State v. Travarus Marcell Pierce
CourtCourt of Appeals of Wisconsin
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket2025AP002086-CR
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
November 17, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.
Appeal No. 2025AP2086-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2022CF2106
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
TRAVARUS MARCELL PIERCE,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Milwaukee County: DAVID C. SWANSON, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Colón, P.J., Geenen, and Petrashek, JJ.
Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent
or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2025AP2086-CR
¶1 PER CURIAM. Travarus Marcell Pierce appeals from a judgment,
entered upon a jury’s verdict, for first-degree reckless homicide while using a
dangerous weapon and possession of a firearm by a felon, as well as an order
denying his motion for postconviction relief. Pierce argues: (1) that there was
insufficient evidence to support his first-degree reckless homicide conviction;
(2) that the circuit court erred in failing to designate Juror No. 10 as an alternate
after it was discovered mid-trial that the juror had socialized with a testifying
detective; and (3) that this court should use its discretionary power to order a new
trial in the interest of justice. We reject Pierce’s arguments and affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 On May 18, 2022, at approximately 7:30 a.m., Maseceo Cook was
shot on the side of the road in the 3700 block of West Townsend Street in
Milwaukee. He was pronounced dead on the scene. At about the same time, a
911 call reported a robbery attempt at Hometown Gas Station, located at the
corner of North 35th Street and West Townsend Street. The gas station
surveillance footage from that day led police to suspect that Pierce had committed
the homicide. Pierce was charged with first-degree reckless homicide and
possession of a firearm by a felon.
¶3 At trial, the State presented testimony from multiple Milwaukee
Police Department (MPD) detectives and officers about the homicide
investigation. Detective Alexander Klabunde testified that gas station surveillance
footage showed Cook arrive on a bicycle. He entered the gas station and
interacted with the driver of a silver Hyundai, who had gone inside the gas station
to use the ATM. Cook attempted to grab something from the Hyundai driver.
Then, when the Hyundai driver displayed a firearm, Cook ran out of the station
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No. 2025AP2086-CR
and across North 35th Street, with the Hyundai driver following him on foot. The
Hyundai driver returned inside the station, and Cook attempted to follow him.
When the Hyundai driver noticed Cook outside, he opened the gas station door
and again pointed a firearm at Cook. Cook ran away again, but returned and was
unable to open the door. Interior footage showed that patrons held the door closed
from the inside, barring Cook’s entry.
¶4 Soon after, a dark green Pontiac Torrent SUV1 pulled up to the gas
pumps. The driver, later identified as Pierce, exited the Pontiac and entered the
station. Both Pierce and the Hyundai driver then exited the station. Outside,
Pierce and Cook “square[d] off” against each other “in somewhat of a boxer
stance,” while the Hyundai driver stood behind Pierce. However, no physical
altercation actually occurred.
¶5 Cook then pedaled his bike north through the gas station property
and turned west on West Townsend Street. Seconds later, the Hyundai turned
north onto North 35th Street, then proceeded west on West Townsend Street.
Pierce followed in the Pontiac moments later, looping behind the station before
turning west on West Townsend Street.
¶6 Detective Vincent Lopez testified that additional surveillance
cameras captured events on West Townsend Street at the time of the homicide.
An alley camera captured Cook riding his bicycle westbound on West Townsend
Street, followed by a black Cadillac and, later, a dark green Pontiac Torrent.
1
Although there was no evidence of multiple Pontiac Torrent SUVs involved in this
encounter, witnesses described the vehicle as being different colors. For ease of reading, we refer
to it as dark green.
3
No. 2025AP2086-CR
Then, a different camera captured the Pontiac heading north on North 38th Street,
followed shortly after by the black Cadillac. According to Lopez, under normal
driving conditions, it would take 4 to 5 seconds for a vehicle to cover the distance
between the areas recorded by the cameras, but it took the Pontiac 50 seconds to
make the turn from West Townsend Street onto North 38th Street.
