Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 86607-9-I (Consolidated with No. 86972-8-I Respondent, v. ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, ALAN F. DEAN, WITHDRAWING OPINION, AND Appellant. SUBSTITUTING OPINION Appellant Alan Dean moved for reconsideration of the opinion filed on July 13, 2026. Respondent State of Washington has not filed an answer. The panel has considered the motion pursuant to RAP 12.4 and has determined that the motion should be denied, the opinion should be withdrawn, and a substitute opinion be filed. Now, therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that the appellant’s motion for reconsideration is denied; and it is further ORDERED that the unpublished opinion filed on July 13, 2026, is withdrawn; and it is further ORDERED that a substitute unpublished opinion be filed. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 86607-9-I (Consolidated with No. 86972-8-I) Respondent, v. DIVISION ONE ALAN F. DEAN, UNPUBLISHED OPINION Appellant. SMITH, J. — In 2020, law enforcement arrested Alan Dean for premeditated murder in the first degree for a “cold case” committed in 1993. Dean asserted an “other suspect” defense at trial. The jury found Dean guilty and he was sentenced to 320 months. Dean appealed, claiming (1) the trial court violated his right to due process by admitting his involuntary statements; (2) the court denied Dean his constitutional right to present a defense; (3) Dean was denied effective assistance of counsel; (4) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct; (4) the trial court violated Dean’s right to confront a witness; (5) Dean was deprived of a fair trial due to cumulative error; and (6) the trial court erroneously entered community custody conditions that exceeded the statutory maximum. We conclude the trial court did violate Dean’s right to confront a witness, but because overwhelming evidence of Dean’s guilt existed, the error was harmless. Because the trial court also erred when imposing the community custody conditions, we remand to strike the term of community No. 86607-9-I (Consol. with No. 86972-8-I)/2 custody and impose conditions consistent with RCW 9.94B.050(2)(b) but otherwise affirm. FACTS Background In 1993, M.L. was fifteen years old and lived in Bothell, Washington, with her mother, Sharon,1 her younger sister, K.L., and her mother’s fiancé, Gary McClellan. On the evening of April 13, 1993, M.L was home alone with plans to have a friend spend the night. M.L. spoke with her mother on the phone around 9:30 p.m. and said everything was fine. When Sharon and McClellan returned home around 2 a.m., they found the door kicked in, the house in disarray, and M.L. missing. Sharon later indicated that she did not immediately call police because M.L. had run away in the past. The next afternoon, around 1:45 p.m., Sharon became worried about M.L. and called law enforcement to report her missing. That same afternoon, April 14, 1993, M.L.’s body was found below the Edgewater Creek Bridge in Everett. On the morning of April 15, 1993, law enforcement went to Sharon’s house to take statements from Sharon and McClellan and conduct a search of the house. By that time, Sharon had cleaned the house. In M.L.’s bedroom, detectives found a day calendar in the trash. An entry on March 14, 1993, read 1 To protect the identity of the victim, we use Sharon’s first name only. 2 No. 86607-9-I (Consol. with No. 86972-8-I)/3 “Met Alan on Nightline[2] over the phone.” Entries on March 15 and 16 indicated M.L had met with Alan in person. The day planner also included phone numbers for “Michael” and “Nightline.” On May 18, Detective Greg Rinta called the phone number for Michael. The man who answered identified himself as Alan and said no one named Michael was associated with that number. Alan agreed to speak with Detective Rinta. Detective Rinta met with Alan—later identified as the defendant Alan Edward Dean—at his home, which was less than four miles from where M.L.’s body was found. Detective Rinta showed Dean a picture of M.L., and Dean recognized M.L. as someone he had met through Nightline and dated “once or twice” in March 1993. Dean told Detective Rinta that he went by the name “Mike” when using the chat line. Dean denied ever having sex with M.L. Law enforcement also interviewed T.P., who dated M.L. for about a year around the time of her death.3 At the time of M.L.’s death, T.P. was 16 years old and lived in Edmonds with his family. On the night M.L. disappeared, M.L. and T.P. argued on the phone. T.P. told M.L. she was “marked.”4 T.P. was a person of interest, but law enforcement did not have enough evidence to arrest him. 2 Nightline was “a chat line where people could talk to strangers in an anonymous fashion, leading to potentially meeting up in-person.” M.L.’s friends confirmed that M.L. was a user of the service. 