Full Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT ACADEMY FOR POSITIVE LEARNING, INC., a Florida not-for-profit corporation, PALM BEACH MARITIME MUSEUM, INC., a Florida not- for-profit corporation, d/b/a PALM BEACH MARITIME ACADEMY, MARLENY OLIVO, an individual, and PEDRO OLIVO, an individual, Appellants, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA and G-STAR SCHOOL OF THE ARTS, INC., a Florida not-for-profit corporation, Appellees. No. 4D19-2816 [February 24, 2021] “CORRECTED OPINION” Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Glenn D. Kelley, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2019-CA-000405- XXXX-MB. Shawn A. Arnold and Braxton A. Padgett of The Arnold Law Firm, LLC, Jacksonville, for appellants. Jon L. Mills of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, Miami, and Stuart A. Singer and Sabria A. McElroy of Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee, School Board of Palm Beach County. ON APPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC AND CERTIFICATION OF QUESTION OF GREAT PUBLIC IMPORTANCE PER CURIAM. After this court’s 2-1 affirmance opinion issued April 22, 2020, appellants challenged the majority opinion by filing a motion for rehearing en banc and certification of question of great public importance under Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.330 and 9.331, based on the following arguments, in pertinent part: Statewide there are more than 194,000 charter school students in nineteen other counties across all five appellate districts of the state where a voter-approved school board operating millage is in place. Fla. H.R. Appr. Comm/Ways & Means Comm., HB 7123 (2019) Final Bill Analysis (May 28, 2019); Fla. Dept. of Educ., Fla. Charter School Enrollment Share. This Court’s ruling will be precedent over matters in the Fourth District affecting 72,750 charter school students and parents (including over 21,000 in Palm Beach County) and millions of public dollars per year. Id. While House Bill 7123 (2019) amended section 1011.71(9), Florida Statutes, to codify the requirement that school boards share voted operating millage revenues with charter schools going forward, this legislative “fix” does not provide a remedy to Appellants because they were approved by voters prior to July 1, 2019. Additionally, there are two lawsuits currently pending in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida related to a school board operating millage approved by voters in Miami-Dade County, from which charter schools have similarly been excluded. City of Aventura v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., Case No. 2020-006112-CA-01 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 2020); Archimedean Academy, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., Case No. 2019-030739-CA-01 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 2019). Other litigation is easy to foresee. This decision will also likely have a major impact on future charter school funding cases. The majority’s interpretation of the opening sentence of section 1002.33(17), Florida Statutes, erodes a guiding principle established by the Legislature that charter school students be funded the same as their counterparts attending district schools. . . . Notably, the underfunded mandates of the School Safety Act apply to all public schools, including both charter schools and district schools alike. The exclusion of Palm Beach County’s charter schools from the referendum has created a substantial disparity in funding between public charter schools and district schools. These charters now face a substantial hurdle in hiring qualified teachers to enable them to successfully compete with the other public schools in the district. § 1002.33(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2019) (“Charter schools -2- may fulfill the following purposes: . . . Provide rigorous competition within the public school district to stimulate continual improvement in all public schools.”). Further, taxes paid by parents for the safety of children should not favor the safety of school district children over public charter school children. Given the far-reaching implications of the panel’s decision on charter school students across the state, ongoing litigation involving the very same issue, and the varied conclusions of five reviewing judges in three separate suits, this case is exceptionally important and should be considered by this Court en banc under Fla. R. App. P. 9.331(d). .... If this Court declines to rehear this case en banc, the Appellants alternatively request that this Court certify the following question as an issue of great public importance for review by the Supreme Court of Florida pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.330(a)(2)(C): Are local school boards required under section 1002.33(17), Florida Statutes, to share with public charter schools revenues generated from a voted operating millage levied pursuant to section 1011.71(9), Florida Statutes, which was approved by voters prior to July 1, 2019? For the reasons argued above, we grant appellants’ motion for rehearing en banc, withdraw this court’s 2-1 affirmance opinion issued April 22, 2020, and substitute the following reversal opinion in its place. We also grant appellants’ motion for certification of question of great public