¶7 Detective Klabunde testified that the investigation into other
vehicles on the Hometown surveillance footage led to Devin Pippins, who was
driving a black Cadillac seen at the gas station that day. Pippins testified that
while parked at the station, he observed a three-person argument over an
attempted theft of car keys. He identified the dark green Pontiac Torrent SUV
from the surveillance footage as being driven by a Black man with dreadlocks who
was carrying a firearm. He identified that man as Pierce during a police
identification array.
¶8 Pippins testified about the events that occurred on West Townsend
Street after the trio left the gas station. He followed Cook, who was biking west
on West Townsend Street, and stopped to tell him to go home because he was
afraid that the man with the gun would “catch” Cook later. Pippins then parked
his Cadillac; he observed the Pontiac drive down the street and slow down, at
which point Cook got off his bike and “started knocking” on the front passenger
window of the Pontiac. While Pippins could not hear the exchange, he saw that
Cook “was flipping them off.” The Pontiac pulled away and Cook walked back to
his bike.
¶9 Then, the Pontiac made a U-turn and drove toward Cook. Pippins
heard “a couple gunshots go off” and saw Cook fall off his bike. He stated the
gunshots came from the Pontiac’s passenger window. Once the Pontiac had gone,
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No. 2025AP2086-CR
Pippins drove over to Cook’s body, but he could not tell if Cook was breathing.
Pippins testified he drove off without calling 911 or reporting the shooting.
¶10 The State also called additional witnesses who testified about the
investigation into Cook’s shooting and the evidence recovered. An MPD detective
testified about recovering a fired bullet next to Cook’s body. The deputy chief
medical examiner testified that the autopsy of Cook’s body showed that he had
been shot twice. One bullet was recovered during the autopsy. A firearms and
tool mark examiner at the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory testified that the two
projectiles recovered were .45 caliber full metal jacket bullets, both of which had
been fired through the same firearm barrel. Another MPD detective testified about
recovering a box of .45 caliber ammunition in a search of the residence where
Pierce was staying. A forensic scientist at the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory
testified that Pierce’s DNA was not excluded from samples taken from inside the
Pontiac.
¶11 The mother of Pierce’s children testified that she consented to a
search by the police of her residence, where Pierce was residing at the time of the
shooting. She acknowledged that the police recovered .45 caliber ammunition and
a 9mm firearm from her residence; she explained that the .45 caliber ammunition
was for a gun she was considering purchasing. She also testified that based on her
experience with Pierce’s Pontiac, the passenger window did not move up and
down.
¶12 On the second day of trial, when the State called Detective
Klabunde, Juror No. 10 stated she may know the detective. When questioned by
the court, Juror No. 10 explained that the detective was her friends’ neighbor, and
they had minor interactions at parties. Klabunde told the court they attended the
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No. 2025AP2086-CR
same party the Saturday before the trial but did not exchange more than a few
words. Both the State and the circuit court asked whether Juror No. 10 could
remain fair and impartial and not give special weight to Klabunde’s testimony; she
asserted she could. There were no motions to remove Juror No. 10 and the
attorneys and court accepted keeping her on the jury, with the possibility of
designating her as the alternate before deliberation. However, 2 other jurors from
the 14-person panel were chosen at random as the alternates.
¶13 The jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts. At sentencing, the
circuit court imposed a 35-year sentence for the reckless homicide count,
bifurcated as 25 years of initial confinement and 10 years of extended supervision,
and a concurrent sentence of 10 years for the felon in possession of a firearm
count, bifurcated as 5 years of initial confinement and 5 years of extended
supervision.
¶14 Pierce moved for postconviction relief, arguing that the circuit court
should vacate his judgment of conviction. The court denied the motion. Pierce
now appeals. Additional facts will be provided in the discussion below.
DISCUSSION
I. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Pierce’s
convictions.
