Julian Darius Karapetkov v. Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA Record No. 1013-25-4 JULIAN DARIUS KARAPETKOV v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA Present: Judges O’Brien, Causey and Bernhard Argued at Fairfax, Virginia Opinion Issued September 1, 2026 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY James P. Fisher, Judge Joseph Flood (Jonathan P. Sheldon; Sheldon & Flood, PLC, on briefs), for appellant.1 Ken J. Baldassari, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,2 Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. PUBLISHED OPINION BY JUDGE DORIS HENDERSON CAUSEY Julian Darius Karapetkov pleaded guilty to one count of arson of an occupied dwelling and one count of arson with $1,000 or more of property damage, in violation of Code § 18.2-77 and Code § 18.2-81. The circuit court imposed a life sentence with all but 10 years suspended for the first count, and 10 years with no time suspended for the second count, totaling 20 years of active incarceration. On appeal, Karapetkov argues the court erred in failing to set restitution and ordering the probation officer to determine the amount of restitution as a special condition. In addition, he contends the court abused its discretion by denying his request to continue the hearing on the motion to reconsider his sentences, by imposing a sentence “more than six times the high end of the 1 Different counsel represented Karapetkov before the circuit court. 2 Jay C. Jones succeeded Jason S. Miyares as Attorney General on January 17, 2026. [discretionary sentencing] guidelines,” and by denying reconsideration. He argues that his sentence is so disproportionate that it violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and the due process guarantees of the Virginia and United States Constitutions. We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance, because any prejudice from the proceeding was speculative. We further hold that Karapetkov’s sentence, imposed within the statutory range, is not subject to the appellate review that he seeks. Finally, regarding restitution, we decline to invoke the ends of justice exception. We accordingly affirm. BACKGROUND3 This appeal stems from Karapetkov making incessant, unwanted, and eventually unlawful contact with C.G.4 over a three-year period. C.G. and Karapetkov attended middle school together and “reconnected in 2020” during their senior year of high school. Following a brief period of non-romantic communications and in person encounters, C.G. decided to “cut off contact” with Karapetkov. Regardless, Karapetkov continued communication with C.G. via text messaging and social media. Despite attempts to block Karapetkov and change her number, C.G. continued to receive messages from him, as many as 35 per day. Karapetkov and C.G. attended Virginia Commonwealth University (“VCU”) around the same time, where the messages continued in the same manner and frequency. In August 2021, C.G. reported Karapetkov to the VCU police and obtained a temporary protective order. 3 The facts relating to sentencing (in contrast to sufficiency of the evidence determinations) and to Karapetkov’s request for a continuance, are reviewed for abuse of discretion on the entire record. See Minh Duy Du v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 555, 563-64 (2016) (sentencing); Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 705, 722 (2008) (continuance). 4 This opinion uses initials to protect the privacy of the victim. -2-  In February 2022, Karapetkov was arrested, and subsequently convicted in the Richmond City General District Court, for stalking C.G. while the two were students at VCU. Karapetkov was granted an appeal bond in April 2022, requiring him to have no future contact with C.G. He violated this directive in August 2022. On September 4, 2022, a video showing C.G. attending a VCU campus party was posted to social media.5 A few hours later, the Loudoun County Fire and Rescue Services responded to a “structure fire” at the home of C.G.’s parents. The fire damaged a portion of the home and the two cars parked in the driveway. The Commonwealth estimated the damaged cars’ value at $22,923 and $22,475. Karapetkov admitted to setting the tires of the vehicles on fire. He told authorities he was “upset by the financial harm his parents had suffered due to him having to change schools and obtain attorneys.” He likewise admitted to “being upset by the video posted of [C.G.].” On March 21, 2024, Karapetkov pleaded guilty to arson of an occupied dwelling and arson with $1,000 or more of property damage. Paragraph (15)(f) of the “Plea of Guilty to Felonies” (herein “the plea agreement”) entered into between Karapetkov and the Commonwealth, and dated March 21, provides as follows: “No restitution is owed in this case.” The court accepted Karapetkov’s guilty pleas without amending the plea agreement, and, on the Commonwealth’s motion, the court entered a nolle prosequi as to the remaining charges. In a subsequent conviction order, the trial court wrote that it “accepts and agrees to abide by the terms and