importance, although we certify a different question than that which appellants have requested, as shown at the end of the following opinion. Opinion During the November 2018 election, the School Board of Palm Beach County, Florida placed a referendum on the ballot asking county voters to approve an ad valorem levy for the operational needs of only non-charter district schools. We conclude the 2018 referendum’s exclusion of charter schools violated section 1002.33(17), Florida Statutes (2018), providing -3- “[s]tudents enrolled in a charter school, regardless of the sponsorship, shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program, the same as students enrolled in other public schools in the school district.” (emphasis added). Based on the foregoing, we reverse the circuit court’s final judgment (and its incorporated “Orders on Pending Motions for Summary Judgment”) and find that the 2018 referendum violated Florida law, as explained below. We remand for the circuit court to enter an order denying the school board’s motion for summary judgment and granting appellants’ motions for summary judgment, and to determine the proper remedy to which appellants are entitled under their complaint. The 2018 Referendum The 2018 referendum appeared on the ballot as follows: REFERENDUM TO APPROVE AD VALOREM LEVY FOR SCHOOL SAFETY, TEACHERS AND OPERATIONAL NEEDS Shall the School Board of Palm Beach County have authority to levy 1.00 mills of ad valorem millage dedicated for operational needs of non-charter District schools to fund school safety equipment, hire additional school police and mental health professionals, fund arts, music, physical education, career and choice program teachers, and improve teacher pay beginning July 1, 2019 and automatically ending June 30, 2023, with oversight by the independent committee of citizens and experts? ______Yes ______No Palm Beach County voters approved the 2018 referendum, which went into effect on July 1, 2019. The Underlying Litigation After County voters approved the referendum, but before the referendum went into effect, two Palm Beach County charter schools and the parents of a student attending one of those charter schools (collectively, “appellants”) filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive -4- relief against the school board. The complaint requested the circuit court to: (1) enter a declaratory judgment requiring the school board to share the 2018 referendum revenues with charter schools on a pro rata basis; and (2) enjoin the school board from denying charter schools their proportionate share of the 2018 referendum revenues. In the alternative, the complaint requested the circuit court to declare the 2018 referendum to be illegal and void. Appellants asserted the 2018 referendum’s exclusion of charter schools violated section 1002.33(17), Florida Statutes (2018), providing that “[s]tudents enrolled in a charter school, regardless of the sponsorship, shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program, the same as students enrolled in other public schools in the school district.” (emphasis added). Appellants and the school board filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The parties agreed no factual issues existed and the case involved only statutory construction. However, despite having initially pled an alternative request for relief asking the circuit court to declare the 2018 referendum to be illegal and void, appellants’ motion for summary judgment primarily sought the entry of a declaratory judgment requiring the school board to share the 2018 referendum revenues with charter schools on a pro rata basis and enjoining the school board from denying charter schools their proportionate share of the 2018 referendum revenues. As the circuit court later observed, “Neither side wants to lose the money, rather the parties simply disagree about who gets the money.” Following a hearing, the circuit court issued an order granting the school board’s motion for summary judgment and denying appellants’ motions. The circuit court found the 2018 referendum did not violate Florida law. The circuit court later entered a final judgment in the school board’s favor, prompting this appeal. We conclude the 2018 referendum’s exclusion of charter schools violated Florida law, as explained below. A. Interpreting sections 1002.33(17) and 1011.71(9) in harmony according to plain meaning favors the charter schools’ position. The method by which students enrolled in charter schools are funded, and the sources from which such funding is derived, are provided in Section 1002.33(17), Florida Statutes (2018), titled “Charter schools.” That section provides, in pertinent part: -5- (17) Funding. -- Students enrolled in a charter school, regardless of the sponsorship, shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program, the same as students enrolled in other public schools in the school district. . . . .... (b) The basis for the agreement for funding students enrolled in a charter school shall be the sum of the school district’s operating funds from the Florida Education Finance Program as provided in s. 1011.62 and the General Appropriations Act, including gross state and local funds, discretionary lottery funds, and funds from the school district’s current operating discretionary millage levy; divided by total funded weighted