State v. Dennis D. Banks

COURT OF APPEALS DECISION NOTICE DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. November 5, 2026 A party may file with the Supreme Court a Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and RULE 809.62. Appeal No. 2025AP597-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2020CF2473 STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT IV STATE OF WISCONSIN, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, V. DENNIS D. BANKS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for Dane County: JOHN D. HYLAND, Judge. Affirmed. Before Graham, P.J., Kloppenburg, and Nashold, JJ. ¶1 KLOPPENBURG, J. After a jury convicted Dennis D. Banks of one count of first-degree sexual assault of a child, the circuit court, applying the persistent repeater enhancer under WIS. STAT. § 939.62(2m)(c) (2023-24), sentenced Banks to life imprisonment without the possibility of release on  No. 2025AP597-CR extended supervision.1 On appeal, Banks argues that the State did not at sentencing meet its burden to provide sufficient evidence under WIS. STAT. § 973.12 to prove Banks’s persistent repeater status under § 939.62(2m)(b)2., when the State relied on the court taking judicial notice of Banks’s prior conviction by observing an uncertified electronic copy of the judgment of conviction.2 In the alternative, Banks argues that the court erred in dismissing without an evidentiary hearing his postconviction motion alleging that trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in failing to move to dismiss the persistent repeater enhancer in the criminal complaint and in failing to object to the court taking judicial notice of the prior conviction at sentencing. ¶2 We conclude that the State met its burden to prove Banks’s persistent repeater status by providing sufficient information to enable the circuit court to take judicial notice of the electronic copy of the prior judgment of conviction in the electronic record. We further conclude that the court properly dismissed Banks’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims without a hearing because the record conclusively shows that a motion to dismiss the inclusion of the persistent repeater enhancer in the criminal complaint would lack merit and that Banks was not prejudiced by trial counsel failing to object to the State’s mode of proving his persistent repeater status. Accordingly, we affirm. 1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version. 2 “Persistent repeater status” refers to having the requisite prior offense to be a persistent repeater under the meaning of WIS. STAT. § 939.62(2m)(b)2. (“The actor is a persistent repeater” if “[t]he actor has been convicted of a serious child sex offense on at least one occasion at any time preceding the date of violation of the serious child sex offense for which [the actor] presently is being sentenced under [WIS. STAT.] ch. 973, which conviction remains of record and unreversed.”). 2  No. 2025AP597-CR BACKGROUND ¶3 In August 2019, the State filed a criminal complaint charging Banks with two counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child and one count of felony bail jumping. On September 30, 2020, the State moved to dismiss the complaint so that it could refile the complaint adding persistent repeater enhancers to the sexual assault charges. On that same day, the circuit court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, and the State refiled the complaint with the same charges along with persistent repeater enhancers on the sexual assault charges.3 Trial counsel did not move to dismiss the persistent repeater enhancers in the refiled criminal complaint. ¶4 The refiled criminal complaint alleged that Banks was a persistent repeater because he had in 2003 been convicted of a serious child sex offense, repeated sexual assault of the same child. Due to the persistent repeater enhancers, Banks faced a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of extended supervision if convicted of at least one of the counts of first-degree sexual assault of a child. See WIS. STAT. § 939.62(2m)(c). A jury found Banks guilty of one count of first-degree sexual assault of a child and bail jumping. ¶5 The circuit court held a sentencing hearing on August 24, 2022. To support the persistent repeater enhancer, the State asked the court to take judicial 3 For ease of reading, we refer to the criminal complaint that the State refiled in this case as “the refiled criminal complaint.” The refiled criminal complaint also included a repeater enhancer on the bail-jumping charge, but Banks makes no appellate argument challenging that repeater enhancer. Accordingly, we do not further address it in this opinion. 