Charles Grant Merrell v. The State of Wyoming

THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING 2026 WY 121 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2026 November 13, 2026 CHARLES GRANT MERRELL, Appellant (Defendant), v. S-26-0015 THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee (Plaintiff). Appeal from the District Court of Lincoln County The Honorable Joseph B. Bluemel, Judge Representing Appellant: James K. Sanderson of Sanderson Law Office, Afton, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Sanderson. Representing Appellee: Keith G. Kautz, Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General; Kristen R. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Jones. Before BOOMGAARDEN, C.J., and GRAY, FENN, JAROSH, and HILL, JJ. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume. FENN, Justice. [¶1] A jury convicted Charles G. Merrell of two counts of sexual abuse of a minor in the third degree in violation of Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) (2023). On appeal, Mr. Merrell asserts Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) is unconstitutionally vague, the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, his right to a unanimous jury verdict was violated, the district court erroneously admitted evidence about alleged “grooming” behavior, the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing statements, and the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of due process and a fair trial. We affirm. ISSUES [¶2] Mr. Merrell raises six issues, which we rephrase as follows: I. Is Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) unconstitutionally vague because the undefined phrase “immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties” fails to provide fair notice of prohibited conduct and permits arbitrary and unequal application of the law? II. Did the State present sufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Merrell’s convictions? III. Was Mr. Merrell’s right to a unanimous verdict violated when each count alleged multiple distinct acts, but the jury was not instructed that it must unanimously agree on which act formed the basis for the charge? IV. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence and argument regarding alleged “grooming” behavior? V. Did the prosecutor engage in misconduct during closing arguments that denied Mr. Merrell a fair trial? VI. Did the cumulative effect of these errors deprive Mr. Merrell of due process and a fair trial? FACTS [¶3] On January 10, 2025, a detective from the Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office received a report from Star Valley High School that a student, JR, made disclosures of possible sexual abuse by her stepfather, Charles Merrell. Because she did not feel safe at home, JR went to live with her stepbrother in Cedar City, Utah, after disclosing Mr. Merrell’s behavior to her siblings over the Christmas holiday. The detective arranged for JR to 1 participate in a forensic interview. During this interview, JR disclosed that Mr. Merrell had discussions with her about masturbation and paid her $50 to encourage her to “explore” her body. He would also frequently touch her buttocks and bare stomach. JR stated Mr. Merrell would give her full body hugs that were so close she could feel his “privates” touching her body. Mr. Merrell kissed JR’s neck during some of these hugs. JR told the interviewer Mr. Merrell would force her to dance with him in the kitchen, and he would pull her so close that there would be no space between them. JR stated she could feel Mr. Merrell’s “privates” against hers, which she said was “hard” and “stuck out.” JR also disclosed Mr. Merrell would give her “massages” where he would touch her bare buttocks with his hands, even when she objected to this contact. JR described an incident where Mr. Merrell forced her to model a bikini and then tried to pull the waistband lower down onto her hips. When JR flinched and moved away, Mr. Merrell became angry. JR told the detective she was afraid to be alone in the home with Mr. Merrell, and on one occasion Mr. Merrell asked JR if she was afraid he was going to rape her. [¶4] The detective interviewed Mr. Merrell, who admitted all the contact described by JR, except for having an erection while dancing with or hugging JR. Mr. Merrell read the detective a letter he had written to JR attempting to explain his motives for the forced touching. This letter confirmed much of the conduct described by JR, but asserted his motives were innocent, and he was merely attempting to help her become comfortable with touch so she would have a successful