¶15 To prove first-degree reckless homicide, the State needed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Pierce caused Cook’s death; (2) Pierce caused
Cook’s death by criminally reckless conduct; and (3) the circumstances of Pierce’s
conduct showed an utter disregard for human life. See WIS JI—CRIMINAL 1020.
Pierce argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he caused Cook’s
death and that his conduct showed utter disregard for human life.
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No. 2025AP2086-CR
¶16 “The question of whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a
verdict of guilt in a criminal prosecution is a question of law,” which we review
independently. State v. Smith, 2012 WI 91, ¶24, 342 Wis. 2d 710, 817 N.W.2d
410. “Although the trier of fact must be convinced that the evidence presented at
trial is sufficiently strong to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of the
defendant’s innocence in order to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” on
appeal, the reviewing court may not substitute its “judgment for that of the trier of
fact unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the [S]tate and the conviction,
is so lacking in probative value and force that no trier of fact, acting reasonably,”
could have found the requisite guilt. State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 503,
507, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990). “It is well established that a finding of guilt may
rest upon evidence that is entirely circumstantial and that circumstantial evidence
is oftentimes stronger and more satisfactory than direct evidence.” Id. at 501.
¶17 Pierce argues that no reasonable jury could have reached this verdict
given serious inconsistencies in Pippins’ testimony. But, as demonstrated below,
the record reflects that these conflicting facts were presented to the jury. “The
function of the jury is to decide which evidence is credible and which is not and
how conflicts in the evidence are to be resolved.” Id. at 503.
¶18 Pierce asserts that Pippins was not credible because some of his
testimony was inconsistent with that of other witnesses. First, Pippins testified
that he saw Pierce with a gun during the gas station altercation with Cook, even
though the surveillance footage and Detective Klabunde’s testimony established
that only the Hyundai driver pointed a gun at Cook at the gas station. Second,
Pierce notes that in Pippins police interview with Detective Lopez after the
shooting, Pippins said he viewed the shooting through his vehicle’s rear-view
mirror, whereas Pippins’ testimony was that he saw the shooting through his front
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No. 2025AP2086-CR
vehicle window. In addition to Pippins’ claim about his vantage point for the
shooting, he also testified the gunshots came from the passenger window of the
Pontiac. However, the mother of Pierce’s children testified that based on her
experience with Pierce’s Pontiac, the passenger window did not move up and
down.
¶19 Pierce further contends that Pippins’ credibility was weakened by
internal inconsistencies in his own testimony. One example was Pippins’
testimony that he went to the police within a few days of the shooting, which was
entirely refuted by Detective Lopez’s testimony that Pippins did not contact the
police at all and instead the police found him through their investigation of other
vehicles in the gas station surveillance footage. A second example was Pippins’
claim that he had followed Cook because he was worried about Cook’s wellbeing,
which Pierce regards as insincere because Pippins failed to call 911 after the
shooting. As a third example, Pierce offers Pippins’ claim that he was a regular
visitor to Hometown Gas Station but did not recognize Cook or anyone else there
on the day of the shooting.
¶20 Ultimately, none of the testimonial inconsistencies show that the
jury acted outside “the bounds of reason” in reaching its decision. See Poellinger,
153 Wis. 2d. at 503. Pippins’ testimony was not incredible or inherently
unreliable. “It is certainly allowable for the jury to believe some of the testimony
of one witness and some of the testimony of another witness even though their
testimony, read as a whole, may be inconsistent.” State v. Toy, 125 Wis. 2d 216,
222, 371 N.W.2d 386 (Ct. App. 1985).
¶21 The matter of witness credibility was addressed at trial. Pierce’s
trial counsel highlighted inconsistencies in Pippins’ story point-by-point during
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No. 2025AP2086-CR
closing arguments. Based on the evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude
that Pippins had misidentified Pierce as the man with the gun at the gas station, but
had credibly testified that Pierce’s Pontiac was involved in the shooting. The jury
also could reasonably conclude that Pippins had misremembered the direction his
vehicle was facing during the shooting, and that he did not call 911 for fear of
retribution. And the jury could have disbelieved the testimony of the mother of
Pierce’s children about the non-operability of the passenger side window on
Pierce’s Pontiac.
