State of Washington v. Jorge Luis Acevedo
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket41161-3
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
FILED
NOVEMBER 19, 2026
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 41161-3-III
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
JORGE LUIS ACEVEDO, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
COONEY, A.C.J. — Jorge Acevedo was charged with robbery in the first degree
with a deadly weapon enhancement. A jury found him guilty and returned a special
finding that he was armed with a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense.
On appeal, Mr. Acevedo contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss for governmental misconduct, (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct by
making improper remarks during his opening statement and closing argument, and (3) his
attorney was ineffective by failing to object to those remarks and by not requesting a
lesser-included theft instruction. We disagree with Mr. Acevedo’s arguments and affirm.
No. 41161-3-III
State v. Acevedo
BACKGROUND
On December 20, 2023, Mr. Acevedo entered an Albertsons grocery store in
Pasco, Washington, and attempted to steal a rotisserie chicken, Hawaiian sweet rolls, and
a bag of potato chips. As Mr. Acevedo exited the store, loss prevention officers Gabriel
Martinez and Patricio Martinez 1 confronted him. Mr. Acevedo returned the rotisserie
chicken and Hawaiian sweet rolls to the officers. The confrontation then escalated and
Mr. Acevedo reached into his pocket, produced an object, and told Gabriel and Patricio
that he was “going to fuck them up.” Verbatim Tr. of Proc. (VTP) at 159. Mr. Acevedo
fled with the bag of potato chips still concealed in his jacket.
Patricio reported the incident to law enforcement. Officer Mario Becho
responded, interviewed the loss prevention officers, and obtained the surveillance video
and photographs Gabriel took of Mr. Acevedo. After viewing the video and photographs,
Officer Becho recognized the suspect as Mr. Acevedo. The State charged Mr. Acevedo
with robbery in the first degree with a deadly weapon enhancement. The case proceeded
to a jury trial.
During voir dire, the court advised the venire that the State bore the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Acevedo committed robbery in the first
degree and the deadly weapon enhancement. The court further explained that Mr.
Gabriel Martinez and Patricio Martinez are brothers who share the same
1
surname. We refer to them by their first names for clarity. No disrespect is intended.
2
No. 41161-3-III
State v. Acevedo
Acevedo had no burden to prove the existence of reasonable doubt and that he was
presumed innocent throughout the trial. The court then empaneled the petit jury. Before
opening statements, the court instructed the jury to decide the case based solely on the
evidence admitted in the courtroom and the court’s instructions on the law. The jury was
also instructed that counsels’ remarks were not evidence and to “disregard anything the
lawyers say that is at odds with the evidence or the law in my instructions.” VTP at 40.
In its opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury, “The State’s going to call
former Officer Mario Becho. 28 years on the service, retired after 28 years, absolutely he
got out of it—honorably. This case isn’t about anything that Officer Becho did on
December 20th.” VTP at 46-47. In his opening statement, Mr. Acevedo’s attorney
asserted that the State would be unable to prove the “use or threaten[ed] use of immediate
force” element of robbery:
The evidence will not show that my client used a weapon or a threat
or anything else to take and carry away the property. My client was getting
away with it until he was confronted by Loss Prevention personnel.
And that’s an important distinction, ladies and gentlemen, because if
he used the threat of force or the fear of force to try and take the property,
we’d be looking at something different. But he didn’t; he gave it back when
confronted and then proceeded to argue with them prior to leaving the
scene without the items.
VTP at 48.
The State first called Patricio as a witness. He testified that he worked as a loss
prevention associate for Albertsons in December 2023. According to Patricio, his
3
No. 41161-3-III
State v. Acevedo
primary duty was to confront suspected shoplifters and “verbally talk to them about it.”
VTP at 52. He testified that he and Gabriel confronted Mr. Acevedo after observing him
take potato chips, a rotisserie chicken, and Hawaiian sweet rolls. Gabriel photographed
Mr. Acevedo before making verbal contact.
Patricio testified that Mr. Acevedo became aggressive and began shouting and
swearing. Patrico further testified that Mr. Acevedo’s fist was clenched and that he “saw
just the blade [of a knife] protruding out of his clenched fist,” which was “about like four
inches.” VTP at 54. Patricio told Mr. Acevedo he had not returned all of the
merchandise, and Mr. Acevedo responded aggressively by yelling, swearing, and
threatening to “shank” him. VTP at 55.
