Russian Riverkeeper v. County of Sonoma

Filed 8/4/26 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO RUSSIAN RIVERKEEPER et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, A172760 v. COUNTY OF SONOMA, (Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SCV-273415) Defendant and Appellant. In 2023, the County of Sonoma amended its local ordinance regulating approval of groundwater well permits. Russian Riverkeeper and California Coastkeeper Alliance (together, Keepers) challenged the amendments in superior court, arguing that in amending the ordinance Sonoma failed to fulfill its duties under the public trust doctrine and also failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.; CEQA). The superior court agreed with Keepers on both points and issued a writ of mandate, setting aside the amended ordinance. On appeal, Sonoma asks us to reverse. We conclude Keepers failed to satisfy their burden of showing Sonoma’s public trust analysis was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, but we agree with the superior court that substantial evidence does not support Sonoma’s claimed exemptions from CEQA review. As we will discuss, the distinct burdens of proof and standards of review applicable to each claim require this split. Therefore, we reverse the superior 1 court’s determination that Sonoma violated the public trust doctrine but affirm the court’s conclusion that Sonoma failed to comply with CEQA. BACKGROUND “ ‘By the law of nature these things are common to mankind—the air, running water, the sea and consequently the shores of the sea.’ ” (National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 419, 433–434 (National Audubon), quoting Institutes of Justinian 2.1.1.) The public trust doctrine evolved from the concept that “the sovereign owns ‘all of its navigable waterways and the lands lying beneath them “as trustee of a public trust for the benefit of the people.” ’ ” 1 (National Audubon, at p. 434.) In California, the public trust doctrine imposes “an affirmative duty” upon the state “to take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible.” (Id. at p. 446.) The events in this appeal were set in motion by a 2018 Court of Appeal decision, which held that counties, as subdivisions of the state, share the state’s “responsibility for administering the public trust.” (Environmental Law Foundation v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 844, 855, 868 (Environmental Law Foundation).) Specifically, the Third District determined in Environmental Law Foundation that “the public trust doctrine impose[d] a fiduciary duty on the County” of Siskiyou to consider the public trust in permitting groundwater wells that impacted navigable waterways (i.e., public trust resources). (Id. at pp. 855, 861.) To comply with its public trust duties, Sonoma amended its well permitting ordinance; Keepers challenge that amendment in these proceedings. 1 Navigable waters are those “which are capable of being navigated by oar or motor-propelled small craft.” (People ex rel. Baker v. Mack (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 1040, 1050; see also Harb. & Nav. Code, § 100 [navigable waters defined].) 2  I. Factual Background In Sonoma, the main stem of the Russian River is considered a navigable waterway protected by the public trust doctrine. (See Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park Dist. (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 560, 570–571 [“the Russian River from Alexander Valley Bridge to the Del Rio Dam” is “navigable in law”].) The Russian River also serves as a critical habitat to threatened and endangered species like the Central California Coast Coho salmon, the California Costal Chinook salmon, and the Central California Coast steelhead trout (collectively, salmonids). However, “[g]roundwater extraction has the potential to impact groundwater dependent ecosystems” such as those of anadromous salmonids, which “require sufficient water depths . . . in order to reach spawning areas.” Sonoma relies on more than “45,000 water wells, the most per capita in any county in California,” to supply water for agriculture, residential, commercial, and industrial users in unincorporated areas. Consequently, between 2017 and 2022, Sonoma issued an average of 320 permits for groundwater wells each year. Sonoma regulates the “procedures, construction standards and setbacks, destruction, and water treatment” of groundwater wells through Chapter 25B of the Sonoma County Code (Chapter 25B). The 2015 version of Chapter 25B allowed Sonoma to issue groundwater well permits on a “purely ministerial basis,” meaning permit applications were “subject to objective codified standards, which, if met, result[ed] in permit.” 