3 The record is unclear about when exactly T.P. and M.L. broke up. 4 According to T.P., “marked” meant “threaten to kill somebody or something.” 3 No. 86607-9-I (Consol. with No. 86972-8-I)/4 DNA and Arrest In April 1993, Dr. Eric Kiesel conducted a formal autopsy on M.L.’s body. Dr. Kiesel detected an odor consistent with ether coming from her body.5 Greg Frank, a forensic scientist, performed testing on stains extracted from M.L.’s shorts and underwear. The stains tested positive for blood and trace amounts of acid phosphates,6 but negative for spermatozoa. This was the extent of testing done in 1993. In 2001, Frank tested the stains for DNA. One of the stains contained DNA from two sources—one was M.L. and the other was an unknown male. The unknown male source was run through the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), a state and national DNA profile repository. At the time, the database included the DNA profile of M.L.’s on-and-off boyfriend, T.P. No matches to any profiles stored in CODIS, which included T.P.’s, were returned. In 2019, detectives employed genetic genealogy testing to compare the DNA found on M.L.’s clothing to DNA profiles in a publicly available database. From this process, detectives identified Dean as a potential source of the DNA. The Snohomish County Sherriff’s Department attempted to get a sample of Dean’s DNA via a covert operation. Undercover officers went to Dean’s house posing as market researchers sampling chewing gum. Dean engaged with the “researchers” and tried the gum, 5 Ether is a hydrocarbon compound that was used as a general anesthetic until the early 1960s. It is now primarily used as a carburetor cleaner. 6 An acid phosphate test can detect the presence of some liquids, such as semen and vaginal fluids. 4 No. 86607-9-I (Consol. with No. 86972-8-I)/5 but he did not allow them to take his used sample. He asked the officers, “You’re not trying to collect my DNA; are you?” Dean was pleasant during the interaction and was able to articulate his position clearly. The detectives noted Dean made various anti-government statements, including telling the officers he was aware that government agents might attempt to obtain DNA samples and alluding to the officers being “dark agents of the State.” The detectives believed his views were extreme, but not outlandish. At no time did Dean indicate he was unwilling to talk to them. Detectives continued to surveil Dean, and in April 2020, they collected a cigarette that Dean had discarded on the roadway near his home. The DNA on the cigarette matched the unidentified male DNA on M.L.’s clothing. Law enforcement arrested Dean in July 2020. Dean cooperated with the officers, but stated, “I’m not going to enter into any contract,” and told the officers they were interfering with interstate commerce. Based on Dean’s comments, the arresting officer believed Dean was a proponent of the sovereign citizen movement.7 After the arrest, detectives searched the home where Dean lived. In the garage, detectives found several items containing ether and heptane.8 Officers transported Dean to the Sherrif’s Office, where he met with detectives in an interview room. Detectives read Dean his Miranda9 rights and 7 Sovereign citizens believe they are exempt from federal, state, and local laws. 8 At the time, Dean rented a room in a house, and the garage was a shared living space. 9 Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). 5 No. 86607-9-I (Consol. with No. 86972-8-I)/6 asked if he understood. Dean replied, “No.” The detectives asked Dean what he did not understand and how they could help him understand. Dean repeated the following statements after each inquiry: “I decline any and all offers of contract, and I don’t concede to any presumptions,” and “I comprehend you’re just trying to do your job, but I can’t make any legal determinations on any of the questions that you’re asking me.” Detectives informed Dean that he had been arrested for murder in the first degree and kidnapping in the first degree arising from a 1993 case. The detectives let Dean know they were going to take a DNA sample, advised him that the room was being recorded, and then left to gather the materials needed to collect a sample of his DNA. After the detectives left the room, Dean whispered, “I