During Patricio’s testimony, the court admitted three photographs: one depicting
Mr. Acevedo walking away while apparently clenching something in his hand and two
depicting the vehicle Mr. Acevedo used to leave the area. On cross-examination, Patricio
testified that he prepared an incident report for his employer and believed it had been
included with the police report. He could not confirm, however, that he personally
provided the report to law enforcement.
The State next called Gabriel. The State published a screenshot from the
surveillance video, and Gabriel identified the suspect as Mr. Acevedo. Gabriel testified
that, after he and Patricio confronted Mr. Acevedo, Mr. Acevedo became aggressive and
threatened to “shank[]” both of them. VTP at 93. Gabriel further testified that they were
4
No. 41161-3-III
State v. Acevedo
unable to recover the knife or all of the merchandise. On cross-examination, Gabriel
testified that loss prevention officers typically prepare shoplifting reports and that
Patricio wrote a report and submitted it to law enforcement on the day of the incident.
Albertsons loss prevention agent Haylee Schneider likewise testified that Patricio
prepared a report “for [her] system” and that both “Patricio and Gabriel gave a report to
the [Police Department].” VTP at 125.
Officer Becho testified that he worked for the Pasco Police Department “for just
over 28 years” and had “just recently retired February 1st.” VTP at 132. Officer Becho
stated he did not recall receiving the report Patricio prepared and it was not attached to
his report.
The State rested after Officer Becho’s testimony. Defense counsel then moved to
dismiss because the defense had not received Patricio’s report. 2 Counsel argued that Mr.
Acevedo’s right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the absence of the report because the
report could have informed witness examinations and aided in the defense’s
investigation. Counsel asserted that the State should have produced the report in
discovery, and either had, or should have had, access to it. Although counsel
acknowledged the State did not intentionally withhold the report, he argued that the
Mr. Acevedo also moved to dismiss based on the defense’s nonreceipt of Officer
2
Becho’s body-worn camera recording. On appeal, however, he asserts governmental
misconduct only as to the missing report, not the body camera recording.
5
No. 41161-3-III
State v. Acevedo
circumstances nevertheless deprived Mr. Acevedo of the ability to fully develop his
defense.
The State responded that it was unaware that any internal report existed and noted
that Officer Becho testified that any report would have been attached to his police report
had it been provided. The State also argued there was no evidence the report was within
the government’s possession or control, and the government has no obligation to “get
everything under the sun and be aware of everything under the sun.” VTP at 148. The
court found there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the State or law enforcement
had received the report and denied Mr. Acevedo’s motion to dismiss.
Mr. Acevedo testified in his own defense. He stated that he entered Albertsons,
shoplifted items, and was aggressively confronted by Gabriel and Patricio as he
attempted to leave. He admitted to taking merchandise, including a bag of chips that he
put in his pocket. Mr. Acevedo testified that he felt threatened because the loss
prevention officers were “aggressive.” VTP at 158. He acknowledged that he told them
“to back up or I’m going to fuck them up.” VTP at 159. He testified that he forgot about
the chips in his coat in the heat of the moment and tried to leave as quickly as possible
because he believed the encounter would continue to escalate. Mr. Acevedo denied
having a knife and testified that he only had a “vape.” VTP at 160. He conceded that his
conduct could have been perceived as threatening but maintained that he was trying to
6
No. 41161-3-III
State v. Acevedo
leave as the loss prevention officers continued to act aggressively toward him. Defense
counsel also questioned him about the brevity of the encounter.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor impeached Mr. Acevedo’s credibility with
a prior conviction for making false statements to law enforcement and two prior
convictions for possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Mr. Acevedo also acknowledged
that he fled Albertsons, in part, to avoid going to jail. He again denied possessing a knife
during the encounter.
