Kris Dasean Sherrod v. Commonwealth of Virginia
CourtCourt of Appeals of Virginia
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket0527251
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 0527-25-1
KRIS DASEAN SHERROD
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Malveaux and Causey
Argued at Williamsburg, Virginia
Opinion Issued November 17, 2026*
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
Bryant L. Sugg, Judge
Charles E. Haden for appellant.
Tanner M. Russo, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,1 Attorney General; Ryan Beehler,
Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE DORIS HENDERSON CAUSEY
A jury convicted Kris Desean Sherrod of forcible sodomy of a victim under the age of 13,
in violation of Code § 18.2-67.1, and taking indecent liberties with a child while maintaining a
custodial relationship with the child, in violation of Code § 18.2-370.1. On appeal, Sherrod
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, contending that the trial
court erred in denying his motion to strike and renewed motion to strike. We disagree and affirm
the trial court’s rulings.
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
1
Jay C. Jones succeeded Jason S. Miyares as Attorney General on January 17, 2026.
BACKGROUND2
Before being adopted by her aunt, Starlett Marcus Forbes, N.M.,3 a nine-year-old girl,
lived in extended stay motels with other members of her family. In 2022, N.M. lived in the
Intown Suites in the City of Newport News in one motel room with her mother, father, father’s
girlfriend, stepbrother, grandmother, and grandmother’s boyfriend. Her aunt, Precious Marcus,
lived in another room of the Intown Suites with N.M.’s uncle, Sherrod, and Marcus’s children.
While N.M. and her extended family were living at the Intown Suites, N.M. was in
Marcus’s room with Sherrod, her cousins, and her mother. Her mother and Marcus left to go to a
grocery store, and N.M. was left in the room with Sherrod and her seven-year-old cousin.
Sherrod brought N.M. into the bathroom of the motel room to “play a game,” while her cousin
stayed in the bedroom. The game involved Sherrod exposing his penis to N.M. and then putting
his penis in her mouth. N.M. told Sherrod that she “did not want to play the game anymore,”
and Sherrod stopped.
N.M. did not report the incident to anyone immediately because she was scared that her
family would not believe her, and she did not trust her mother, grandmother, or Marcus.
However, N.M. trusted her other aunt, Forbes, and N.M. reported Sherrod to Forbes sometime
after Forbes adopted her in October 2023. N.M. later reported to law enforcement and
underwent a forensic interview at a child advocacy center. Sherrod was charged with forcible
sodomy of a victim under the age of 13, in violation of Code § 18.2-67.1, and taking indecent
liberties with a child while maintaining a custodial relationship with the child, in violation of
Code § 18.2-370.1.
2
“On appeal, ‘we review the evidence in the “light most favorable” to the Commonwealth,’
the prevailing party below.” Diaz v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. App. 286, 295 (2024) (quoting
Clanton v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 561, 564 (2009) (en banc)).
3
We use the minor victim’s initials to protect her privacy.
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At his jury trial, the Commonwealth called N.M. to testify as to the facts set forth above.
N.M. also testified about an earlier incident in which Sherrod unzipped N.M.’s jumpsuit and
“touched [her] private part.” N.M. testified that she could not remember where the jumpsuit
incident occurred, but she remembered that it was not at the Intown Suites.4
The Commonwealth called an Intown Suites employee, who confirmed that Sherrod,
N.M.’s mother, and Marcus stayed at the Intown Suites. The Commonwealth called two
employees of the City of Newport News Police Department, who both testified that N.M.
identified Sherrod as the perpetrator in a photographic lineup.
The Commonwealth then called Amber Grant, an expert in “child sexual abuse, forensic
interviewing, and delayed disclosures,” who testified that children delay reporting sexual abuse
“[m]ore times than not.”5 Grant testified that children might delay reporting if they lack family
support and feel that the adults in their life would not believe them. Grant added that she would
be “surprised” if a child disclosed sexual assault by an adult that was “still around them.”
At the close of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, Sherrod moved to strike the charges,
arguing that there was no corroborating evidence to support N.M.’s account of what he did to
her. He also argued that the Commonwealth failed to establish a custodial relationship with
N.M. with respect to the indecent liberties charge. The trial court denied the motion.
Sherrod then called his fiancée, Marcus, who testified that she and Sherrod stayed at the
Intown Suites in April 2022 and August 2022 with her sister. Marcus stated that N.M. “barely
stayed” with them at Intown Suites and denied that Sherrod ever babysat N.M. “[w]ith just him
and her” in the room. Marcus denied that there was ever a time when the other adults went to the
4
Forbes also testified that N.M. started living with her in October 2023, and she gained
full custody of N.M. in April 2024.
