M.R. v. District of Columbia

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA M.R., by her parent and next friend, L.R., et al., Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 25-0556 (CKK) v. District of Columbia, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION (July 15, 2026) A student using the pseudonym “M.R.” and her parent “L.R.” (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against the District of Columbia (“Defendant”) to appeal an administrative decision relating to the student’s publicly funded placement at the Lab School of Washington (“Lab School”), a private school that serves students with disabilities.1 Shortly after filing their complaint in this action, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to secure the student’s placement at the Lab School until the case was resolved. See Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 10. That motion for preliminary injunction was resolved in favor of the Plaintiffs. See Order, ECF No 18; Mem. Op., ECF No. 19. Pending before this Court is Plaintiffs’ [22] Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant’s [25] Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, which are both fully briefed. Upon 1 On March 21, 2025, immediately prior to this case being randomly assigned to the undersigned, Chief Judge James Boasberg granted the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym. See Mem. Op. and Order, ECF No. 4. 1 consideration of the parties’ submissions,2 the relevant legal authority, and the entire record, and for the reasons explained herein, the Court shall DENY Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANT Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. I. BACKGROUND3 A. IDEA Eligibility M.R., who is seventeen years old, is a student in this District who has been diagnosed with specific learning disabilities in reading, math, and written expression. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 4, 6–7; see June 2017 Hearing Officer Determination (“HOD”), AR1, ECF No. 21-1, at 182.4 M.R. began her public education at a D.C. public school, where she repeated kindergarten. See February 2025 HOD, AR1 at 10. In March 2016, when M.R. was in first grade, District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”) determined that she was eligible for special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). See June 2017 HOD, 2 The Court’s consideration has focused on the following documents, including the attachments and exhibits thereto: • Plaintiffs’ Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1; • Administrative Record (“AR”), ECF No. 21; • Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pls.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 22; • Defendant’s Combined Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.’s Cross-Mot.”), ECF Nos. 25-26; • Plaintiffs’ Combined Opposition to the Defendant’s Cross-Motion and Reply in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion (“Pls.’ Reply”), ECF Nos. 27-28; and • Defendant’s Reply in Support of its Cross-Motion (“Def.’s Reply”), ECF No. 29. In an exercise of its discretion, the Court concludes that oral argument is not necessary to resolve the issues pending before the Court. See LCvR 7(f). 3 The Court borrows liberally from the Background section in its memorandum opinion on the motion for preliminary injunction, ECF No. 19. 4 Throughout this Memorandum Opinion, all citations, including citations to the Administrative Record (“AR”), refer to the automatic pagination in the ECF system, rather than to any internal pagination of the exhibits or the documents contained therein. Because the AR is divided into 4 sections, as docketed, the Court refers to it as AR1 [corresponding to ECF No. 21-1], AR2 [ECF No. 21-2], AR3 [ECF No. 21-3], and AR4 [ECF No. 21-4], for clarity. 2 AR1 at 181-182; Pls.’ August 2020 Due Process Complaint, AR3 at 264. In consultation with M.R.’s mother, L.R., DCPS developed an initial Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) for M.R. that called for her to receive 90 minutes of specialized instruction each week, in addition to general education and English language learner (ELL) services. June 2017 HOD, AR1 at 182. DCPS immediately began implementing M.R.’s IEP at her public elementary school. Id. at 182–183. B. 2016-2017 School Year At the beginning of the 2016-2017 School Year, L.R. enrolled M.R. at the Lab School, a private school that provides full-time special education services to students with disabilities. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 9; June 2017 HOD, AR1 at 186; see also AR1 at 177 (noting that Plaintiffs requested DCPS’s reimbursement for M.R.’s unilateral placement at the Lab School for the 2016-2017 School Year). DCPS did not agree to pay for the cost of M.R.’s attendance at the Lab School because it contended that the IEP prepared in March 2016 had offered M.R. a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) that could be delivered at a public elementary school. See June 2017 HOD, AR1 at 177. DCPS completed a new IEP for M.R. in March 2017. See id. at 187-188. This IEP proposed 10 hours of specialized instruction for M.R. each week, along with additional hours of occupational therapy and speech-language therapy. Id. L.R. objected to this IEP, arguing that M.R.’s educational program should include a greater amount of specialized instruction and that all services should be provided outside of the general education context. Id. 1. HOD re: March 2016 and March 2017 IEPs L.R. filed an administrative due process complaint arguing that DCPS had denied M.R. a FAPE for the 2016-2017 School Year by not proposing adequate IEPs in either March 2016 3 or March 2017. See June 2017 HOD, AR1 at 175-177. As a remedy for that violation, L.R. sought reimbursement of the cost of M.R.’s attendance at the Lab School for the 2016-2017 School Year. See id. On review of L.R.’s complaint regarding the 2016-2017 School Year, Hearing Officer Peter Vaden (“Hearing Officer Vaden”) found that although M.R. may not require “segregation from her nondisabled peers for the entire school day,” there was persuasive evidence that M.R. “needs to be in a small classroom setting for at least her academic subjects” so that she can be “less distracted” and be “assured individualized support.” June 2017 HOD, AR1 at 196-197. After weighing the parties’ evidence, the Hearing Officer concluded that the March 2017 IEP did not offer M.R. a FAPE because it did not provide sufficient small-group instruction. Id. at 197. Hearing Officer Vaden also concluded that the Lab School was an appropriate placement for M.R., that L.R. had not acted unreasonably by contesting the March 2017 IEP and sending M.R. to the Lab School, and that the equities weighed in favor of reimbursing the cost of M.R.’s attendance at the Lab School after the date of the IEP that he found had failed to offer her a FAPE. Id. at 197-199. However, Hearing Officer Vaden concluded also that M.R.’s previous IEP, which was completed in March 2016, had not denied M.R. a FAPE. Vaden opined that the appropriateness of an IEP depended on the information available at the time it is offered to the student. See June 2017 HOD, AR1 at 193; see also Edward M.R. v. District of Columbia, 128 F.4th 290, 294 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (explaining that courts “evaluate IEPs’ substantive adequacy ‘as of the time each IEP was created rather than with the benefit of hindsight’” (quoting Z.B. v. District of Columbia, 888 F.3d 515, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2018)). Hearing Officer Vaden noted that DCPS had limited information in March 2016 about M.R.’s specific need for a small classroom environment and 4 that L.R. had not initially raised any concerns about the proposed IEP. June 2017 HOD, AR1 at 194-195. Under those circumstances, Hearing Officer Vaden concluded that DCPS did not deny M.R. a FAPE by not revising the March 2016 IEP before the beginning of the 2016–2017 School Year. Id. Accordingly, Hearing Officer Vaden found that L.R. was entitled to reimbursement for the cost of M.R.’s education at the Lab School after the date of the March 2017 IEP through the end of the 2016–17 School Year. Id. at 199; see also Leggett v. District of Columbia, 793 F.3d 59, 66–67 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (explaining criteria for deciding when reimbursement of the costs of attending a private school is a proper remedy for failure to provide a FAPE). Hearing Officer Vaden also directed DCPS to convene M.R.’s IEP team “as soon as practicable” to review and revise her IEP to ensure that “all of [her] academic courses, with the exception of specials such as art and music, . . . be provided in a small classroom setting, outside general education.” June 2017 HOD, AR1 at 199-200. 2. Appeal of Hearing Officer’s June 2017 Decision L.R. and M.R. appealed the adverse parts of Hearing Officer Vaden’s June 2017 decision by filing a civil action against the District of Columbia in the District Court, urging the court to find that the March 2016 IEP had not offered M.R. a FAPE and requesting reimbursement of the entire cost of M.R.’s attendance at the Lab School during the 2016-2017 School Year. See Compl., M.R. v. District of Columbia, No. 17-cv-1565 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 2, 2017). During this appeal, DCPS agreed to a “stay-put” at the Lab School for the 2017-2018 School Year, recognizing that the Lab School was M.R.’s “current school” at that time. See September 27, 2017 e-mail from DCPS counsel confirming stay-put, AR3 at 227. 