Dashawn Kiree Tucker, a/k/a Deshawn Kiree Tucker v. Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA Record No. 0954-25-3 DASHAWN KIREE TUCKER, A/K/A DESHAWN KIREE TUCKER v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA Present: Judges Athey, Ortiz and Causey Argued at Lexington, Virginia Opinion Issued November 4, 2026* FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RADFORD Josiah T. Showalter, Jr., Judge Robert L. Canard (Robert L. Canard, PLLC, on brief), for appellant. Sheri H. Kelly, Assistant Attorney General (Jay Jones, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE CLIFFORD L. ATHEY, JR. Following a jury trial, the Circuit Court of the City of Radford (“trial court”) convicted Dashawn Kiree Tucker (“Tucker”) of detaining a person for sex trafficking, abduction with the intent to extort or defile, and conspiracy to commit abduction with the intent to extort or defile. The trial court sentenced Tucker to 70 years’ incarceration, with 40 years suspended. On appeal, Tucker assigns error to the trial court for: 1) denying his motion for a mistrial; 2) excluding impeachment evidence; and 3) imposing a ten-year term of probation. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. * This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).  I. BACKGROUND1 On January 10, 2022, Tucker went to a Food City parking lot in Radford to meet with Tabatha Stephenson (“Stephenson”) and her friend, C.W.2 C.W. owed a debt to Tucker. They all left the Food City parking lot in Tucker’s vehicle, and later that night Tucker transferred C.W. to another vehicle in “the middle of nowhere” driven by Waylon Cox (“Cox”). From there, C.W. was transported to several locations throughout southside Virginia and forced to engage in nonconsensual sex acts with numerous individuals. On January 12, while being held “against her will” at a “trailer” in Henry County, C.W. texted 911 that she “needed help.” Law enforcement responded, and after being interviewed by investigators, C.W. was transported to the hospital for treatment. As a result, Tucker was arrested later the same day and charged with abducting C.W. with the intent to extort or defile, in violation of Code § 18.2-48. On April 7, 2022, a preliminary hearing was held on the abduction charge in the City of Radford General District Court (“district court”). During the preliminary hearing, C.W. testified that she knew Tucker as a result of her friendship with Stephenson. She also testified that Stephenson and Tucker had previously been in an intimate relationship. C.W. further testified that she owed Tucker $2,000, which she had borrowed from him in order to purchase a Hyundai Sonata. C.W. then testified that on January 10, 2022, she and Stephenson drove her Hyundai Sonata to a Food City parking lot located in Radford. C.W. explained that Stephenson had asked her to drive to the Food City because 1 “Consistent with the standard of review when a criminal appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we recite the evidence below ‘in the “light most favorable” to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court.’” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). 2 We use the victim’s initials to protect her privacy. -2- “[Stephenson] had somebody that was coming to pick her up.” C.W. further explained that she did not know that Tucker was coming to meet them at the Food City and “had been avoiding” him. C.W. next testified that after she and Stephenson arrived at the Food City, Tucker pulled in behind her Hyundai Sonata in his SUV and came up to her window. She then testified that Tucker told her that he had been looking for her and “needed his money back.” C.W. further stated that she became frightened after Tucker told her that she “could do this the easy way or the hard way.” Meanwhile, Stephenson exited C.W.’s Sonata and entered the driver’s seat of Tucker’s SUV. C.W. then testified that after Stephenson drove Tucker’s SUV alongside her Sonata, Tucker opened the front-passenger door to his SUV as well as the driver’s door to C.W.’s Sonata. He then indicated that he wanted C.W. to get into the passenger seat of his SUV. She testified that she felt like she had no choice but to get into Tucker’s SUV. C.W. further testified that after leaving Food City in Tucker’s SUV, Cox called Tucker over FaceTime. Tucker then told Cox on that call that C.W. could either “work [her debt] off or get fucked up.” C.W. explained that she took “get fucked up” to mean that she would “get beaten.” C.W. next recounted travelling to Tucker’s apartment in Dublin, after which C.W., Tucker, and Stephenson drove to a location in Floyd County that C.W. described as “in the middle of nowhere” “on a mountain road in a curve” with no “lights or homes nearby.” Upon arrival, Tucker transferred C.W. and Stephenson into Cox’s vehicle. C.W. recalled that during her transfer to Cox’s vehicle, Tucker “gave [Cox] money.” After being transported to a “trailer” in Henry County, C.W. testified that she was “forced to commit sex acts” with multiple people “against her will” and was “passed through several men.” C.W. next testified that she eventually escaped from the “trailer” after she texted 911 from her phone and law enforcement arrived. -3-  C.W. then admitted that she voluntarily consumed marijuana at the “trailer” in Henry County and also consumed a “blue pill” after Cox told her to take it. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the district court certified the abduction charge to a grand jury, and on June 10, 2022, the grand jury indicted Tucker for abduction with the intent to extort or defile, in violation of Code § 18.2‑48. The grand jury also subsequently issued ten additional direct indictments against Tucker. Relevant to this appeal, Tucker was also indicted with conspiracy to commit abduction with the intent to extort or defile, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-22 and 18.2-48, detaining a person for sex trafficking, in violation of Code § 18.2‑355, and sex trafficking by force, intimidation, or deception, in violation of Code § 18.2‑357.1. Prior to the commencement of the jury trial, the Commonwealth informed the trial court that C.W. had died due to an apparent overdose. Following several continuances, the jury trial in this matter began on March 20, 2024. The Commonwealth first called Stephenson, who recounted the events of January 10 and 11, 2022. Stephenson testified that on January 10, she and C.W. drove to Food City to meet with one of C.W.’s friends, however Tucker was present upon their arrival as well. Stephenson also testified that Tucker had arrived “alone” in his red SUV and had “blocked” the Sonata from leaving its parking space. She then explained that she had exited the Sonata, entered the SUV, and drove Tucker’s SUV into the parking space adjacent to C.W.’s Sonata. Stephenson also admitted that she texted Tucker to pick her up from Food City but stated that it was Tucker who “made [C.W.] get in the car with [her], and [they] all left.” Stephenson also acknowledged that she was driving Tucker’s red SUV “[b]ecause [Tucker] told [her] to” and that she did not “feel like [she] had a choice[.]” The Commonwealth then introduced security camera footage of the parking lot in evidence depicting the sequence of events identified in Stephenson’s testimony. -4-  Stephenson further testified that the group first arrived at Tucker’s apartment3 and then, around 1:00 a.m. on the morning of January 11, Tucker stated that they were “going to go meet” Cox. Stephenson then testified that she was “worried” about going to meet with Cox because she thought he was “dangerous.” She then explained that Tucker drove his red SUV on the way to meet with Cox and that Tucker told Stephenson that he and Cox needed to “go handle business.” Stephenson then explained to the jury that she, C.W., and Tucker next arrived in the “middle of nowhere” where Cox and his wife were waiting for them in a black truck. She recalled that Cox got out of the truck and talked with Tucker for about five minutes. She further recalled that Cox then told her and C.W. that they were to get in Cox’s black truck. Stephenson testified that Tucker then went back into his SUV and drove away. Next, Stephenson explained that Cox then drove her and C.W. to his house in Martinsville, whereupon Stephenson and C.W. were “raped” and “held hostage.” Stephenson then testified that after “an hour[ or] an hour and a half,” she and C.W. were taken to a “trailer” owned by Bobby Helms (“Helms”). Stephenson further testified that Helms “forced” her and C.W. to engage in sodomy with him. She then testified that law enforcement arrived at Helms’s “trailer” and that C.W. was subsequently transported to a local hospital. Stephenson also admitted that on January 10 and January 11, she voluntarily consumed “coke and meth” but had not taken a “blue pill.” Stephenson concluded by explaining that she was with C.W. from “9:00 [p.m.] on the 10th to about 8:00 [p.m.] on the 11th” and that she had observed C.W. voluntarily consume a “blue pill, some weed, and some coke.” 3 The record supports that the group first stopped at a gas station in Dublin before arriving at Tucker’s apartment. Stephenson however specifically testified that they did not make that stop. Either way, this fact is irrelevant to resolving this appeal. -5-  The Commonwealth next called Henry County Sheriff’s Office Deputy Matt Hodges (“Deputy Hodges”), who testified that he was dispatched to Helms’s “trailer” the night of January 11, 2022. Deputy Hodges’s body-worn camera footage was admitted in