marriage. [¶5] The State charged Mr. Merrell with two counts of sexual abuse of a minor in the third degree in violation of Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv). Count I alleged Mr. Merrell “[t]ook immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with JR . . . (to wit: touching and massaging [her] buttocks/bare buttocks) . . . .” Count II alleged Mr. Merrell “[t]ook immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with JR . . . (to wit: rubbing and touching [her] bare stomach, sometimes while kissing [her] neck from behind) . . . .” Mr. Merrell filed a motion for a bill of particulars, asserting the charges did not “adequately inform [him] of the specific nature, time, place, manner, or means of the alleged offense(s) sufficient to prepare a defense.” After a hearing on Mr. Merrell’s motion, the State filed an amended information. The State amended Count I to assert that between October 2021 and September 2023, Mr. Merrell “[t]ook immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with JR . . . (to wit: touching buttocks, pinching buttocks and massaging buttocks) . . . .” The State amended Count II to assert that between October 2021 and September 2023, Mr. Merrell: [t]ook immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with JR . . . (to wit: full body hugs, forced dancing, coming up behind JR and putting his hands on her stomach and rubbing/stroking it, sometimes while simultaneously kissing her neck, and forced hugs/dancing when the defendant was erect and put his erect penis on JR’s leg) . . . . 2 [¶6] A three-day jury trial commenced on October 27, 2025. JR testified she was approximately 8 years old when Mr. Merrell married her mother. When she was between the ages of 10 and 12, Mr. Merrell started insisting on more frequent hugs and asked her to sit on his lap and cuddle with him. When she turned 15, Mr. Merrell began touching her even more. Initially, he would brush up against her buttocks, which he tried to pass off as an accident, but then he progressed to patting, spanking, “full-hand pinching,” and grabbing her buttocks. On the multiple occasions when she told Mr. Merrell that his actions made her uncomfortable, he got defensive and attempted to justify his conduct. [¶7] JR also testified about massages Mr. Merrell insisted on giving her. She stated Mr. Merrell would ask her if she wanted a massage, and she would decline. Despite her refusal, Mr. Merrell would insist on giving her a massage. She would lie next to him on the couch and “he would run his whole hand underneath [her] spandex and touch [her] bare butt[ocks] and massage it fully.” If she was laying on her back, “he would massage [her] quads and then move up and stick his hand underneath [her] spandex again and massage . . . around [her] hip flexors and close to [her] private parts.” She testified she was 15 when these massages began. Mr. Merrell often complimented JR’s buttocks, and he would tell her it was “sexy,” she needed to show it off, and he could not resist touching it. [¶8] JR described multiple incidents where Mr. Merrell forced her to dance with him. She testified: In the kitchen, anytime when there would be music playing, he would immediately pull me close, body-to-body contact with him, making sure my legs were spread apart enough that one of his legs could go in between mine so there was no distance between us. He would grab one hand and then with his other he would grip it around my waist and he wouldn’t give me any space even when I would try to push back, and he would just sit there and dance with me even though he knew I was uncomfortable with it and that I wanted my distance. When they were dancing, JR “could feel his penis and his private parts up against [her].” [¶9] JR further testified Mr. Merrell would force her to hug him and kiss him on the cheek every time she saw him. There were also several occasions where Mr. Merrell came up behind JR, ran his hands up her shirt, rubbed her bare stomach, and kissed her neck. Mr. Merrell told JR she was very attractive, and he felt he had every right to be attracted to her. He often told her she was sexy, beautiful, and “smokin’ hot.” [¶10] Although the incident occurred when JR was 17 and was not part of the charged conduct, JR also testified about the episode that occurred when she was trying on a swimsuit. Mr. Merrell had purchased a bikini for her, and he insisted that she try it on, 3 even though she was uncomfortable wearing it. When she came out, he called her over and “grabbed the top waistband of the swimsuit bottoms and pulled it lower.” JR was startled and jumped back, and Mr. Merrell responded by grabbing her