5  The Honorable James E. Boasberg referred consideration of this matter to Magistrate Judge G. Michael Harvey for a Report and Recommendation. Magistrate Judge Harvey recommended that the District Court affirm Hearing Officer Vaden’s conclusion that the March 2016 IEP had provided M.R. with a FAPE and deny Plaintiffs’ request for reimbursement for the cost of M.R.’s education at the Lab School for the several months of the 2016–2017 School Year that preceded the March 2017 IEP. See Report and Recommendation, M.R. v. District of Columbia, No. 17-cv-1565, ECF No. 22 (D.D.C. July 6, 2018) (GMH) (AR1 at 205-242). Judge Boasberg adopted Magistrate Judge Harvey’s Report and Recommendation in full and entered judgment in favor of the District. See M.R. v. District of Columbia, No. 17-cv-1565, ECF No. 23 (D.D.C. July 23, 2018) (JEB) (AR1 at 270-271). C. 2018-2019 School Year In August 2018, L.R. notified DCPS that she intended to keep M.R. at the Lab School for the 2018-2019 School Year and requested that DCPS fund her placement there. See October 24, 2018 Stay-Put Order, AR1 at 295-298. DCPS declined. See id. L.R. requested an administrative hearing and invoked M.R.’s “stay-put” rights. Id. DCPS opposed the “stay-put” request, arguing that the Lab School was no longer M.R.’s “current educational placement.” Id. Hearing Officer Keith Seat concluded that M.R. was entitled to a “stay-put” order maintaining her placement at the Lab School during the pendency of her administrative challenge to DCPS’s decision not to fund that placement for the 2018-2019 School Year. Id. at 298. The parties eventually reached a settlement agreement in which DCPS agreed to fund M.R.’s placement at the Lab School through the end of the 2018-2019 School Year. See April 23, 2019 Offer of Settlement. AR1 at 299-300. 6  D. 2019-2020 School Year Essentially the same pattern recurred the following school year. In August 2019, L.R. notified DCPS that she intended to keep M.R. at the Lab School for the 2019-2020 School Year, asked that DCPS fund that placement, and invoked M.R.’s “stay-put” rights. See November 19, 2019 Interim Stay-Put Order, AR1 at 328-329. DCPS declined and opposed the “stay-put” request. See id. at 330. Hearing Officer Michael Lazan agreed with L.R. that the Lab School was M.R.’s “current educational placement” and ordered that DCPS maintain her placement there until the administrative challenge was resolved. Id. at 336. In June 2020, the parties reached a settlement agreement resolving L.R.’s administrative complaint regarding the 2019- 2020 School Year. See June 11, 2020 Offer of Settlement, AR1 at 411-413. E. 2020-2021 School Year A similar pattern unfolded yet again during the 2020-2021 School Year. L.R. notified DCPS in August 2020 that she intended to keep M.R. at the Lab School, requested funding for that placement, and invoked M.R.’s “stay-put” rights. See August 2020 Due Process Complaint, AR3 at 259-270; September 30, 2020 Stay-Put Order, AR3 at 271-272. DCPS declined and opposed the “stay-put” request. See id. at 275. Hearing Officer Peter Vaden ordered DCPS to maintain M.R.’s placement at the Lab School pending resolution of the administrative challenge to its decision not to fund her placement there for the full 2020-2021 School Year. Id. at 276. At L.R.’s request, Vaden later dismissed the administrative complaint as moot, in May 2021, concluding that there was no longer any “effectual relief” that the administrative process could provide. See May 6, 2021 Dismissal Order, AR3 at 318-319. Shortly after Hearing Officer Vaden dismissed L.R.’s complaint regarding placement for the 2020-2021 School Year, DCPS notified Plaintiffs that it did not intend to maintain M.R.’s 7 placement at the Lab School following the date of Hearing Officer Vaden’s decision. See May 7, 2021 e-mails re: status of tuition payments, AR3 at 322-323. L.R. then filed yet another administrative complaint and argued that M.R. was entitled to a “stay-put” order preserving her placement at the Lab School through the end of the 2020-2021 School Year. May 2021 Due Process Complaint, AR3 at 325-330. On June 28, 2021, Hearing Officer Vaden concluded that the Lab School continued to be M.R.’s “current educational placement” and ordered DCPS to maintain that placement through the end of the 2020–2021 School Year. June 28, 2021 Decision and Order on Stay-Put, AR3 at 336-338. F. 2021-2022 School Year DCPS developed a new IEP for M.R. in April 2021. See April 2021 IEP, AR2 at 1-36; February 2025 HOD, AR1 at 11. The IEP team recommended a program including 20 hours per week of specialized instruction, three hours per month of occupational therapy services, four hours