2 Thus, according to a 2 In 2015, Sonoma amended Chapter 25B to comply with Water Code section 13801, which, in relevant part, requires counties to “adopt a water well . . . drilling and abandonment ordinance” that meets or exceeds certain requirements. (Wat. Code, § 13801, subd. (c).) Sonoma requests we take judicial notice of an earlier version of Chapter 25B, which purportedly 3 report prepared by Sonoma, between 2015 and 2023, Chapter 25B did not “explicitly require consideration of impacts to public trust resources for individual well permits.” In 2023, in response to Environmental Law Foundation and an ensuing lawsuit by the California Coastkeeper Alliance, Sonoma amended Chapter 25B in an attempt to comply with its public trust duties. A. The Amendment Process The Sonoma Board of Supervisors (the Board) held its first hearing on potential amendments to Chapter 25B on August 9, 2022. Sonoma staff presented on the public trust doctrine and the proposed amendments, and members of the public, including Keepers, offered comments in response. After the hearing, the Board sought more information and directed staff to coordinate with the relevant governmental agencies and engage in public outreach. In September 2022, Sonoma released a revised version of the proposed amendments to Chapter 25B for public review and held four outreach meetings to explain the revisions, solicit feedback, and answer questions. On October 4, 2022, Sonoma held a noticed public hearing on the proposed amendments. After the hearing, the Board requested more analysis and demonstrates that Sonoma “had issued well permits on a purely ministerial basis since 1972.” Keepers oppose the request because (1) Sonoma did not make the request for judicial notice below, and (2) the 1972 version is not relevant to this appeal. Because Sonoma’s groundwater well permitting process in 1972 is not relevant to this appeal, we deny the request for judicial notice. (See, e.g., San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v. State Lands Com. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 202, 231 (San Francisco Baykeeper) [declining request to take judicial notice of California Coastal Commission letter as not relevant]; Roth v. Jelley (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 655, 678, fn. 10 [declining judicial notice request because the documents “are not relevant to the issues raised in this appeal”].) 4 directed staff “to convene a Technical Advisory Committee to advise on proposed amendments to Chapter 25B.” The Board planned to revisit the matter in six months (April 2023); however, to prevent “an undue rush on well permitting” during the intervening period, the Board imposed a temporary moratorium on new well permits from October 4, 2022, to April 2023, except for emergencies. The Board convened a policy working group and a separate technical working group to report on the “best available science and policies for development of a well ordinance.” Members of the policy working group “represent[ed], solicit[ed], and integrate[d] community and stakeholder interests into recommendations on the revised well ordinance,” while the technical working group “advise[d] on the analytical processes necessary to implement any potential policies,” focusing on “technical development through data compilation, modeling, and other measures to better understand the interconnection of public trust surface waters and groundwater.” The working groups were comprised of scientific experts, public agencies, conservation groups, and community members, and each group considered and evaluated well classifications, monitoring and metering requirements, adverse impacts, conservation measures, and medium- and long-term policy options. The working groups engaged in six independent meetings and three joint meetings between November 2022 and March 2023. Additionally, the groups meet weekly with Matthew O’Connor, Ph.D., a hydrologist with O’Connor Environmental, Inc., who provided technical support services and helped working group members review and interpret hydrological data. 5  In March 2023, O’Connor issued a report, titled “Sonoma County Well Ordinance Public Trust Review Area Delineation” (the O’Connor report). The O’Connor report identified areas where groundwater pumping (“streamflow depletion”) could affect navigable waters and salmonid habitats, 3 which it designated as “Public Trust Review Area” (PTRA). The PTRA was identified using a “risk-based approach” that considered “two primary factors”: “Significant Resource Sensitivity” and “Significant Existing Streamflow Depletion.” Waterways within Sonoma, including non-navigable waterways, were ranked from “low” to “high” or “very high” based on the sensitivity of the salmonid habitats and the level of existing streamflow depletion. Areas that ranked as “moderate risk” to “high risk” in either habitat value or streamflow depletion were included in the PTRA, while areas that were classified as “low risk” for both habitat value and streamflow depletion were excluded from the PTRA. In high risk areas, the PTRA included the entire