evidence and depicted Deputy Hodges interviewing Stephenson, C.W., and Helms. Deputy Hodges first spoke with C.W., who informed him that she had texted 911 because she has been “passed around like a sex doll.” C.W. further advised Deputy Hodges that she had not attempted to escape from the “trailer” because she feared being beaten and left beside the road. Stephanie Hodges (“Hodges”), a forensic nurse examiner, then testified that she had conducted a sexual assault examination on C.W. on January 11 at the hospital using a Physical Evidence Recovery Kit (“PERK”). Hodges explained that when conducting a physical exam of C.W.’s vaginal area, she found “no breaks in the tissue or the external skin” and no “bruising, swelling, or abrasions.” Hodges further explained to the jury that the presence or absence of injury to the vaginal area was not dispositive as to whether sexual activity was consensual or non-consensual. She also noted that C.W. tested positive for cocaine, methamphetamine, amphetamine, marijuana, and oxycodone. Hodges then described C.W. as “visibly upset and crying throughout the exam.” Hodges also noted in her report that C.W. had told her that “if she didn’t work off her $2,000.00 debt, they were going to . . . fuck her up really bad.” Hodges also recalled that C.W. told her that Tucker exited a truck and “hand[ed] Ponytail some money.”4 After the conclusion of Hodges’s testimony, the Commonwealth introduced into evidence the audio recording of the April 7, 2022 preliminary hearing including C.W.’s testimony. The audio recording was published and played for the jury in its entirety. 4 The identity of “Ponytail” is unclear from the record in this case. -6-  Henry County Sheriff’s Office Investigator Evan Monroe (“Investigator Monroe”) then explained to the jury that C.W. had testified at numerous other preliminary hearings in other jurisdictions regarding the events of January 10 and January 11, 2022. He testified that C.W. had testified at a preliminary hearing conducted in the Henry County General District Court on February 14, 2022, concerning related charges against Cox and Helms. He also recalled that C.W.’s testimony at the February 14 preliminary hearing included: Tucker’s alleged statement to C.W. that “we could do it the easy or the hard way”; C.W.’s allegation that Tucker had been threatening C.W.’s family because C.W. owed Tucker money; her statement that Tucker and Cox told her she could “either get fucked up or . . . work it off”; and her allegation that when Tucker FaceTimed with Cox at the Food City parking lot, he showed C.W.’s face to Cox before Cox told Tucker to take C.W. to Tucker’s apartment until they could arrange a meeting. Investigator Monroe also testified that, during her February 14 testimony, C.W. stated that she “had bruising” to her “vaginal area.” The transcript of C.W.’s entire testimony at the February 14 preliminary hearing was also introduced into evidence. Investigator Monroe further recalled that C.W. had testified at another preliminary hearing held in the Henry County General District Court on April 21, 2022, involving charges against Cox’s wife due to the same underlying events. He explained that C.W.’s testimony at this April 21 preliminary hearing included: C.W. explaining that she did not have a choice when getting into Tucker’s vehicle, that Cox told C.W. that she could “either come down there and get fucked up or work [her debt] off,” and that she was “raped several times” while in Henry County. The transcript of C.W.’s testimony from the April 21 hearing was also admitted in evidence. Investigator Monroe also testified that he had also conducted an interview with C.W. before her death and had made contemporaneous notes during the interview. Those notes were -7- also entered into evidence. He recalled from that interview that C.W. stated she was told she could “either work [her debt] off or get fucked up.” He also recalled that C.W. provided a statement to him regarding these events, which he then read to the jury. In C.W.’s statement, she recounted that she was forced to perform multiple sexual acts on multiple different men and that she had been raped four times. Detective Carla Cross (“Detective Cross”) then testified that she had monitored phone calls involving inmates at the New River Valley Regional Jail. Detective Cross testified that she recognized Tucker’s voice on a recording that was made in the days immediately following the incident and Tucker’s arrest. When the Commonwealth began playing the recorded phone call for the jury, Tucker objected to the recording’s relevance. The trial court took the objection under advisement. At the conclusion of Detective Cross’s testimony, Tucker renewed his objection based upon the recording’s relevance. During argument on the objection, the