Full Opinion

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two November 10, 2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 61810-9-II Respondent, v. A.F., UNPUBLISHED OPINION Appellant. GLASGOW, J.—The trial court adjudicated AF guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle, reckless driving, consuming liquor as a minor, and second degree taking a motor vehicle without permission. The trial court explained its verdict orally but did not enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by JuCR 7.11(d). AF appeals, arguing in part that the trial court erred when it failed to enter written findings and conclusions. Based on the Washington Supreme Court’s clear direction in State v. Head, 136 Wn.2d 619, 964 P.2d 1187 (1998), we remand to the trial court to enter written findings and conclusions. FACTS I. BACKGROUND At around 1:00 a.m. on a summer night, two teenage boys pulled up to Finch Playfield in Aberdeen in a white SUV and asked 20-year-old Maddison Buchanan and her younger brother, 13-year-old JE-M, to get in the car. The teenagers in the car were wearing face coverings, and one No. 61810-9-II was shirtless. They told Buchanan and JE-M that they had stolen the car and that they had alcohol. The teenagers were driving erratically. Buchanan and JE-M did not get in the car. Instead, Buchanan took a picture of the SUV’s license plate and called the police. Police initially responded to Finch Playfield but did not find the SUV or the suspects there. After some investigation, the police discovered that the SUV had been stolen from a nearby home. Later that same night, an officer found the stolen SUV in a parking lot on Cherry Street and attempted to block it with his car. The SUV maneuvered away from the police car and “sped away.” 4 Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 1614. The police officer pursued the SUV. The SUV struck two power poles and then “lost control and struck a[n] [unoccupied] parked car,” which then collided with another unoccupied parked car. Id. at 1617. The driver and passenger fled on foot. The passenger was not wearing a shirt. Another officer joined the pursuit and recognized the shirtless passenger as AF. Inside the SUV, police found an electronic benefits transfer card belonging to AF’s father. Officers found AF at his home and arrested him. The State charged AF with one count of possession of a stolen motor vehicle; one count of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle; one count of hit and run; one count of reckless driving; one count of possessing or consuming liquor as a minor; and one count of second degree taking a motor vehicle without permission. The State also alleged that AF committed each offense shortly after being released from juvenile detention. 2 No. 61810-9-II II. TRIAL A. Testimony Buchanan testified consistently with the facts recited above regarding the interaction at Finch Playfield. She testified that both young people in the car were wearing ski masks over their faces. She also stated that the driver was shirtless. JE-M testified that he knew both of the young people in the car. JE-M testified that AF was family—though JE-M did not know the exact relation—and that JE-M had gone to school with the other young person. JE-M testified that AF was driving the vehicle, and doing so “really bad[ly].” 4 VRP at 1555. He testified that AF was “going really [slow], brake-checking and turning on the blinkers without . . .turning.” Id. JE-M further testified that AF was shirtless and that JE-M was close enough to see AF wearing a white tank top “wrapped around his face.” Id. at 1554. JE-M stated that the tank top was positioned right under AF’s nose, and that AF’s eyes, nose, and forehead were visible. JE-M said that he confirmed the identity of the other boy in the car when he briefly exited the passenger side of vehicle: “I said, . . . is that you? And he said yeah, how do you know?” Id. at 1558. JE-M then explained that he had spent time with AF when JE-M was seven years old and AF was nine. JE-M testified that he recognized AF’s voice and his build. On cross-examination, JE-M acknowledged that a person’s voice and build would change between second grade and their teenage years. But JE-M did not retract his conclusion: Q: So if you haven’t talked to him in . . . six years, how did you recognize his voice? A: Because it just sounded like him. 3 No. 61810-9-II Id. at 1561. Police officers testified consistently with the facts recited above regarding the apprehension of AF. One officer testified that when he arrived at the scene of the SUV crash and joined the pursuit of the shirtless suspect, he recognized the shirtless suspect from previous law enforcement encounters as AF. B. Verdict The trial court adjudicated AF guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle, reckless