Chase Daniel Cook v. Commonwealth of Virginia
CourtCourt of Appeals of Virginia
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket1188253
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 1188-25-3
CHASE DANIEL COOK
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Beales, Lorish and Duffan
Opinion Issued November 17, 2026*
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY
Bruce D. Albertson, Judge
(Robert G. Munro; Robert G. Munro, PLLC, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on
brief.
(Jay Jones, Attorney General; Justin M. Brewster, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for
appellee.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM
Chase Daniel Cook challenges the sentence the circuit court imposed after finding in a
revocation hearing that he had violated the terms of his suspended sentences. In 2013, he was
convicted of two counts of manufacturing a controlled substance and one count of abuse of a
child. In 2024, the circuit court revoked his suspended prison sentence of 23 years and 6 months,
and resuspended 9 years—resulting in 14 years and 6 months of actual incarceration. The circuit
court denied Cook’s motion to reconsider his sentence.1 Cook also asserts that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel at sentencing.
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
1
Having examined the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously agrees that
oral argument is unnecessary because “the dispositive issue or issues have been authoritatively
BACKGROUND2
On March 1, 2013, Cook pleaded guilty to and was convicted of two counts of
manufacturing a controlled substance, in violation of Code § 18.2-248, and was also convicted of
abuse of a child, in violation of § 18.2-371.1. The circuit court sentenced Cook to a total prison
term of 25 years, with 23 years and 6 months suspended.
On May 26, 2017, Cook was arrested for and charged with petit larceny. His suspended
sentence of 23 years and 6 months was revoked, and all but two years was resuspended, leaving 21
years and 6 months suspended. On October 6, 2019, Cook was charged with possession with intent
to distribute a schedule I/II controlled substance.
In 2021, his sentence was revoked again, and the circuit court resuspended all but two years,
leaving 19 years and 6 months suspended. However, on May 13, 2021, Cook pleaded guilty to
possession with intent to distribute a schedule I/II controlled substance. He was sentenced to five
years of incarceration, with four years suspended, leaving now a total of 23 years and 6 months
suspended.
On January 31, 2023, Cook was released from incarceration. Over the next four months, he
tested positive for drugs three times. On June 2, 2023, Cook was arrested and charged with
possession of schedule I/II drugs. On June 20, 2023, Cook’s probation officer filed a major
violation report alleging his violations of Condition 1 (that Cook would obey all laws) and
Condition 8 (that Cook would not use, possess, or distribute controlled substances). Between
December 18, 2023 and January 15, 2024, the probation officer filed three addenda to the report,
decided, and the appellant has not argued that the case law should be overturned, extended,
modified, or reversed.” See Code § 17.1-403(ii)(b); Rule 5A:27(b).
2
We consider the evidence from a revocation hearing in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, as the prevailing party below, including all the reasonable and legitimate
inferences that may properly be drawn from that evidence. Green v. Commonwealth, 75
Va. App. 69, 76 (2022).
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stating that Cook had tested positive for drugs on multiple occasions and that he had been charged
with shoplifting, obstructing justice, possession of schedule I/II drugs, and eluding.
On October 1, 2024, the circuit court held a hearing in which it first accepted Cook’s guilty
pleas under a plea agreement to the eluding, obstruction of justice, and possession with intent to
distribute charges. After the circuit court conducted a guilty plea colloquy with Cook, the
Commonwealth proffered its evidence of his guilt. The circuit court sentenced Cook to: (1) five
years of incarceration for the eluding charge (with four years and six months suspended); (2) twelve
months all suspended for the obstruction of justice charge; and (3) ten years (with seven years
suspended) on the possession with intent to distribute charge. The circuit court judge asked Cook,
“Do you have any questions about your sentence?” Cook responded, “No, sir.”
The circuit court then asked if the parties were ready to proceed to the revocation, and
defense counsel responded, “Yes, Judge, we are.” The Commonwealth stated that it was relying on
the major violation report and addenda, the evidence it had just proffered for the new convictions,
and the entire file on the revocation then before the circuit court. The Commonwealth confirmed
that Cook had also been convicted on the shoplifting charge. Defense counsel acknowledged that
Cook had violated the conditions of his suspended sentences and supervised probation.
After the Commonwealth recited Cook’s lengthy criminal record and prior revocations,
defense counsel (in lieu of presenting any evidence) argued that “substance abuse is a large part of
what’s causing these criminal activit[ies]” and that Cook needed “some kind of a structure so that he
lands on his feet, hits the ground running and increases the likelihood that he can re-enter society
productively.” Counsel for Cook sought a sentence within the discretionary revocation sentencing
guidelines and asked the circuit court to consider “revoking a smaller part of his sentence.”