Commonwealth characterized the recording as Tucker losing his temper during a conversation with his roommate by stating, “Zach, you saw, you witnessed what just happened to two people for fucking up some shit.” The trial court sustained Tucker’s objection to the introduction of the recording. Tucker then moved for a mistrial, contending that the portion of the call played to the jury was prejudicial and “it paint[ed] [Tucker] in an awfully bad light.” The trial court denied Tucker’s motion for a mistrial, instead informing the jury that it had “sustained an objection by the defense as to the relevance of this call” and that the jury must “disregard this phone call” and “it [wa]s not to be considered . . . for any deliberations.” The contents of the recording were not transcribed by the court reporter and the audio recording of the phone call is also not in the record. -8-  The Commonwealth then rested at the conclusion of its case-in-chief. Tucker then moved to strike all of the charges, contending that C.W.’s prior testimony and statements were incredible because C.W. “c[ould]n’t even be honest about the fact that she was using drugs when she’s tested positive to five substances.” Tucker also contended that the Commonwealth failed to prove that C.W. was taken to a “bawdy place” under Code § 18.2-355(1). The trial court denied the motion to strike concerning the four charges relevant here.5 Tucker then sought to introduce into evidence indictments against C.W. pending at the time of her death for possessing hydrocodone in Franklin County on March 15, 2022. Tucker explained that he sought to introduce the indictments to impeach C.W., alleging that “she testified at that hearing that she had been clean . . . for at least a year.”6 The Commonwealth objected to the introduction of the indictments because C.W. had not been convicted because she died prior to the charges being resolved. The trial court sustained the Commonwealth’s objection. Tucker did not testify on his own behalf, but the defense did play “a portion of the [April 7, 2022] preliminary hearing, which ha[d] been received as evidence.” After playing this “portion” of the audio recording,7 the defense then rested and the Commonwealth declined to offer any additional evidence in rebuttal. At the conclusion of all the evidence and outside of the presence of the jury, Tucker renewed his motion to strike the charges, contending once again that 5 The trial court granted Tucker’s motion to strike several other charges where Stephenson was the victim of the criminal offense. 6 C.W. did not state this during her testimony at the April 7, 2022 preliminary hearing. C.W. did testify during the February 14, 2022 preliminary hearing in the Henry County General District Court that she “use[d]” “meth or cocaine” “about a year and a half ago.” She also testified at that February 14 preliminary hearing that she recreationally “smoke[d] marijuana.” 7 The record does not indicate which “portion” of the April 7, 2022 preliminary hearing was played for the jury. -9- C.W.’s testimony was incredible. Tucker further argued that the Commonwealth had not identified Tucker’s alleged co-conspirator, “so it[] [was] not clear to [him] that any conspiracy was proved.” The trial court denied the renewed motion to strike with respect to the indictments relevant here. The trial court then instructed the jury on the law applicable to the case and both parties completed their closing arguments. The jury retired to deliberate and, following deliberations, the jury returned its verdicts. The jury acquitted Tucker of sex trafficking by force, intimidation, or deception. However, the jury found Tucker guilty of abduction with the intent to extort or defile, conspiracy to commit abduction with the intent to extort or defile, and for detaining a person for sex trafficking. On February 21, 2025, Tucker filed a motion to set aside the verdicts because a witness who was previously “unwilling to speak to [Tucker’s counsel] concerning [being a potential witness]” contacted Tucker’s counsel about a year after the jury returned its verdicts, wishing to testify in Tucker’s defense. The trial court denied the motion. By final order entered on May 8, 2025, the trial court sentenced Tucker to 60 years’ incarceration, with 40 years’ suspended, for abduction with the intent to extort or defile; 5 years’ incarceration for conspiracy to commit abduction with the intent to extort or defile; and 5 years’ incarceration for detaining a person for sex trafficking.8 Tucker was ordered to be placed on probation for ten years following his release from incarceration “unless sooner released by the Court.” Tucker appealed. 