driving, consuming or possessing liquor as a minor, and second degree taking a motor vehicle without permission. It found AF not guilty of eluding a pursuing police vehicle or hit and run. The trial court gave the reasons for its ruling in some detail. The trial court explained that AF was not guilty of eluding a police vehicle or hit and run because the evidence did not show that AF was driving the vehicle during the Cherry Street car chase. But the trial court implied that it believed AF was driving the SUV during the initial encounter with Buchanan and JE-M at Finch Playfield, stating, “[T]his goes back to Finch [Playfield]. . . . I do believe when you were driving, you had a wanton disregard for the safety of persons and property.” 5 VRP at 2040. In addition to stating that AF was driving unsafely, the trial court also found that AF was intoxicated during the Finch Playfield incident, justifying adjudications for reckless driving, minor consuming liquor, and taking a motor vehicle without permission. III. SENTENCING The State asked the trial court to order a manifest injustice upward sentence of 104-130 weeks. The State reasoned that AF had recently been released from Department of Children, 4 No. 61810-9-II Youth, and Families custody when he committed the offenses; that AF’s prior juvenile adjudications were for serious offenses including second degree burglary and possession of a stolen vehicle; and that AF was at a high risk to reoffend. AF moved to dismiss his adjudication for possession of a stolen vehicle on the grounds he could not be convicted of both possession and theft of the same vehicle. The trial court instead determined that the adjudication for taking a motor vehicle without permission merged into the adjudication for possession of a stolen vehicle. As a result, the trial court dismissed the adjudication for taking a motor vehicle without permission. The trial court found that a standard range sentence on AF’s possession of a stolen vehicle adjudication would constitute a manifest injustice. Accordingly, on that count it sentenced AF to 65 weeks to 80 weeks in Department custody, with credit for 13 days served. For each of the remaining two counts, reckless driving and possessing liquor as a minor, the trial court sentenced AF to a standard-range sentence of 30 days with credit for 30 days served. The trial court’s order of disposition did not include written findings of fact or conclusions of law. AF timely appeals. AF claims that the trial court failed to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law, that there was insufficient evidence of his identity, and that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to JE-M’s testimony identifying AF. Written findings of fact and conclusions of law have not been submitted to this court since the appeal was filed. ANALYSIS I. TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO ENTER FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS AF points out that the trial court failed to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law, in violation of JuCR 7.11(d). The State concedes that the trial court failed to enter findings 5 No. 61810-9-II and conclusions as required by JuCR 7.11(d), but it argues that “given the limited nature of this appeal, and the record before this Court, the lack of findings of fact and conclusions of law is harmless, and . . . remand is unnecessary.” Br. of Resp’t at 21. JuCR 7.11(d) mandates that in a juvenile adjudication, The court shall enter written findings and conclusions in a case that is appealed. The findings shall state the ultimate facts as to each element of the crime and the evidence upon which the court relied in reaching its decision. The findings and conclusions may be entered after the notice of appeal is filed. The prosecution must submit such findings and conclusions within 21 days after receiving the juvenile’s notice of appeal. In analyzing the analogous CrR 6.1(d), which states that “[i]n [an adult criminal] case tried without a jury, the court shall enter findings of facts and conclusions of law,” the Supreme Court held in State v. Head that “failure to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law . . . requires remand for entry of written findings and conclusions.” 136 Wn.2d at 624. In doing so, the Head court rejected the State’s argument that “error in failing to enter written findings and conclusions [was] harmless” because “the trial court’s oral decision [was] comprehensive and satisfie[d] the purpose of CrR 6.1(d).” Id. at 622. The Head court reasoned that “[a]n oral opinion ‘has no final or binding effect unless formally incorporated into the findings, conclusions, and judgment.’” Id. (quoting State v. Mallory, 69 Wn.2d 532, 533-34, 419 P.2d 324 (1966)). The court reiterated that the rule “mandat[es] entry of written findings and conclusions.” Id. at 623-24. Later, in State v. Banks, the Supreme Court allowed for harmlessness where findings and conclusions were entered but were arguably incomplete. 