Full Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING 2026 WY 116 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2026 October 29, 2026 TIMOTHY R. CHRISTENSEN, Appellant (Defendant) v. S-26-0073 THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee (Plaintiff). Appeal from the District Court of Sheridan County The Honorable Benjamin S. Kirven, Judge Representing Appellant: Branden S. Vilos, Attorney at Law, P.C., Cody, Wyoming. Representing Appellee: Keith G. Kautz, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General; Kristen R. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General; John J. Woykovsky, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Woykovsky. Before BOOMGAARDEN, C.J., GRAY, FENN, JAROSH, and HILL, JJ. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume. JAROSH, Justice. [¶1] A jury convicted Timothy R. Christensen of one count of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor, CZ. Mr. Christensen appealed, alleging the district court erred when it allowed the State to present prior consistent statements made by CZ pursuant to Wyoming Rule of Evidence (W.R.E.) 801(d)(1)(B). Mr. Christensen also asserts the district court erred when it excluded evidence related to a text message CZ sent Mr. Christensen. Finding no error, we affirm. ISSUES [¶2] Mr. Christensen presents two issues on appeal, which we rephrase as: 1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted into evidence prior consistent statements made by CZ? 2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it excluded evidence related to a text message CZ sent Mr. Christensen? FACTS [¶3] CZ has cerebral palsy and learning difficulties. In February 2025, she was fifteen years old and in the sixth grade. CZ’s mother Samantha had a long-standing friendship with Mr. Christensen’s wife, Kasandra. CZ and Samantha would often visit Mr. Christensen and Kasandra at their home. [¶4] During a visit on February 16, 2025, Samantha and Kasandra spent five hours in the basement while Kasandra was doing Samantha’s nails. The Christensen’s three children were also home that evening. Meanwhile, for most of that time, CZ and Mr. Christensen were upstairs in the home. [¶5] On that night, CZ told Mr. Christensen she wanted to have sex. He then “grabbed [her] vagina” and motioned for her to follow him into his bedroom. In the bedroom, Mr. Christensen told CZ to pull down her pants and lay on the bed, which she did. He then pulled down his pants and underwear, put CZ’s legs on his shoulders, and put his penis in her vagina for “a long time.” He also told CZ to turn over and then he “put his penis in [CZ’s] butt.” He then told CZ to go back to the living room, which she did. Sometime later, Samantha came back upstairs and she and CZ returned home. [¶6] The following evening, CZ woke up Samantha in the middle of the night to tell her mother she had sex with Mr. Christensen and was worried she was pregnant. Samantha and her sister, who lived next door, then took CZ to the emergency room. 1 At the hospital, Nurse Chrissy White conducted a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) exam on CZ. During the examination, Nurse White collected swabs from CZ’s external genitalia, her vagina and cervix, her anus, and her fingernails. The nurse also collected CZ’s underwear, sweatpants, and hoodie. Id. Testing later revealed vaginal/cervical swabs contained male DNA consistent with Mr. Christensen’s DNA profile. The DNA test was “approximately 5.66 thousand times more likely [] from [Mr.] Christensen than an unknown, unrelated individual.” [¶7] Sheridan Police Detective Karla Krinkee was assigned to the case. She examined CZ’s cell phone and discovered over 1,000 text messages between CZ and Mr. Christensen, dating back to April 2024. On both February 20 and 21, 2025, Detective Krinkee used CZ’s phone to send Mr. Christensen text messages while posing as CZ. In response to some of the text messages, Mr. Christensen called CZ’s phone, but the detective did not answer. When the detective began sending more messages posing as CZ, “to the effect of [CZ] being scared that she was pregnant,” but that she “wanted to [have sex with Mr. Christensen] again,” Mr. Christensen’s text response was, “Stop.” Mr. Christensen tried to call CZ’s phone back several times, but when there was no answer, he texted, “Are you trying to get me into trouble?” The exchange continued, with Mr. Christensen asking, “What did I do wrong?” and telling CZ she is “going to get [Mr. Christensen] in trouble.” On February 21, police executed a search warrant for the Christensen home. Police seized Mr. Christensen’s cell phone but discovered it had been factory reset. Police also obtained video footage available from cameras inside the home, although some time frames were missing. [¶8] On February 24, 2025, the State charged Mr. Christensen with two counts of sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree. Count I alleged Mr. Christensen “inflict[ed] sexual intrusion on CZ by vaginal sexual intercourse,” while Count II alleged he “inflict[ed] sexual intrusion on CZ by anal intercourse[.]” Trial [¶9] A jury trial began on September 8, 2025. During his opening statement, Mr. Christensen’s defense counsel stated: Now the government’s claiming that Tim here, followed a guest in the house into the bedroom at her invitation, climbed up on to her, had sex with her two different ways, and left. Just like that. The government claims that this happened while there were five other people in the house moving around. 