8 Tucker’s initial sentencing hearing in March of 2025 resulted in a longer sentence on the conspiracy charge than what was permissible by statute. So the trial court conducted a re-sentencing hearing, which resulted in the terms of incarceration described above. - 10 -  II. ANALYSIS A. Standard of Review This Court “review[s] a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence using an abuse of discretion standard and, on appeal, will not disturb a trial court’s decision to admit or deny evidence absent a finding of abuse of that discretion.” Warren v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 788, 802 (2023) (quoting Avent v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 175, 197 (2010)). “[W]e [also] review [the] denial of a motion for a mistrial for abuse of discretion.” Bethea v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 487, 500 (2018) (third alteration in original) (quoting Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 220 (2013)). “A reviewing court can conclude that ‘an abuse of discretion has occurred’ only in cases in which ‘reasonable jurists could not differ’ about the correct result.” Id. at 506‑07 (quoting Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 197 (2015)). Further, “[w]hen an appellate court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a criminal conviction, its role is a limited one.” Commonwealth v. Garrick, 303 Va. 176, 182 (2024). “The judgment of the trial court is presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is ‘plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017) (quoting Code § 8.01-680). “Thus, ‘it is not for this [C]ourt to say that the evidence does or does not establish [the defendant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because as an original proposition it might have reached a different conclusion.’” Commonwealth v. Barney, 302 Va. 84, 97 (2023) (alterations in original) (quoting Cobb v. Commonwealth, 152 Va. 941, 953 (1929)). Finally, we review de novo “a[n] . . . interpretation of a statute,” Graves v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 196, 199 (2017), “[w]hether an appellant is entitled to invoke [the ends-of-justice exception to Rule 5A:18],” Bell v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. App. 616, 628 (2024), - 11 - and “[w]hether the record is sufficiently complete to permit our review on appeal,” Bay v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 520, 529 (2012). B. The evidence was sufficient to convict Tucker. Tucker first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. He emphasizes that the Commonwealth failed to prove that Tucker conspired with another to abduct C.W. because the Commonwealth’s evidence failed to show that Tucker “entered into an agreement with at least one other person to commit an unlawful act and that the agreement contemplated the specific criminal objective alleged.” Tucker also avers that C.W.’s testimony was inherently incredible.9 We disagree. 1. The evidence is sufficient to support the existence of a conspiracy. “To prove a conspiracy, the Commonwealth must offer evidence of ‘an agreement between two or more persons by some concerted action to commit an offense.’” James v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 671, 677-78 (2009) (quoting Wright v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 502, 506 (1982)); see also Code § 18.2-22. “It is a rare case where any ‘formal agreement among alleged conspirators’ can be established.” Id. at 678 (quoting Wilder Enter. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 632 F.2d 1135, 1141 (4th Cir. 1980)). Thus, “[t]he existence of a 9 Tucker also argues on brief that the evidence was insufficient to show that he “deprived the complaining witness of her liberty.” However, Tucker did not raise this argument in his motion to strike, renewed motion to strike, or even his post-trial motion to set aside the verdict. As a result, Tucker has waived this argument for appellate review. See Rule 5A:18; see also Rompalo v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 147, 155‑56 (2020). In addition, “[Tucker] has not invoked either exception to Rule 5A:18, and we do not consider them sua sponte.” Spanos v. Taylor, 76 Va. App. 810, 827-28 (2023). Finally, Tucker contends that the evidence was insufficient to show “that an economic transaction or defilement occurred.” But Tucker provides no legal citations in support of his argument on this issue. As a result, Tucker has waived this argument as well. See Pollack v. Va. State Bar ex rel. Seventh Dist. Comm., 304 Va. 451, 467 (2025) (“We have repeatedly held that when an appellant makes a cursory argument in support of an assignment of error and fails to provide sufficient legal reasoning, factual analysis, or citations to authority, the argument is waived.”); see also Rule 5A:20(e). - 12 - conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence.” Chambliss