3  No. 2025AP597-CR notice of Banks’s prior conviction and provided the case number and county for the case in which the prior judgment of conviction had been entered. The court then accessed that case in the electronic record maintained by the Dane County Clerk of Court and took judicial notice of the prior conviction based on its own observation of the uncertified electronic copy of the judgment of conviction in that record. Trial counsel did not object. Applying the persistent repeater enhancer on the one count of first-degree sexual assault of a child in this case, the court sentenced Banks to life imprisonment without the possibility of release on extended supervision. ¶6 Banks filed a postconviction motion for resentencing in which he argued that: the circuit court erred in allowing the State to include the persistent repeater enhancer in the refiled criminal complaint; the State at sentencing provided insufficient evidence of Banks’s prior conviction; and trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not moving to dismiss on the first issue and not objecting on the second issue. The circuit court denied the motion in a written order, without holding a Machner hearing.4 ¶7 Banks appeals. DISCUSSION ¶8 Banks challenges the application at sentencing of the persistent repeater enhancer based on the circuit court taking judicial notice of the prior 4 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979) (setting forth requirement for an evidentiary hearing on a motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel to permit trial counsel to explain alleged errors). 4  No. 2025AP597-CR conviction.5 He frames this challenge as a sufficiency of the evidence claim based on the State’s purported failure to meet its burden to prove the prior conviction. He also claims that trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in failing to move to dismiss the enhancer in the refiled criminal complaint and in failing to object to the court taking judicial notice of the prior conviction at sentencing. We address Banks’s claims in turn. I. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Prove Repeater Status ¶9 Banks argues that the circuit court erred when it determined that Banks was a persistent repeater because the State failed to prove the prior conviction.6 Banks contends that the State failed to meet its burden of proof because the State did not provide the court with sufficient evidence for the court to take judicial notice of Banks’s prior conviction. The State argues that it may—and did—prove Banks’s prior conviction by means of judicial notice when the State during sentencing provided the prior case’s county and case number, and the court used that information to observe the uncertified electronic copy of the judgment of conviction in the electronic record maintained by the Dane County Clerk of Court. 5 In his appellant’s brief, Banks also argues that the circuit court erred in allowing the persistent repeater enhancer to be included in the refiled criminal complaint. However, in his reply brief, Banks concedes that he has forfeited this argument, and that he may raise this asserted error only through a claim that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to dismiss the enhancer. See State v. Carprue, 2004 WI 111, ¶47, 274 Wis. 2d 656, 683 N.W.2d 31 (explaining that, in the absence of an objection by trial counsel, appellate courts “follow ‘the normal procedure in criminal cases,’ which ‘is to address waiver [or forfeiture] within the rubric of the ineffective assistance of counsel’” (quoted source omitted)). We accept his concession on this issue. 6 Under WIS. STAT. § 973.12(1), a defendant is subject to the persistent repeater enhancer “[i]f the prior convictions are admitted by the defendant or proved by the state.” Here, the parties do not dispute that Banks did not admit the prior conviction, and so the only question is whether the State proved the prior conviction. 5  No. 2025AP597-CR ¶10 As an initial matter, we reject the State’s assertion that Banks has forfeited direct review of his challenge to the circuit court’s application of the persistent repeater enhancer at sentencing based on taking judicial notice of the prior conviction. As stated, in support of this challenge, Banks argues that the State did not meet its burden to prove the prior conviction based on judicial notice, and that, therefore, there was insufficient evidence of the prior conviction to support the court’s application of the persistent repeater enhancer. Sufficiency of the evidence challenges are not subject to the general forfeiture rule. State v. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, ¶49, 273 Wis. 2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 203 (The accused can “raise a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for the first time on appeal as a matter of right.”). In asserting that Banks has forfeited this challenge, the State makes only a conclusory reference to State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶29, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612, and State v. Coffee, 2020 WI 1, ¶22, 389 Wis. 2d 627, 937 N.W.2d 579, without making any accompanying argument. Accordingly, we proceed to address on its merits Banks’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge directed at the court taking judicial notice of his prior conviction. ¶11 Banks did not in the circuit court and does not on appeal argue that the existence or date of Banks’s prior conviction narrated by the circuit court are inaccurate. Banks’s challenge is solely to the State’s mode of proof. As we explain, his challenge fails. Our analysis, as we explain in more detail in the following sections, proceeds as follows. Under WIS. STAT. § 902.01, the circuit court may take judicial notice of an uncertified electronic copy of a judgment of conviction in another Dane County case, which it observes in an electronic record maintained by the Dane County Clerk of Court. Under WIS. STAT. § 973.12(1), an uncertified electronic copy of a judgment of conviction in an electronic record 6  No. 2025AP597-CR maintained by the clerk of court may prove the prior conviction. Here, the electronic copy of the judgment of conviction observed by the court satisfied § 973.12(1) by containing the date and the crime of the prior conviction, and, under § 902.01(4), the State provided the court with the necessary information for the court to take judicial notice of the prior conviction, by providing the county and case number of the prior case. Accordingly, we conclude that the State provided sufficient evidence under § 973.12 to prove Banks’s repeater status under WIS. STAT. § 939.62(2m)(b)2. A. Standard of review and principles of statutory interpretation ¶12 To determine whether the State provided sufficient evidence to support application of the persistent repeater enhancer, we interpret and apply WIS. STAT. § 902.01 (judicial notice of adjudicative facts), and WIS. STAT. § 973.12(1) (evidence required to prove persistent repeater status) to the undisputed facts of this case. The interpretation and application of statutes present questions of law that we review independently. Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 2009 WI 74, ¶36, 319 Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 615. ¶13 When interpreting a statute, we begin with its language. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶¶44-45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. “Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning.” Id., ¶45. “Importantly, ‘ascertaining the plain meaning of a statute requires more than focusing on a single sentence or portion thereof.’” Brey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2022 WI 7, ¶11, 400 Wis. 2d 417, 970 N.W.2d 1 (quoted source omitted). Statutory interpretation involves “‘a full consideration of all relevant intrinsic 7  No. 2025AP597-CR sources’ including ‘the statutory text at issue, related statutes and phrases, a statute’s place within the statutory structure, its stated or textually manifest purpose, and statutory history.’” Brekke v. Midwest Med. Ins. Co., 2026 WI 29, ¶20, 421 Wis. 2d 381, 37 N.W.3d 515 (quoted source omitted). “Statutory language is to be interpreted ‘reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.’” Id. (quoted source omitted). In addition, “when engaging in statutory interpretation, we are assisted by prior decisions that have examined the relevant statutes.” State v. Soto, 2012 WI 93, ¶20, 343 Wis. 2d 43, 817 N.W.2d 848. B. Additional Background ¶14 The refiled criminal complaint charged Banks as a persistent repeater under WIS. STAT. § 939.62(2m)(b)2. based on an alleged 2003 conviction for a serious child sex offense. ¶15 At sentencing, to prove Banks’s qualifying prior conviction, the State asked that the circuit court take judicial notice of Banks’s prior conviction. The State provided the case number of the prior conviction and noted that the conviction was a Dane County court record. The court then said: The court is observing the court file in [the case number provided by the State]. The Judgment of Conviction entered at the time of conviction[,] January 9, 2003, contains a single count of repeated sexual assault of the same child under [WIS. STAT. §] 948.025(1). It’s a Class B felony. I’m satisfied that the court record maintained through the Dane County Clerk of Court’s office provides the factual basis for the persistent repeater allegation within the information. ¶16 In its written order denying Banks’s postconviction motion, the circuit court explained: “This court did review the official record as maintained by 8  No. 2025AP597-CR the clerk of court and not a report …. [The court viewed] an electronic copy of the judgment of conviction, which the Court viewed by accessing the document through [the Wisconsin Circuit Court Access system] on the bench.” ¶17 We clarify how the circuit court accessed the electronic judgment of conviction. The Consolidated Court Automation Programs (CCAP) is the Wisconsin Court System’s information technology office and provides a variety of critical services to the Wisconsin Court System. One such service, CCAP’s Case Management system software, stores circuit court records electronically and— with the implementation of mandatory electronic filing—those electronically stored records now constitute the official record as maintained by the clerk of court. See WIS. STAT. § 801.18(9)(a) (electronic documents constitute the official record); § 801.18(9)(c) (“[T]he clerk of court shall maintain the official court record only in electronic format for all cases[.]”); Consolidated Court Automation Programs (CCAP), WISCONSIN COURT SYSTEM, https://www.wicourts.gov/ courts/offices/ccap.