by the shoulders, shoving her up against the door frame, and yelling in her face. At some point after this occurred, she was alone in the house with Mr. Merrell, and he came into her room, sat next to her on the bed and asked her if she was afraid that he was going to rape her. When JR “answered honestly and told him yes,” Mr. Merrell became defensive and said he would never do that because it would ruin his relationship with his wife and his family. [¶11] JR stated Mr. Merrell started having conversations with her about masturbation. He encouraged her to “explore” her body and look at pictures of naked women or the other girls in the locker room and compare her body to theirs. He also forced her to sit in his lap while he read her an article, which he falsely claimed had been written by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (LDS), saying masturbation was encouraged by the church. Mr. Merrell asked JR if she had been masturbating, and “to get him off [her] back,” she said that she had. He told her he was “proud” of what she had done and gave her $50. [¶12] JR explained why she did not disclose Mr. Merrell’s conduct to her mother; she testified she was “afraid of what might happen and [of] putting her in harm as well.” However, when her siblings returned home for the holidays, she brought up her concerns about what was going on in the home and explained that she was not comfortable living there any longer. Her siblings helped her pack up her belongings, and she went to live with her stepbrother. [¶13] After hearing the evidence presented at the trial, the jury found Mr. Merrell guilty of both counts of sexual abuse of a minor in the third degree. Mr. Merrell filed a motion for judgment of acquittal asserting the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. The district court denied this motion. Mr. Merrell filed a motion for a new trial. The district court denied this motion. The district court sentenced Mr. Merrell to concurrent sentences of three to six years in prison. This appeal timely followed. DISCUSSION I. Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) is not unconstitutionally vague. [¶14] Mr. Merrell argues Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) is unconstitutionally vague. Although he primarily asserts the statute is vague as applied to the conduct alleged in this case, he also claims the statute is vague on its face. Mr. Merrell claims the statute fails to provide fair notice of what conduct is illegal, and it delegates policy matters to police, judges, or juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis. [¶15] Mr. Merrell filed a motion to dismiss the charges under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure (W.R.Cr.P.) arguing Wyoming Statute § 6-2- 4 316(a)(iv) was unconstitutionally vague. The district court denied Mr. Merrell’s motion. “A court’s determination of whether a statute is constitutional on its face or as applied to a defendant is a matter of law” this Court reviews de novo. Dugan v. State, 2019 WY 112, ¶ 10, 451 P.3d 731, 736 (Wyo. 2019) (citation omitted). A. Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) is constitutional on its face. [¶16] “When challenging a statute for unconstitutional facial vagueness[,] the party must demonstrate that the statute reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct[] or that the statute specifies no standard of conduct at all.” Giles v. State, 2004 WY 101, ¶ 15, 96 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Wyo. 2004) (citations omitted). “When a statute is challenged for vagueness on its face, the [C]ourt examines the statute not only in light of the complainant’s conduct, but also as it might be applied in other situations.” Id. (quoting Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 975 (Wyo. 1988)). [¶17] This Court has repeatedly rejected facial vagueness challenges to Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv). We have consistently held the indecent liberties statute does not reach a substantial amount of protected conduct. See, e.g., Giles, ¶¶ 15–16, 96 P.3d at 1031–32; Ochoa v. State, 848 P.2d 1359, 1363–64 (Wyo. 1993). Indeed, we have found the statute does not implicate constitutionally protected privacy, religious, or free-speech rights. Giles, ¶ 16, 96 P.3d at 1032 (citations omitted); Ochoa, 848 P.2d at 1363–64. [¶18] Similarly, we have repeatedly rejected the argument that Wyoming Statute § 6-2- 316(a)(iv) specifies no standard of prohibited conduct. See Giles, ¶ 19, 96 P.3d at 1033; Ochoa, 848 P.2d at 1363; Griego, 761 P.2d at 976. A “statute is void for vagueness if it fails to give a person of ordinary