conditions set forth in the Plea Agreement.” I. The Original Sentencing Hearing During the plea hearing, the court discussed the sentencing ranges under the plea agreement, stating the arson of property offense carried a penalty of “two to ten years in the Virginia 5 “Th[e] video was a panning shot of a party at a fraternity house at VCU and[,] in part of the video, [C.G.] can be observed walking through the room.” -3- penitentiary,” and the arson of an occupied dwelling offense “has a legislative penalty range of five years to life in prison.” The court noted that sentencing guidelines would be prepared “for the purposes of establishing average sentences” but clarified that it could sentence Karapetkov “to any lawful punishment within the penalty ranges” if found guilty. Karapetkov acknowledged these statements. On July 8, 2024, the parties convened for the sentencing hearing. The circuit court received sentencing guidelines, a pre-sentence report, and a sentencing memorandum in support of Karapetkov. The sentencing guidelines recommended a range of punishments from one year and three months to three years of incarceration. The Commonwealth presented the testimony of C.G. and C.G.’s father, mother, and sister. C.G.’s father testified that Karapetkov’s “unwanted communications” with C.G. “have included expressions of anger, swearing, [and] claims to be able to manipulate counselors, and [that Karapetkov] attempted to fabricate evidence to suggest [C.G.] was sending messages to herself.” He alleged the arson damage caused the family to “spend[] tens of thousands of dollars out of pocket” for repairs and to be displaced from their home for 20 months. C.G.’s sister read aloud several text messages sent by Karapetkov and contended, in the three years that he harassed C.G., he never changed his behavior, despite legal and nonlegal interventions. C.G.’s mother testified that their home “used to be a place where [the family] felt safe; a place filled with memories of [their] kids growing up, of hosting holidays, [and] celebrating family milestones”; but “[n]ow the memories seem to all be about the fire.” She recalled the “fear and shock, trying not to panic when [they] were initially unable to get in contact with [C.G.], and memories of the aftermath of the fire: [s]oot everywhere[ and] sorting through destroyed belongings.” -4-  C.G. described Karapetkov’s messages as “scary,” “exhausting, due to the constant influx of them at all hours of the day and night,” and “concern[ing] . . . because [he] was making suicidal remarks.” She testified that Karapetkov “continued his constant terrorization” at VCU, where they both attended college, ultimately “ignor[ing] warnings from the school, law enforcement and judges.” As a result, C.G. contemplated suicide, struggled in school, and feared entering new relationships, worried that Karapetkov would harm anyone with whom she became close. The defense called Karapetkov’s father and brother to the stand. His brother described Karapetkov’s experiences with his court-appointed therapist, explaining the sessions lasted about ten minutes, and stating, “they didn’t really talk about anything related to this case, or pretty much anything related to him.” His father confirmed that Karapetkov attended therapy twice a week, sometimes for ten minutes, and testified, “[Karapetkov] was telling me that they [would] talk about good restaurants here in the Ashburn/Sterling area. It was not really . . . anything useful or helpful.” His brother and father testified they were willing to delay or modify their employment to better monitor Karapetkov. Karapetkov testified. He maintained he “would never . . . intentionally try to harm [C.G.] or her family,” explaining “not once did [C.G.’s] parents, or anyone else, cross my mind. . . . The only person that was on my mind was [C.G.], and I knew for a fact that she was in Richmond, safe from the fire.” He stated, “On the night of the fire, the only thought that kept flowing through my mind was that my opportunity of having a relationship with [C.G.], living a normal college life with plenty of friends and experiences, was gone.” And “[w]hen I saw the . . . video of [C.G.], my heart dropped, and I began experiencing a lot of sadness, regret, anger and hopelessness.” The Commonwealth asked the court to sentence Karapetkov to 25 years, with no more than 10 years suspended. It reasoned the proposed sentence was appropriate given the facts of the case -5- and Karapetkov’s behavior in the days leading up to the fire, which suggested that he intended to set the house on fire. Defense counsel rebutted, contending the evidence established that “a vehicle . . . outside the home[] was set on fire” and the “fire jumped from the car to the house.” (Emphasis added). Defense counsel argued the messages were “no more than love letters” and insisted Karapetkov never approached C.G. in person or “made any threats, either direct or indirect.” He further argued that Karapetkov did not receive a comprehensive mental health evaluation, and thus, “[h]e [hadn’t] been given an opportunity to demonstrate . . . that with the help of a qualified professional, . . . he can comply with whatever condition is set by this [c]ourt.” Defense counsel asserted the guidelines were “appropriate” because they adequately reflected all “relevant information,” including Karapetkov’s guilty plea, his acceptance of responsibility, the fact that he was “legally restrained,” and “the injury to the victim.” The court “impart[ed] some of [its] reasoning” before issuing the sentences. The judge weighed aggravating and mitigating factors. Aggravating factors included that Karapetkov had a “truly unnatural and irrational obsession, of what [the court found] to be a possessory nature.” The court gave “little credit” to Karapetkov’s contention that the messages were simply “love machinations,” instead deeming them to be “a product of a delusion . . . that’s likely continuing to-date.” The court held that Karapetkov’s “ignoring of the legal restraint imposed by the Richmond court” constituted a “very strong factor,” further stating, “I don’t think it’s adequately weighed in the Virginia sentencing guidelines.” Further, the court found that Karapetkov’s “tactics of manipulation” lasted for 18 months. The court found that the balance of information demonstrated at least some pre-planning on Karapetkov’s part to set the house on fire. In addition to “emotional, traumatic, and the psychological damage,” it noted “financial damage[s] [of] over a million dollars” to the home and -6- vehicles.6 Lastly, when considering Karapetkov’s continued efforts to contact C.G. from jail, the court stated the sentencing guidelines “do not really, in any appreciable way, adequately account for the concept of future dangerousness,” “given the type of stalking that went on here.” As to mitigating factors, the court noted that Karapetkov was a “young man” without a prior record. It determined that Karapetkov was undergoing “a mental or emotional disturbance” and the “vacuum of information” concerning his mental health was “equally capable of being dangerous, as it is being mitigating.” The court found that Karapetkov’s efforts at therapy were “anemic” and that it could not “put much weight on the guesswork that . . . [Karapetkov’s actions were the] product of depression.” The court sentenced Karapetkov to life in prison, with all but ten years suspended, for the arson of an occupied dwelling conviction, and to ten years for the arson of property conviction. The court set conditions for the suspended sentence, including good behavior for life, no contact with the victim or the victim’s family, and supervised probation for five years. The court also listed several special conditions. In particular, the judge stated, “you are to develop and commit to a restitution plan with the supervising probation officer upon your release.” Karapetkov did not object to the imposed sentence or conditions. The court memorialized its rulings in a sentencing order dated July 9, 2024. The restitution terms read: 12. If directed by a Probation/Parole Officer, or otherwise by a specific court order of the Commonwealth of Virginia, pay restitution, fines and costs associated with this matter. .... 17. The Defendant is to develop and commit to a restitution plan with the probation officer upon release. 6 It is unclear from where in the record the circuit court drew this figure. The figure is not a finding as to restitution. -7- (Emphases added). The order further directs: “It is ORDERED that the Defendant is to pay the costs and restitution of this proceeding; including any Court Appointed Attorney fees that may be assessed, to the Clerk of the Court.” On July 19, 2024, the court entered an order staying the “finality” of the sentencing order “until further Order of this [c]ourt.” The stay order was renewed in October 2024, December 2024, and January 2025, and the case was continued twice thereafter. II. Hearing on the Motion to Reconsider the Sentences On May 1, 2025, the circuit court held a hearing on Karapetkov’s motion to reconsider the imposed sentences. Defense counsel requested to continue the case until May 15 because Karapetkov’s mother had been hospitalized after falling through a screened door from the second floor of her residence. He explained that his mother served as a “potential rebuttal witness” and that Karapetkov wished for her to be present. He further asserted that Dr. Jennifer Marshall, the clinical psychologist who evaluated Karapetkov, indicated the mother’s fall might be a “potential suicide attempt,” which could affect her data and findings concerning his mental health. The Commonwealth objected, asserting the matter “ha[d] been continued so many times”7; “the mother 7 The Commonwealth stated, in relevant part: [The motion to reconsider] was then extended and stays were granted initially from July to October, then October to December, December to January, January to February, and then when we were here in February, defense requested a further extension. The Commonwealth did object to the last two extensions of the stay. We were here in February, the Court said essentially move or get off the