knew that’s what this is about.” Then he looked at the ceiling and said, “I’m sorry.” The DNA obtained from Dean after his arrest was compared with the DNA found on M.L.’s clothing. While another male’s DNA was detected in trace amounts in one of the blood stains on M.L.’s shorts, Dean’s DNA matched every sample taken from M.L.’s clothing from which scientific comparison could be conducted, including the stain found on M.L.’s underwear. Dean did not rebut the DNA evidence at trial, but he did elicit testimony from Frank that DNA, including DNA deposited by semen, could remain on clothing through up to six wash cycles. Competency After detectives received a DNA sample from Dean, he was transported to the Snohomish County Jail for booking. During the booking process, a nurse 6 No. 86607-9-I (Consol. with No. 86972-8-I)/7 reported Dean was “alert and oriented times four with no acute distress.” The next day, a mental health professional (MHP) met with Dean and noted Dean was “curled up in his blanket . . . look[ing] around the room and would not really engage with [me].” Dean made several incoherent statements and declared he had “been tortured because [he doesn’t] want to say what they wanted [him] to say.” At Dean’s arraignment on August 18, 2020, the court expressed concern about Dean’s mental competency. The State asserted, “It doesn’t appear to me that this is a situation where the defendant does not understand. It’s more of a situation where he protests and refuses to acknowledge.” The court disagreed, noting Dean did not “seem to be tracking,” and ordered a competency evaluation. Dean refused to meet with the evaluator. At a subsequent hearing, the State recommended that Dean be transported to Western State Hospital (WSH) so he could be evaluated under 24/7 care. Dean remained at the jail until September 22, 2020, when the jail called a medical emergency because Dean was “hard to get to respond and his color was grey blue.” The jail sent Dean to a local hospital where a clinician noted Dean was having paranoid ideation about food and had not eaten in several days. Several days later, a provider at the hospital relayed to the jail that Dean’s condition had improved, and they did not believe psychiatric intervention was warranted at that time. Dean returned to jail. On October 6, 2020, Dean screamed at a jail nurse and claimed the medications were poisoning him. Two days later, Dean was admitted to WSH for a competency evaluation. Dean was uncooperative in the interview, and when told his attorney would be present, Dean stated, he’s “not [my] attorney. . . . He’s 7 No. 86607-9-I (Consol. with No. 86972-8-I)/8 posing, he’s a pretender.” Dean’s competency evaluation stated that, “although some of his beliefs may be tied to anti-government conspiracy theories or ideologies, his thought processes are notably disorganized and tangential.” Additionally, the evaluation noted that Dean was “paranoid upon evaluation, guarded to give information, and delusional.” The evaluation concluded by stating Dean’s “diagnostic picture remains relatively unclear,” but offered a diagnosis of “Unspecified Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorder . . . as well as an Unspecified Personality Disorder, with Antisocial and Paranoid Traits.” Dean was deemed not competent to stand trial. In November 2020, the court held a Sell10 hearing and concluded Dean could be forcibly medicated. Dean remained at WSH for almost two years, a period which included two competency restorations followed by a civil commitment. During this time, Dean’s evaluations varied concerning the etiology of his symptoms: [S]ome providers not[ed] his symptoms were consistent with a schizophrenia spectrum disorder, other providers noting his presentation was consistent with a personality disorder and beliefs consistent with sovereign citizenship, and other providers conceptualizing the etiology of his symptoms and behaviors as both schizophrenia and a personality disorder, and with one forensic evaluator providing a diagnosis of schizophrenia and rule-out of neurocognitive disorder. In August 2022, WSH discharged Dean, and he returned to the Snohomish County Jail. In February 2023, Dean participated in a neuropsychological 10 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 156 L. Ed. 2d 197 (2003). 