sensibility fair notice that the contemplated conduct is forbidden.” Giles, ¶ 11, 96 P.3d at 1030 (quoting Hobbs v. State, 757 P.2d 1008, 1011 (Wyo. 1988)). However, this principle “does not invalidate every statute which a reviewing court believes could have been drafted with greater precision.” Id. at ¶ 12, 96 P.3d at 1030 (quoting Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Wyo. 1979)). Instead, “[a]ll the Due Process Clause requires is that the law give [s]ufficient warning that men may conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden.” Sorenson, 604 P.2d at 1033 (citation omitted). [¶19] In Sorenson v. State, we rejected the argument that the undefined terms “immoral,” “immodest,” and “indecent,” made it impossible for the defendant to understand that his acts were criminal until after the jury passed judgment on his case. 604 P.2d at 1034–35. We held: If the three words “immoral, immodest and indecent,” standing alone, were our only consideration, we might agree with appellant. Their meanings to each of several persons of ordinary intelligence may differ to a point wherein it could not 5  be said that the conduct required or forbidden is set forth with reasonable certainty. On the other hand, strict application of the definitions of the words could lead to the conclusion that a person of ordinary intelligence would know that conduct such as fondling the breast of a twelve-year-old child is proscribed by them and is clearly prohibited by the “standard of morality” of this society. In any event, we need not consider the three words on their own connotation as suggested by appellant. They are accompanied in the statute by the words “liberties” and “child” which narrow down and designate with reasonable certainty the acts and conduct required or forbidden. “Liberties” are such as common sense of society would regard as indecent and improper. “Indecent liberties” is self-defining. “Indecent liberties” and “indecent assault” are convertible terms. Accordingly, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. Id. (citation modified). We further stated it was unnecessary for the statute to specify what would be considered as “immodest, immoral, and indecent liberties” with particularity, and we recognized “[t]he indelicacy of the subject forbids it.” Id. at 1035. We held “[t]he common sense of the community, as well as the sense of decency, propriety, and morality which people generally entertain, is sufficient to apply the statute to each particular case[] and point out unmistakably what particular conduct is rendered criminal by it.” Id. (citations omitted). Due process does not require the statute to “spell out in exact words what constitutes the conduct made punishable.” Id. (citation omitted). [¶20] “Under the doctrine of stare decisis, we depart from precedent only upon due reflection and only if we are convinced that it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.” Hicks v. State, 2025 WY 113, ¶ 91, 578 P.3d 366, 391 (Wyo. 2025) (quoting Bernard v. State, 2025 WY 66, ¶ 14, 570 P.3d 416, 420 (Wyo. 2025)). Mr. Merrell has failed to convince this Court we should depart from our precedent and hold Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) is unconstitutionally vague on its face. B. Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) is constitutional as applied in this case. [¶21] We next consider Mr. Merrell’s “as applied” challenge. When a statute is challenged “as applied,” we examine the statute solely in light of the defendant’s specific conduct. Ruby v. State, 2006 WY 133, ¶ 5, 144 P.3d 425, 427 (Wyo. 2006) (citation modified). To determine whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied, “we must decide whether the statute provides sufficient notice to a person of ordinary intelligence” 6 that the defendant’s conduct was illegal and “whether the facts of the case demonstrate arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.” Id. [¶22] Mr. Merrell contends Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the conduct alleged in the case because he had no notice the charged conduct could violate the statute. He claims previous decisions have involved sexual intercourse, direct manipulation of a child’s genitals, or conduct that is “more overtly sexual and materially more egregious . . . .” He argues the statute should require some form of sexual contact or contact with a victim’s intimate parts. Finally, he argues the legislature’s failure to define the conduct prohibited by Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) with precision or without reference to any defined physical act “leaves the boundary of felony