¶22 Our appellate review considers the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict and generally does not permit us to choose which version
of events is credible. See Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 500. We search the record to
determine whether “any possibility exists” that the jury could have made its
findings from the evidence adduced at trial, and we will not overturn that verdict
even if this court believes the jury “should not have found guilt based on the
evidence before it.” Id. at 507. The circumstantial evidence set forth above is
more than sufficient to support the jury’s determination that Pierce caused Cook’s
death under circumstances that showed utter disregard for human life.2
2
Although Pierce also argues that the State did not present a motive for Pierce to shoot
Cook, motive is not an element of a reckless homicide offense. In any case, there was evidence
of Pierce’s anger at Cook; Pierce and Cook had been in an altercation at the gas station, and
Pippins testified that Cook confronted Pierce by pounding on his vehicle window and flipping
him off prior to the shooting.
Pierce also emphasizes the lack of physical evidence. The absence of the murder weapon
or DNA evidence clearly linking Pierce to Cook’s homicide does not diminish the validity of a
jury verdict based on circumstantial evidence. See State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 501, 451
N.W.2d 752 (1990) (“It is well established that a finding of guilt may rest upon evidence that is
entirely circumstantial and that circumstantial evidence is oftentimes stronger and more
satisfactory than direct evidence.”).
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No. 2025AP2086-CR
II. Pierce has not demonstrated objective juror bias; therefore, the circuit
court did not err when it did not designate Juror No. 10 as an alternate.
¶23 Pierce argues that Juror No. 10 was objectively biased and the circuit
court committed plain error by failing to make Juror No. 10 an alternate. As
discussed above, Juror No. 10 notified the court that she personally knew
Detective Klabunde. After the juror stated that she could remain impartial, Pierce
offered no objections, and Juror No. 10 was not designated as an alternate.
¶24 The State argues that Pierce has forfeited the juror bias issue by
failing to object at trial. The State further argues that the plain error doctrine
under WIS. STAT. § 901.03(4) (2023-24)3 cannot apply, as it is applicable only to
evidentiary issues.4
¶25 “The plain error doctrine allows appellate courts to review errors
that were otherwise waived by a party’s failure to object.” State v. Jorgensen,
2008 WI 60, ¶21, 310 Wis. 2d 138, 754 N.W.2d 77. “Generally, if a claim is
forfeited, we address that claim in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel.”
State v. Counihan, 2020 WI 12, ¶28, 390 Wis. 2d 172, 938 N.W.2d 530.
3
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
4
Plain error pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 901.03(4) is an evidentiary rule within the
Wisconsin Rules of Evidence. However, Wisconsin case law has applied the concept of plain
error to claims of improper trial commentary by the prosecutor, comments which are expressly
not evidence under standard jury instructions. See WIS JI—CRIMINAL 50, 160; see e.g., State v.
Bell, 2018 WI 28, ¶¶19, 59, 380 Wis. 2d 616, 909 N.W.2d 750 (analyzing the prosecutor’s
comments during voir dire, opening statements, and closing arguments for plain error); State v.
Jorgensen, 2008 WI 60, ¶¶20, 41, 310 Wis. 2d 138, 754 N.W.2d 77 (analyzing the prosecutor’s
closing arguments for plain error); State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶¶2-3, 301 Wis. 2d 642, 734
N.W.2d 115 (analyzing the prosecutor’s opening statement and closing arguments for plain
error). While this case law would support applying the plain error doctrine more expansively
than the State suggests, we need not resolve that issue because Pierce has failed to show that his
constitutional right to a “fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors” was violated. See State v.
Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 715, 596 N.W.2d 770 (1999).