After the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury on the law, including the
following:
First, it is [your] duty to decide the facts in this case based upon the
evidence presented to you during this trial. It is also your duty to accept the
law from my Instructions, regardless of what you personally believe the law
is or what you personally think it should be. You must apply the law from
my Instructions to the facts that you decide have been proved and in this
way decide the case. . . . The evidence that you are to consider during your
deliberations consists of testimony that you have heard from witnesses and
the exhibits that I have admitted during the trial. If evidence was not
admitted or was stricken from the record, you are not to consider it in
reaching your verdict.
VTP at 189-90. The court further instructed the jury that it was “the sole judges of the
credibility of each witness” and must determine the “value or weight to be given to the
testimony of each witness.” VTP at 191-92. The court also reminded the jury that the
“lawyers’ statements are not evidence” and that the State “has the burden of proving each
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” VTP at 192-93.
7
No. 41161-3-III
State v. Acevedo
During closing argument, the prosecutor stated that, following the shoplifting
incident:
[Patricio] has since got his Master’s and [is] now involved in Education.
Very mild-mannered, kind of quiet—I was having a hard time hearing him.
When you go back and think about his testimony, think about Patricio and
think if he was a—a violent guy, a real aggressive guy.
VTP at 205. The prosecutor also addressed Officer Becho’s testimony, noting that
Officer Becho “retired after 28 years, honorably retired.” VTP at 207. The prosecutor
further argued that Officer Becho testified in a “very matter-of-fact” manner and “did not
seem, again, like an aggressive guy,” adding that Officer Becho was “just going to tell
you how it is.” VTP at 207.
The prosecutor then walked through the elements of robbery and argued how the
evidence established each element. Addressing the “retain possession” element, the
prosecutor analogized the case to a bank robbery:
Retain possession, prevent, or overcome resistance to the taking—so
what are we talking about there? What we’re saying there is that the taking
was against the person’s will—here we have a couple different—we have
Gabriel and Patricio were obviously working on behalf of Albertsons,
which corporate persons is the ones who actually own that property, but
even if it isn’t technically something that Patricio and Gabriel own
specifically, they were still protecting it, right?
And the same when someone might be a bank teller at a bank or
work security at a bank—someone comes in and points a gun in your face
and says give me the money in the register, right? You’re the victim, as is
the bank. It’s not your money in the register, but you’re the one with the
gun pointed in your face.
8
No. 41161-3-III
State v. Acevedo
VTP at 211-12. In addressing the alleged threat of violence, the prosecutor argued,
“Obviously, [it is] violence to tell someone that you’re going to shank them. I have a
couple kids, I don’t have to tell them I’m going to F them up. I’m sure I will do that to
them eventually, but they’re not very old and I’m hoping I don’t (indiscernible), but
right?” VTP at 212. The prosecutor then concluded his argument by stating,
I’ll bring up those issues again, if I feel like I need to. I don’t want
to bludgeon a dead horse, okay?
That being said, the fingers when [Mr. Acevedo] pointed at Patricio
Martinez; when he pointed at Gabriel Martinez; he pointed at Albertsons;
he pointed at Haylee Schneider; he pointed at Officer Becho to blame
(indiscernible) Mr. Acevedo. And that’s why after the State is done with
closing arguments, Defense goes.
VTP at 219.
During closing argument, defense counsel emphasized that Mr. Acevedo had
forgotten about the bag of chips in his jacket by the time he left the store because the loss
prevention officers were so aggressive toward him. Counsel argued the evidence did not
show Mr. Acevedo used a weapon to threaten the loss prevention officers at that point
because Mr. Acevedo was simply trying to leave. Counsel further argued that, to convict,
the jury had to find the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Acevedo
intended to steal the bag of potato chips.
Defense counsel also highlighted what he characterized as weaknesses in the
State’s case, including (1) a missing report, (2) the absence of a body-worn camera
recording, (3) the lack of exterior video capturing the confrontation, (4) conflicting
9
No. 41161-3-III
State v. Acevedo
evidence about whether Mr. Acevedo had a knife, and (5) the loss prevention officers’
failure to follow de-escalation techniques, which counsel argued exacerbated the
encounter.