criminal liability to be supplied on a case-by-case basis.” [¶23] We disagree. The absence of a prior case involving identical conduct does not necessarily establish a lack of notice. We have recognized “if the statute has been previously applied to conduct identical to that of the appellant, he cannot complain that notice was lacking.” Giles, ¶ 13, 96 P.3d at 1031 (citation omitted). However, we have also made clear that identical precedent is not required. See Ruby, 2006 WY 133, ¶ 7, 144 P.3d at 428–30 (quoting Rabuck v. State, 2006 WY 25, ¶¶ 18–26, 129 P.3d 861, 865–67 (Wyo. 2006) (rejecting an insufficient notice argument and stating “the lack of prior cases discussing similar conduct is not determinative”). Rather, “[w]e will not find a statute vague as applied if we can conclude that its language would sufficiently apprise a person that the conduct proven at trial was prohibited by law.” Jones v. State, 2016 WY 110, ¶ 24, 384 P.3d 260, 266 (Wyo. 2016) (citation omitted). [¶24] We previously rejected the argument the indecent liberties statute applies only to offenses amounting to sexual assault. Rabuck, 2006 WY 25, ¶ 23, 129 P.3d at 866–67. Contrary to Mr. Merrell’s argument, we have recognized the indecent liberties statute has “broad application.” Rabuck, ¶ 19, 129 P.3d at 866 (citation omitted). The breadth is consistent with the statute’s purpose of “protect[ing] children from exploitation.” Id. at ¶ 22, 129 P.3d at 866 (quoting Misenheimer v. State, 2001 WY 65, ¶ 12, 27 P.3d 273, 280 (Wyo. 2001)). A person exploits a child by “taking unjust advantage of [a child] for one’s own benefit or selfish ends.” Exploitation, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). [¶25] The fairness required by the vagueness doctrine does not require a statute that specifies “in exact words” what conduct is punishable. Giles, 2004 WY 101, ¶ 21, 96 P.3d at 1034 (quoting Millhollan v. State,143 S.E.2d 730, 733 (Ga. 1965)). The doctrine does not transform the practical difficulty of drafting a criminal statute broad enough to encompass varied conduct into a constitutional defect. Id. (quoting Sorenson, 604 P.2d at 1035). “[T]he indecent liberties statute should not be subject to challenge ‘by virtue of the fact that it is broad enough to capture even innovative forms of sexual imposition upon minors.’” Rabuck, 2006 WY 25, ¶ 19, 129 P.3d at 866. The question, therefore, is not 7 whether the statute expressly identifies the particular conduct at issue in this case, but whether its language gave Mr. Merrell fair notice that such conduct was prohibited. [¶26] When this Court is asked to consider whether a criminal statute provided an accused with sufficient notice, “we have examined the defendant’s consciousness of guilt in assessing whether the defendant had notice of the criminal prohibition.” Rabuck, 2006 WY 25, ¶ 20, 129 P.3d at 866. Here, the evidence demonstrates Mr. Merrell understood that JR viewed his conduct as inappropriate. Mr. Merrell repeatedly became defensive when JR expressed her discomfort with or objection to his conduct, and he attempted to justify the continued forced touching. In addition, after JR left the home, but before he was interviewed by the police, Mr. Merrell composed a letter attempting to explain his behavior to JR. The letter graphically described the conduct JR later disclosed to the police, and it asked her to choose between his proposed alternative motives for touching her: When Chuck had her try on swimsuits, was he trying to help her overcome her negative body image? Was he trying to help build her confidence and low self[-]esteem? Was he trying to help her face the embarrassment she always displayed when she had on a swimsuit?????? Or [. . .] Was he getting his Jollies off watching her put on a swimsuit? Was he getting so visually excited he just couldn’t wait to get his hands down her pants and finger bang her brains out? When he challenged her to start giving hugs and kisses and practice it often, was it so she could face her fears of closeness and touch? Was he trying to help her with her insecurity with intimacy? Was he trying to help her develop the ability to let people in? To let people get near? Or [. . .] Was it just so he could French kiss her on the mouth and stick his tongue down her throat? Was it so he could rub his penis up against her, cause himself to get a woody, and show off his big, hard, boner? When Chuck challenged her to stop fearing her bum and how negatively she felt about it . . . was he trying to have her not care so much? To stop giving her power away to that insecure 8  thought and feeling? To allow vulnerability to touch in that