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2026). Circuit courts may access documents stored within CCAP’s Case Management system through CCAP’s Wisconsin Circuit Court Access system (WCCA) software or through CCAP’s “Judicial Dashboard” software.7 ¶18 There are two versions of WCCA. Members of the public may use the public-access internet WCCA website to view certain case information, 7 The Wisconsin Court Access System is sometimes referred to as “CCAP.” See, e.g., Kirk v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 2013 WI App 32, ¶5 n.1, 346 Wis. 2d 635, 829 N.W.2d 522. CCAP’s Case Management system is also sometimes referred to as “CCAP.” For clarity, we use “WCCA” to refer to the Wisconsin Court Access System, and we refer to CCAP’s Case Management system by its full name. We use “CCAP” only to refer to the information technology office that provides information technology services to the Wisconsin Court System. 9  No. 2025AP597-CR including docket entries, in accordance with Wisconsin’s open records law.8 Access to the public records of the Wisconsin circuit courts, WISCONSIN CIRCUIT COURT ACCESS, https://wcca.wicourts.gov (last visited Oct. 12, 2026). The documents identified in the docket entries cannot be viewed in the public-access internet WCCA website. However, documents can be viewed via the courthouse version of WCCA available to circuit courts and to the public on courthouse computers.9 ¶19 Like the courthouse version of WCCA, the Judicial Dashboard software allows circuit court judges to electronically access circuit court records, including documents, that are maintained in CCAP’s Case Management system. See Consolidated Court Automation Programs (CCAP), WISCONSIN COURT SYSTEM, https://www.wicourts.gov/courts/offices/ccap.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2026); Judicial Dashboard, CCAP HELP CENTER (Apr. 20, 2023) (internal training document). The Judicial Dashboard pulls from the same CCAP Case Management system as the courthouse version of WCCA, but the Judicial Dashboard is designed to give judges the ability to manage their caseloads. 8 “[WCCA] reflects information entered by [the clerk of court, register in probate, or the juvenile court clerk in each county].” Kirk, 346 Wis. 2d 635, ¶5 n.1. See Access to the public records of the Wisconsin circuit courts, WISCONSIN CIRCUIT COURT ACCESS, https://wcca.wicourts.gov/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2026) (“The official recordkeepers for the circuit courts are the clerk of [] court, the register in probate, and the juvenile court clerk in each county. The information contained on the WCCA website has been entered by the official recordkeepers in each county.”). 9 The courthouse version of WCCA is a separate web application with different software from the public-access internet WCCA website. See Courthouse WCCA, CCAP HELP CENTER (Aug. 26, 2026) (internal training document); Consolidated Court Automation Programs (CCAP), WISCONSIN COURT SYSTEM, https://www.wicourts.gov/courts/offices/ccap.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2026). See also WIS. STAT. § 801.18(9)(e) (“The clerk of court shall make the public portions of the electronic record available for viewing at the clerk of court’s office. The clerk of court shall make nonpublic portions of the electronic record available for viewing by authorized persons.”). 10  No. 2025AP597-CR ¶20 It is through the courthouse version of WCCA or the Judicial Dashboard that a circuit court may access electronic versions of documents within CCAP’s Case Management system. What this means is that here, when the circuit court accessed the electronic record maintained by the Dane County Clerk of Court, the court was able to, and did, observe not only the docket entries in the prior case but also the documents identified in the docket entries—specifically, the judgment of conviction in the prior case that the State identified by county and case number. C. Judicial notice of a judgment in another case in an electronic court record under WIS. STAT. § 902.01 ¶21 Banks argues that the circuit court erred in taking judicial notice of a record in another case under WIS. STAT. § 902.01. Based on the facts here, we more precisely frame the question as whether the court properly took judicial notice of a judgment in another case in an electronic record. To answer that question, we interpret and apply the language of § 902.01, which governs judicial notice of adjudicative facts. ¶22 WISCONSIN STAT. § 902.01 applies only to adjudicative facts. Pertinent here, “[a]djudicative facts are ‘simply