During rebuttal, the prosecutor asserted that Mr. Acevedo should have anticipated
a confrontation would follow because he knew he was shoplifting. The prosecutor also
told the jury, “So I don’t mean to be a little bit too direct, but I would trust what we’ve
got here.” VTP at 229. Defense counsel did not object during the State’s closing
arguments. The jury found Mr. Acevedo guilty of robbery in the first degree and
returned a special verdict finding Mr. Acevedo was armed with a deadly weapon. The
court sentenced Mr. Acevedo to 92 months of confinement followed by 18 months of
community custody.
Mr. Acevedo timely appeals.
ANALYSIS
MOTION TO DISMISS
Mr. Acevedo contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for
governmental misconduct. We disagree.
A trial court may dismiss a criminal prosecution under CrR 8.3(b) when
governmental misconduct has prejudiced the defendant’s rights. To obtain dismissal,
the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence both (1) governmental
misconduct and (2) actual prejudice resulting from that misconduct. See State v.
10
No. 41161-3-III
State v. Acevedo
Salgado-Mendoza, 189 Wn.2d 420, 427, 403 P.3d 45 (2017); State v. Rohrich, 149
Wn.2d 647, 654, 71 P.3d 638 (2003).
Appellate courts review a trial court’s ruling on a CrR 8.3(b) motion to dismiss for
abuse of discretion. See Salgado-Mendoza, 189 Wn.2d at 427. 3 A trial court abuses its
discretion only if its decision is “‘manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable
grounds, or for untenable reasons.’” State v. Miller, 159 Wn. App. 911, 918, 247 P.3d
457 (2011) (quoting State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775
(1971)). “A decision is based ‘on untenable grounds’ or made ‘for untenable reasons’ if
it rests on facts unsupported in the record or was reached by applying the wrong legal
standard.” Rohrich, 149 Wn.2d at 654 (quoting State v. Rundquist, 79 Wn. App. 786,
793, 905 P.2d 922 (1995)).
“‘[G]overnmental misconduct’ need not be of an evil or dishonest nature, simple
mismanagement is sufficient.” State v. Dailey, 93 Wn.2d 454, 457, 610 P.2d 357 (1980)
(citing State v. Sulgrove, 19 Wn. App. 860, 578 P.2d 74 (1978)); State v. Oppelt, 172
Wn.2d 285, 297, 257 P.3d 653 (2011). Under CrR 4.7(a)(1), the prosecutor must disclose
certain information “within [the prosecutor’s] possession or control no later than the
3
Although Salgado-Mendoza addressed governmental misconduct under CrRLJ
8.3(b), that rule is identical to CrR 8.3(b). The court in Salgado-Mendoza also cited
cases analyzing CrR 8.3(b). 189 Wn.2d at 432; see also City of Seattle v. Holifield, 170
Wn.2d 230, 238, 240 P.3d 1162 (2010) (applying past reasoning about CrR 8.3(b) to facts
involving CrRLJ 8.3(b) because “[t]he language of CrR 8.3(b) is identical to CrRLJ
8.3(b), the rule before us here”).
11
No. 41161-3-III
State v. Acevedo
omnibus hearing.” That disclosure includes “the names . . . of persons whom the
prosecuting attorney intends to call as witnesses at the . . . trial, together with any written
or recorded statements and the substance of any oral statements of such witnesses.” CrR
4.7(a)(1)(i). The prosecutor’s disclosure obligation, however, “is limited to material and
information within the knowledge, possession or control of members of the prosecuting
attorney’s staff.” CrR 4.7(a)(4).
If discoverable information is in the possession of another person, the prosecutor
must, upon request, make a good faith effort to obtain and provide it to the defense.
CrR 4.7(d); see also CrR 4.7(h)(7)(i). A “[v]iolation of the State’s discovery obligations
can support a finding of governmental misconduct.” Salgado-Mendoza, 189 Wn.2d at
429. The State, however, has no duty to disclose information it is unaware of or does not
possess or control. State v. Mullen, 171 Wn.2d 881, 895, 259 P.3d 158 (2011).