area she feared so much? Or [ . . .] Was he brushing it, patting it, smacking it, and giving her a massage, so that he could get excited about the ideas of grabbing that ass, bending her over and sexually pounding her from behind? Mr. Merrell’s statements demonstrate he had fair notice that his conduct was prohibited. His contemporaneous efforts to justify the touching and explain it to JR indicate he understood the nature of his conduct and recognized this type of conduct was unlawful. See Rabuck, 2006 WY 25, ¶ 20, 129 P.3d at 866 (stating the defendant’s attempts to conceal his conduct indicated he understood his conduct was unlawful). These statements also show Mr. Merrell knew society would construe his actions as immoral or indecent. [¶27] In further assessing whether Mr. Merrell had fair notice that his conduct was prohibited, we consider his conduct in its full context and under the totality of the circumstances. See id. at ¶ 31, 129 P.3d at 868 (citation omitted). Here, the record reflects Mr. Merrell knew both JR and her mother objected to his conduct. Despite these objections, Mr. Merrell continued grabbing and pinching JR’s buttocks, massaging her bare buttocks and hip flexors underneath her spandex, forcing her to dance so closely to him that she “could feel his penis and his private parts up against [her,]” and hugging her from behind while running his hands over her bare stomach and kissing her neck. The evidence also shows Mr. Merrell justified doing things like peeking into JR’s room by saying she was not his biological daughter, and it was natural for him to be curious. Mr. Merrell admitted to his wife that he was sexually attracted to JR. He also told JR he was attracted to her, and “he felt he had every right to be.” He often told JR she was “sexy,” “beautiful,” or “smokin’ hot.” He asked JR to keep their conversations about masturbation secret, and he attempted to convince JR it was acceptable for her to engage in masturbation by saying it was condoned by their church. Mr. Merrell’s behavior got progressively worse until JR became afraid that he was going to rape her. [¶28] The totality of the circumstances demonstrates Mr. Merrell’s conduct constituted “taking unjust advantage of [JR] for [his] own benefit or selfish ends.” Exploitation, Black’s Law Dictionary. The circumstances described above demonstrate Mr. Merrell’s conduct was the type of conduct that a person of ordinary intelligence would understand could fall within the statute’s prohibition. Indeed, the common sense of society would recognize Mr. Merrell’s conduct as implicating the very type of exploitation the statute seeks to prevent. See Rabuck, 2006 WY 25, ¶ 22, 129 P.3d at 866 (quoting Misenheimer, 2001 WY 65, ¶ 12, 27 P.3d at 280). The statute therefore provided Mr. Merrell sufficient 9 notice that his conduct was prohibited. We conclude Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mr. Merrell. II. The evidence was sufficient to sustain Mr. Merrell’s convictions. [¶29] Mr. Merrell argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for two reasons. First, he contends the State failed to prove all the essential elements of the crime as charged in Count II. Second, Mr. Merrell contends the “conduct proven at trial does not rise to the level of conduct previously upheld by this Court.” We will address each of these arguments in turn. A. The State presented sufficient evidence to prove all the essential elements of Count II. [¶30] Mr. Merrell asserts the State had to prove he engaged in all the conduct that followed the “to wit” language in the elements instruction that was given to the jury. This instruction informed the jury they had to find Mr. Merrell: 5. Knowingly took immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with [JR] (to wit: full body hugs, forced dancing, coming up behind [JR] and putting his hands on her stomach and rubbing/stroking it, sometimes while simultaneously kissing her neck, and forced hugs/dancing when the defendant was erect and put his penis on [JR’s] leg). . . . Mr. Merrell asserts the “defendant was erect” allegation was part of the element of the crime, and the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove JR felt an erection. [¶31] Our standard of review for challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence is well known. [W]e do not reweigh the evidence or reexamine the credibility of witnesses; we determine whether a jury could have reasonably concluded each of the elements of the crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, we simply determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of a charged crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt on the evidence presented. Walker v. State, 2026 WY 94, ¶ 45, 596 P.3d. 249, 263 (Wyo. 2026) (citation modified). 