full-time equivalent students in the school district; multiplied by the weighted full-time equivalent students for the charter school. . . . § 1002.33(17)(b), Fla. Stat. (2018) (emphasis added). Section 1011.71, Florida Statutes (2018), titled “District school tax,” describes the sources from which “funds from the school district’s operating discretionary millage levy” may be generated. That section provides, in pertinent part: (1) . . . [E]ach district school board desiring to participate in the state allocation of funds for current operation as prescribed by s. 1011.62(19) shall levy . . . a millage rate not to exceed the amount certified by the commissioner as the minimum millage rate necessary to provide the district required local effort for the current year, pursuant to s. 1011.62(4)(a)1. In addition to the required local effort millage levy, each district school board may levy a nonvoted current operating discretionary millage. The Legislature shall prescribe annually in the appropriations act the maximum amount of millage a district may levy. .... (9) In addition to the maximum millage levied under this section and the General Appropriations Act, a school district may levy, by local referendum or in a general election, -6- additional millage for school operational purposes up to an amount that, when combined with nonvoted millage levied under this section, does not exceed the 10-mill limit established in s. 9(b), Art. VII of the State Constitution. . . . Funds generated by such additional millage . . . must not be incorporated in the calculation of any hold-harmless or other component of the Florida Education Finance Program formula in any year. . . . § 1011.71(1), (9), Fla. Stat. (2018) (emphasis added). Both sections 1011.71(1) and (9) use the words “may levy” to describe how a school district may increase its operating millage above the required operating millage also described in section 1011.71(1). That is, a school board “may levy” an increased operating millage by its own vote under section 1011.71(1), or a school board “may levy” an increased operating millage by voting to place an increased operating millage on the ballot and obtaining voter approval under section 1011.71(9). The consistent use of the words “may levy” makes both increased operating millages discretionary. See Fla. Bar v. Trazenfeld, 833 So. 2d 734, 738 (Fla. 2002) (“The word ‘may’ when given its ordinary meaning denotes a permissive term rather than the mandatory connotation of the word ‘shall.’”). Because the increased operating millages permitted by sections 1011.71(1) and (9) are both discretionary, and because a school district’s “current operating discretionary millage levy” is to be included in the method of funding students enrolled in a charter school under section 1002.33(17)(b), the 2018 referendum’s exclusion of charter schools violated section 1002.33(17)’s requirement that “[s]tudents enrolled in a charter school, regardless of the sponsorship, shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program, the same as students enrolled in other public schools in the school district.” (emphasis added). See Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Glenville, 252 So. 3d 1120, 1127 (Fla. 2018) (“As with any matter involving an issue of statutory interpretation, courts must first look to the actual language of the statute and examine the statute’s plain meaning.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cnty. v. Survivors Charter Schs., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1220, 1234 (Fla. 2009) (“[W]e give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). B. The school board’s arguments lack merit. -7- 1. The school board misinterprets sections 1002.33(17) and 1011.71(9) as providing two distinct funding mechanisms. The sections are related and must be read in harmony. The school board argues sections 1002.33(17) and 1011.71(9) provide two distinct funding mechanisms and, therefore, section 1002.33(17) has no application to the instant case. According to the school board, “[g]eneral funding for charter schools under [section 1002.33(17)(b)] includes a mandatory requirement that [Florida Education Finance Program] funds be distributed to charter schools,” but section 1011.71(9) explicitly states “additional millage for school operational purposes” generated after a local referendum or general election “do not become part of the calculation of the Florida Education Finance Program.” The flaw in the school board’s reasoning is that charter schools’ general funding under section 1002.33(17)(b) does not include only Florida Education Finance Program components. Rather, section 1002.33(17)(b)’s plain language provides charter schools’ funding is “the sum of” three sources: (1) “the school district’s operating funds from the Florida Education Finance Program as provided in s. 1011.62 and the General Appropriations Act, including gross state and local funds,” (2) “discretionary lottery funds,” and (3) “funds from the school district’s current operating discretionary millage levy.” That sum is then “divided by total funded weighted full-time equivalent students in the school district; multiplied by the weighted full-time equivalent students for the charter school.” Id. The flaw in the school board’s reasoning arises from its misapplication of the word “including” within