To establish actual prejudice, the defendant must show the alleged error “‘had
practical and identifiable consequences in the trial of the case.’” State v. WWJ Corp.,
138 Wn.2d 595, 603, 980 P.2d 1257 (1999) (quoting State v. Lynn, 67 Wn. App. 339,
345, 835 P.2d 251 (1992)). In the dismissal context, prejudice exists when delayed
disclosure interjects “new facts” shortly before trial, forcing the defendant to choose
between the right to a speedy trial and the right to be represented by adequately prepared
counsel. Salgado-Mendoza, 189 Wn.2d at 432 (citing State v. Price, 94 Wn.2d 810, 814,
12
No. 41161-3-III
State v. Acevedo
620 P.2d 994 (1980)). The defendant bears the burden of showing how the late
disclosure materially prejudiced the defense. Id. at 436.
Mr. Acevedo argues the State committed governmental misconduct by failing to
disclose Patricio’s report. He contends that, even if the prosecutor was unaware the
report existed, the nondisclosure still constitutes unintentional misconduct because the
State has a continuing duty to provide discovery. Mr. Acevedo further asserts he was
prejudiced because the late revelation of the report forced him to choose between
competing constitutional rights and his right to representation by adequately prepared
counsel.
The State responds that no governmental misconduct occurred because the report
was neither within the State’s possession or control, nor known to the prosecution. The
State further argues that, even if nondisclosure could be characterized as misconduct, Mr.
Acevedo has not shown actual prejudice. His claimed harms are speculative, and he did
not seek a continuance—an available remedy that would not have required him to forgo
his speedy trial rights. We conclude the State’s failure to disclose a report that it did not
know existed, and did not possess or control, does not constitute governmental
misconduct.
After the State rested, Mr. Acevedo moved to dismiss on the grounds that he had
not received Patricio’s report. The court denied the motion. At trial, Patricio testified
that he prepared an incident report for Albertsons. Ms. Schneider likewise confirmed that
13
No. 41161-3-III
State v. Acevedo
Patricio wrote a report. Gabriel testified that Patricio wrote the report and submitted it to
law enforcement. Patricio, however, could not confirm that he provided the report to law
enforcement. Officer Becho testified that he did not recall receiving any written reports
by Patricio.
Mr. Acevedo concedes the prosecutor was unaware the report existed but contends
the prosecutor nevertheless “should have asked for and obtained this written report before
trial.” Br. of Appellant at 15. That argument fails because the State’s discovery
obligations do not extend to materials outside of the State’s possession or control. Here,
the report was Albertsons’s document, not a record of the State. Officer Becho testified
he did not recall receiving any written report from Patricio and that, had he received one,
it would have been attached to his police report. The record establishes the State neither
possessed the report nor knew of its existence.
Mr. Acevedo’s claim also fails under CrR 4.7(d), which requires a defendant to
request and designate materials in possession of a third party that the defendant seeks to
obtain through the prosecutor. Although Mr. Acevedo generally sought discovery, the
record reflects the State was unaware the Albertsons report existed, it did not possess it,
and Mr. Acevedo did not specifically request or designate the report under CrR 4.7(d).
On these facts, the court had tenable grounds to deny Mr. Acevedo’s motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Because there
14
No. 41161-3-III
State v. Acevedo
is no governmental misconduct, we need not address Mr. Acevedo’s arguments related to
his competing constitutional rights claims.
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Mr. Acevedo contends his conviction must be reversed because the prosecutor
repeatedly made improper, prejudicial statements that were so flagrant and ill-intentioned
that no curative instruction could have remedied the harm. The State responds that the
challenged statements were not misconduct and, even if any were improper, any
prejudice could have been cured by an instruction. We agree with the State.
Prosecutorial misconduct warrants reversal if “‘the prosecuting attorney’s conduct
was both improper and prejudicial.’” State v. Monday, 171 Wn.2d 667, 675, 257 P.3d
551 (2011) (quoting State v. Fisher, 165 Wn.2d 727, 747, 202 P.3d 937 (2009)). The
defendant bears the burden of proving that the prosecutor’s conduct was both improper
and prejudicial. State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 756, 278 P.3d 653 (2012). In closing
argument, the prosecutor must confine argument to the law as set out in the court’s
instructions. State v. Walker, 164 Wn. App. 724, 736, 265 P.3d 191 (2011). A
prosecutor acts improperly by misstating or mischaracterizing the law and where there is
a substantial likelihood that the misstatement affected the verdict. Id.