v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 459, 466-67 (2013). Because conspirators often perform different roles in pursuit of their criminal plan, where the Commonwealth proves that the conspirators “by their acts pursued the same object, one performing one part and the others performing another part so as to complete it or with a view to its attainment, the [factfinder] will be justified in concluding that they were engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object.” James, 53 Va. App. at 678 (alteration in original) (emphases omitted) (quoting Charity v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 581, 586 (2007)). Here, the Commonwealth’s evidence demonstrated that Tucker conspired with another person to abduct C.W. The evidence indicated that Stephenson asked Tucker for a ride without C.W. knowing, and Tucker appeared in the Food City parking lot demanding repayment of the $2,000 he was owed. There, Tucker told C.W. that she “could do it either the easy way or the hard way.” Tucker contacted Cox for further instructions and displayed C.W.’s face to Cox. C.W. believed she had no choice but to go with Tucker or risk serious harm. Evidence also indicated that both Tucker and Cox told C.W. that she had to “work off” the debt or be physically harmed. Tucker then drove C.W. to a location in “the middle of nowhere,” telling Stephenson on the way that he and Cox needed to “go handle business” at this location. Upon arrival, Tucker then gave Cox $2,000 and transferred C.W. to Cox’s truck. C.W. was then taken to several locations, where she was forced to perform sexual acts with strangers. A rational factfinder could reasonably conclude from this evidence that an agreement existed between Tucker and another person, namely Cox, to abduct C.W. with the intent to extort or defile. And since that conclusion is not “plainly wrong or without evidence to support it,” we must conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the existence of a conspiracy. Pijor, 294 Va. at 512 (quoting Code § 8.01-680). - 13 -  2. C.W. is not inherently incredible. Tucker claims that C.W.’s accounts from the preliminary hearings were internally inconsistent and conflicted with her statements to the police and the forensic nurse. In support, Tucker highlights C.W.’s repeated statements that she only used marijuana that were proven false by drug screenings. He also points to C.W.’s claim of bruising and injury, though the nurse examiner found none. Generally, “determining the credibility of the witnesses and the weight afforded the testimony of those witnesses are matters left to the trier of fact, who has the ability to hear and see them as they testify.” Maldonado v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 554, 562 (2019) (quoting Miller v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 527, 536 (2015)). “[T]his Court must accept ‘the [factfinder’s] determination of the credibility of witness testimony unless, “as a matter of law, the testimony is inherently incredible.”’” Canada v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 367, 386 (2022) (quoting Nobrega v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 508, 518 (2006)). “[W]e may only disturb the [factfinder’s] credibility determination if the evidence is ‘inherently incredible, or so contrary to human experience as to render it unworthy of belief.’” Lopez v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 70, 84 (2021) (quoting Kelley v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 617, 626 (2019)). “Evidence is not ‘incredible’ unless it is ‘so manifestly false that reasonable [people] ought not to believe it’ or ‘shown to be false by objects or things as to the existence and meaning of which reasonable [people] should not differ.’” Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 487 (2018) (quoting Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 415 (2006)). Although not required to satisfy the standard, testimony that is corroborated is less likely to be inherently incredible. See Lambert v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 740, 760 (2019). Here, we find no basis to conclude that C.W. was inherently incredible. As a result of C.W. being deceased at the time of the trial, the Commonwealth relied on multiple statements and - 14 - transcripts of C.W.’s testimony from preliminary hearings in the present case, preliminary hearings from other cases, and C.W.’s previous statements to police and medical personnel. Throughout all those accounts, C.W. consistently testified and reported that she was forced to leave Radford with Tucker under a perceived threat of harm. She consistently testified that she was transported by Tucker and Cox to locations where she was forced to engage in sexual acts