section 1002.33(17)(b). According to the school board, the word “including” modifies each funding component which follows – “gross state and local funds, discretionary lottery funds, and funds from the school district’s current operating discretionary millage levy” – thus making each component a part of the Florida Education Finance Program formula. However, if each funding component following the word “including” already was included in “the school district’s operating funds from the Florida Education Finance Program as provided in s. 1011.62 and the General Appropriations Act,” what else is the fund for students enrolled in a charter school to be “the sum of”? The question cannot be answered, because interpreting the word “including” as modifying each funding component stated within section 1002.33(17)(b) improperly renders the phrase “the sum of” as mere surplusage. See Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cnty., -8- 3 So. 3d at 1233 (“Basic to our examination of statutes, and an important aspect of our analysis here, is the elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The only logical construction of section 1002.33(17)(b) is that the word “including” modifies only its nearest reasonable referent, that is, “gross state and local funds.” See Scherer v. Volusia Cnty. Dep’t of Corrs., 171 So. 3d 135, 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“The [nearest-reasonable-referent] canon holds simply that, whether coming before or after what is modified, modifiers (adjectives, adverbs, prepositional phrases, restrictive clauses) should be read as modifying the nearest noun, verb, or other sentence element to which they can reasonably be said to pertain.”) (emphasis added). Thus, the proper construction of section 1002.33(17)(b) is that the basis for the agreement for funding students enrolled in a charter school shall be the sum of “the school district’s operating funds from the Florida Education Finance Program as provided in s. 1011.62 and the General Appropriations Act, including gross state and local funds,” “discretionary lottery funds,” and “funds from the school district’s current operating discretionary millage levy.” As explained in Section A above, “funds from the school district’s current operating discretionary millage levy” include increased operating millages permitted by both sections 1011.71(1) and (9). 2. The school board overlooks section 1002.33(17)’s plain meaning that charter school students shall be funded by the same method as other public school students. The school board correctly argues that section 1002.33(17) describes the method of funding charter school students. However, the school board then argues the method of funding charter school students is not the same as the method for funding public school students, despite the plain meaning of section 1002.33(17)’s first sentence – “Students enrolled in a charter school, regardless of the sponsorship, shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program, the same as students enrolled in other public schools in the school district.” (emphasis added). -9- The school board seeks to justify its disregard of the plain meaning of “the same as” by its own attempted application the nearest-reasonable- referent canon. According to the school board: Applying this principle to the sentence at issue, it is clear that the modifier “the same as” must be read to modify the entire nearest antecedent phrase – “shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program.” Appellants simply ignore the words “as if they are in a basic program or a special program” between “funded” and “the same as.” . . . It defies logic to interpret “the same as” to modify only the first few words in the antecedent clause but not the nearer, remaining words. It would also render the words “shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program” meaningless, contrary to basic principles of statutory construction. It is an “elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.” Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 740, 749 (Fla. 2010). (emphasis added). The school board misapplies the nearest-reasonable-referent canon by considering only the “nearest antecedent phrase.” (emphasis added). As our sister court explained, the nearest-reasonable-referent canon may rely on a modifier which “com[es] before or after what is modified.” See Scherer, 171 So. 3d at 138 (“The [nearest-reasonable-referent] canon holds simply that, whether coming before or after what is modified, modifiers (adjectives, adverbs, prepositional phrases, restrictive clauses) should be read as modifying the nearest noun, verb, or other sentence element to which they can reasonably be said to pertain.”) (emphasis added); see also Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 152 (2012) ([T]he nearest-reasonable-reference canon “applies not just to words that precede the modifier, but also to words that follow it.”) (emphasis added). Applying the nearest-reasonable-referent canon to section 1002.33(17)’s first sentence, the modifier “the same as” may apply to the antecedent phrase “shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program,” or it may apply to the subsequent phrase “students enrolled in other public schools in the school district.” The question is, to - 10 - paraphrase our sister court, to