In evaluating a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the challenged conduct is not
considered in isolation. Monday, 171 Wn.2d at 675. Rather, the court examines the
prosecutor’s remarks in the “full trial context, including the evidence presented, ‘the
15
No. 41161-3-III
State v. Acevedo
context of the total argument, the issues in the case, the evidence addressed in the
argument, and the instructions given to the jury.’” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 561, 940 P.2d 546 (1997)). This contextual
review focuses on prejudice because misconduct warrants relief only if there is a
substantial likelihood the misconduct affected the verdict. Id. Accordingly, the inquiry
centers not merely on what was said or done, but on the effect of the challenged conduct.
Emery, 174 Wn.2d at 762.
If a defendant fails to object at trial to the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct, then
“the defendant is deemed to have waived any error, unless the prosecutor’s misconduct
was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction could not have cured the resulting
prejudice.” Id. at 760-61. “Under this heightened standard, the defendant must show that
(1) ‘no curative instruction would have obviated any prejudicial effect on the jury’ and
(2) the misconduct resulted in prejudice that ‘had a substantial likelihood of affecting the
jury verdict.’” Id. at 761 (quoting State v. Thorgerson, 172 Wn.2d 438, 455, 258 P.3d 43
(2011)).
Mr. Acevedo argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by (1) improperly
vouching for witnesses, (2) making inflammatory statements, (3) shifting the burden of
proof to Mr. Acevedo, and (4) expressing an improper personal opinion. He further
contends the alleged misconduct cumulatively prejudiced his right to a fair trial. We
address each contention in turn.
16
No. 41161-3-III
State v. Acevedo
Vouching
Mr. Acevedo contends the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of
Officer Becho and Patricio. “Improper vouching generally occurs (1) if the prosecutor
expresses his or her personal belief as to the veracity of the witness or (2) if the
prosecutor indicates that evidence not presented at trial supports the witness’s testimony.”
State v. Ish, 170 Wn.2d 189, 196, 241 P.3d 389 (2010). Vouching is also improper when
the prosecutor “places the prestige of the government behind the witness[es].” State v.
Rodriguez-Perez, 1 Wn. App. 2d 448, 458-59, 406 P.3d 658 (2017). A prosecutor may,
however, argue “reasonable inferences from the evidence, including evidence respecting
the credibility of witnesses.” Thorgerson, 172 Wn.2d at 448.
Mr. Acevedo contends the prosecutor improperly vouched for Officer Becho by
telling the jury in his opening statement that Officer Becho “absolutely” retired
“honorably.” VTP at 46. According to Mr. Acevedo, this argument “impl[ied] that
[Officer Becho] did nothing wrong in this investigation.” Br. of Appellant at 22. In
closing argument, the prosecutor returned to the same theme, again stating that Officer
Becho retired honorably and that “[Officer Becho is] just going to tell you how it is.”
VTP at 207. Mr. Acevedo did not object to either remark.
Mr. Acevedo contends these remarks conveyed to the jury that the Pasco Police
Department permitted Officer Becho to retire “honorably,” thereby implying the
department would not have done so had he engaged in wrongdoing. Br. of Appellant at
17
No. 41161-3-III
State v. Acevedo
23. He further argues the prosecutor tied that purported departmental endorsement to
Officer Becho’s testimony in this case, inviting jurors to credit Officer Becho because of
his “honorable” retirement. Br. of Appellant at 23.
Mr. Acevedo correctly observes that the record contains no evidence Officer
Becho retired “honorably.” Officer Becho testified only that he retired after 28 years of
service. To the extent the prosecutor’s use of “honorably” suggested facts not in
evidence, the remark was improper. However, it is not apparent that the isolated
adjective amounted to an expression of personal belief in veracity or an invocation of
evidence outside the record to bolster the officer’s credibility. Nor does the record
support Mr. Acevedo’s speculation that the jury would infer the Pasco Police Department
would not have permitted an “honorable” retirement had Officer Becho done something
wrong. Even assuming the remark constituted vouching, any misconduct was limited and
not pervasive or inflammatory, and it was not so flagrant and ill-intentioned that a timely
curative instruction could not have remedied any potential prejudice.