against her will. And C.W.’s testimony consistently indicated that she was taken to a “trailer” to perform sex acts before texting 911, prompting law enforcement to arrive. Moreover, C.W.’s testimony was corroborated by other sources of evidence. For example, Stephenson’s testimony is consistent with C.W.’s testimony that she left Food City, initially stopped at Tucker’s apartment before being transferred to Cox in the “middle of nowhere,” then was “forced” to engage in sex acts in Helms’s “trailer.” C.W.’s testimony was also corroborated in large degree by the testimony of the police officers who encountered C.W. at Helms’s “trailer” as well as Hodges when she recounted her medical examination of C.W. C.W.’s testimony concerning the sequence of events at the Food City parking lot was also corroborated by security camera footage that depicted Tucker’s SUV blocking C.W.’s Sonata before being parked alongside it. As a result, we cannot conclude that C.W.’s testimony was “so contrary to human experience as to render it unworthy of belief.” Lopez, 73 Va. App. at 84 (quoting Kelley, 69 Va. App. at 626). Although a portion of C.W.’s testimony did change following reiteration, and even though some of those changes led to inconsistencies between each reiteration of her testimony, “[a] legal determination that a witness is inherently incredible is very different from the mere identification of inconsistencies in a witness’ testimony or statements.” Kelley, 69 Va. App. at 626. “Testimony may be contradictory or contain inconsistencies without rising to the level of being inherently incredible as a matter of law.” Id. - 15 -  In this case, we do not find that C.W.’s inconsistencies rise to that level for a couple of reasons. First, C.W.’s accounts of the events underlying the elements of Tucker’s convictions were corroborated by numerous additional evidence and testimony at trial. See Lambert, 70 Va. App. at 760. For example, Stephenson’s testimony traced C.W.’s account of the interaction at Food City and being exchanged to Cox “in the middle of nowhere.” Stephenson’s testimony also corroborated C.W.’s testimony that she was taken to a “trailer” in Henry County and forced to commit sex acts “against her will.” In addition, security camera footage at the Food City parking lot also confirmed that Tucker’s SUV blocked C.W.’s Sonata then was pulled alongside it. And Deputy Hodges’s body-worn camera footage corroborated that C.W. was in a “trailer” and that she stated she was being forced to commit sex acts with numerous men. We find that the level of corroboration to C.W.’s testimony instructive in concluding that her testimony was not “so manifestly false that reasonable [people] ought not to believe it.” Gerald, 295 Va. at 487 (quoting Juniper, 271 Va. at 415). Beyond corroboration, we also find that C.W.’s testimony was consistent regarding the alleged acts that took place on January 10 and 11. For example, C.W.’s testimony at the numerous hearings consistently recounted how Cox told her she would “get fucked up” if she did not “work off” her debt to Tucker. Further, her testimony was consistent that she was forced to engage in sexual acts with numerous men, some of those acts which occurred in Henry County. Once again, in such circumstances, we cannot conclude that some contradictions in her testimony rendered her accounts “so manifestly false that reasonable [people] ought not to believe it.” Gerald, 295 Va. at 487 (quoting Juniper, 271 Va. at 415). Accordingly, C.W.’s testimony, in the context of all of the evidence presented at trial, was simply not “so contrary to human experience as to render it unworthy of belief” and was thus not inherently incredible. Lopez, 73 Va. App. at 84 (quoting Kelley, 69 Va. App. at 626). As a - 16 - result, C.W.’s testimony could simply be believed or disbelieved by the factfinder. See Grimaldo v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. App. 304, 323 (2024) (highlighting that “inconsistencies or contradictions are factors considered in the overall assessment of witness credibility”). And here, the factfinder believed the incriminating portions of C.W.’s testimony. Thus, we find Tucker’s contention that C.W.’s testimony was inherently incredible not supported by the record. C. The trial court did not err by denying Tucker’s motion for a mistrial. Tucker also assigns error to the trial court for denying his motion for a mistrial. However, Tucker failed to either proffer the recording he objected to in support of his motion for mistrial or to ensure that the recording is in the record. We therefore cannot address the merits of this assignment of error since the record is not sufficient to permit appellate review of this assignment of error. “Whether improper evidence is so prejudicial as to require a