the facts of the particular case,’ that is, ‘who did what, where, when, how, and with what motive or intent.’” State v. Harvey, 2001 WI App 59, ¶7, 242 Wis. 2d 189, 625 N.W.2d 892, aff’d on other grounds, 2002 WI 93, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 (citation omitted). We accept the State’s assertion, which Banks does not dispute, that a prior conviction is an adjudicative fact. ¶23 WISCONSIN STAT. § 902.01(2) specifies that, to be judicially noticed, an adjudicative fact “must be one not subject to reasonable dispute” in that it is 11  No. 2025AP597-CR either: “(a) A fact generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the [circuit] court”, or “(b) A fact capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Here, we conclude that a judgment in another case in a circuit court electronic record accessed through the courthouse version of WCCA or through the Judicial Dashboard is “[a] fact capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” See § 902.01(2)(b). Accordingly, we do not address subsection (a). ¶24 To understand whether a judgment in another case in an electronic court record is “[a] fact capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” we examine the recordkeeping practices of circuit courts. See WIS. STAT. § 902.01(2)(b). A clerk of court is responsible for maintaining court records. WIS. STAT. § 753.06 (division of circuit courts); WIS. STAT. § 753.30 (establishing clerk of court’s record-keeping duties); WIS. STAT. § 59.40(2) (describing a clerk of court’s record-keeping duties). The clerk of court must “[f]ile and keep all papers properly deposited with [the clerk] in every action or proceeding.” § 59.40(2)(a). In addition, “[t]he papers may be … transferred to … electronic format … and the originals may thereafter be destroyed.” § 59.40(2)(a). ¶25 The official record, as maintained by the clerk of court through CCAP’s Case Management system, is electronic: Given that the official court record is electronic, [CCAP’s] [C]ase [M]anagement system is integral to the functioning of Wisconsin’s circuit courts. This system creates court notices, summonses, judgments of conviction, driving suspensions, orders for financial disclosure and warrants— all critical in legal proceedings. CCAP Case Management began as the system where clerks recorded information 12  No. 2025AP597-CR contained in the official record, or paper case file; today it is the official record. Consolidated Court Automation Programs (CCAP), WISCONSIN COURT SYSTEM, https://www.wicourts.gov/courts/offices/ccap.htm. (last visited Oct. 12, 2026). See WIS. STAT. § 801.18(9)(a) (electronic documents constitute the official record); § 801.18(9)(b) (“The duties of the clerk of court under [WIS. STAT. §§] 59.40, 851.72, and 851.73, and all other statutes, court rules, and procedures may be fulfilled through proper management of electronic documents as provided in this section.”). ¶26 Both versions of WCCA and the Judicial Dashboard interface with CCAP’s Case Management system, such that the courthouse version of WCCA and the Judicial Dashboard display the case information and documents contained within the official record. See Access to the public record of the Wisconsin circuit courts, WISCONSIN CIRCUIT COURT ACCESS, https://wcca.wicourts.gov (last visited Oct. 26, 2026) (explaining that “[t]he information displayed [in WCCA] is an exact copy of the case information entered into [CCAP’s] [C]ase [M]anagement system by court staff in the counties where the case files are located,” and “[t]he information contained on [WCCA] has been entered by the official recordkeepers in each county”); Consolidated Court Automation Programs (CCAP), WISCONSIN COURT SYSTEM, https://www.wicourts.gov/courts/offices/ ccap.htm. (last visited Oct. 12, 2026) (The Judicial Dashboard provides “access to case information including the full court record[.]”). ¶27 Thus, the electronic judgment of conviction that the circuit court here viewed at sentencing was “[a] fact capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” See WIS. STAT. § 902.01(2)(b). The circuit court can readily access 13  No. 2025AP597-CR documents in other cases through the courthouse version of WCCA and the Judicial Dashboard, and the accuracy of those documents cannot be reasonably questioned because they are identical to documents contained in the official record. ¶28 Banks asserts that no court may ever take judicial notice of a record in another case. Banks does not directly address the statutory language of WIS. STAT. § 902.01 and instead relies on cases that are uninstructive. For example, Banks cites Perkins v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 341, 212 N.W.2d 141 (1973), but acknowledges that the decision in that case concerns whether an appellate court— not a circuit court—has authority to take judicial notice of its own record in another case. Id. at 346-47 (holding that our supreme court could not take judicial notice of a case not contained within the appellate record). In