which nearest sentence element can the modifier “the same as” reasonably be said to pertain? The most reasonable interpretation is that “the same as” modifies the subsequent phrase “students enrolled in other public schools in the district,” because “the same as” draws a direct comparison to the earlier phrase “[s]tudents enrolled in a charter school.” In reaching our opinion, we have not ignored the antecedent phrase “as if they are in a basic program or a special program” within section 1002.33(17)’s first sentence. On the contrary, we conclude the antecedent phrase “as if they are in a basic program or a special program” supports appellants’ argument that charter school students are to be funded the same as other public school students. That is because “basic program” and “special program” are statutorily-defined terms which plainly apply to both charter school students and public school students. Section 1011.61(6), Florida Statutes (2018), defines “Basic programs” as “includ[ing], but . . . not limited to, language arts, mathematics, art, music, physical education, science, and social studies.” Section 1003.01(10), Florida Statutes (2018), defines “Special program” as synonymous with “Alternative measures for students with special needs” and “mean[ing] measures designed to meet the special needs of a student that cannot be met by regular school curricula.” Section 1003.01(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2018), which defines “Exceptional student,” elucidates what types of “special programs” exist: “Exceptional student” means any student who has been determined eligible for a special program in accordance with rules of the State Board of Education. The term includes students who are gifted and students with disabilities who have an intellectual disability; autism spectrum disorder; a speech impairment; a language impairment; an orthopedic impairment; an other health impairment; traumatic brain injury; a visual impairment; an emotional or behavioral disability; or a specific learning disability, including, but not limited to, dyslexia, dyscalculia, or developmental aphasia; students who are deaf or hard of hearing or dual sensory impaired; students who are hospitalized or homebound; children with developmental delays ages birth through 5 years, or children, ages birth through 2 years, with - 11 - established conditions that are identified in State Board of Education rules pursuant to s. 1003.21(1)(e). (emphasis added). Based on the foregoing, we agree with appellants’ argument that, under section 1002.33(17)’s plain meaning, “Students enrolled in a charter school, regardless of the sponsorship, shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program, the same as students enrolled in other public schools in the school district.” (emphasis added). 3. Contrary to both sides’ arguments, the Legislature’s 2019 amendment of section 1011.71(9) should not affect our interpretation of the 2018 version of section 1011.71(9). In 2019, the Legislature amended section 1011.71(9) to add the following language shown in bold: (9) In addition to the maximum millage levied under this section and the General Appropriations Act, a school district may levy, by local referendum or in a general election, additional millage for school operational purposes up to an amount that, when combined with nonvoted millage levied under this section, does not exceed the 10-mill limit established in s. 9(b), Art. VII of the State Constitution. Any such levy shall be for a maximum of 4 years and shall be counted as part of the 10-mill limit established in s. 9(b), Art. VII of the State Constitution. For the purpose of distributing taxes collected pursuant to this subsection, the term “school operational purposes” includes charter schools sponsored by a school district. Millage elections conducted under the authority granted pursuant to this section are subject to s. 1011.73. Funds generated by such additional millage do not become a part of the calculation of the Florida Education Finance Program total potential funds in 2001- 2002 or any subsequent year and must not be incorporated in the calculation of any hold-harmless or other component of the Florida Education Finance Program formula in any year. If an increase in required local effort, when added to existing millage levied under the 10-mill limit, would result in a combined millage in excess of the 10-mill limit, any millage levied pursuant to this subsection shall be considered to be required local effort to the extent that the district millage - 12 - would otherwise exceed the 10-mill limit. Funds levied under this subsection shall be shared with charter schools based on each charter school’s proportionate share of the district’s total unweighted full-time equivalent student enrollment and used in a manner consistent with the purposes of the levy. The referendum must contain an explanation of the distribution methodology consistent with the requirements of this subsection. § 1011.71(9), Fla. Stat. (2019) (emphasis added). According to appellants, the 2019 Legislature’s addition of the bolded sentences was meant to clarify the Legislature’s intent for the 2018 referendum’s approved millage increase under section 1011.71(9) “to be shared with public charter schools all along.” In support, appellants cite several Florida Supreme Court