per month of speech-language pathology services, and two hours per month of behavioral support services, all to be delivered outside of the general education setting. April 2021 IEP, AR2 at 27. L.R. and DCPS cross-filed administrative complaints regarding the appropriateness of DCPS’s proposed placement for M.R. for the 2021-2022 School Year, and these cases were consolidated for hearing. See Prehearing Order, AR3 at 339-340. L.R. again argued that M.R. should be placed at the Lab School and requested a “stay-put” order preserving her status there. See id. at 340, 343. DCPS opposed those requests and sought a ruling that a public middle school placement it had proposed for the 2021-2022 School Year based on the April 2021 IEP was appropriate. See id. Hearing Officer Vaden again granted L.R.’s request for a “stay-put” order. See id. at 343. But after holding an administrative due process hearing, in October 2021, 8 Hearing Officer Vaden concluded that the April 2021 IEP and DCPS’s proposed placement at a public middle school were appropriate, meaning that DCPS had offered M.R. a FAPE and that it was therefore not required to continue to fund her placement at the Lab School. October 2021 HOD, AR3 at 375. 1. Appeal of Hearing Officer’s October 2021 Decision L.R. and M.R. appealed to the District Court regarding Hearing Officer Vaden’s October 2021 HOD. See Compl., M.R. v. District of Columbia, Case No. 21-cv-2990, ECF No. 1 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 12, 2021). Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to secure M.R.’s “stay-put” rights pending resolution of the appeal. See Mot. for Prelim. Injunction, Case No. 21-cv-2990, ECF No. 3. DCPS did not oppose the motion, and accordingly, the Honorable Tanya S. Chutkan granted the unopposed motion, declared that the Lab School was M.R.’s “current educational placement,” and ordered that DCPS maintain her placement there pending resolution of the appeal. See December 3, 2021 Minute Order, Case No. 21-cv-2990. The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which Judge Chutkan referred to Magistrate Judge Robin M. Meriweather for a Report and Recommendation. See December 11, 2021 Minute Order. Magistrate Judge Meriweather recommended that each party’s motion be granted in part and denied in part. More specifically, she recommended partial summary judgment to DCPS on the following issues: witness credibility; whether M.R. was entitled to full-time specialized instruction in all classes; the Parent’s “participation” claim; the appropriateness of the public school as a placement; and examining the proper IEP. Magistrate Judge Meriweather recommended partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs insofar as the case would be remanded to the Hearing Officer for further proceedings on whether the IEP should have included certain goals related to reading, including a goal related to phonetic awareness, 9 as well as to reconsider whether L.R. was entitled to reimbursement of the cost of M.R.’s attendance at the Lab School. See Report and Recommendation, M.R. v. District of Columbia, Case No. 21-cv-2990 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2023) (RMM) (AR2 at 335-376). Judge Chutkan adopted the Report and Recommendation in full. See Order, M.R. v. District of Columbia, Case No. 21-cv-2990, ECF No. 20 (D.D.C. Oct. 16, 2023) (TSC) (AR2 at 501-502). On remand from the District Court to Hearing Officer Vaden, L.R. argued that the case was moot and should be dismissed because DCPS had already paid off M.R.’s Lab School expenses for the 2021-2022 School Year. See Prehearing Order on Remand, AR2 at 506. DCPS opposed dismissal and urged the Hearing Officer to render a decision on the merits. Id. Hearing Officer Vaden concluded that the District Court should decide the mootness issue and deferred further proceedings pending action by the District Court. Id. at 508-507. L.R. then filed a motion to dismiss the District Court case as moot, which was unopposed by DCPS and granted by Judge Chutkan in July 2024. See Order, M.R. v. District of Columbia, No. 21-cv-2990 (D.D.C. July 23, 2024), AR2 at 611. Hearing Officer Vaden dismissed the associated administrative proceedings shortly thereafter. See Administrative Dismissal Order, AR2 at 612- 613. G. 2023 and 2024 IEPs Meanwhile, DCPS developed a new IEP for M.R. in September 2023. See IEP, AR2 at 435-493; February 2025 HOD, AR1 at 16. This IEP called for M.R. to receive 20 hours per week of specialized instruction outside of the general education setting, three hours per month of occupational therapy, and three hours per month of behavioral support services. Id. It also called for the use of a variety of assistive devices and other interventions designed to help M.R. succeed