149 Wn.2d 38, 46, 65 P.3d 1198 (2003). Specifically, the court determined that the trial court’s failure to address the defendant’s knowledge in its written findings and conclusions when convicting him of knowing unlawful possession of a firearm was harmless and did not require remand. Id. at 44. 6 No. 61810-9-II The Banks court first held that “[t]he omission of an essential element from . . . the findings and conclusions in a bench trial” is “subject to [constitutional] harmless error analysis.” Id. at 46. It reasoned that “most constitutional errors are presumed to be subject to harmless error analysis” and that the failure to enter a written finding related to the essential element of knowledge was an error that “neither infected the whole trial process nor rendered [the defendant’s] trial fundamentally unfair.” Id. at 43-44. The court then decided the error was harmless, reasoning that the trial court’s finding that the defendant “‘bent over and picked up the gun and got into his car’” necessarily implied that the trial court had inferred knowing possession of the gun. Id. at 42 (quoting record). Thus, the Supreme Court has held an omission of a written finding or conclusion on one element can be harmless error, but where the trial court has failed to enter written findings and conclusions at all, the Supreme Court has required remand. Here, there is no dispute that the trial court failed to enter written findings and conclusions in violation of JuCR 7.11(d). Although one might argue that we should extend Banks to apply in these circumstances, the Banks court’s reasoning does not apply here. There, the court could infer from the written findings and conclusions that were present that the trial court had found that the defendant had the required knowledge to be convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm. Here, there are no written findings at all. And in its oral ruling, the trial court never specifically and expressly found that AF was driving the SUV at Finch Playfield, though it made several statements that implied such a finding. For instance, when discussing the reckless driving charge, the trial court said, “[T]his goes back to Finch [Playfield]. . . . I do believe when you were driving, you had a wanton disregard for 7 No. 61810-9-II the safety of persons and property.” 5 VRP at 2040. But regardless of how comprehensive an oral opinion may be, or what findings can be inferred from it, the Supreme Court has held that it is still “no more than . . . the court’s informal opinion at the time rendered” and “‘has no final or binding effect unless formally incorporated into the findings, conclusions, and judgment.’” Head, 136 Wn.2d at 622 (quoting Mallory, 69 Wn.2d at 533-34). Additionally, the Supreme Court’s decision in Banks does nothing to disturb its repeated affirmations in Head that CrR 6.1(d), which states that “[t]he court shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law,” is mandatory. (Emphasis added.) JuCR 7.11(d) contains nearly identical language (“[t]he court shall enter written findings and conclusions”) and should be treated the same. (Emphasis added.) And failure to enter written findings and conclusions at all is obviously different from failure to discuss an element in the trial court’s written findings. The State asserts that under State v. Otis, 151 Wn. App. 572, 213 P.3d 613 (2009), we are entitled to address AF’s claims without written findings and conclusions because we have a sufficient record before us. This court stated in Otis that “where the record is sufficient to facilitate review, we may decide issues raised on appeal in the absence of written findings and conclusions.” 151 Wn. App. at 577 (citing State v. Denison, 78 Wn. App. 566, 897 P.2d 437 (1995)). But we are skeptical of the foundation for the Otis court’s reasoning because the case it relies on, Denison, predates the Supreme Court’s holding in Head, and Denison too required remand for entry of findings and conclusions. Denison, 78 Wn. App. at 575. Additionally, unlike here, the defendant in Otis was challenging a pretrial ruling only. 151 Wn. App. at 573. Thus, Otis does not justify ignoring the Supreme Court’s decision in Head, which squarely addressed a lack of written findings and conclusions after a bench trial. 8 No. 61810-9-II CONCLUSION Accordingly, we remand to the trial court to enter written findings and conclusions and do not reach AF’s claims of insufficient evidence or ineffective assistance of counsel at this stage. A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered. GLASGOW, J. We concur: VELJACIC, C.J. PRICE, J. 9