10 [¶32] Mr. Merrell asserts there is no evidence in the record from which the jury could reasonably infer JR felt an erection, and its finding on this element must be based on speculation and conjecture. It is true that this Court “must guard against a conviction obtained by adding inference to inference.” Hightower v. State, 2020 WY 152, ¶ 19, 477 P.3d 103, 106 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Seeley v. State, 959 P.2d 170, 175–76 (Wyo. 1998)). When a conviction is based in part on inference, that inference “must be based on more than speculation and conjecture.” Id. As we have explained: the line between a reasonable inference that may permissibly be drawn by a jury from basic facts in evidence and an impermissible speculation is not drawn by judicial idiosyncracies. [sic] The line is drawn by the laws of logic. If there is an experience of logical probability that an ultimate fact will follow a stated narrative or historical fact, then the jury is given the opportunity to draw a conclusion because there is a reasonable probability that the conclusion flows from the proven facts. Id. (quoting Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 811 F.2d 511, 521 (10th Cir. 1987)). Thus, we must determine whether the facts proved by the State provided the jury a logical basis to conclude JR felt an erection or whether reaching that conclusion required the jury to speculate. See id. at ¶ 21, 477 P.3d at 107 (identifying the “critical question” as whether the jury could draw permissible inferences to “bridge the gap” between the State’s evidence and the jury’s ultimate conclusion). [¶33] Here, the State’s evidence provided the jury with a logical basis to conclude JR felt an erection. JR testified that she could feel Mr. Merrell’s “penis and private parts” against her leg when they were dancing in the kitchen. The detective who interviewed JR “took” JR’s statements about Mr. Merrell’s penis sticking out “to be describing an erection.” In the letter Mr. Merrell wrote to JR, he asked her to decide whether he was trying to help her face her fears of intimacy and touch or if he was forcing her to hug and kiss him so “he could rub his penis up against her, cause himself to get a woody, and show off his big, hard, boner[.]” While JR may have never used the word erection in her testimony, the jury could reasonably infer from the basic facts in evidence that Mr. Merrell did in fact have an erection during the forced dancing. [¶34] The State presented sufficient evidence to prove Mr. Merrell committed all the conduct listed in Count II. B. The conduct proven at trial satisfied the statute and established Mr. Merrell committed third-degree sexual abuse of a minor. [¶35] Mr. Merrell’s sufficiency argument largely rests on a comparison between his 11 conduct and the conduct at issue in prior indecent liberties cases. He asserts previous cases brought under the indecent liberties statute have applied to over sexualized conduct involving breasts, sexual intrusion, or intercourse. He asserts there is not sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction because there is no evidence of sexual contact or sexual intrusion, and “the conduct proven here differs materially from the conduct previously sustained.” [¶36] As discussed above, the indecent liberties statute applies to offenses other than those amounting to sexual assault. Rabuck, 2006 WY 25, ¶ 23, 129 P.3d at 867. In fact, “physical touching is not a required element of the crime of indecent liberties.” Id. at ¶ 24, 129 P.3d at 867. This Court has previously upheld convictions under the indecent liberties statute for a variety of conduct, including surreptitiously recording minors in a state of undress. Id. at ¶¶ 19–32, 129 P.3d at 866–69; Ruby, 2006 WY 133 ¶¶ 6–8, 144 P.3d at 427–30. In this case, the jury was not tasked with deciding whether Mr. Merrell’s behavior was as egregious as that of other defendants who have been convicted under the statute. Instead, the jury was asked to determine whether Mr. Merrell’s behavior fell within the statute. The jury found that it did. We find the jury’s determination was reasonable and supported by the evidence. [¶37] Mr. Merrell’s conduct was largely undisputed. During his interview with the detective and in his written letter, he admitted to touching JR. The evidence established Mr. Merrell grabbed and pinched JR’s buttocks, massaged her bare buttocks and hip flexors underneath her spandex, forced her to dance so closely to him that