mistrial is a question of fact to be resolved by the trial court in each particular case.” Bennett v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 261, 273 (1999) (quoting Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 280 (1993)). “Thus, a trial court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial will not be reversed on appeal unless there exists a manifest probability as a matter of law that the improper evidence prejudiced the accused.” Id. at 273-74 (quoting Mills v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 415, 420 (1997)). “The party requesting a mistrial has the burden of demonstrating the requisite ‘probability of prejudice.’” Pollino v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 243, 248 (2004) (quoting Blevins v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 412, 429-30 (2003)). However, the application of such rules presumes that the record permits us to review the merits of such a claim. See Berglund Chevrolet, Inc. v. Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 71 Va. App. 747, 759 (2020) (“An appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate record from which the appellate court can review its claimed assignments of error.”). “An appellate court - 17 - cannot review the correctness of a trial court’s decision unless the evidence upon which the trial court relied is included in the record on appeal.” Bland v. Va. State Univ., 272 Va. 198, 201‑02 (2006). And if the actual recording is not itself in evidence, an appropriate proffer creates a record of “what the [evidence] would have been” “to assure that the record will be complete” for appellate review. Holles v. Sunrise Terrace, Inc., 257 Va. 131, 135 (1999); Wyche v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 839, 843 (1978). “Though sometimes thought of as a mere waiver principle, the proffer requirement serves the higher purpose of safeguarding our duty under Code § 8.01-678 to reverse only when the trial court error actually prejudiced the defense.” Cortez-Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 66, 76-77 (2011) (quoting Ray v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 647, 650 (2010)). Accordingly, while Tucker bore “the burden of demonstrating the requisite ‘probability of prejudice’” that resulted when the trial court denied his motion for a mistrial, Pollino, 42 Va. App. at 248 (quoting Blevins, 40 Va. App. at 429-30), Tucker has failed to supply a record sufficient for us to make that conclusion. Although the record reflects that a portion of Tucker’s jail call was played in front of the jury, the phone call was not transcribed. Nor is the audio of the call itself in the record. In addition, Tucker failed to proffer the contents of the portion of the recording that was played in the jury’s presence. Based upon the objection concerning the recording’s admissibility, we can only glean that Tucker, in an angry tone, mentioned that two people had faced undesirable consequences for something they had done or failed to do. Without a transcript of the contested evidence, or a sufficient proffer thereof, we cannot determine whether the trial court abused its discretion when denying the motion for a mistrial. Therefore, Tucker’s argument on this point is waived. See Bland, 272 Va. at 201‑02. - 18 -  D. The trial court did not err by denying admission of C.W.’s indictments in evidence. Tucker next asserts that the trial court erred by excluding evidence that C.W. had been indicted for possession of drugs because the evidence, if admitted, would have impeached C.W.’s statements about her sobriety.10 We disagree. “Evidence that a witness has been convicted of a crime may be admitted to impeach the credibility of that witness,” subject to certain conditions. Va. R. Evid. 2:609 (emphasis added). Virginia law allows only evidence of a witness’s conviction—not an indictment—to impeach credibility. See Dowell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1145, 1147 (1991), aff’d upon reh’g en banc, 14 Va. App. 58, 58 (1992) (en banc); Smith v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1111, 1121 (1931). Here, C.W.’s indictments reflected only that she was charged with offenses involving drug possession, not that she was convicted of a crime. In fact, C.W. was deceased before any trial on those indictments occurred, precluding those indictments from forming the basis of a conviction. Hence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding C.W.’s indictments. E. The trial court did not err when imposing Tucker’s sentence. Lastly, Tucker maintains that Code § 19.2-303 provides for a five-year cap on the period of probation, absent special circumstances concerning a need for a court-ordered program or payment of restitution. Hence, Tucker asserts that the trial court impo