sub-watershed “to be protective of both acute and cumulative streamflow depletion impacts.” In moderate risk areas, the PTRA “consists of stream buffers,” which are areas that extend anywhere from 100 feet to 750 feet from the stream based on “the transmissivity and storativity of the aquifer and the distance of the well from the stream.” Also in March 2023, the working groups issued an “Outcome and Recommendations Report” that provided “recommendations and options of how” Sonoma could satisfy its public trust obligations that included “[c]umulative impact considerations.” Using the PTRA framework, the working groups recommended categorizing well permit applications by level 3 Salmonids were used as “indicator species” because they are “sensitive to streamflow depletion” and “represent overall sensitivity of [public trust resources].” 6 of review; permits would be subject to either “ministerial (routine)” review or “discretionary (more tailored) review” based on location and well type. Wells outside of the PTRA would be subject to ministerial review. Wells within the PTRA would be subject to discretionary review unless the well “fit into defined ministerial well classes.” The working groups also recommended two levels of water conservation requirements that would be applicable to “[n]early all wells in the public trust review area,” “except public water wells, which fall under local government and/or State Water Board jurisdiction.” Additional metering and monitoring requirements were recommended “to increase data collecting to improve water use estimates.” After considering the working groups’ recommendations and additional comments from the public, the Board adopted the proposed amendments on April 18, 2023. The Board did not conduct an independent environmental review under CEQA because it determined the Class 7, Class 8, and the common sense exemptions applied. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14,4 §§ 15307, 15308, 15061, subd. (b)(3).) B. The Amendment of Chapter 25B 5 The purpose of the amendments, as stated in Chapter 25B, “is to protect the environment, public health and safety, and groundwater resource[s]” and “to address the County’s public trust obligation.” (Ch. 25B, § 25B-2, subds. (a), (b).) As amended, Chapter 25B provides: “All water well 4 We refer to the CEQA guidelines (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, §§ 15000– 15387) as the Guidelines. 5 Further references and citations to Chapter 25B are to the version amended in 2023 unless otherwise noted. 7 applications shall be reviewed for potential adverse impacts on public trust resources, except as provided in this Chapter.” (Id., § 25B-4, subd. (d)(1).) Adopting the PTRA framework set forth in the O’Connor report, Chapter 25B created a “Public Trust Review Area,” which it defined as “the area estimated to be where the underlying aquifer is interconnected with navigable surface waters or a tributary stream that flows to a navigable water and which is based on available information indicating groundwater extraction may impact public trust resources including instream habitat of anadromous fish.” 6 (Ch. 25B, § 25B-4, subd. (d)(2).) Consistent with the working groups’ recommendations, Chapter 25B created two categories of permit applications: “Discretionary” permit applications and “Ministerial” applications. (Ch. 25B, § 25B-5, subd. (d)(1), (2).) For discretionary permits, the applicant must provide “sufficient” information to determine whether issuing a permit will “cause or exacerbate a substantial adverse impact on public trust resources after imposition of feasible mitigation measures.” 7 (Id., § 25B-4, subd. (d)(3).) “Applications not subject to the [discretionary] public trust limitation are subject to ministerial review,” meaning the application “shall be approved” if it otherwise complies with the Sonoma County Code. (Id., § 25B-5, subd. (e)(1), (2).) Certain categories of wells were “exempt from the discretionary public trust review,” and thus subject to ministerial approval, because they pose a “low potential for impacts to public trust resources” or involve an “overriding 6 Chapter 25B includes a “map of the Public Trust Review Area,” which may be updated “[f]rom time to time,” at the Board’s discretion. (Ch. 25B, § 25B-4, subd. (d)(2).) As initially adopted, the PTRA “covers 313 square miles (19% of the County).” 7 In their briefing to us, Keepers represent that the discretionary review process “is not at issue in this lawsuit.” 