8 No. 86607-9-I (Consol. with No. 86972-8-I)/9 evaluation, and it was determined Dean did “not appear to be encephalopathic11 at [the] time as he did not present as confused and he was fully oriented.” Subsequently, the court ordered another competency evaluation, and Dean was deemed competent to stand trial. Motions in Limine 1. Statements by Dean In February 2024, the court held a CrR 3.5 hearing to determine whether statements made by Dean during the gum ruse, his arrest, and post-arrest interview were admissible. The court concluded that all statements were made voluntarily and free of coercion. Concerning the statements Dean made in the interview room after his arrest, the court concluded, Under the totality of the circumstances, it does not appear to the Court that his mental illness, to the extent he had one, interfered with the voluntariness of those statements. The court finds that there was no Miranda violation, they went through the proper process, they were not questioning him, and that those statements are admissible under [CrR] 3.5, as they were the result of a voluntary, spontaneous utterance on his part. 2. Testimony of Dr. Barry Logan In March 2024, the court heard arguments from the parties concerning the State’s motion to allow expert testimony from Dr. Barry Logan. The State sought to have Dr. Logan testify about the results of the chemical analysis of M.L.’s autopsy. Dr. Logan was the state toxicologist in 1993 and was involved with testing blood samples taken from M.L. Two sets of tests were done on M.L.’s 11 “Encephalopathic” refers to a state or condition in which the brain is affected by disease, damage, or dysfunction, leading to altered mental function. 9 No. 86607-9-I (Consol. with No. 86972-8-I)/10 blood. The first round of testing was performed by analyst John Larson.12 Larson created a draft report based on the printouts from the testing instruments and compiled both the report and the printouts for Dr. Logan to review. Larson’s report indicated that M.L.’s blood contained acetone. After reviewing the raw data and Larson’s report, Dr. Logan concurred with Larson’s assessment. Dr. Logan communicated with Dr. Kiesel, who had performed the original autopsy, about the results. Dr. Kiesel told Dr. Logan that he believed it was ether, not acetone, present in M.L,’s blood. Based on this feedback, Dr. Logan redesigned the test so it could differentiate between acetone and ether. Larson again ran M.L.’s blood sample. Dr. Logan was present for some of this testing. Dr. Logan reviewed the instrument data from this round and concluded M.L.’s blood contained ether rather than acetone. Dr. Logan also signed off on the final report. The court concluded Dr. Logan’s testimony did not present a confrontation clause issue and granted the State’s motion. 3. Graffiti Evidence Dean brought a motion to admit photographs taken by law enforcement in 1994 of graffiti discovered on the walls of a backyard shed at T.P.’s home. The photographs were taken in 1994, when the bank repossessed the home and alerted law enforcement to the existence of the graffiti. The photographs Dean sought to admit depicted graffiti with the following statements: (1) “[T.P.] wants [M.L.] dead!!”; (2) “I’ll be dead soon, 6 ft. under” (stick figure in a coffin); and 12 Larson was deceased at the time of trial. 10 No. 86607-9-I (Consol. with No. 86972-8-I)/11 (3) “[M.L.] is gonna die soon.” (smiley face).13 The State asserted that the graffiti appeared to be in at least three different people’s handwriting. During pretrial interviews, both T.P. and M.D. stated they did not create the graffiti, nor did they know who wrote it. M.D. noted some of the handwriting looked feminine and admitted it could have been her. Dean claimed he was offering the photographs as proof that T.P. put a hit on M.L. The court concluded the statements were hearsay and no exception existed. In a motion for reconsideration, Dean argued the writings were admissible for the purpose of impeaching law enforcement’s investigation. He maintained detectives “cleared” T.P. before the writings were found, and the investigation efforts concerning T.P. were minimal. The court denied Dean’s motion. 4. Other Suspect Evidence Dean also sought to admit testimony that T.P. was abusive towards his girlfriend, M.D., as part of his “other suspect” defense. In a pretrial interview, M.D. stated T.P. choked her “a couple of times.” Dean contended this evidence went to T.P.’s intent, motive, and modus operandi underlying his alleged murder of M.L. The court allowed the evidence, noting Dean satisfied the ER 404(b) requirements.14 13 The graffiti in (3) above used the first name of M.L., but it is unclear to whom this statement referred given this first name was shared by M.D., T.P.’s girlfriend at the time of M.L.’s death. 