In its sentencing argument, the Commonwealth agreed that drugs were “a basis or a root of a
problem for Mr. Cook,” and also emphasized his lengthy criminal history and repeated positive drug
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tests. The Commonwealth argued that Cook had “put the health and safety of other people at risk,”
and as reflected in his prior child abuse conviction, his dangerous driving in the incident leading to
his eluding conviction, and his careless placement of drugs. Accordingly, the Commonwealth
sought an active sentence of ten years.
In allocution, Cook acknowledged that he had “a drug problem and it does seem to keep
being a reoccurring issue.” Cook asked for mercy and “one more shot to prove myself to do this.”
In sentencing Cook, the circuit court judge stated that the Commonwealth “hit the nail on
the head” and that Cook is “a person that is willing to endanger others.” Thus, the guidelines were
“not appropriate” in Cook’s case. The circuit court revoked the aggregate suspended sentence of 23
years and 6 months on all the previous convictions but suspended 9 years, resulting in an active
sentence of 14 years and 6 months.3
The circuit court entered final judgment on October 2, 2024. On October 21, 2024, Cook
moved to reconsider the sentence. The motion stated that, after the revocation hearing, Cook told
his attorney that he “was not satisfied with the preparation for the hearing, and that there was
evidence about his positive achievements while on probation which he did not share with Counsel
nor with this Court.” The circuit court denied the motion to reconsider because “all of the
information that’s being described was available for the defendant to present” at the revocation
hearing, and Cook had not sought a continuance.
3
The sentencing guidelines ranged from one year and three months to four years. The
circuit court explained its departure from the guidelines:
Defendant’s criminal history is extensive and repeatedly involves
harm to others such as distribution and abuse/neglect of a child.
He violated probation by leading police on a high speed chase for
almost 20 minutes as he was throwing items out his window. He
then ran from police. When taken to [hospital] he tried to hide
drugs in his hospital bed.
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ANALYSIS
I. Revocation
In his first assignment of error, Cook argues, “The trial court abused its discretion by
revoking Defendant’s previously suspended sentence in its entirety in the light of Defendant’s
mitigating evidence.”
Our Supreme Court has “consistently held that the ‘revocation of a suspended sentence
lies in the discretion of the trial court and that this discretion is quite broad.’” Commonwealth v.
Delaune, 302 Va. 644, 658 (2023) (quoting Peyton v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 503, 508 (2004)).
“In revocation appeals, the trial court’s ‘findings of fact and judgment will not be reversed unless
there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’” Green, 75 Va. App. at 76 (quoting Jacobs v.
Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 529, 535 (2013)).
Cook maintains that his actions cited by the circuit court were covered by the
discretionary sentencing guidelines. However, to the extent that Cook contests his sentence as
excessive in view of the guidelines, his argument is not cognizable on appeal. Code
§ 19.2-306.2(D) (failure to follow guidelines “shall not be reviewable on appeal”). See also
Fazili v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 239, 248 (2019) (“a circuit court’s failure to follow the
guidelines is ‘not . . . reviewable on appeal’”). Cook also complains that the circuit court “added
one subjective factor” in weighing the fact that on several occasions his actions had endangered
others. Again, any argument that this contravened the guidelines is not reviewable on appeal.
Beyond this, Cook did not object to the Commonwealth’s argument that he had often endangered
others, and Cook may not do so for the first time on appeal. Rule 5A:18.
Nevertheless, the record does not show that the circuit court abused its discretion in
sentencing Cook as it appropriately considered Cook’s long criminal history, which included
new criminal offenses while on probation and repeated instances of endangering the safety of
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others. Although the circuit court had the authority not to resuspend any part of Cook’s revoked
sentence, it reasonably exercised its discretion when it determined to do so. In addition, the
circuit court offered a reasonable explanation for its decision to depart from the discretionary
guidelines, citing Cook’s extensive criminal history that “repeatedly involve[d] harm to others.”
“It is within the trial court’s purview to weigh any mitigating factors presented by the
defendant.” Khine v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. App. 530, 558 (2024) (quoting Keselica v.
Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 31, 36 (2000)). The circuit court, however, was not required to
give Cook’s mitigating circumstances controlling effect. Sheets v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. App.
706, 718 (2024). “Barring clear evidence to the contrary, this Court will not presume that a trial
court purposefully ignored mitigating factors in blind pursuit of a harsh sentence.” Khine, 82
Va. App. at 558 (quoting Bassett v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 580, 584 (1992)).
