Full Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA Record No. 0865-25-1 DAMIAN RAUL GUZMAN v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Malveaux and Causey Opinion Issued November 10, 2026* FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS Gary A. Mills, Judge1 (Daniel B. Winegard, Assistant Public Defender, on brief), for appellant. (Jason S. Miyares,2 Attorney General; David A. Stock, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. MEMORANDUM OPINION PER CURIAM Based on his conditional Alford3 plea, the Circuit Court of Newport News convicted Damian Raul Guzman of possessing cocaine and sentenced him to 5 years of incarceration with 4 years and 11 months suspended. On appeal, Guzman challenges the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.4 * This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 Judge Mills entered the final sentencing order. The Honorable Bryant L. Sugg denied the motion to suppress. 2 Jay C. Jones succeeded Jason S. Miyares as Attorney General on January 17, 2026. 3 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 4 Having examined the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is unnecessary because “the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.” See Code § 17.1-403(ii)(c); Rule 5A:27(c). BACKGROUND5 On December 23, 2023, Newport News Detective Kempf was in his unmarked police vehicle seeking to execute an arrest warrant for a homicide suspect. The warrant listed the suspect as around 25 years old, 5’5” tall, and weighing 145 pounds. About that time, Detective Kempf saw a man, later identified as Guzman, walking down the street. Detective Kempf first noticed Guzman because he wore a “balaclava-styled mask” covering all of his face but his eyes. Detective Kempf also observed that Guzman matched the description of the homicide suspect. Detective Kempf heard a radio call for officers to “attempt to make contact” with Guzman. He then saw Guzman run by the unmarked vehicle “ahead of” other officers. Detective Kempf exited the vehicle, pursued Guzman, and detained him by pushing him to the ground and handcuffing him. Officers subsequently found a baggie containing crack cocaine near Guzman.6 Guzman moved to suppress the baggie of cocaine before trial, asserting that Detective Kempf violated his Fourth Amendment rights by seizing him without reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Detective Kempf, the only witness at the suppression hearing, testified that he would have detained Guzman “based on” his mask because, in his training and experience, wearing a mask obscuring a person’s entire face was a felony in Virginia.7 5 “On an appeal of a circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress, this Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.” Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 182, 187 (2022). “We also presume — even in the absence of specific factual findings — that the trial court resolved all factual ambiguities or inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of” the Commonwealth as the prevailing party below. See Commonwealth v. Holland, 304 Va. 34, 47 (2025) (quoting Hill v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 804, 807 (2019)). 6 The officers then determined that Guzman was not the homicide suspect described in the arrest warrant. 7 On cross-examination, Detective Kempf stated that he did not recall whether he observed other uniformed police officers attempt to contact Guzman or how they initially approached him. -2- The Commonwealth argued that Detective Kempf had reasonable suspicion to seize Guzman based on his mask and the fact that he matched the description of the homicide suspect. Guzman characterized the descriptors as vague and asserted that the descriptors’ ability to describe him was limited by wearing his mask. He also argued that wearing a mask outdoors in the December cold did not suggest criminal activity because he did not intend to conceal his identity.8 The trial court found that Detective Kempf had reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot based on three factors: 1) Guzman’s matching the homicide suspect’s description; 2) Guzman’s mask; and 3) his “running by” Detective Kempf’s unmarked vehicle. The trial court thus denied the motion to suppress. Guzman pleaded guilty to possessing cocaine, preserving his right to appeal the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion. This appeal followed. ANALYSIS “In this Court, [Guzman] ‘bears the burden to show that the [trial] court committed reversible error by denying [his] motion to suppress.’” Ayala v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. App. 41, 49 (2023) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Keepers v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 17, 33 (2020)). A defendant’s “claim that evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment presents a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo on appeal.” Baskerville v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 673, 684 (2023) (italics omitted) (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 717, 721 (2007)). We defer to the trial court’s factual findings, reviewing them “only for clear error,” and “giv[ing] due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” Id. (quoting Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Code § 18.2-422 provides that it is “unlawful for any person over 16 years of age to, with the intent to conceal his identity, wear any mask . . . whereby a substantial portion of the face is hidden or covered so as to conceal the identity of the wearer, to be or appear in any public place.” -3- 72 Va. App. 700, 712 (2021)). But we “independently decide whether, under the applicable law, the manner in which the challenged evidence was obtained satisfies constitutional requirements.” Id. (quoting Shiflett v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 141, 145-46 (2005)). “The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 462, 476 (2020). But “a police officer ‘may constitutionally conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.’” Bland v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 405, 413 (2016) (quoting Beasley v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 381, 395 (2012)). “Reasonable, articulable suspicion requires an officer to possess, at the time of the stop, ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped.’” Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 234, 246 (2021) (quoting Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014)). Whether there is reasonable suspicion to support the stop is based on the totality of the circumstances. See McArthur v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 352, 359 (2020). Reasonable suspicion “requires only ‘some minimal level of objective justification.’” Williams, 71 Va. App. at 482 (quoting Hairston v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 552, 561 (2017)). The reasonable suspicion inquiry “depends on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380 (2020) (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 402 (2014)). Whether the officer’s conduct is reasonable “is judged from the perspective of a[n objectively] reasonable officer on the scene allowing for the need of split-second decisions and without regard to the officer’s [subjective] intent or motivation.” McArthur, 72 Va. App. at 360 (alterations in original) (quoting Thompson v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 1, 7 (2009)). With these principles in mind, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that Detective Kempf had reasonable suspicion to detain Guzman. In Virginia, wearing a mask that -4- covers most of a person’s face is a crime when he intends to conceal his identity. Code § 18.2-422. The possibility that Guzman may have covered his face up to his eyes for an innocent reason did not make it unreasonable to have reasonable suspicion that he did so for an illicit purpose. Moreover, the fact that Guzman matched the homicide suspect’s physical description strengthened the inference that Guzman wore the mask for the proscribed purpose. We must view these circumstances in their totality, not in isolation. See McArthur, 72 Va. App. at 359. The trial court also found that Guzman was running from other police officers when Detective Kempf pursued and detained him. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“Headlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.”).9 See also Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 268, 276 (2010). Considered alongside Guzman’s mask and his physical similarity to the homicide suspect, Guzman’s flight created sufficient objective justification for Detective Kempf’s split-second decision to detain him for further investigation. See McArthur, 72 Va. App. at 360; Williams, 71 Va. App. at 482. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Affirmed. 9 In explaining its order denying the motion to suppress, the trial court used the word “running.” Given our deference to the trial court’s factual findings and our presumption that the trial court resolved all factual ambiguities in favor of the Commonwealth, we conclude that the trial court found that Guzman was fleeing from the officers. See Holland, 304 Va. at 47. Guzman does not argue otherwise. -5-