in the classroom. February 2025 HOD, AR1 at 16-17. The next year, in September 10 2024, DCPS developed a similar IEP for M.R. that called for the same services, with the addition of one hour per week with a special education case manager. Id. at 17-18. The Lab School also developed its own IEP for M.R., which called for 32 hours per week of specialized instruction, three hours per month of occupational therapy, and six hours per month of speech-language pathology, all to be delivered outside of the general education setting. Id. at 17. H. 2023-2024 and 2024-2025 School Years On July 26, 2024 – the same day that Hearing Officer Vaden dismissed the administrative proceedings regarding DCPS’s proposal for the 2021-2022 School Year, see Administrative Dismissal Order, AR2 at 612-613 – L.R. filed a Due Process Complaint requesting an administrative hearing regarding DCPS’s proposals for the 2023-2024 and 2024- 2025 School Years, once again invoking M.R.’s “stay-put” rights. See September 18, 2024 Stay-Put Order, AR3 at 140-141. L.R. filed a motion to maintain her placement at the Lab School pending the resolution of the administrative challenge. See id. at 141. DCPS did not agree to recognize the Lab School as M.R.’s “stay-put” placement, but Hearing Officer Michael Lazan granted the “stay-put” motion in September 2024, concluding that the Lab School was M.R.’s “current educational placement.” Id. at 141, 147. L.R. later withdrew and refiled her administrative hearing request to incorporate additional issues that had arisen since her original filing. See September 24, 2024 e-mails from counsel, AR3 at 498-499. She also filed a renewed motion to enforce M.R.’s “stay-put” rights to placement at the Lab School, which Hearing Officer Lazan granted in an October 31, 2024 Order on Motion for Stay-Put Relief, AR3 at 598-603. After an administrative hearing that lasted five days and included testimony from 10 witnesses, Hearing Officer Lazan denied in full 11 L.R.’s request for relief, concluding that DCPS had offered M.R. a FAPE during the 2024-2025 School Year. February 2025 HOD, AR1 at 21-34. In February 2025, L.R. and M.R. filed this civil action against the District of Columbia to appeal from Hearing Officer Lazan’s HOD. See Compl., ECF No. 1. As noted previously, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to preserve M.R.’s “stay-put” placement at the Lab School until this case is resolved, which was granted by this Court. See Order, ECF No. 18. Below, the Court summarizes the administrative proceeding underlying this civil action. 1. Administrative Proceedings re: 2024-2025 School Year Plaintiffs’ September 24, 2024 due process complaint alleged that DCPS denied M.R. a FAPE by: (1) failing to propose an appropriate IEP and/or location of services for the 2024- 2025 School Year; (2) failing to propose a location of services for her for the 2024-25 School Year as of the date of the filing of this hearing request; (3) continuing to describe her on her IEP as an English Language Learner student; and (4) failing to find her eligible for speech/language services. Due Process Complaint, AR3 at 160-161 (also noting the question as to whether the Lab School was a proper placement). By way of relief, L.R. requested that “DCPS fund [M.R.] at the Lab School of Washington for the 2024-2025 School Year, with all related fees and costs,” due to its alleged “failure to propose an appropriate IEP and placement.” Id. at 160. An October 8, 2024 resolution meeting did not result in a settlement, and on November 19, 2024, DCPS filed its due process complaint, seeking a ruling that DCPS did not deny the M.R. a FAPE for the 2024-2025 School Year.5 February 2025 HOD, AR1, at 5-6, 9. On December 3-4, 2024, and January 6-7 and 21, 2025, the parties proceeded to the due process 5 The due process complaints were consolidated in one case by the Hearing Officer. HOD, AR1 at 6. 12 hearing phase as contemplated by 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) and (f)(1)(B). Both sides produced exhibits and provided testimony concerning the issues raised in the Due Process Complaints. Below, the Court discusses in brief the witnesses. a. Due Process Hearing Witnesses In addition to M.R.’s parent, L.R., Plaintiffs’ witnesses consisted of: (1) Audrey Dolginoff, a director at the Lab School, who was qualified as an expert in special education (“Witness A”); (2) Gretchen Kunz, a speech-language pathologist, who was qualified as an expert in speech-language pathology and literacy (“Witness B”); (3) Laura Solomon, M.R.’s educational consultant, who was qualified as an expert in special education (“Witness C”). Ms. Dolginoff testified that she had been M.R.’s case manager for M.R.’s IEP for the last three years and she had observed