2 Counsel added the defense would present testimony about what other witnesses “didn’t see,” and that the jury would have to consider “if what the State is saying is true, less than 8 feet separate the people doing the nails and what [the State] claim[s] is happening on the bed[.]” Counsel also previewed testimony from CZ, stating that “CZ is going to talk – come here and talk to you about what she says happened.” Finally, defense counsel told the jury Mr. Christensen would testify in his own defense, but not “to what the State claims happened.” Testimony [¶10] CZ testified first at trial. She described the events of February 16, and recalled that although Mr. Christensen told her not to tell anyone, she decided to tell her mother that she had sex with “Tim.” During CZ’s cross-examination, Mr. Christensen asked CZ if she had ever “done any pranks on Tim over the phone,” or texted him “something over the phone to freak him out,” and CZ said no. [¶11] During the testimony of Mr. Christensen’s wife, Kasandra, both the State and the defense revisited the topic of pranks. Kasandra testified that she reviewed Mr. Christensen’s phone “kind of often” and had “full access” to it. When defense counsel asked whether she had ever seen “anything inappropriate texted between [Mr. Christensen] and CZ,” she answered, “Prior to this incident, no,” but then added, “there was a conversation about a pregnancy test.” The State objected and asked for Kasandra’s answer to be stricken from the record and for the jury to disregard it because the comment “can only have something to do with sexual conduct.” The State continued, “Wyoming Statute § 6-2-312 has not been complied with and this is … inadmissible. That’s within rape shield.” Defense counsel argued it “did not solicit this answer” and that the State opened the door to this answer. The State then said, if it was someone else’s pregnancy test, “that would make it irrelevant.” [¶12] The court sustained the State’s objection, indicated it would instruct the jury to disregard Kasandra’s answer, but allowed defense counsel to voir dire Kasandra outside the presence of the jury. During that voir dire, Kasandra testified that she found a text on Mr. Christensen’s phone of a picture of a pregnancy test. She testified CZ sent the text. Mr. Christensen responded to CZ that she should tell her mother, as it was obvious she and her boyfriend were doing “nefarious things.” However, as it turned out, the picture of the pregnancy test was not CZ’s — it was a picture of someone else’s pregnancy test. Id. Kasandra then recalled a subsequent phone call between Mr. Christensen and CZ where it was revealed the picture was “apparently … a prank.” No evidence existed that CZ had actually engaged in sexual conduct related to the picture of the pregnancy test. 3 [¶13] After the voir dire of Kasandra, the court upheld its prior ruling sustaining the objection, and stated that “Sparks [v. State, 2019 WY 50, 440 P.3d 1095 (Wyo. 2019)] … is directly on point as it relates to this particular issue and prohibits any further line of questioning into that specific matter.” [¶14] CZ’s mother, Samantha, also testified. Samantha testified that CZ told her she had sex with Mr. Christensen. When the State asked whether CZ told Samantha, “what kind of sex she had,” Mr. Christensen objected on hearsay grounds. The court overruled the objection, and Samantha recounted the details as CZ had told them to her — that the parties had vaginal and anal sex, and it happened in Mr. Christensen’s bedroom. [¶15] Nurse White (who examined CZ), and Detective Krinkee also testified for the State. Both witnesses testified as to what CZ told them. Nurse White also read the report she wrote the night she treated CZ: His bedroom. I was sitting on his bed. Then he took his pants off, and he told me to take my pants off. Then he just went for it. He stuck his penis in my vagina. He did like 30 minutes of that and then we ended it. In that thirty minutes, he stuck his penis in by butt. We went to the bathroom -- he went to the bathroom, and I went to the living room. He met me in the living room. And he started playing his Xbox. Detective Krinkee also testified about the forensic interview she conducted with CZ after the assault where CZ reported Mr. Christensen “put his penis in her vagina” and “in her butt.” During this line of questioning, defense counsel asked for a “continuing objection” based on hearsay. Mr. Christensen’s Testimony [¶16] Mr. Christensen testified in his own defense and denied