5
Grant interviewed N.M. on April 17, 2024. During the interview, N.M. told Grant that,
aside from the bathroom incident and the jumpsuit incident, Sherrod would often “touch[] her.”
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grocery store and left Sherrod with N.M. at the motel. On cross-examination, Marcus confirmed
that one of her daughters expressed feeling “uncomfortable around [Sherrod]” because Sherrod
had “brushed passed her or whatever.” Sherrod next called N.M.’s mother to testify. She
confirmed that Sherrod, N.M., and other extended family members all stayed at the Intown
Suites in 2022. She stated that she never went to the grocery store and left N.M. with Sherrod.
Sherrod renewed his motions to strike. He argued that the Commonwealth failed to offer
any evidence indicating that he entered a custodial or supervisory relationship with N.M. He
further argued that “the Commonwealth appears to be using the same acts to both constitute
indecent liberties and forcible sodomy.” Specifically, “there was no testimony or otherwise, any
evidence that, even if believed that there was some sort of separate exposure of the genitalia
separate and apart from what was necessary to complete the act of sodomy.” The trial court
denied Sherrod’s renewed motion to strike.
In closing, the Commonwealth argued that Sherrod both exposed himself to and forcibly
sodomized N.M. during the bathroom incident. Sherrod argued that N.M. was not credible and
that her allegations were uncorroborated. The jury found Sherrod guilty of both charges. He
now appeals.
ANALYSIS
“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is
presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to
support it.’” Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 327 (2018)). “This familiar standard gives full play to
the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the
evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Raspberry v.
Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 19, 29 (2019) (quoting Burrous v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App.
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275, 279 (2017)); see Kelley v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 617, 626 (2019) (recognizing that
the fact finder has the sole responsibility to determine the credibility of witnesses as well as the
weight to be given their testimony). “In conducting our analysis, we are mindful that
‘determining the credibility of the witnesses and the weight afforded the testimony of those
witnesses are matters left to the trier of fact, who has the ability to hear and see them as they
testify.’” Raspberry, 71 Va. App. at 29 (quoting Miller v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 527, 536
(2015)). “To be incredible, testimony must be either so manifestly false that reasonable men
ought not to believe it, or it must be shown to be false by objects or things as to the existence and
meaning of which reasonable men should not differ.” Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362,
415 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Child testimony may be contradictory
or contain inconsistencies without rising to the level of being inherently incredible. See Rodriguez
v. Commonwealth, 85 Va. App. 664, 696-97 (2025).
I. Forcible Sodomy
A defendant is guilty of forcible sodomy under Code § 18.2-67.1, if they engage in
“cunnilingus, fellatio, anilingus, or anal intercourse with a complaining witness” under the age of
13. Code § 18.2-67.1. Here, N.M. testified that Sherrod exposed his penis to her and put his
penis in her mouth. This testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction under Code § 18.2-67.1.
See Kelley, 69 Va. App. at 626 (holding that this Court will uphold a conviction on appeal if a
witness testifies to facts that, if true, are sufficient to support the conviction if the factfinder based its
decision upon those facts).
As the finder of fact, it was the jury’s duty to weigh the evidence and, here, the jury plainly
did so, resolving inconsistencies in the testimony against Sherrod and finding him guilty. See
Raspberry, 71 Va. App. at 29; see also Corvin v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 296, 299 (1991)
(affirming conviction for forcible sodomy as the “credibility of a witness is a matter solely for the
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jury to decide”). N.M. testified that Sherrod exposed his penis to her and put his penis in her mouth.
The jury weighed N.M.’s testimony and found Sherrod guilty. This was sufficient to sustain a
conviction under Code § 18.2-67.1.
On appeal, Sherrod argues that N.M.’s delay in raising her allegations and related
circumstances “collectively point to a failure of the Commonwealth’s burden of proof.” But there is
nothing about N.M.’s testimony that is so “manifestly false that reasonable men ought not to believe
it,” Juniper, 271 Va. at 415, and a “victim’s failure to immediately report the incident” does not
render the victim’s testimony “inherently incredible as a matter of law,” Corvin, 13 Va. App. at
299; see Woodard v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 24, 28 (1994) (observing that late reporting is
“completely consistent with the all too common circumstances surrounding sexual assault on
minors—fear of disbelief by others”); Love v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 84, 90 (1994)
(holding 12-year-old victim’s seven-year delay in reporting sexual abuse did not render her
testimony inherently incredible); Kimble v. Commonwealth, No. 1621-24-4, slip op. at 6-7, 2026
Va. App. LEXIS 22, *8 (Jan. 13, 2026) (reiterating that this Court has repeatedly held that the
failure to immediately report an incident of sexual abuse is insufficient to render the victim’s
testimony inherently incredible).6
To the extent Sherrod is arguing that his conviction should be overturned because there
was no corroborating evidence supporting N.M.’s testimony, this argument fails because
“convictions for sodomy and other sexual offenses may be sustained solely upon the testimony of
the victim without corroboration.” Corvin, 13 Va. App. at 299. See also Garland v.
Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 189, 191 (1989) (“There is no requirement of corroboration.”). This
precedent reflects an important public policy to protect children, who already face an uphill battle in
6
“Unpublished opinions, although not binding, may be cited as ‘informative’ and
‘considered for their persuasive value.’” Osman v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 613, 653 n.23
(2023) (quoting Otey v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 346, 350 n.3 (2012)); see Rule 5A:1(f).
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choosing to report abuse, as reflected in Grant’s expert testimony at trial. Therefore, the trial court
properly denied Sherrod’s renewed motion to strike the charge of forcible sodomy of a minor.
II. Indecent Liberties
Code § 18.2-370.1 provides in pertinent part,
Any person 18 years of age or older who . . . maintains a custodial or
supervisory relationship over a child under the age of 18 . . . who,
with lascivious intent, knowingly and intentionally . . . exposes his or
her sexual or genital parts to such child; or . . . sexually abuses the
child as defined in subdivision 6 of § 18.2-67.10 is guilty of a Class 6
felony.
Code § 18.2-370.1. In analyzing this statutory provision, we have construed the term “custody”
broadly, going beyond legal custody, to include those with informal, temporary custody.
Kolesnikoff v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 396, 404 (2009). “The key question in determining
whether a given relationship falls within the statute is whether the defendant ‘had the
responsibility for and control of the [child’s] safety and well-being.’” Linnon v. Commonwealth,
287 Va. 92, 98 (2014) (quoting Krampen v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 163, 168 (1999)). This
reading of Code § 18.2-370.1 is consistent with the statute’s purpose—to protect minors from
adults who might exploit certain types of relationships. See Sadler v. Commonwealth, 276 Va.
762, 765 (2008). Whether such a custodial or supervisory relationship exists at the time of the
offending conduct is “a matter of fact,” determined on a case-by-case basis. Id.
Sherrod argues that the trial court erred in denying his renewed motion to strike because
the Commonwealth failed to establish that he was in a custodial relationship with N.M. His
argument first relies on the testimony of N.M.’s mother and Marcus, who denied that he was
ever alone with N.M. However, the jury, as the trier of fact, was tasked with resolving this
competing testimony and, here, the jury chose to believe N.M. and reject competing testimony.
See Raspberry, 71 Va. App. at 29.
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Sherrod then argues that, even if the grocery store incident did occur, there was no
testimony at trial indicating that N.M.’s mother ever expressly entrusted N.M. to Sherrod’s care.
He argues that he was under no duty to supervise N.M. The record does not support this
contention. The family was in a transitory living arrangement, and the record supports that
Sherrod had a supervisory role over N.M. N.M. testified that Sherrod was the “only adult
present” when the other adults left for the grocery store, and that if Sherrod told her to do
something, she had to do it. Given that he had this level of “responsibility for and control” over
N.M., a factfinder could reasonably infer the existence of a custodial relationship.7 See
Krampen, 29 Va. App. at 168; see also Guda v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 453, 459 (2004)
(reiterating that “Code § 18.2-370.1 does not require the specific entrustment of the child to the
care of the adult to create a custodial or supervisory relationship”).8
Certainly, not every instance where a defendant is the only adult in the room would
amount to a custodial relationship. Here, this specific factual inquiry has shown that Sherrod had
a supervisory relationship with N.M., and the evidence overwhelmingly supports his conviction
under Code § 18.2-370.1.
7
At oral argument, Sherrod’s counsel suggested that the children could have wandered
into the room after N.M.’s mother left for the grocery store, and therefore, the Commonwealth
failed to show that her mother entrusted N.M.’s care to him. However, N.M. testified that she
was already in the motel room with her mother when her mother and aunt left, with only N.M.,
her seven-year-old cousin, and Sherrod remaining.
8
To the extent Sherrod is arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support a
conviction under Code § 18.2-370.1 because N.M. was not a credible witness, for the reasons set
forth above, we reject this argument. See Kelley, 69 Va. App. at 626. Sherrod points to no place in
the record where N.M.’s testimony was inconsistent or otherwise jeopardized her credibility.
N.M. stated multiple times that the bathroom incident occurred while Sherrod was entrusted with
her care while the other adults went to a grocery store. See Kolesnikoff, 54 Va. App. at 404
(holding that “custody” includes informal, temporary custody).
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Affirmed.
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