her but not worked with her directly. AR4 at 235-236, 241. Ms. Kunz indicated that she was the director of speech, language and literacy at the Lab School, where she managed a team of speech language pathologists. AR4 at 301, 303. Ms. Kunz did not directly provide these services to M.R., but she had substituted a few times during speech and language sessions when M.R.’s clinician was not there. AR4 at 307. Ms. Solomon explained that, among other credentials, she holds a doctorate in special education, and she served as an adjunct professor for several years at universities in their master’s level teacher training programs. AR4 at 512, 513. In 1983, she opened a private practice providing consultation services to families with students with educational disabilities in the District of Columbia metropolitan area. Id. at 515. DCPS’s witnesses consisted of: (1) Sean Bradley, a DCPS monitoring specialist who was qualified as an expert in special education with an emphasis on non-public placement (“Witness D”); (2) Delissa Green, a speech-language pathologist, who was qualified as an expert in speech- 13 language pathology programming and evaluations (“Witness E”); (3) Rosanna DeMammos, a deputy chief with DCPS, who was qualified as an expert in English language learner (“ELL”) testing and services (“Witness F”); (4) Selena Barlow, a DCPS manager, who was qualified as an expert in special education programming and placement and reading (“Witness G”); (5) Lori Easterly, a DCPS program specialist, who was qualified as an expert in special education programming and placement with an emphasis on private placement (“Witness H”); (6) Crystal Millington, a DCPS program manager, who was qualified as an expert in special education programming and placement with an emphasis on full-time placement (“Witness I”); and (7) Devon Wade, a DCPS director, who was qualified as an expert in special education (“Witness J”). Mr. Bradley indicated that he was the monitoring specialist on the non-public team at DCPS, where he monitored DCPS students with disabilities who were funded by DCPS to attend special education day schools, and in this capacity, he oversaw six non-public schools, including the Lab School. AR4 at 398. Mr. Bradley explained that he observed students at the schools, set up their transportation, reviewed their progress reports and attendance, and he acted as the LEA representative for DCPS at the IEP meetings at the non-public schools for the previous four years. Id. Ms. Green stated that she had been a speech-language pathologist on the central IEP team [officially] since 2015, but she had been a speech and language pathologist with DCPS for 26 years, and her main role was doing assessments. AR4 at 435-436. Ms. DeMammos indicated that she was the deputy chief of the Lanaguage Acquisition Division which supported all multilingual learners or English learners in DCPS. AR4 at 572. Ms. DeMammos supervised a team that supported over 8,000 multilingual learners or English learners in grades preschool 3 through grade 12 and in the opportunity academies. AR4 at 574. 14  Ms. Barlow testified that, since March of 2021, she had managed the Central IEP team – a 13-person assessment team for students who attend private schools – to make sure that Child Find obligations were being met. AR4 at 598-599. Prior to that, she was a non-public monitoring specialist for DCPS, where she monitored students whom DCPS had placed at various non-public schools to make sure that their IEPs were being implemented. AR4 at 599. Ms. Easterly testified that she was the program specialist with the CIEP team, which is the central office IEP team, and that her position involved facilitating and leading IEP meetings and eligibility meetings and conducting observations, while working with private and parochial schools as well as DCPS. AR4 at 651. In her position, Ms. Easterly worked with Lab School frequently. Id. Ms. Millington testified that she was the program manager for DCPS special education classrooms. AR4 at 702. More specifically, she managed the self-contained classrooms - the learning support classrooms and behavior and education support classrooms to ensure that there was appropriate allocation of staff and supports. AR4 at 707. Ms. Wade indicated that she was the director of specialized education at Jackson-Reed High School (“Jackson-Reed”) and in that capacity, she sat in as the LEA representative designee for all IEP eligibility meetings, oversaw case managers, conducted classroom observations, and acted as liaison between central service and the school.6 AR4 at 739. b. HOD On February 13, 2025, Hearing Officer Lazan issued his HOD, in which he addressed each of the issues raised by the Plaintiffs’ regarding the alleged denial of a FAPE, as