14 To admit evidence of the defendant’s prior misconduct, “ ‘the trial court must (1) find by a preponderance of the evidence that the misconduct occurred, (2) identify the purpose for which the evidence is sought to be introduced, 11 No. 86607-9-I (Consol. with No. 86972-8-I)/12 The State filed a motion asking the court to reconsider. During the hearing, Dean offered a new, non-propensity, basis for admission: consciousness of guilt. Dean told the court he expected M.D. to testify about an incident that occurred while she was dating T.P., where T.P. and a friend, E.C., took her out in the woods behind T.P.’s house and tied her to a tree, then the friend put his hands around M.D.’s neck, and T.P. said, “Do you want to die like [M.L.] died?” The court considered both the State’s motion for reconsideration and the newly offered evidence of the incident in the woods. The court reversed its original order allowing the admission of evidence of T.P. choking M.D., noting, “the case law is clear that this does not fit MO, modus operandi, because it’s not so distinctive and unusual of a manner of assaulting or attempting to kill someone that it would justify admitting the prior misconduct.” But, with regard to the incident with T.P., E.C., and M.D. in the woods, the court found its probative value outweighed the prejudice and allowed its admission. 5. Autopsy Photographs The State sought to admit 16 photographs from M.L.’s autopsy. The State maintained the photographs selected offered “a very particular and specific thing, clothing that the victim was wearing, the injuries to her throat from various angles, the face shot for identification, and the condition of her various limbs and (3) determine whether the evidence is relevant to prove an element of the crime charged, and (4) weigh the probative value against the prejudicial effect.’ ” State v. Gresham, 173 Wn.2d 405, 421, 269 P.3d 207 (2012) (quoting State v. Thang, 145 Wn.2d 630, 642, 41 P.3d 1159 (2002)). 12 No. 86607-9-I (Consol. with No. 86972-8-I)/13 back and torso.” The court granted the State’s motion, noting it did not “believe that they are so shocking under [ER] 403 as to be unfairly prejudicial, and they’re directly relevant to the State’s burden in this matter.” Trial At trial, Dean’s theory of the case was that T.P. was responsible for M.L.’s death. Sharon described M.L. and T.P.’s relationship as “volatile,” and noted she did not like the way T.P. treated M.L. She testified that shortly before M.L.’s death, T.P and M.L. broke up. She stated that on the day of M.L.’s death, M.L called her at work and told her that T.P. “was going to come and kill her [M.L.].”15 At the end of Sharon’s direct examination, the State handed her what had previously been admitted as Exhibit (Ex.) 29—an autopsy photograph of M.L.16 The photograph depicted M.L.’s face. M.L.’s eyes were closed, her mouth sightly open, and red ligature marks were visible on her neck. The State questioned, “I’m going to ask you to take a look at [the photograph], and I’m going to ask you to indicate for us whether this is, in fact, a photograph of your daughter [M.L.], okay?” Sharon replied, “Oh, my God. It’s her.” The State ended its direct examination and the court turned to Dean for cross-examination. Before Dean’s attorney began cross-examination, he stated, “Your Honor, I’ll just ask, if [Sharon] needs a few minutes, that would certainly be understandable.” Sharon 15 Neither Sharon’s initial report to police nor her written statement included this fact. 16 Before showing Sharon the photo, the State approached Dean’s counsel and confirmed it was going to present the photo to Sharon. Dean’s counsel did not object. 13 No. 86607-9-I (Consol. with No. 86972-8-I)/14 indicated she was ready to continue, but after a few moments, Dean noted, “Your Honor, I know [Sharon] has indicated that she’s all right, but I do wonder if this would be an appropriate time for the afternoon recess, as I do see that she is still understandably upset and tearful.” The court recessed and Dean moved for a mistrial. Dean noted Sharon had already been shown several photos of M.L., and no apparent need existed for the State to show her the final autopsy photo. Dean claimed, It was clearly a ploy that was meant to derail cross- examination. It puts defense in a terrible light before the jury to ask her really anything about [M.L.]