a separate case, when addressing the judicial notice authority of a circuit court, the supreme court expressly ruled that a circuit court may take judicial notice of its own records in another case. See Johnson v. Mielke, 49 Wis. 2d 60, 75, 181 N.W.2d 503 (1970) (“Generally, a [circuit] court may take judicial notice of its own records and proceedings for all proper purposes. This is particularly true when the records are part of an interrelated or connected case, especially where the issues, subject matter, or parties are the same or largely the same.”). ¶29 Perkins is also uninstructive because it predates WIS. STAT. § 902.01 and the existence of readily accessible electronic court records, as do the two cases cited in Perkins to which Banks also points. See Perkins, 61 Wis. 2d at 346-47 (citing State v. La Pean, 247 Wis. 302, 307, 19 N.W.2d 289 (1945), and 14  No. 2025AP597-CR State ex rel. Mengel v. Steber, 158 Wis. 309, 311, 149 N.W. 32 (1914)).10 Not only do La Pean and Mengel predate § 902.01 and the existence of electronic court records, but they also focus on the evidentiary basis of judicial notice; they do not provide any reasoning relevant to determining whether an electronic court record of documents in another case is a “kind[] of fact” contemplated by § 902.01(2). See La Pean, 247 Wis. at 307-08 (insufficient evidence offered of former plea); Mengel, 158 Wis. at 311 (no evidence offered of prior judgment). ¶30 In sum on this issue, we conclude that a circuit court may take judicial notice of a judgment in another case in the electronic record.11 10 The language in WIS. STAT. § 902.01(2) first took effect on January 1, 1974. S. CT. ORDER, 59 Wis. 2d R1, 23-24 (1973) (“Kind of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (a) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (b) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”); see also 1999 Wis. Act 85 (renumbering and other minor changes to § 902.01(2)). This language provided a more precise definition of the “verifiable certainty” standard identified in Fringer v. Venema, 26 Wis. 2d 366, 372-73, 132 N.W.2d 565, mandate amended, reh’g denied, 26 Wis. 2d 366, 133 N.W.2d 809 (1965). See S. CT. ORDER, 59 Wis. 2d R31 (1973). The language was also modeled after the Uniform Rule governing judicial notice; however, the language of § 902.01(2) is not identical to that Uniform Rule, which limited judicial notice of facts to those “so universally known that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute” including those “capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy.” See S. CT. ORDER, 59 Wis. 2d R32 (1973). 11 It does not follow that a circuit court must always take judicial notice of a judgment in another case in an electronic record when requested to do so by a party. For example, an opposing party may make a timely request under WIS. STAT. § 902.01(5) that explains—or the court may independently recognize—specific reasons that would make a document in an electronic record one subject to reasonable dispute and, consequently, not a judicially noticeable fact. 15  No. 2025AP597-CR D. Judicial notice of an uncertified electronic copy of a judgment of conviction as proof of a prior conviction under WIS. STAT. § 973.12(1) ¶31 Banks argues that judicial notice of an uncertified copy of a judgment of conviction is not sufficient to prove a prior conviction under WIS. STAT. § 973.12(1). ¶32 WISCONSIN STAT. § 973.12(1) describes how a State may prove repeater status under WIS. STAT. § 939.62. In relevant part, § 973.12(1) provides that: If the prior convictions are admitted by the defendant or proved by the [S]tate, [the defendant] shall be subject to sentence under … [§ ]939.62 unless [the defendant] establishes that [the defendant] was pardoned on grounds of innocence for any crime necessary to constitute [the defendant] a repeater or a persistent repeater. An official report of the F.B.I. or any other governmental agency of the United States or of this or any other state shall be prima facie evidence of any conviction or sentence therein reported. Any sentence so reported shall be deemed prima facie to have been fully served in actual confinement or to have been served for such period of time as is shown or is consistent with the report. Accordingly, if the defendant does not admit a prior conviction, an official report is one mode of proof the State may use to prove that the prior conviction exists. ¶33 However, an official report is not the only mode of proof that the State may use to prove repeater status. State v. Saunders, 2002 WI 107, ¶26, 255 Wis. 2d 589, 649 N.W.2d 263. For example, “Wisconsin courts have recognized that a certified copy of a judgment of conviction is excellent documentary evidence for proving a prior conviction for purposes of [WIS. STAT.] § 973.12(1).” Id., ¶24; see also State v. Flowers, 221 Wis. 2d 20, 32, 586 N.W.2d 175 (Ct. App. 1998) (“A certified judgment of conviction is the best evidence we can conceive of to show a [circuit] court the existence