Likewise, the prosecutor’s remark that Officer Becho would “tell them how it is”
does not amount to improper vouching. VTP at 207. It was a brief, colloquial comment
and is readily distinguishable from statements held to be vouching. See State v. Jones,
144 Wn. App. 284, 294, 183 P.3d 307 (2008).
Mr. Acevedo also contends the prosecutor vouched for Patricio during closing
argument by describing him as “mild-mannered” and stating that he had since earned his
18
No. 41161-3-III
State v. Acevedo
master’s degree. VTP at 205. Patricio did not testify about his education. Mr. Acevedo
argues that the prosecutor’s reference to the degree injected facts not in evidence to
bolster Patricio’s credibility and to support the State’s position that Patricio was not
violent or aggressive.
Mr. Acevedo is correct that the record contains no evidence Patricio obtained a
master’s degree; that assertion came solely from the prosecutor. Because the prosecutor
referenced a fact outside the evidence, the remark was improper. However, the remark
was isolated and not so flagrant or ill-intentioned that any minimal prejudice could not
have been cured by an instruction. Patricio’s relevance to the case concerned his actions
and observations as a loss prevention officer during the incident. Any later academic
achievement does not meaningfully bear on his perception, memory, or demeanor at the
time, and thus does not create a substantial likelihood of affecting the verdict.
The prosecutor’s description of Patricio as “mild-mannered” was a reasonable
inference from the evidence. Nothing in the record suggests Patricio was aggressive or
loud in his testimony, and the jury could assess his demeanor for itself. In any event, the
court expressly instructed the jury that it was “the sole judges of the credibility of each
witness.” CP at 37; VTP at 191.
Nor did the verdict turn on Officer Becho’s or Patricio’s credibility individually.
The jury was presented with other evidence supporting the verdict, including Mr.
Acevedo’s own testimony where he admitted that he shoplifted and threatened Patricio
19
No. 41161-3-III
State v. Acevedo
and Gabriel when confronted. Viewed in context, the prosecutor’s brief remarks do not
amount to vouching.
Alleged Inflammatory Statements
Mr. Acevedo contends the prosecutor made inflammatory remarks during closing
argument. Prosecutors are afforded “‘wide latitude’ in closing argument, but their
argument must be based on the evidence and must not misstate the applicable law.” State
v. Crossguns, 199 Wn.2d 282, 296-97, 505 P.3d 529 (2022). Washington courts also
recognize that counsel may use analogies to help jurors understand and apply the law.
See State v. Barajas, 143 Wn. App. 24, 40, 177 P.3d 106 (2007); In re Pers. Restraint of
Richmond, 16 Wn. App. 2d 751, 756, 482 P.3d 971 (2021). When a prosecutor ties an
analogy directly to the defendant, the prosecutor must choose their words carefully and
avoid improper argument. Barajas, 143 Wn.2d at 40. Additionally, a prosecutor may not
invite a verdict based on prejudice or passion by making arguments designed to inflame
the jury. In re Pers. Restraint of Glassmann, 175 Wn.2d 696, 704, 286 P.3d 673 (2012).
During closing argument, the prosecutor analogized the facts here to an armed
bank robbery. Mr. Acevedo argues the prosecutor’s use of first-person framing—
“‘[y]ou’re the victim . . . you’re the one with the gun pointed in your face’” was highly
prejudicial and irrelevant because this case involved neither a bank robbery nor a firearm.
Br. of Appellant at 27-28 (quoting VTP at 212). He also challenges the prosecutor’s
20
No. 41161-3-III
State v. Acevedo
remark, “I have a couple kids, I don’t have to tell them I’m going to F them up.” VTP at
212.
Mr. Acevedo relies on State v. Pierce, 169 Wn. App. 533, 280 P.3d 1158 (2012),
where this court held the prosecutor committed misconduct by using first-person rhetoric
that appealed to jurors’ emotions and by presenting facts not in evidence. In Pierce, the
prosecutor not only spoke in the first person but also construed a speculative narrative
about what the defendant was thinking before the alleged double murder. Id. at 556.
This court concluded the comments served no legitimate purpose other than to inflame
the jury’s emotions. Id. at 555.