. It was clearly designed to enflame the passions of the jury. [Sharon], upon seeing the photo shouted, “Oh, my God,” and burst into tears. The State countered that it was appropriate to “close the circle” by having Sharon identify the individual in the photograph. The State also noted that it had told Sharon that morning it would be showing her autopsy photographs. The court concluded there was a legitimate basis for the State to show the photograph and noted, “while it’s unfortunate the witness had a – an emotional reaction, which is understandable, to it, it was not so overblown that it can’t be, with a break, overcome.” After the recess, Sharon returned to the stand and Dean conducted cross-examination with seemingly no issues. Later in trial, the State showed Dr. Kiesel the same photograph (Ex. 29) and he explained, “this is an identification photograph that we take on all cases.” Prior to deliberations, the court read the jury instructions, which included the following instruction: “You must not let your emotions overcome your rational 14 No. 86607-9-I (Consol. with No. 86972-8-I)/15 thought process. You must reach your decision based on the facts proved to you and on the law given to you, not on sympathy, prejudice, or personal preference.” Dean called several witnesses at trial, including T.P. T.P. testified that M.L. prank-called his house the night she was killed but had little memory of much else. When asked if he had any memory of telling M.L. she was marked, T.P. claimed he did not recall making that comment. But in a written statement to law enforcement on April 20, 1993, T.P. said he had placed a tag on M.L.’s life. T.P.’s stepbrother, A.G., testified and confirmed that T.P. had placed a hit on M.L. A.G. recalled that T.P. had told him that “he had forgotten to call off a hit” on M.L. A.G. said T.P was not planning the hit himself but had recruited someone from the gang he was affiliated with to carry out the hit. A.G. testified “nothing” wound up happening with the hit and T.P. never mentioned it to him again. In his written statement to law enforcement in 1993, A.G. said, “[T.P.] did tell [M.L.] she was marked, but only after she kept calling and refused to stop.” T.P.’s father and brothers, S.P. and B.P., also testified. Neither recalled much from the night of April 13, but their statements to police on April 16, 1993, indicated that on the night of April 13, T.P. returned home around 9:00 p.m., was on the couch watching a movie at 2:00 a.m., and was asleep on the couch at 6:00 a.m. Conversely, M.D. testified that T.P. stayed at her house the night of April 13, 1993. Dean called M.D. as a witness and asked about the incident in the woods. While describing the incident, M.D. testified it was T.P.’s friend, E.C., who asked if she wanted to die like M.L., not T.P., as Dean had indicated. The State 15 No. 86607-9-I (Consol. with No. 86972-8-I)/16 objected and asked to be heard outside the presence of the jurors. The State noted that M.D.’s testimony was different than what was discussed during the motions in limine. During the motion, Dean had offered this incident as proof of T.P.’s consciousness of guilt because it was T.P. who said, “Do you want to die like [M.L.]” but now M.D. was testifying it was T.P.’s friend who said those words. Dean responded that in her interview with detectives, M.D. indicated it was T.P. who said those words. Dean offered two remedies: impeachment or a stipulation from the detective that during the interview, M.D. referred to T.P making the statement. The court allowed Dean to impeach M.D., but stated, “if she does not— after being confronted with her out-of-court statement—agree to that, then the matter is over.” Dean responded, “And I will move on at that point.” When Dean continued questioning, M.D. confirmed it was E.C. who made the statement. The State objected and moved to strike. The court sustained the objection and told the jury “to disregard the last answer with regard to who made the statement and what the statement was.” The State requested that the entire portion of the testimony concerning the incident be struck; the court sustained that as well and told the jury to “disregard the entirety of that line of questioning.” Dean did not object. The jury found Dean guilty of murder in the first degree, and the court sentenced Dean to 320 months imprisonment, to be followed by 36 months community custody. Dean appealed, claiming (1) the trial court violated his right to due process by admitting his involuntary statements; (2) the court denied Dean 16 No. 86607-9-I (Consol. with No. 86972-8-I)/17 his constitutional right to present a defense; (3) Dean was denied effective assistance of counsel; (4) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct; (4) the trial court violated Dean’s right to confront