of a prior felony conviction.”); State v. 16  No. 2025AP597-CR Farr, 119 Wis. 2d 651, 660, 350 N.W.2d 640 (1984) (“If the defendant stands mute or denies the conviction, a certified copy of it can be presented to the [circuit] court or the case jacket itself may be presented if it is from the same county where sentencing is being done ….”); cf. State v. Koeppen, 195 Wis. 2d 117, 127, 536 N.W.2d 386 (Ct. App. 1995) (Koeppen I) (“[T]he prosecutor did not submit a certified copy of the repeater convictions or an official report specific enough to identify the defendant, the crimes and the date of the convictions.”). ¶34 In Saunders, our supreme court explained that WIS. STAT. § 973.12(1) “does not demand that prior convictions be proved through any specific method” and that “the portion of § 973.12(1) that speaks of official government reports constituting prima facie evidence of prior convictions supports the inference that the [S]tate may use other forms of evidence—ones not entitled to prima facie deference—to meet its proof requirements under the subsection.” Saunders, 255 Wis. 2d 589, ¶26. The court has more specifically considered whether modes of proof other than an official report or certified judgment of conviction satisfy the requirements of § 973.12(1) in Saunders, 255 Wis. 2d 589, and Farr, 119 Wis. 2d 651. We review the holdings in these two cases and then explain why, taken together, they support our conclusion that a circuit court may take judicial notice of an uncertified electronic copy of a judgment of conviction as sufficient proof of the conviction to establish a defendant’s repeater status. ¶35 In Saunders, our supreme court concluded that an uncertified copy of a judgment of conviction proved a defendant’s repeater status. Saunders, 255 Wis. 2d 589, ¶70. As the court explained, the fact “[t]hat a certified copy of a judgment of conviction is the ‘best evidence’ does not connote that certified copies are the only copies that may be used.” Id., ¶24. The court further explained that the primary concern is “the accuracy of details about the conviction.” Id., ¶42. 17  No. 2025AP597-CR The Saunders court noted that if the uncertified copy of the judgment of conviction offered by the State contains inaccurate information, then the defendant should object, which “would advise the court of the defendant’s concern and permit the [S]tate to take remedial action.” Id., ¶29. However, the court cautioned that a lack of objection to the mode of proof does not relieve the State of its burden to prove the existence and date of the prior conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., ¶¶51, 63. Ultimately, the court concluded that the uncertified copy of the judgment of conviction in that case contained the requisite information from which the circuit court could conclude that the defendant was a repeater. Id., ¶59. ¶36 In Farr, our supreme court concluded that a probation report which did not provide the dates of the prior convictions was not an official report under the meaning of WIS. STAT. § 973.12(1). Farr, 119 Wis. 2d at 657-58. Because the probation report did not include the dates, the probation report “left to conjecture” whether the convictions occurred within the time period required for the enhanced penalty. Id. The Farr court explained that to be an official report, “the report must contain relevant information regarding the issue of repeater status and must specifically include the date of conviction for the previous offense.” Id. at 658. ¶37 Based on this line of cases interpreting WIS. STAT. § 973.12(1), we reject Banks’s argument that an uncertified electronic copy of a judgment of conviction may never prove repeater status. What is essential to the mode of proof is that it allows the circuit court to verify the existence and date of a prior conviction; an electronic format does not necessarily preclude a court from doing so. Rather, as the facts stated above show, the court here was able to verify the existence and date of the prior conviction based on its observation of the 18  No. 2025AP597-CR uncertified electronic copy of the judgment of conviction in the prior case, sufficient to meet the proof requirements of § 973.12(1). ¶38 Banks argues to the contrary, citing State v. Bonds, 2006 WI 83, 292 Wis. 2d 344, 717 N.W.2d 133. In Bonds, our supreme court ruled that a “CCAP report” generated by CCAP’s Case Management system and accessed through the public-access internet WCCA website was not sufficient evidence to prove a prior conviction.12 Id., ¶49. The court, referencing the 2006 version of the public- access internet WCCA website that included a disclaimer about CCAP’s Case Management system’s potential inaccuracy, concluded that: [A] CCAP report, by its own terms, is of questionable accuracy. It is not the official record of a criminal case, as the clerks of court for each county are the officials responsible for those records. WIS. STAT. § 59.40(2)(c). And, a CCAP report is not a copy of the actual judgment of conviction.… The