Mr. Acevedo’s reliance on Pierce is misplaced. Unlike the prosecutor in Pierce,
here, the prosecutor did not invite the jury to convict based on a speculative narrative
about what Mr. Acevedo was thinking or intending beyond the evidence. Rather, the
hypothetical was offered to illustrate the “retain possession” component of robbery. In
context, the analogy served an explanatory purpose tied to the elements the jury was
required to apply, not an improper appeal to passion or prejudice. Even if the comparison
was inartful, it was an isolated remark that could have been addressed by a timely
objection and curative instruction. Finally, the analogy did not misstate the law; it was
used to explain how the “retain possession” element operates, not to alter the State’s
burden or the court’s instructions.
21
No. 41161-3-III
State v. Acevedo
As for the prosecutor’s reference to his children, the purpose of the remark is not
apparent from the record, and Mr. Acevedo is correct that it was irrelevant to any issue
the jury was asked to decide. However, the statement was isolated and brief, and it was
not so flagrant or ill-intentioned that any potential prejudice could not have been cured by
a timely objection and a curative instruction.
Alleged Burden Shifting
Mr. Acevedo contends the prosecutor impermissibly shifted the burden of proof
during closing argument. “A prosecutor commits misconduct if they shift the burden of
proof to the defendant.” State v. Stotts, 26 Wn. App. 2d 154, 170-71, 527 P.3d 842
(2023). A prosecutor does not necessarily shift the burden merely by criticizing or
commenting on the defense’s theory. See State v. Russell, 125 Wn.2d 24, 91, 882 P.2d
747 (1994).
Mr. Acevedo argues the prosecutor crossed the line when he told the jury that Mr.
Acevedo was “point[ing] . . . finger[s]” at the other witnesses. VTP at 231, 219. He
contends this framing suggested “there was something suspicious about Mr. Acevedo
putting on a defense and questioning the State’s evidence.” Br. of Appellant at 30. He
further emphasizes that “[t]he prosecutor made these statements in closing argument, not
rebuttal, so they were not in response to arguments made by Mr. Acevedo.” Br. of
Appellant at 30.
22
No. 41161-3-III
State v. Acevedo
The cited remarks do not amount to burden shifting. The court instructed the
jury—both before opening statements and again before closing arguments—that the
prosecutor bore the burden of proof. Against that backdrop, the prosecutor’s “pointing
fingers” comment was a fair response to the defense’s theory and to Mr. Acevedo’s own
testimony, not an argument that Mr. Acevedo had to prove anything.
From the outset, the defense asserted Mr. Acevedo did not use or threaten force to
remove property from Albertsons. Mr. Acevedo then testified that the loss prevention
officers were the aggressors during the encounter. Consistent with that testimony,
defense counsel argued in closing that the officers acted aggressively and failed to de-
escalate as trained. Counsel further suggested that, given the intensity of the
confrontation, Mr. Acevedo forgot the chips were in his jacket and made threats only
because he felt threatened. In context, the prosecutor’s remarks simply challenged that
narrative and the credibility of Mr. Acevedo’s account; they did not shift the burden of
proof.
Although the prosecutor made the remarks in his initial closing argument rather
than in rebuttal, Mr. Acevedo’s testimony had already laid out the defense’s narrative and
effectively previewed the argument counsel would advance in summation. Even if the
prosecutor’s comments could be construed as burden shifting, any resulting prejudice was
not so flagrant and ill-intentioned that it could not have been cured by a timely objection
and a curative instruction.
23
No. 41161-3-III
State v. Acevedo
Alleged Personal Opinion
Mr. Acevedo contends the prosecutor improperly injected his opinion about the
strength of the State’s case. Prosecutors have wide latitude in closing argument, but they
may not argue facts not in evidence or express an opinion about the defendant’s or a
witness’s credibility. Glassman, 175 Wn.2d at 706; State v. Reed, 102 Wn.2d 140, 145,
684 P.2d 699 (1984)). Given that latitude, argument is not misconduct unless “it is clear
and unmistakable that counsel is not arguing an inference from the evidence but is
expressing a personal opinion.” State v. Papadopoulos, 34 Wn. App. 397, 400, 662 P.2d
59 (1983).
Mr. Acevedo contends the prosecutor crossed the line during rebuttal when he
stated, “So I don’t mean to be a little bit too direct, but I would trust what we’ve