a witness; (5) Dean was deprived of a fair trial due to cumulative error; and (6) the trial court erroneously entered community custody conditions that exceeded the statutory maximum. ANALYSIS CrR 3.5 Dean contends the trial court erred when it concluded that admission of the statements he made during his postarrest interview did not violate his due process rights.17 Because Dean was not exhibiting any signs of mental illness and his statements were not coerced, the court did not err when it concluded the statements were made voluntarily. We will not disturb a trial court’s determination that a statement was made voluntarily if “there is substantial evidence in the record from which the trial court could have found by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary.” State v. Cushing, 68 Wn. App. 388, 393, 842 P.2d 1035 (1993). The due process clause of the federal and state constitutions protects individuals from convictions predicated on, in whole or part, the admission of involuntary statements coerced by the actions of a State actor. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3; State v. McCullough, 56 Wn. App. 655, 658, 784 17 Dean only challenges the voluntariness of statements made during his postarrest interview. His statements made to law enforcement during his arrest are not challenged, but they are discussed to the extent they inform the voluntariness of his interview room statements. 17 No. 86607-9-I (Consol. with No. 86972-8-I)/18 P.2d 566 (1990). For purposes of due process, “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary.’ ” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986). Whether a statement is involuntary is determined by the totality of the circumstances. State v. Unga, 165 Wn.2d 95, 100, 196 P.3d 645 (2008). Factors considered in the totality of the circumstances analysis include the defendant’s physical condition, age, mental abilities, and conduct of law enforcement. State v. Rupe, 101 Wn. 2d 664, 679, 683 P.2d 571 (1984). While the court must consider the mental abilities of a defendant, mental illness does “not necessarily require the conclusion that the confession was involuntary.” Cushing, 68 Wn. App. at 392-93. Even where mental illness is a factor, police coercion must also be present for a statement to be deemed involuntary. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165 (“[W]hile mental condition is surely relevant to an individual’s susceptibility to police coercion, mere examination of the confessant’s state of mind can never conclude the due process inquiry.”) Here, Dean contends the totality of the circumstances show that he had an untreated mental illness and law enforcement exploited this condition during the July 28, 2020, interview. Dean references his past treatment for schizophrenia, maintaining this indicates a longstanding condition,18 and his more recent competency evaluations to support his assertion that his behavior was the product of more than anti-government beliefs. He maintains the State 18 In 2007 and 2009, Dean received services through King County Regional Support Network in relation to a diagnosis of Unspecified Schizophrenia. 18 No. 86607-9-I (Consol. with No. 86972-8-I)/19 had reason to question his mental condition—based on his statements during the gum ruse and his arrest—and exploited this condition by lying to him about the reason for his arrest, then “taking his incoherent statements as an invocation of his right to silence.” Dean likens his situation to State v. Sergent, 27 Wn. App. 947, 621 P.2d 209 (1980). In that case, the State charged Sergent with murder in the first degree but found him incompetent to stand trial. Sergent, 27 Wn. App. at 948. Sergent was admitted to WSH and the hospital administered “haloperidol (which reduces delusions and hallucinations of one suffering from schizophrenia) and Cogentin (which controls undesirable physical side effects of the haloperidol).” Id. A few weeks after being admitted, Sergent spoke with law enforcement on the phone and expressed a desire to enter a guilty plea. Id. The court held a CrR 3.5 hearing and deemed the conversation admissible. Id. Subsequently, the court found Sergent guilty of murder in the second degree. Id. Sergent appealed, contending his confession was not made voluntarily. Id. On appeal, the court held, “An examination of all the circumstances surrounding the February 15 statement convinces us that the confession was involuntary.” Id. at 949. The court noted that when Sergent made the statement to law enforcement, he was incompetent to stand trial, actively