engaging in sexual intercourse with CZ. He testified that he never told CZ to get on his bed or to put her legs on his shoulders. He also testified that based on his size and the elevation of the bed in his bedroom, it was not physically possible to have intercourse in the way CZ described it happening. During redirect, defense counsel asked the court to reconsider its ruling prohibiting further questioning about the “prank” text, but the court twice declined to reconsider its ruling. Closing Arguments 4 [¶17] During closing, the State argued it proved Mr. Christensen engaged in vaginal and anal intercourse because CZ testified it happened, Mr. Christensen tried to destroy evidence (factory reset his phone), and male DNA consistent with Mr. Christensen’s was found in CZ’s vagina. Mr. Christensen argued that he should be acquitted because the case was “literally a he said/she said situation.” Regarding CZ’s testimony, Mr. Christensen argued CZ’s testimony about the intercourse was “fanciful,” “incredible” and “fantastical.” Mr. Christensen also argued this was “something [CZ] really wanted to have happen. She wanted this to occur. [It] [d]idn’t occur.” Verdict and Sentence [¶18] The jury found Mr. Christensen guilty of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor by having vaginal intercourse with CZ as charged in Count I and acquitted him of Count II. The court sentenced Mr. Christensen to five to eight years in prison, and this appeal followed. DISCUSSION I. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted CZ’s prior consistent statements into evidence. [¶19] Mr. Christensen argues the district court erred in admitting CZ’s prior consistent statements to her mother, Nurse White, and Detective Krinkee, because the record contains no impeaching attack against the victim during her examination. Mr. Christensen further contends nothing in the record warranted admission of the statements to rehabilitate CZ from such an attack. We disagree. [¶20] This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a hearsay objection for an abuse of discretion. Thompson v. State, 2021 WY 84, ¶ 15, 491 P.3d 1033, 1039 (Wyo. 2021). Similarly, we review the admission of a prior consistent statement for an abuse of discretion. Hilyard v. State, 2023 WY 13, ¶ 17, 523 P.3d 936, 940 (Wyo. 2023). “A district court ‘abuses its discretion when it could not have reasonably concluded as it did.’” Thompson, ¶ 15, 491 P.3d at 1039 (quoting Majors v. State, 2011 WY 63, ¶ 11, 252 P.3d 435, 439 (Wyo. 2011)). If we determine the evidence was admitted in error, we must then consider whether the error was prejudicial. Id. (quoting Mitchell v. State, 2020 WY 142, ¶ 17, 476 P.3d 224, 231 (Wyo. 2020)). An error is prejudicial if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant had the error not occurred. Id., ¶ 28, 491 P.3d at 1042. [¶21] Hearsay “is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” 5 W.R.E. 801(c). Generally, hearsay is inadmissible, subject to certain exceptions. W.R.E. 802. However, under WRE 801(d)(1)(B): (d) Statements which are not hearsay. – A statement is not hearsay if: (1) Prior Statement by Witness. – The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross- examination concerning the statement, and the statement is … B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive[.] [¶22] Our caselaw establishes four requirements for admission under 801(d)(1)(B): 1) the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing; 2) the declarant is subject to cross- examination concerning the statement; 3) the statement is consistent with the declarant’s trial testimony; and 4) the statement is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B); see Lajeunesse v. State, 2020 WY 29, ¶ 19, 458 P.3d 1213, 1220 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Jones v. State, 2019 WY 45, ¶ 15, 439 P.3d 753, 757-58 (Wyo. 2019)). [¶23] The fourth requirement is the most commonly disputed, and it is the only requirement at issue here. In applying this requirement, this Court considers “when the alleged fabrication, improper influence, or motive arose.” Jones, ¶ 16, 439 P.3d at 758. This Court has previously rejected the argument that an impeaching attack must take the form of an explicit allegation made during the cross-examination of the witness. Lajeunesse, ¶ 24, 458 P.3d at 1221. In fact, we have repeatedly recognized that such a charge may arise by implication from the defense’s overall theory. Id. The charge of fabrication or improper motive “need not come only as a specific allegation during cross-examination; ... it may be made by implication or innuendo, and it may be found in the ‘thrust’ of the defenses and testimony presented.” Id. (quoting Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 18, 43 P.3d 80, 89 (Wyo. 2026)); see also Thompson v. State, 2021 WY 84, ¶ 19, 491 P.3d 1033, 1040 (Wyo. 2021); Hilyard, ¶ 32, 523 P.3d at 943. [¶24] In Lajeunesse, we concluded the fourth requirement was satisfied even though defense counsel did not directly assert