be dedicated to public use either under controlling principles of common law or pursuant to statutes such as the Subdivision Map Act.” (Prout, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 212, citing Biagini v. Beckham (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1014– 1015; see also, Gov. Code, § 7050 [irrevocable offers of dedication].) “A statutory dedication is effected when, in compliance with the map act then in force, an offer of dedication is accepted by the public agency.” (Scott v. City of Del Mar (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1302.) “Where a private road has been offered for public dedication, that offer may be accepted either by formal action of the public entity or by public use.” (Wright v. City of Morro Bay (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 767, 770.) “Dedication by map or plat has been a common method of dedicating land to public use for street purposes.” (Prout, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 213, citing Flavio v. McKenzie (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 549, 553 (Flavio) [“The act of recording, i.e., filing, the map showing defined areas for streets is an offer to dedicate that land for street purposes”].) Offers of dedication are generally governed by contract principles. (Shenson v. County of Contra Costa (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1172, citing Mikels, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at pp. 353–354 & fn. 3.) “Such offers must be accepted before they create binding obligations, and a ‘qualified acceptance of the offer of dedication [does] not result in a completed dedication of a public easement.’ ” (Mikels, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 353; citing Biagini, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1009; Copeland v. City of Oakland (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 717, 722 [“conditional nature of public entity’s acceptance prevents creation of public liability for street”].) 17  With respect to the creation of a street or portion thereof, the Streets and Highways Code provides that “no public or private street or road shall become a city street or road until the governing body, by resolution, has caused the street or road to be accepted into the city street system.” (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 1806, subd. (b).) The origin of that statute “lies in the common law of dedication of an interest in land to the public for a public use, under which an owner may show his intention to dedicate by an explicit offer which may be written or oral.” (Re-Open Rambla, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1506.) “The offer also ‘may be inferred from the owner’s long acquiescence in a public use of the property under circumstances which negative the idea that the use was under a license’ or from adverse and continuous public use. [Citation.] The offer, however, ‘must be accepted by the public[,] [a]nd acceptance may be formal, as by resolution or ordinance, or by user.’ ” (Ibid.) B. Standard of review An appellate court’s review in a CEQA case “ ‘is the same as the trial court’s: [It] reviews the agency’s action, not the trial court’s decision; in that sense appellate judicial review under CEQA is de novo.’ ” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 495, quoting Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 427.) We independently determine whether the record demonstrates any legal error by the agency and deferentially consider whether the record “ ‘contains substantial evidence to support [the agency’s] factual determinations.’ ” (Ibid.) The particular standard of review of an agency’s decision under CEQA “depends on the nature of the action being reviewed and when in the multitiered process it occurred.” (Sierra Club v. County of Sonoma (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 11, 23 (County of Sonoma).) Here, we are reviewing the Town’s determination that its approval of the lot line adjustment—which included a condition requiring that, within 30 days of dedication of the easement, the Town Engineer “shall accept such dedication(s) on behalf of the 18 Town”—was exempt from CEQA because the action was ministerial. In such circumstances, we review for a prejudicial abuse of discretion under Public Resources Code section 21168.5. (Id., citing Muzzy Ranch Co., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 381; see also, Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 495.) An abuse of discretion exists where the agency did not proceed in the manner required by law or if the determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence. (County of Sonoma, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 23; Pub. Resources Code, § 21168.5.) Within the context of that standard, though, where an agency’s exemption conclusion involves factual determinations, we review those for substantial evidence. (County of Sonoma, supra, at p. 24, citing Save Our Carmel River v. Monterey Peninsula Water Management Dist. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 677, 694.) By contrast, where an agency’s determination that an activity is exempt involves only pure questions of law, we review those questions de novo. (County of Sonoma, at p. 24, citing Friends of Juana Briones House, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 303; Prentiss v. City of South Pasadena (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 85, 89.) 6 C. Analysis 1. The approved project consisted of the lot line adjustment and the dedication and acceptance of the property 6 The Town argues that, because review here proceeds under Public Resources Code section 21168.5, rather than section 21168—and therefore as a traditional mandamus proceeding under Code of Civil P