well as DCPS’s position that there was no denial of FAPE. After making his findings of fact, AR1 at 9-21, Hearing Officer Lazan set forth his conclusions of law that: (1) “DCPS offered [M.R.] a 6 Jackson-Reed was the location of services designated by DCPS. 15 FAPE through its IEPs corresponding to the 2024-2025 school year” [AR1 at 29]; (2) L.R.’s claim that a FAPE was denied when DCPS failed to propose a location of services for the 2024- 2025 School Year by the date of the filing of the hearing request was not raised “in her closing brief,” and furthermore, this claim was deemed to be “without merit” [id. at 30] ; (3) L.R.’s claim that M.R. continued to be described as an ELL was “not mentioned in the Parent’s brief [and] must be dismissed” [id. at 31]; and (4) L.R.’s claim that M.R. was denied a FAPE when she was not found eligible for speech/language was rebutted by Ms. Green’s testimony and accordingly, that claim was dismissed [id. at 32]. The Hearing Officer concluded also that DCPS offered M.R. a FAPE during the 2024-2025 School Year, and he dismissed Plaintiffs’ case with prejudice. Id. at 32. The Court turns now to the applicable legal standards regarding review of the Hearing Officer’s decision, in the context of the parties having filed the cross-motions for summary judgment, which are before this Court. II. LEGAL STANDARD A. IDEA The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., provides federal funding to the District of Columbia, States, and United States territories for public education, subject to certain conditions. First, recipients of federal funding must ensure that a “free appropriate public education is available to all children with disabilities.” See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). The “free appropriate public education” required by this condition is commonly known as a “FAPE.” Second, children with disabilities must, “[t]o the maximum extent appropriate,” be “educated with children who are not disabled” and “remov[ed] . . . from the regular educational environment . . . only when the nature or severity of the disability of [the] child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and 16 services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.” Id. § 1412(a)(5). This condition is known as the “least restrictive environment” requirement. See id. The IDEA’s “primary vehicle” for ensuring an appropriate public education for students with disabilities is the “individualized education program” (“IEP”). See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988); 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). Under the IDEA, a team including a student’s parents, teachers, and school officials must meet at least once each year to discuss the student’s performance, set goals, and identify services that the “local educational agency”—usually a school district—will provide to support the student in reaching those goals. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). The IEP is the “written statement” of this assessment and plan. See id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i). The IEP team must develop an IEP that is “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” Endrew F. ex. Rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. (“Endrew F.”), 580 U.S. 386, 399 (2017); see also Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley (“Rowley”), 458 U.S. 176, 204 (1982) (The plan “should be reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.”) The IDEA requires that a State or local educational agency have an IEP in place “for each child with a disability in the agency’s jurisdiction” at the beginning of each school year. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A). Because Congress recognized that parents and school officials would sometimes disagree about what services should be included in an IEP and how those services should be implemented, the IDEA guarantees certain “procedural safeguards” for students with disabilities and their parents. Id. § 1412(a)(6). First, a parent who is dissatisfied with their child’s IEP may request an administrative due process hearing before an independent hearing officer. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1). Second, if the parent is “aggrieved by” the hearing officer’s determination, the 17 parent may seek judicial review in the district court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). The reviewing court, “basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). B. Summary Judgment “Although motions for review of an HOD are called motions for summary judgment, the Court does not follow ‘a true summary judgment procedure.’” Middleton v. District of Columbia, 312 F. Supp. 3d 113, 128 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting L.R.L. ex rel. Lomax v. District of Columbia, 896 F. Supp. 2d 69, 73 (D.D.C. 2012)); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Rather, in a civil action brought to challenge a Hearing Officer’s determination pursuant to the IDEA, “[a] motion for summary judgment operates as a motion for judgment based on the evidence comprising the record and any additional evidence the Court may receive.” D.R. v. District of Columbia, 637 F. Supp. 2d 11, 16 (D.D.C. 2009). When neither party has requested that the court hear additional evidence, the motion for summary judgment is “the procedural vehicle for asking the judge to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record.” Heather S. v. Wisconsin, 125 F.3d 1045, 1052 (7th Cir. 1997); M G. v. District of Columbia, 246 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2017) (citations omitted); Thomas v. District of Columbia, 407 F. Supp. 2d 102, 109 (D.D.C. 2005) (same). The burden of proof falls upon the party challenging the hearing officer’s decision, who must “at least take on the burden of persuading the court that the hearing officer was wrong.” Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia (“Reid ”), 401 F.3d 516, 521 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). A court reviewing an administrative IDEA determination “shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate,” based upon “a preponderance of the evidence.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii); see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205–206. 18  The preponderance of the evidence standard does not authorize unfettered de novo review by the court and is “by no means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206; see also Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 399 (“Any review of an IEP must appreciate that the question is whether the IEP is reasonable, not whether the court regards it as ideal.”) As a general matter, factual findings from the administrative proceeding are to be considered prima facie correct. District of Columbia v. Ramirez, 377 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67 (D.D.C. 2005). Courts must give “due weight” to the administrative findings since “courts lack the specialized knowledge and experience necessary to resolve persistent and difficult questions of educational policy.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-208 (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “[a] hearing officer’s findings based on credibility determinations of live witness testimony are given particular deference where there is no supplementation of the record.” McAllister v. District of Columbia, 45 F. Supp. 3d 72, 76 (D.D.C. 2014) (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “a hearing decision ‘without reasoned and specific findings deserves little deference.’” Reid, 401 F.3d at 521 (quoting Kerkam v. McKenzie, 931 F.2d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). Finally, where “ a court upset[s] [a hearing] officer’s decision,” it must “explain its basis for doing so.” McKenzie, 862 F.2d at 887. III. DISCUSSION Hearing Officer Lazan’s HOD addressed the four issues raised in the Plaintiffs’ Due Process Complaint; however, in their Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs do not challenge the Hearing Officer’s conclusions on the timeliness of DCPS’s location of services offer, M.R.’s language classification, or the provision of speech-language services. Accordingly, because those three issues are uncontested by Plaintiffs, the Hearing Officer’s 19 conclusions relating to those three issues are affirmed. That leaves standing the denial of FAPE claim based on DCPS’s alleged failure to propose a sufficient amount of specialized instruction, an appropriate peer group, and a specific reading intervention, and by DCPS designating a location of services that was alleged to be too large. Those issues will be addressed herein. Plaintiffs do attempt to raise a second contested issue in their Motion for Summary Judgment - that FAPE was denied because the school failed to permit a meaningful observation of the proposed program at Jackson-Reed for either L.R. or M.R.’s educational consultant. See Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 22, at 30-35. In his February 2025 HOD, the Hearing Officer explained that “[t]hough the Parent did move for the right to an observation, and this motion was granted by written order dated November 5, 2024, FAPE claims corresponding to this motion were not raised in the due process complaint, which could have been amended to include such claims.” AR1 at 29; see District of Columbia v. Pearson, 923 F. Supp. 2d 82, 87 (D.D.C. 2013) (indicating that the party requesting the due process hear