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No. 2025AP2086-CR
However, Pierce has not argued he received constitutionally ineffective assistance,
and we decline to address undeveloped arguments. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d
627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). As our supreme court concluded
when presented with a scenario where a defendant might argue plain error or
ineffective assistance of counsel, there “can be neither a deficiency nor plain
error,” unless there was an improper action or error. State v. Bell, 2018 WI 28,
¶14, 380 Wis. 2d 616, 909 N.W.2d 750. Therefore, we begin by considering
whether Juror No. 10 exhibited objective bias.
¶26 “[A] criminal defendant’s right to receive a fair trial by a panel of
impartial jurors is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and Art. I, § 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution, as well as
principles of due process.” State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 715, 596 N.W.2d
770 (1999). For a juror to be impartial, they “must be indifferent and capable of
basing his or her verdict upon the evidence developed at trial.” State v. Lepsch,
2017 WI 27, ¶21, 374 Wis. 2d 98, 892 N.W.2d 682 (citation omitted).
¶27 Objective bias impairs a juror’s impartiality and is determined by
considering whether a reasonable person in the juror’s position could remain
impartial. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 718. The circuit court must evaluate the facts
and circumstances of the challenged juror’s responses to determine whether
objective bias exists. State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 283, 588 N.W.2d 1
(1999).5 Whether a juror was objectively biased is a mixed question of fact and
5
The circuit court is guided by three non-exclusive factors when assessing objective
bias, factors which generally focus on the facts surrounding voir dire and the juror’s disclosure of
information. See State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶39, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421. Here, this
matter was not considered a failure to disclose information during voir dire. Juror No. 10 did not
speak up during voir dire, but she did inform the court as soon as she realized that she might
know Klabunde.
11
No. 2025AP2086-CR
law. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 720. While the circuit court’s findings of fact will
be upheld unless clearly erroneous, “[w]hether those facts fulfill the legal standard
of objective bias is a question of law.” Id.
¶28 We conclude that Juror No. 10’s minimal socialization with a
testifying State witness did not rise to the standard of objective bias. The juror’s
interactions with Detective Klabunde were minimal and superficial. The circuit
court and counsel both considered Juror No. 10’s averment of impartiality
sufficient to not take any further steps during trial, such as designating her an
alternate or making an objection. Given the de minimis nature of the contact
between Juror No. 10 and Klabunde, we conclude a reasonable person in the
juror’s position could remain impartial. Accordingly, Pierce has not demonstrated
that Juror No. 10 exhibited objective bias. Therefore, Pierce has not shown plain
error in the court’s handling of this issue or deficiency on the part of counsel.
III. Discretionary reversal is not warranted.
¶29 This court may exercise our power of discretionary reversal “if it
appears from the record that the real controversy has not been fully tried, or that it
is probable that justice has for any reason miscarried.” WIS. STAT. § 752.35; State
v. Klapps, 2021 WI App 5, ¶31, 395 Wis. 2d 743, 954 N.W.2d 38. This authority
is only exercised in “exceptional cases” and is to be used “infrequently and
judiciously.” State v. Avery, 2013 WI 13, ¶38, 345 Wis. 2d 407, 826 N.W.2d 60
(citations omitted).
¶30 Pierce argues that the real controversy over who shot Cook has yet
to be tried and it is a miscarriage of justice for him to be convicted solely on shaky
circumstantial evidence. As discussed above, neither his sufficiency of the
evidence claim nor his objective bias claim provides a basis for a new trial or
12
No. 2025AP2086-CR
reversal. Pierce has not shown that this case is exceptional. See State v.
McKellips, 2016 WI 51, ¶52, 369 Wis. 2d 437, 881 N.W.2d 258. We are not
persuaded that the controversy was inadequately tried or that justice has been
miscarried. Accordingly, we decline to use our discretionary power to grant a new
trial. We affirm the judgment of conviction and the order denying postconviction
relief.
By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.
13