8 public interest in favor of ensuring adequate water supply for existing and domestic uses.” (Ch. 25B, § 25B- 4, subd. (e).) As relevant, these exemptions include: (1) “water well[s] outside the Public Trust Review Area”; (2) “Low Water Use” wells, “where the cumulative groundwater use from all wells on a parcel” is limited to two acre-feet per year (AFY), and the well owner complies with metering and monitoring requirements and Level 1 conservation measures8; (3) “Existing Use” wells, “where the cumulative groundwater use from all wells on the parcel” is limited to amounts historically used as of October 4, 2022 (the start of the mortarium), provided the owner complies with metering and monitoring requirements and Level 1 and 2 conservation measures 9; and (4) “Net Zero Groundwater Increase” wells, “where the proposed use of water may increase but not result in a net increase in groundwater use from the local aquifer through implementation of water conservation measures . . . or participation in a streamflow augmentation project authorized by the California Department of Fish and Wildlife or National Marine Fisheries Service, provided that” the well complies with metering and monitoring requirements and Level 1 and 2 8 Level 1 water conservation requirements include efficient faucets and showerheads; leak and water conservation audits; water efficient landscaping; a limit on “irrigated grass lawns”; disconnection of downspouts and redirection of roof rainwater to a location that “maximized infiltration and minimizes erosion”; and compliance with applicable water conservation requirements “that are consistent with or more protective than the requirements of this Chapter.” (Ch. 25B, § 25B-13, subd. (b).) 9 Level 2 water conservation requirements include efficient water closets and urinals; a water conservation plan “to reduce groundwater use to the maximum extent feasible” for commercial, industrial, and institutional sites; a conservation plan and “a frost protection plan” for agricultural sites using greater than two AFY of water; and “growing season” use limits for vineyards. (Ch. 25B, § 25B-13, subd. (a).) 9 conservation requirements, and the applicant demonstrates through a hydrogeologist prepared “groundwater recharge plan and report” that “enhanced ground water recharge” fully offsets “the proposed net increase in water extraction.” (Ch. 25B, § 25B-4, subd. (e)(2), (6)–(8).) To comply with the meeting and monitoring requirements, well owners were required to install, maintain, and report to Sonoma’s “Permit and Resource Management Department” monthly readings from “totalizing water meters” that “measure[d] all groundwater extracted from the well,” and monitor and report on “water levels within the well . . . at least monthly.” 10 (Ch. 25B, §§ 25B-5, subd. (a); 25B-12, subd. (a).) Sonoma “anticipated” and “expected” that net groundwater use by existing users would decrease over time through the implementation of Level 1 and Level 2 conservation efforts but could not “quantify” any water savings due to “uncertainty” in its estimates. Under the amended Chapter 25B, Sonoma retained the right to inspect well sites before and after permit issuance, to deny noncompliant applications, and to revoke or modify permits if “circumstances under which the permit was granted have changed and the public health, safety, and welfare require” or if the permitted work violated applicable ordinances. (Ch. 25B, §§ 25B-5, subd. (e)(7); 25B-10, subd. (d).) “Any interested person” could appeal the discretionary approval or rejection of a well application to the Board, which, if requested by the permitting agency, could approve a 10 Certain wells were exempt from the metering and monitoring requirements. Wells that serviced a single parcel of land for solely residential purposes with a cumulative groundwater use of two acre-feet per year (AFY) or less of water were exempt from both the metering and monitoring requirements. (Ch. 25B, § 25B-12.) Wells with a “cumulative groundwater use of 5.0 acre-feet or less of water per year” were exempted from only the monitoring requirement. (Id., § 25B-12, subd. (b).) 10 permit where the “overriding considerations that balance the protection of public trust resources with the health, safety and welfare needs of the community, including the need for drinking water” warranted. (Id., § 25B-4, subd. (d)(6), (7).) II. Procedural Background In May 2023, Keepers filed a petition for writ of mandate and declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking to invalidate the amended ordinance and enjoin Sonoma from issuing groundwater well permits. In August 2024, after briefing and a hearing on the merits, the superior court granted the petition in full. Specifically, the court found that the Keepers satisfied their burden of showing the amendments lacked evidence in support of the public trust because “there is no evidence or analysis supporting the Amendment and that such evidence or analysis is necessary in order to determine the efficacy of the Amendment’s terms as well as what is feasible.” The court further found that Sonoma failed to support its finding that the amended ordinance was exempt from CEQA review. On October 30, 2024, the court entered judgment, setting aside the amendments to Chapter 25B, rescinding the categorical exemptions to CEQA review, and suspending