cases, including Matthews v. State, 760 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 2000), to argue “a court may consider an amendment to a statute soon after controversies as to the interpretation of the original act arise as legislative interpretation of the original law. Such subsequent amendments to a statute, which serve to clarify rather than change existing law, are entitled to substantial weight in construing the earlier law.” Id. at 1150 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Here, appellants argue, a growing controversy existed two years earlier about whether voted operating discretionary millage revenues must be shared with public charter schools. See Indian River Charter High Sch., Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Indian River Cnty., Case No. 31-2016-CA-000432 (Fla. 19th Cir. Ct. June 13, 2017) (circuit court held the Indian River County School Board was required to share voted millage levy revenues with charter schools). Thus, appellants argue, the Legislature’s 2019 amendment to section 1011.71(9) was meant to clarify that “[i]t was the intent of the Legislature all along for Voted Millage funds to be shared with public charter schools, even under the prior version of section 1011.71(9).” On the other hand, the school board argues the 2019 Legislature’s addition of the bolded sentences necessarily means those provisions did not exist within the 2018 version of section 1011.71(9). In support, the school board cites Arnold v. Shumpert, 217 So. 2d 116, 119 (Fla. 1968) (“[W]hen a statute is amended, it is presumed that the Legislature intended it to have a meaning different from that accorded to it before the amendment.”). The school board also counters appellants’ reliance on cases like Matthews with other Florida Supreme Court cases holding it is inappropriate to use an amendment enacted several years after the - 13 - original enactment to “ clarify” original legislative intent. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55, 62 (Fla. 1995) (“[A] clarifying amendment to a statute that is enacted soon after controversies as to the interpretation of a statute arise may be considered as a legislative interpretation of the original law and not as a substantive change. It would be absurd, however, to consider legislation enacted more than ten years after the original act as a clarification of original intent[.]”). In our opinion, rather than attempting to choose one viable statutory construction canon over another in determining the 2019 amendment’s effect on section 1011.71(9), we simply interpret the 2018 version of section 1011.71(9) as written. If we had been called upon to interpret the 2018 version of section 1011.71(9) before the 2019 amendment, we would have done so, using other statutory construction canons available for our consideration. Also contrary to the parties’ positions, the 2019 amendment’s prior drafts or final bill analysis should not affect our interpretation of the 2018 version of section 1011.71(9). According to the school board, the Legislature considered in an earlier bill draft, but ultimately did not adopt, language which would have made the 2019 amendment retroactive. Instead, the Legislature included express language providing that the 2019 amendment applies prospectively, which the school board says shows the Legislature did not intend the changes to “clarify” a requirement that already applied. On the other hand, appellants argue the 2019 amendment’s final bill analysis states it was intended “to clarify that the term ‘school operational purposes’ includes charter schools sponsored by a school district.” (emphasis added). The school board’s reliance on earlier drafts, and appellants’ reliance on a final bill analysis, are simply not persuasive as a matter of law. See Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So. 2d 294, 299 (Fla. 2000) (“[W]hen the statutory language is clear, legislative history cannot be used to alter the plain meaning of the statute.”); Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So. 2d 360, 376 (Fla. 2005) (Cantero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (proposing that “legislative staff analyses add nothing to an investigation of legislative intent”). Conclusion In sum, our review is limited to the 2018 versions of sections 1002.33(17) and 1011.71(9), and how those statutes may be read in harmony according to their plain meaning. The 2018 referendum, by - 14 - excluding charter schools from that portion of the current discretionary operating millage levy provided in section 1011.71(9), violated section 1002.33(17)’s requirement that “[s]tudents enrolled in a charter school, regardless of the sponsorship, shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program, the same as students enrolled in other public schools in the school district.” (emphasis added). Based on the foregoing, we reverse the circuit court’s final judgment (and incorporated “Orders on Pending Motions for Summary Judgment”) finding the 2018 referendum did not violate Florida law. We remand for the circuit court to enter an order denying the school board’s motion for summary judgment and granting appellants’ motions for summary judgment. As for the remedy on remand, the school board and the appellants have agreed (in their requested supplemental briefing following our original