she “could feel his penis and his private parts up against [her,]” and hugged her from behind while running his hands over her bare stomach and kissing her neck. The main dispute in the case was Mr. Merrell’s motive for touching JR. The jury could have reasonably rejected Mr. Merrell’s claims that his motives were innocent and concluded his inappropriate touching of his stepdaughter with sexual motives fell within the statute. [¶38] The State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Merrell’s convictions on both counts. III. Mr. Merrell’s right to a unanimous verdict was not violated. [¶39] Mr. Merrell argues his right to a unanimous verdict was violated because both counts contained “multiple discrete factual allegations within a single element through the ‘to wit’ language[,]” but “[t]he jury was never instructed that it must unanimously agree on which specific act satisfied that element.” [¶40] Because Mr. Merrell did not object to the jury instructions below, we review this claim for plain error. Lee v. State, 2024 WY 97, ¶ 12, 555 P.3d 496, 499 (Wyo. 2024) (citations omitted); see also Duncan v. State, 2026 WY 86, ¶ 27, 593 P.3d 1237, 1245 (Wyo. 2026) (reviewing jury instructions for plain error when no objection was made at 12 trial). “To establish plain error, an appellant must show: ‘(1) the record clearly reflects the alleged error; (2) a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law in a clear and obvious manner; and (3) the appellant was denied a substantial right which caused the appellant material prejudice.’” Lee, ¶ 12, 555 P.3d at 499 (quoting Kobielusz v. State, 2024 WY 10, ¶ 24, 541 P.3d 1101, 1108 (Wyo. 2024)). “Material prejudice exists when the appellant demonstrates a reasonable probability that the jury verdict would have been more favorable in the absence of the error.” Id. (quoting Soares v. State, 2024 WY 39, ¶ 37, 545 P.3d 871, 880 (Wyo. 2024)). [¶41] The first prong of plain error is satisfied here because the jury instructions appear in the record. To establish the second prong, Mr. Merrell “must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way.” Walker v. State, 2022 WY 158, ¶ 22, 521 P.3d 967, 977 (Wyo. 2022) (quoting Six v. State, 2008 WY 42, ¶ 12, 180 P.3d 912, 917 (2008)). We apply the following principles when reviewing jury instructions: The purpose of jury instructions is to provide the jury with a foundational legal understanding to enable a reasoned application of the facts to the law. In order to support a reliable verdict, it is crucial that the trial court correctly state the law and adequately cover the relevant issues. Ultimately, the test of adequate jury instructions is whether they leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be found to have been committed. Id. (quoting Blevins v. State, 2017 WY 43, ¶ 26, 393 P.3d 1249, 1255 (Wyo. 2017)). [¶42] Most unanimity challenges involve cases where a defendant was charged with two or more identical counts of the same crime without any differentiation between the counts in the jury instructions. In those circumstances, there is a risk the jury could convict a defendant without unanimously agreeing on which charge formed the basis for the conviction. See, e.g., Walker, 2022 WY 158, ¶18, 521 P.3d at 976 (reversing two of the appellant’s convictions when he was charged with five identical counts of sexual abuse and the instructions and verdict form did not differentiate among the counts). A second type of unanimity challenge involves cases where a defendant was charged with committing a crime in alternative ways. See, e.g., Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 818 (Wyo. 1996) (discussing the requirement for a unanimous verdict when the defendant was charged with alternative ways of committing aggravated vehicular homicide). Neither of these unanimity challenges is at issue in the case. [¶43] Instead, Mr. Merrell argues “[t]hese were separate factual allegations” in a single count. He asserts the fact the jury submitted a question during deliberations asking if it had to find “all of the described offenses happened or some of the offenses,” and what the 13 words “to wit” meant shows the jury was uncertain “as to the factual basis required for a conviction.” To the extent Mr. Merrell’s argument rests on the premise that each factual allegation constituted a separate offense, his claim is one of duplicity, not instructional error. [¶44] “Our precedent clearly prohibits charging multiple separate offenses in a single count.” Triplett v. State, 2017 WY 148, ¶ 14, 406 P.3d 1257, 1260 (Wyo. 2017). Wyoming has long prohibited “duplicitous” charging on the grounds