exhibiting symptoms of schizophrenia, experiencing strong negative reaction to his medications, had waived his fundamental constitutional rights without the assistance of counsel, and believed confessing would result in his transfer to prison, thereby “escaping the prescribed medications.” Id. at 950. Additionally, 19 No. 86607-9-I (Consol. with No. 86972-8-I)/20 the court noted the officer’s questions to Sergent were “highly suggestive and leading.” Id. at 951. The facts here are distinguishable. Unlike Sergent, no evidence exists suggesting Dean was actively experiencing symptoms of mental illness during the interview. Dean had been treated for schizophrenia over ten years prior, but he had no documented treatment again until October 16, 2020, nine months after his arrest, when a psychologist deemed him incompetent to stand trial. However, when law enforcement arrested Dean in February 2020, officers noted Dean appeared to be tracking what they were saying and understood the situation. Even if Dean had been experiencing mental illness symptoms, nothing in the record indicates law enforcement was aware of and exploited his mental illness. The arresting officer believed Dean considered himself a sovereign citizen and recognized his communications as consistent with those beliefs. Dean made similar statements during his interview with Detectives Walvatne and Conley, and the detectives understood that Dean was communicating his desire to not answer questions. When Dean continued to say he “decline[d] any and all offers of contract” and he could not “make any legal determinations on any of the questions,” the detectives ceased questioning him. Detective Conley told Dean what he was being charged with, informed him that he was being recorded, offered assistance if he needed anything, and left the room. The detectives did not use coercive tactics, did not threaten Dean or ask him suggestive or leading questions, and they left the room when Dean made it clear he did not want to talk. 20 No. 86607-9-I (Consol. with No. 86972-8-I)/21 The court’s determination that Dean’s statement was voluntary is supported by the record. Dean was not displaying obvious symptoms of mental illness, but even if he was experiencing a mental health issue, the detectives did not use coercive tactics. We conclude the trial court did not err when it admitted Dean’s July 28, 2020, statements. Right to Present a Defense Dean contends the trial court violated his right to present his “other suspect” defense when it excluded the graffiti writings and testimony from M.D. concerning the incident in the woods. We disagree. A defendant has the right to present a complete defense. State v. Cayetano-Jaimes, 190 Wn. App. 286, 297-98, 359 P.3d 919 (2015). This includes the right to present relevant, material evidence and “ ‘a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations.’ ” State v. Jones, 168 Wn.2d 713, 720, 230 P.3d 576 (2010) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. Ed 297 (1973)). We apply a two-step analysis to determine whether a defendant’s right to present a defense was violated by a trial court’s exclusion of evidence. State v. Arndt, 194 Wn.2d 784, 797, 453 P.3d 696 (2019). First, we analyze the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. State v. Jennings, 199 Wn.2d 53, 58, 502 P.3d 1255 (2022). A trial court abuses its discretion if it “ ‘applies the wrong legal standard[] or bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law.’ ” State v. Orn, 197 Wn.2d 343, 351, 482 P.3d 913 (2021) (alteration in original) (quoting State v Lord, 161 Wn.2d 276, 284, 165 P.3d 1251 (2007)). If the trial 21 No. 86607-9-I (Consol. with No. 86972-8-I)/22 court’s evidentiary ruling was an abuse of discretion, we must determine whether the error was prejudicial under the harmless error standard. Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at 59. “An error is harmless and not grounds for reversal if the appellate court is assured beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same verdict without the error.” State v. Romero-Ochoa, 193 Wn.2d 341, 347, 440 P.3d 994 (2019). If the court’s evidentiary ruling was not an abuse of discretion or was harmless error, we then consider de novo whether the exclusion of evidence violated the defendant’s right to present a defense. Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at 58. First, the court must determine whether the evidence is minimally relevant. Jones, 168 Wn.2d at 720. Evidence is relevant if it has “ ‘any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it