the issuance of non-emergency well permits “unless and until [Sonoma] has complied with the requirements of the Public Trust Doctrine.” Sonoma filed a notice of intent and motion for new trial, which the court denied. Sonoma filed a timely notice of appeal from the October 2024 judgment. DISCUSSION On appeal, Sonoma asserts three grounds for reversal. With regard to the public trust doctrine, Sonoma argues that we should “decline to follow” Environmental Law Foundation and reverse judgment because Keepers did 11 not satisfy their burden of proof in challenging the amended ordinance. Regarding CEQA, Sonoma claims that substantial evidence supports its determination that the amended ordinance is exempt from review and Keepers failed to demonstrate otherwise. Lastly, Sonoma argues the judgment must be reversed because it is procedurally and substantively defective. 11 I. Public Trust Doctrine “The public trust doctrine has been part of California law since the state’s admission to the Union in 1850.” (World Business Academy v. California State Lands Com. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 476, 508 (World Business Academy); see also Pub. Resources Code, § 6009, subd. (a) [“California received title to the tidelands, submerged lands, and beds of navigable lakes and rivers . . . subject to the public trust”].) While initially dedicated to tidelands and navigable waters, the public trust doctrine now “extends to nontidal bodies such as inland waterways and lakes, the lands beneath them, as well as any streams and tributaries that affect any navigable waters.” (Personal Watercraft Coalition v. Marin County Bd. of Supervisors (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 129, 144 (Personal Watercraft).) Under the doctrine, the 11 We granted leave for five amici curiae to submit briefs in support of the parties. In support of Sonoma, California Water Agencies and California State Association of Counties filed briefs generally arguing we should not follow Environmental Law Foundation. In support of Keepers, Environmental Law Foundation and California Law Professors argue in favor of following Environmental Law Foundation; California Law Professors also “explain[ ] the relevant legal standards” for reviewing compliance with the public trust doctrine but does not take a position on “whether [Sonoma] satisfied this duty.” Each party submitted a consolidated brief in response to these amici. Additionally, Endangered Habitats League filed a brief in support of Keepers, arguing Sonoma failed to comply with CEQA, to which Sonoma responded in a separate brief. 12 state owns public trust resources “ ‘as trustee for public purposes’ ” and “has an obligation to regulate the use of these lands for the general benefit of the community.” (World Business Academy, at p. 509.) The public trust doctrine is “more than an affirmation of state power to use public property for public purposes.” (National Audubon, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 441.) It also imposes an affirmative “duty . . . to protect the people’s common heritage” and specifically “to take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible.” (Id. at pp. 441, 446 [requiring public agency to consider public trust in diverting water from streams running into Mono Lake].) A. Environmental Law Foundation v. State Water Resources Control Board In Environmental Law Foundation, the Court of Appeal answered the “extraordinarily narrow” question of “whether the County and the Board have common law fiduciary duties to consider the potential adverse impact of groundwater extraction on the Scott River, a public trust resource, when issuing well permits.” (Environmental Law Foundation, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at pp. 851–852.) The Environmental Law Foundation court concluded the County of Siskiyou did bear such public trust duties but declined to “attempt to define the common law public trust duties of the Board or the County” in “any hypothetical factual scenarios.” (Id. at p. 852.) “Although the state as sovereign is primarily responsible for administration of the trust,” Environmental Law Foundation held, “the county, as a subdivision of the state, shares responsibility for administering the public trust and ‘may not approve of destructive activities without giving due regard to the preservation of those resources.’ ” (Environmental Law Foundation, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 868, quoting Center for Biological 13 Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1370, fn. 19 (Center for Biological Diversity) [“If plaintiffs believe that the board of supervisors or any other agency or subdivision of the state has failed to discharge its responsibilities under the public trust, they may bring an appropriate action against those agencies”].) We are not persuaded by Sonoma’s argument that Environmental Law Foundation “is flat wrong.” As Sonoma frames the issue, the state has “sole authority to administer the public trust,” and “the only way that a county can ‘share’ in the State’s responsibility to administer the public trust is if the Legislature expressly delegates its affirmative duty.” “Such a delegation never occurred here,” says Sonoma, which describes Environmental Law Foundation as “an anomaly” that we should not follow. Although not binding, “we ordinarily follow the decisions of other districts without good reason to disagree,” and we see no reason to disagree with Environmental Law Foundation. (Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. County of Santa Clara (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 480, 485.) First, Environmental Law Foundation builds upon Center for Biological Diversity, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at page 1369, in which Division Three of this appellate district explained that “plaintiffs have the right to insist that the state, through its appropriate subdivisions and agencies, protect and preserve public trust property.” Notably, Center for Biological Diversity rejected the argument that Sonoma asserts in this appeal—“that the absence of legislation explicitly delegating to the counties the responsibility for enforcing the public trust over birdlife means that the Alameda County Board of Supervisors cannot be held accountable for authorizing conduct unjustifiably detrimental to these natural resources.” (Id. at p. 1370, fn. 19.) 14  We disagree with Sonoma’s attempt to minimize Center for Biological Diversity’s conclusion as dicta. The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of the public trust claim on the alternative ground that Alameda was “a necessary and indispensable party.” (Center for Biological Diversity, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1372.) “When an appellate court bases its decision on alternative grounds, none is dictum.” (Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. County of Santa Clara, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 485; McClain v. Alameda County (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 73, 76 [“Where two independent reasons are given for a decision, . . . neither one is to be considered mere dictum”].) Second, we are not persuaded by Sonoma’s legal authority purportedly requiring a “delegation of the State’s public trust obligations.” Sonoma claims, “California courts universally acknowledged the state as the sole trustee of the public trust doctrine,” citing Gray v. Reclamation Dist. No. 1500 (1917) 174 Cal. 622, 636; Colberg, Inc. v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Works (1967) 67 Cal.2d 408, 416; Personal Watercraft, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at page 145; and National Audubon, supra, 33 Cal.3d at page 424. While these cases do recognize “[t]he supreme control of the state over its navigable waters” (Gray, at p. 636), it is in the context of other rights (e.g., the rights of private parties) “yield[ing] without compensation to a proper exercise of the power of the state over its navigable waters,” which is “absolute except as limited by the paramount supervisory power of the federal government over navigable waters.” (Colberg, at pp. 416–417, citing Gray, at p. 637.) Thus, the words “supreme” and “absolute” as used by Gray, at page 637, and Colberg, at page 416, are not reasonably construed as meaning “sole” or exclusive, as Sonoma argues. Rather, supreme and absolute are more fairly read as meaning primary, as used in Environmental Law Foundation. (Environmental Law Foundation, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 868 [“the state 15 as sovereign is primarily responsible for administration of the trust” (italics added)].) Personal Watercraft, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at page 146, also cited by Sonoma, rejected an argument analogous to the one Sonoma asserts here. In Personal Watercraft, plaintiffs claimed that the state’s public trust power was “exclusive,” but the Court of Appeal clarified: “The State may be preeminent, but it has not preempted the field to itself,” and thus the plaintiffs “failed to persuade [the court] that the County usurped powers belonging solely to the State.”12 (Id. at pp. 146, 153.) Thus, Gray, Colberg, and Personal Watercraft stand for the same proposition acknowledged by Environmental Law Foundation: “the state as sovereign is primarily responsible for administration of the trust.” (Environmental Law Foundation, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 868, italics added.) We reject the idea that the state cannot share public trust duties, because “shar[ing] responsibility for administering the public trust” (ibid.) is different from “abdication” of public trust rights and responsibilities (Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois (1892) 146 U.S. 387, 452–453), or improper “ ‘delegat[ion]’ ” of those responsibilities by placing them “ ‘entirely beyond the direction and control of the State’ ” (National Audubon, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 438). To the contrary, and consistent with Environmental Law Foundation, courts have recognized that “there may be circumstances in which [the public 12 Sonoma argues, on reply, that “Personal Watercraft involved the very delegation by the Legislature to the county” that is presently missing. However, the statute at issue in Personal Watercraft, Harbors and Navigation Code section 660, defined the county’s ability to regulate “ ‘vessels’ ” on its navigable waters much in the same way that Water Code section 13801 defines Sonoma’s ability to regulate groundwater wells. (Personal Watercraft, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 146.) 16 trust] affirmative duty also belongs to other state agencies.” (Planning & Conservation League v. Department of Water Resources (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 726, 769, italics added.) In such circumstances, the duty “under the public trust doctrine is triggered . . . where [the county] is taking an action with an impact on public trust uses.” (Id. at p. 770.) Accordingly, Sonoma’s regulation of well permits “carries with it an ‘affirmative duty to take the public trust into account.’ ” (San Francisco Baykeeper, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 234, italics added.) Therefore, considering California case law on the public trust doctrine, we see no reason to depart from Environmental Law Foundation’s holding that counties like Sonoma “share[ ] responsibility for administering the public trust” with the state in permitting groundwater wells. (Environmental Law Foundation, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at pp. 867–868.) B. Compliance with the Public Trust Doctrine For its second argument, Sonoma asserts that Keepers did not show the amendment of Chapter 25B was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support. Considering the “deferential” standard of review and contours of the public trust doctrine, we agree with Sonoma. (American Coatings Assn. v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 446, 461 (American Coatings); National Audubon, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 446 [“As a matter of practical necessity the state may have to approve appropriations despite foreseeable harm to public trust uses”].) The parties dedicate large portions of their briefs to discussing the superior court’s analysis. However, under the applicable standard of review, we “perform the same function” as the superior court and “therefore do not undertake a review of the [superior] court’s findings or conclusions.” (Kahn v. Los Angeles City Employees’ Retirement System (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 98, 17 105–106.) Accordingly, our discussion begins with the appropriate standard of review and explains why Sonoma’s amended ordinance withstands judicial scrutiny before turning to Keepers’ arguments since Keepers bear the burden of proof in challenging the amendments. (Id. at p. 106.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 permits judicial review of an agency’s quasi-legislative act of adopting a regulation.” (Western States Petroleum Assn. v. California Air Resources Board (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 938, 957.) But to start, we must presume the legislative act is valid. (San Francisco Tomorrow v. City and County of San Francisco (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 498, 509 (San Francisco Tomorrow).) The legislative body “ ‘need not make explicit findings to support its action’ ” (id. at p. 509); instead, “to overcome the presumption of validity, the petitioner must produce evidence ‘compelling the conclusion that the ordinance is, as a matter of law, unreasonable and invalid.’ ” (Corona-Norco Unified School Dist. v. City of Corona (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 985, 993 (Corona-Norco).) As the parties agree, “ ‘it is petitioner’s burden to establish that [the county’s] decision was arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support, unlawful, or procedurally unfair.’ ” (American Coatings, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 460, italics added.) Importantly, this “entirely lacking” standard of review “ ‘is not the same as a substantial evidence test’ ”; it “is more deferential to agency decisionmaking than the substantial evidence standard.” (Id. at p. 461.) Indeed, review of “quasi-legislative acts are accorded the most deferential level of judicial scrutiny.” (Pulaski v. Occupational Safety & Health Stds. Bd. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1331, citing Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 575–576; see also Carrancho v. California Air Resources Board (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1266 [legislative acts entitled to deference include 18 “investigation and information gathering in aid of, or as a basis for, prospective legislation”].) “Courts exercise limited review ‘out of deference to the separation of powers between the Legislature and the judiciary.’ ” (Carrancho v. California Air Resources Board, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1265, quoting California Hotel & Motel Assn. v. Industrial Welfare Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 200, 212.) Accordingly, courts “ ‘cannot inquire into the wisdom of a legislative act or review the merits of a local government’s policy decisions.’ ” (San Francisco Tomorrow, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 509.) “If the record reflects ‘ “a reasonable basis for the action of the legislative body, and if the reasonableness of the decision is fairly debatable,” ’ ” then a reviewing court will not disturb the legislative determination. (Fair Education Santa Barbara v. Santa Barbara Unified School District (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 884, 895.) And, unless it is entirely lacking in evidentiary support, we will uphold a legislative act regardless of whether “there is evidence, even substantial evidence, supporting” an alternative decision. (American Coatings, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 475.) In the public trust context, we have said there must be “ ‘full consideration of the state’s public interest’ ” in any “ ‘action which will adversely affect traditional public rights in trust lands.’ ” (Zack’s, Inc. v. City of Sausalito (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1189.) However, “the concept of a public use is flexible, accommodating changing public needs”; thus, there is “no set ‘procedural matrix’ for determining” compliance with the doctrine. (San Francisco Baykeeper, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 233–234.) “Indeed, imposing such procedural constraints would be inconsistent with the recognition that the state is free to choose between public trust uses” and “selecting one trust use ‘in preference to . . . [an]other cannot reasonably be 19 said to be an abuse of discretion.’ ” (Citizens for East Shore Parks v. State Lands Com. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 549, 577, quoting Higgins v. City of Santa Monica (1964) 62 Cal.2d 24, 30.) As our Supreme Court recognized in 1983, “[t]he population and economy of this state depend upon the appropriation of vast quantities of water for uses unrelated to in-stream trust values,” and “[a]s a matter of practical necessity[,] the state may have to approve appropriations despite foreseeable harm to public trust uses.” (National Audubon, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 446.) “The public trust resources therefore need not be protected under every conceivable circumstance, but only in those where protection or harm minimization is feasible.” (Monterey Coastkeeper v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd., etc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1, 21 (Monterey Coastkeeper).) Accordingly, “in carrying out the public trust doctrine,” the state and counties may consider “conflicting policy concerns,” including commerce, recreation, and environmental needs, and “fashion[ ] a compromise to address the practical realities.” (Carstens v. California Coastal Com. (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 277, 289–290.) Here, we cannot say that Sonoma’s amendments to the ordinance were arbitrary, capricious, or “entirely lacking in evidentiary support.” (American Coatings, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 460.) To the contrary, the record demonstrates that Sonoma gathered information, engaged the public, and subsequently balanced “conflicting policy concerns and fashioned a compromise to address the practical realities” of groundwater well permitting. (Carstens v. California Coastal Com., supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at pp. 289–290.) This is the precise type of legislative discretion that is presumed valid, and Keepers do not overcome that presumption on this record. 20  We begin with the O’Connor report, which provides evidentiary support for Sonoma’s decision to adopt the PTRA as “a process for consideration of impacts to public trust resources.” The O’Connor report considered “many potential approaches to mapping the PTRA spanning a wide range of complexity and data requirements” and ultimately developed “risk-based approach . . . to define the PTRA” because it made “the best use of available data and numerical models” “given the data and implementation timeline constraints.” The risk-based approach balanced two public trust concerns— “Streamflow Depletion” and “Resource Sensitivity”—by designating areas as either “high,” “moderate” or “low” value (e.g., a “high value habitat” or a low streamflo