the victim was fabricating her allegations. Instead, by contrasting the victim’s narrative with conflicting circumstances, the defense effectively invited the jury to consider that the victim had fabricated her story. Lajeunesse, ¶ 26, 458 P.3d at 1221. Similarly, in Schmidt v. State, 2001 WY 73, ¶ 21, 29 P.3d 76, 82 (Wyo. 2001), this Court found it “unmistakable” that defense counsel’s opening statement signaled an implied 6 charge of fabrication when counsel told the jury, “at no time during this occasion is there an opportunity … for the things that are alleged to have occurred to have occurred.” [¶25] We recognize the distinction between a general denial of a victim’s account and conduct that expressly or impliedly charges the witness with fabrication. A general attack on a witness’s credibility, without an allegation of recent fabrication, improper influence or improper motive, does not satisfy the fourth requirement. Jones, ¶ 24, 439 P.3d at 761. Furthermore, these statements cannot be admitted simply to anticipate an attack on credibility before the jury has heard it. Id. The impeaching attack must occur in the presence of the jury — whether through opening statements, cross-examination, or the overall thrust of the defense theory — before the prior consistent statements can be introduced. Id., ¶¶ 23-24, 439 P.3d at 760-61. [¶26] Here, the defense’s theory, previewed in its opening statement, went beyond a general denial or assertion of a faulty memory. Defense counsel actively contrasted the State’s account of the assault with the presence and proximity of other people in the house, telling the jury, “[I]f what the State is saying is true, less than 8 feet separate the people doing the nails and what they claim is happening on the bed. That is something you’ll have to consider.” Counsel further stated that while CZ would testify to what she claimed happened, Mr. Christensen would testify that he merely “went into the bedroom because that’s where his bathroom is. He went in and used the bathroom.” [¶27] Later, on cross-examination, defense counsel implicitly challenged CZ’s truthfulness by framing questions with phrases like “you claim” and “you say.” Finally in closing arguments, defense counsel made explicit what had been implied throughout trial. Taken together, the thrust of the defense was not that Mr. Christensen lacked intent or that CZ was merely mistaken. The defense’s position was that the assault absolutely did not occur, implicitly charging that CZ fabricated her account. This was sufficient to satisfy the fourth requirement and permit the State to introduce CZ’s prior consistent statements to her mother, Nurse White, and Detective Krinkee. [¶28] Mr. Christensen also argues the rule requires an express claim of recent fabrication, rather than just fabrication. This argument misconstrues Wyoming law related to the timing of a prior consistent statement. While the United States Supreme Court requires that a prior consistent statement be made before the fabrication or improper influence or motive arose to be admissible as substantive evidence, Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 156, 115 S.Ct. 696 (1995), Wyoming’s rule is broader. In Wyoming, if a prior consistent statement is made after the improper fabrication, influence, or motive arose, the statement is still 7 admissible, but only for rehabilitative purposes rather than as substantive evidence. Jones, ¶ 17, 439 P.3d at 758. In addition, the district court is required to give a limiting instruction if so requested. Id. [¶29] Here, Mr. Christensen’s claim of fabrication came at trial; he does not identify any prior, improper influence or motive to fabricate. Rather, it appears that Mr. Christensen’s argument is that CZ fabricated the incident from the start. However, even assuming CZ’s prior statements came after fabrication or an improper motive or influence arose, the statements would have still been admissible for purposes of rehabilitation, although Mr. Christensen would have been entitled to a limiting instruction, if he had requested one. [¶30] Relatedly, Mr. Christensen argues that by admitting CZ’s prior consistent statements to her mother, Detective Krinkee, and Nurse White, the district court permitted the State to improperly bolster CZ’s testimony. However, the number of times a victim’s out of court statements are repeated at trial is not dispositive of whether they were improperly admitted. Hicks, ¶ 21, 478 P.3d at 659. Instead, we examine the purpose for which the evidence was gathered and offered. Id. [¶31] In Tombroek, the district court allowed the admission of a victim’s statement to her mother, a doctor, and an investigator during a forensic interview. Tombroek v. State, 2009 WY 126, ¶ 4, 217 P.3d 806, 808 (Wyo. 2009). We held the statements were properly admitted because the victim made them “in a manner that would be expected … in the early stages of a typical sexual assault investigation, rather than a manner resembling trial preparation tactics[.]” Id., ¶ 14, 217 P.3d at 812. The same is true here. CZ first disclosed the assault to her mother shortly after it occurred. Her mother took her directly to the hospital, where CZ reported the event to the nurse. Detective Krinkee later interviewed CZ as part of the routine investigation. These statements were made in the ordinary course of seeking medical help and reporting a crime — not in preparation for trial or at the State’s direction to establish corroborating evidence. Nothing about these circumstances suggest that the State procured CZ’s statements for the purpose of using them later at trial as prior consistent statements. [¶32] The district court could have reasonably concluded as it did regarding admission of CZ’s prior consistent statements. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted CZ’s prior consistent statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). II. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded CZ’s pregnancy text message to Mr. Christensen from evidence. 8 [¶33] Mr. Christensen next argues the district court improperly excluded evidence under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-312 (2026), the rape shield statute. Specifically, Mr. Christensen sought to introduce a text message from CZ of a picture depicting a positive pregnancy test, sent months before the assault. The picture was not taken by CZ, nor was it CZ’s pregnancy test. During voir dire outside the presence of the jury, Kasandra Christensen’s testimony was that CZ sent the message to Mr. Christensen as a “prank.” Mr. Christensen sought to admit the evidence to put into context Mr. Christensen’s responses to Detective Krinkee’s text messages sent while pretending to be CZ. Mr. Christensen argues the district court improperly applied the rape shield statute to the evidence, and he suffered prejudice as a result. [¶34] We review a district court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. Testerman v. State, 2025 WY 58, ¶ 27, 568 P.3d 1206, 1215 (Wyo. 2025). Further, this Court may affirm an evidentiary ruling on any legal ground supported by the record, even if it differs from the ground relied upon by the trial court. Blair v. State, 2022 WY 121, ¶ 22, 517 P.3d 597, 602 (Wyo. 2022). [¶35] The district court excluded the text message pursuant to § 6-2-312, the rape shield statute, and Sparks, concluding it constituted evidence offered to prove the victim’s sexual behavior or predisposition. Mr. Christensen argues the text message, which depicted a purported pregnancy test, does not constitute actual “sexual conduct” under § 6-2-312 and therefore fell outside the scope of the rape shield statute. [¶36] We need not decide whether the text message of a picture of a fictional pregnancy test falls within the protective scope of § 6-2-312. Even assuming arguendo that the rape shield statute did not bar the evidence, the text message was properly excluded because it had no probative value and was therefore not relevant. See Martinez v. State, 2018 WY 147, ¶ 35, 432 P.3d 493, 501 (Wyo. 2018) (“Although the district court originally ruled the evidence was inadmissible under Wyoming’s rape shield statute, we need not reach that issue because the proffered evidence is otherwise inadmissible due to [the witness’s] demonstrated lack of clarity and personal knowledge, and the negligible probative value of a single, unsubstantiated physical abuse accusation.”). [¶37] Under W.R.E. 401, evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Meyer v. State, 2026 WY 29, ¶ 15, 585 P.3d 177, 181 (Wyo. 2026). [¶38] Mr. Christensen contends the text message was relevant because it provided context for his responsive calls to CZ on February 21, 2025. We disagree. Nothing about the message or picture made any fact of consequence to the charged offense 9 more or less probable. Meyer, ¶ 17, 585 P.3d at 181. The testimony was that the message was a prank sent months prior to the sexual assault. It had no connection to the events that took place on February 16, 2025. At most, admitting the message would have invited the jury to entertain judgments about CZ’s character from an unrelated incident. [¶39] Even assuming the prank had some minimal probative value, relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Walker v. State, 2026 WY 94, ¶ 35, 596 P.3d 249, 260 (Wyo. 2026). Introducing an unrelated text message concerning a pregnancy test would have confused the issues and perhaps misled the jury into considering a collateral issue with little to no bearing on the allegations before it. [¶40] Although the district court excluded evidence of CZ’s text message based upon Wyoming’s rape shield statute, it would have been proper to exclude it due to its lack of relevance. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion. CONCLUSION [¶41] The district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted into evidence prior consistent statements made by CZ. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded CZ’s text message to Mr. Christensen from evidence. [¶42] Affirmed. 10