opinion) that the “non-charter” limitation in the 2018 referendum is severable and may be stricken from the 2018 referendum. This is because the school board’s resolution authorizing the 2018 referendum to be placed before voters included a severability clause: SECTION 8. SEVERABILITY. In the event that any word, phrase, clause, sentence, or paragraph of this Resolution shall be held invalid by any court of competent jurisdiction, such holding shall not affect any other work [sic], clause, phrase, sentence or paragraph. We concur with the parties’ agreement as to severability. “When a portion of a statute or ordinance is declared invalid the remaining portions thereof which are severable ordinarily should be recognized as valid, and it is the duty of the court to preserve their validity whether or not a severability clause was included.” Dade Cnty. v. Keyes, 141 So. 2d 819, 821 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962). “The fact that the offending provision is not self- contained in a separate section of the statute does not prohibit the court from applying the severability rule.” Small v. Sun Oil Co., 222 So. 2d 196, 199 (Fla. 1969). Rather, “[t]he key is whether the overall legislative intent is still accomplished without the invalid provision.” Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1181, 1196 (Fla. 2017). Applying those principles here, we sever and strike the “non-charter” limitation from the 2018 referendum, leaving the remainder of the 2018 referendum in full force and effect. Severing and striking the “non-charter” limitation from the 2018 referendum still accomplishes the 2018 - 15 - referendum’s intent to generate additional revenue “to fund school safety equipment, hire additional school police and mental health professionals, fund arts, music, physical education, career and choice program teachers, and improve teacher pay.” The only difference is that a portion of those funds must be shared with charter schools, for the reasons stated above. The school board and the appellants nevertheless disagree on when the sharing of funds generated from the 2018 referendum must commence. The school board argues the charter schools are not retroactively entitled to referendum funds for the 2019-2020 and 2020-2021 school years because those funds have already been collected, obligated, distributed, and/or spent. Instead, the school board argues, the charter schools’ remedy “must be on a going forward basis and the remainder of their claims should be remanded for further proceedings.” According to the school board, “apportioning funds between charter schools and [non- charter] schools and ensuring compliance with the purposes contained in the 2018 Referendum will involve complex legal and factual questions that the trial court should address in the first instance.” On the other hand, the appellants argue that the charter schools “are entitled to receive their share of all revenues that have been collected since the 2018 Referendum went into effect, as well as to all revenues that will be collected during the remainder of the referendum period.” According to the appellants, they “were seeking to enjoin the School Board and get a favorable declaratory judgment prior to the School Board collecting, distributing, and otherwise obligating the funds. During this appeal, with full knowledge that this Court could overturn the decision of the trial court, the School Board proceeded to spend the revenues from the 2018 Referendum. The School Board now attempts to use its knowing expenditure of these funds during litigation as a shield against liability for both the 2019-20 school year and the 2020-21 school year.” In reply, the school board argues its actions “in budgeting and spending the millage generated by the 2018 Referendum fall within the scope of governmental functions that are immune from money damages under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.” According to the school board, “[t]o retroactively hold [it] liable for monetary damages for allocating millage pursuant to a voter-approved referendum that was previously upheld by two separate courts would significantly interfere with [its] control over public funds and school budgeting. Protecting the School Board from such interference, whether through a direct damages claim or supplemental declaratory relief, is precisely why sovereign immunity exists.” - 16 - We conclude the issue of when the sharing of funds generated from the 2018 referendum must commence is not ripe for our review because the circuit court, based on its findings, did not reach this issue. We remand for the circuit court to conduct any necessary hearings, evidentiary or otherwise, to determine this issue through findings of fact and conclusions of law in the first instance, subject to appellate review. Lastly, to preserve the school board’s ability to seek appellate review of this opinion, we certify to the Florida Supreme Court the following question of great public importance: Does a local referendum which levies additional millage for school operational purposes under section 1011.71, Florida Statutes (2018), but which includes only non-charter schools in the referendum, violate section 1002.33(17), Florida Statutes (2018) (“Students enrolled in a charter school, regardless of the sponsorship, shall be funded as if they are in a basic