Having reviewed the record before us on appeal, we hold that the sentence the circuit
court imposed in the revocation hearing represents a proper exercise of discretion, and we
decline to disturb its judgment on appeal. See Alsberry v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 314,
321-22 (2002) (holding the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the defendant’s
previously suspended sentence in its entirety “in light of the grievous nature of [the original]
offenses and his continuing criminal activity”).
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In his second assignment of error, Cook argues that his “attorney at trial provided
ineffective assistance of counsel.” He argues that his trial attorney was ineffective under the
two-part test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Cook maintains that his lawyer
was not prepared for the sentencing, and thus he did not present mitigating evidence at the
revocation hearing. The Virginia Supreme Court has clearly stated, however, that an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is not cognizable in a direct appeal, but rather must be raised in a
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habeas corpus petition. See Sigmon v. Dir. of the Dep’t of Corr., 285 Va. 526, 533 (2013)
(“[C]laims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not reviewable on direct appeal and thus can
be raised only in a habeas corpus proceeding.”); Kenner v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 279,
297 (2019). We therefore cannot reach this assignment of error.
III. Motion to Reconsider
In his third assignment of error, Cook argues, “The trial court erred in denying
Appellant’s Motion to Reconsider.” A motion to reconsider a sentence is reviewed for abuse of
discretion—the same standard of review on appeal governing review of the circuit court’s
imposition of a sentence.4 See Cellucci v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. App. 36, 45-46 (2023).
“[T]he abuse of discretion standard requires a reviewing court to show enough deference to a
primary decisionmaker’s judgment that the [reviewing] court does not reverse merely because it
would have come to a different result in the first instance.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 73
Va. App. 121, 127 (2021) (alterations in original) (quoting Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va.
187, 212 (2013)). “Only when reasonable jurists could not differ can we say an abuse of
discretion has occurred.” Bista v. Commonwealth, 303 Va. 354, 370 (2024) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 197 (2015)).
Cook asserts that the circuit court wrongly denied his motion to reconsider. The motion
alleged that “there was evidence about his positive achievements while on probation which he
did not share with” his attorney or the circuit court. To the extent this challenges defense
counsel’s representation, it likewise is not cognizable.5
4
On brief, Cook does not expressly state the standard of review governing this claim.
We will assume that his acknowledgment that the abuse of discretion standard applies to his
argument on sentencing also extends to his claim that the circuit court wrongly denied his motion
to reconsider the sentence.
5
Cook says that his attorney “sabotaged the defense by changing tactics at the last
minute.” Not only does this bear upon the non-cognizable issue of defense counsel’s
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The record before us on appeal shows that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Cook’s motion to reconsider. At the hearing combining Cook’s guilty pleas to his new
charges with the revocation case, defense counsel stated, without protest by Cook, that he was
ready to proceed in the revocation matter. On its face, the motion to reconsider stated that, at the
time of the revocation hearing, “there was evidence about [Cook’s] positive achievements while
on probation which he did not share with Counsel nor with this Court.” At the hearing on the
motion, defense counsel stated—without objection by Cook who was attending via
videoconference—that Cook had thought sentencing would occur later and therefore “wasn’t
pushing people” to appear at the sentencing. The Commonwealth opposed the motion to
reconsider because the evidence was available to present at sentencing, and the circuit court
similarly found that all of the mitigating evidence “that’s being described was available for the
defendant to present” at the sentencing hearing.
The record establishes that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion to reconsider because Cook knew of purported mitigating evidence before the revocation
hearing but did not inform his attorney about it. A defendant cannot complain about a court’s
ruling or defense counsel’s representation based on evidence known to the defendant but not
provided to counsel. See Epperly v. Booker, 235 Va. 35, 45 (1988). The circuit court reasonably
denied the motion to reconsider because Cook did not share the evidence of “his positive
achievements while on probation” with his attorney before sentencing. Cook “will not be heard”
to complain about the failure to present certain mitigating evidence at sentencing because it is an
omission of his own making. Epperly, 235 Va. at 45. It was Cook’s “burden to prove mitigating
circumstances,” and the record makes clear that he did not meet this burden. Cellucci, 77
representation, but it also makes assertions about counsel’s performance and dealings with Cook
not contained in the record. See Wilkins v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 711, 717 (2015)
(appellate review “is limited to the record on appeal”).
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Va. App. at 49 (emphasis in original). Therefore, for these reasons, the circuit court did not
abuse its discretion in sentencing Cook, nor did it abuse its discretion in its denial of the motion
to reconsider.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, we do not disturb the judgment of the circuit court.
Affirmed.
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