State of Washington v. A.M.G.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket40439-1
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
FILED
NOVEMBER 19, 2026
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 40439-1-III
)
Respondent, )
)
v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
A.M.G., )
)
Appellant. )
MURPHY, J. — A.M.G. appeals from his order of disposition for first degree
escape, contending the charging document omitted an essential element of the crime:
knowledge. The State concedes. We agree, reverse the order of disposition, and remand
for dismissal of the charge without prejudice.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 8, 1994, the State charged 15-year-old A.M.G. in juvenile court with one
count of first degree escape. The information accused A.M.G. with “the offense of:
FIRST DEGREE ESCAPE which is a violation of RCW[] 9A.76.110(1) in that on or
about [May 27, 1994] in Yakima County, Washington [A.M.G.] did then and there: . . .
escape from the custody of . . . a detention facility.” Clerk’s Papers at 4.
A.M.G. pleaded guilty, admitting he left the custody of a detention facility without
permission. During the plea colloquy, the juvenile court addressed the mental element of
the crime:
No. 40439-1-III
State v. A.M.G.
THE COURT: And you knew that what you were doing was leaving
without permission, right?
[A.M.G.]: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. And you knew that what you were doing was
essentially escaping?
[A.M.G.]: Yeah.
Verbatim Tr. of Proc. (July 14, 1994) at 10-11. The court accepted A.M.G.’s plea and
entered an order of disposition imposing 28 days of confinement.
On May 16, 2024, A.M.G. filed a notice of appeal. 1
ANALYSIS
A.M.G. contends that because the charging document failed to allege knowledge,
an essential element of the crime of first degree escape, the juvenile court’s order of
disposition must be reversed. The State concedes on this issue.
“All essential elements of a crime, statutory or otherwise, must be included in a
charging document in order to afford notice to an accused of the nature and cause of the
accusation against [them].” State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d 93, 97, 812 P.2d 86 (1991)
(citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WASH. CONST. art I, § 22; former CrR 2.1(b) (1986) 2).
1
Because A.M.G.’s notice was filed well beyond the 30-day deadline in which to
initiate an appeal, this court, on its own motion, placed the matter on a motion to dismiss
docket for an untimely appeal. After the State conceded it could not meet its burden to
demonstrate that A.M.G. in 1994 understood his right to appeal and consciously waived
that right, a commissioner of this court denied the motion to dismiss. Comm’r’s Ruling
(Oct. 29, 2024) at 2.
2
This provision is now found in CrR 2.1(a)(1).
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State v. A.M.G.
When the sufficiency of a charging document is challenged for the first time on appeal,
we construe the document liberally in favor of validity. State v. Brown, 169 Wn.2d 195,
197, 234 P.3d 212 (2010) (citing Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 102). In doing so, we inquire
“(1) whether the essential elements appear in any form, or can be found by any fair
construction, in the information and, if so, (2) whether the [accused] nonetheless was
actually prejudiced by the unartful language used.” Id. at 197-98. When the “information
wholly omits an element, the remedy is to reverse the conviction and dismiss the charge
without prejudice.” Id. at 198.
The primary goal of the first prong of this test is “to give notice to an accused of
the nature of the crime that [they] must be prepared to defend against.” Kjorsvik, 117
Wn.2d at 101. Accordingly, an accused is “entitled to be fully informed of the nature of
the accusations against them so that they can prepare an adequate defense.” Kjorsvik,
117 Wn.2d at 101. Mere citation to the criminal code section and title of the offense do
not satisfy the essential element requirement. State v. Zillyette, 178 Wn.2d 153, 162, 307
P.3d 712 (2013).
In 1994, the statute at issue here stated in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of escape in the first degree if, being detained pursuant
to a conviction of a felony or an equivalent juvenile offense, [they] escape[]
from custody or a detention facility.
Former RCW 9A.76.110(1) (1982). While “knowledge” was not included in the statutory
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State v. A.M.G.
language until the legislature amended the statute to its current form in 2001, caselaw
since 1980 had already established knowledge was an essential element of the crime.
State v. Descoteaux, 94 Wn.2d 31, 34-35, 614 P.2d 179 (1980), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Danforth, 97 Wn.2d 255, 258-59, 643 P.2d 882 (1982); State v. Hall,
104 Wn.2d 486, 492, 706 P.2d 1074 (1985); State v. Christian, 44 Wn. App. 764, 768,
723 P.2d 508 (1986).
The information charging A.M.G. with first degree escape was deficient in
that it failed to include an essential element of the crime. Even construed liberally,
the charging document cannot be read to include the element of knowledge. We
reverse the order of disposition and remand for dismissal of the charge without
prejudice.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in
the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
Murphy, J.
WE CONCUR:
Cooney, A.C.J. Hill, J.
4