pot when it comes to the motion to reconsider. . . . [And the case was] docketed to be heard April 3rd. The Commonwealth was contacted by . . . the clerk’s office . . . that April 3rd no longer worked for the Court and offered April 10th. Defense counsel later requested that the case be set for May 1, 2025. -8- was not called as a witness at the original sentencing hearing”; and “an event almost a year after the original sentencing hearing” should not affect reconsideration of the sentences. The court denied Karapetkov’s continuance request. It held that a motion to reconsider a sentence “is not . . . itself a substantive right” but rather “an accommodation on the notion that perhaps maybe there’s something out there that the [c]ourt could . . . consider.”8 Specifically, “it was represented . . . that there was an issue with regard to [Karapetkov’s] mental [health] and a report that was forthcoming.” Dr. Marshall’s report and testimony sufficiently addressed these concerns. Concerning “parents or other witnesses,” the court stressed the motion is not a “do over.” The hearing proceeded. Dr. Marshall opined that Karapetkov suffered from depressive disorder.9 She explained that he faced several issues in adolescence, including a video-game addiction that led to major self-isolation, closing him out of all former social groups by the time he entered high school. She also attributed Karapetkov’s brother leaving for college, along with the impact of his parents’ divorce; Karapetkov maintained limited contact with his father and continued residence with his mother—who according to Karapetkov, his father, and his brother—experienced “significant struggles” with mental health and illness. Combined with little to no “significant parental supervision,” Dr. Marshall concluded that “significant opportunities for intervention . . . were lost.” Karapetkov did not receive any mental health treatment until the court’s directive, and even then, “[t]here really wasn’t any indication of a formal treatment plan.”10 Considering the 8 The court explained “the matter ha[d] already been considered at a full sentencing hearing.” 9 The court qualified Dr. Marshall as an expert. 10 Dr. Marshall stated, “I don’t recall [Dr. Martha Merrion] actually discussing any kind of formulation of a diagnostic impression and really what detailed services he needed.” She claimed Dr. Merrion “made several . . . reaching statements about [Karapetkov’s] culpability and -9- totality of circumstances, Dr. Marshall concluded that Karapetkov had no experience navigating romantic or non-romantic relationships and that he lacked “insight as to his behavior” with C.G. Karapetkov urged the court to consider the interventions outlined in Dr. Marshall’s report in place of the 20-year sentence.11 The court denied the motion. It held there was “no sufficient nexus between the lack of treatment and the decision to sneak onto somebody else’s property and to maliciously set it on fire.” It held the “brain development argument” was a “total non sequitur,” as “millions of 18 to 25 year olds . . . [have] navigat[ed] the loss of girlfriends without setting the other family’s house on fire.” Finally, it stated, “even assuming [the] mitigating value in today’s presentation,” the evidence was “utterly insufficient to change my mind as to the July 2024 sentence[s].” The court ordered the July 9, 2024 sentencing order into execution. Karapetkov appealed. ANALYSIS I. The Denial of the Motion to Continue Karapetkov contends the circuit court abused its discretion in denying his motion to continue the May 1, 2025 reconsideration hearing because his mother was an essential witness whose hospitalization rendered her unavailable. He asserts his mother’s possible suicide attempt could have altered the findings of his expert, Dr. Marshall. He also argues that he wanted his mother present both as a potential rebuttal witness and for support. Because Karapetkov has not shown the prejudice required for reversal, this Court affirms the ruling of the circuit court. Whether to grant or deny a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the circuit court. Haugen v. Shenandoah Valley Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 274 Va. 27, 34 (2007). To obtain a the instant offense based on little to no data.” The transcript phonetically misspelled Dr. Merrion’s name as Dr. “Marion.” 11 Dr. Marshall mentioned treatment for Karapetkov’s suicidal ideations, intensive therapy, group therapy, and cognitive behavioral interventions. - 10 - reversal on that ground, an appellant must show (1) an abuse of discretion and (2) any resulting prejudice. Id. Prejudice is an essential prong. See Bolden v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 285, 290 (2007). Prejudice may not be presumed; it must appear from the record. Id. Where the harm an appellant alleges is “equivocal and speculative,” no abuse of discretion occurs. Salmon v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 586, 595 (2000) (quoting Haase v. Haase, 20 Va. App. 671, 680 (1995)). Here, we need not decide whether the circuit court abused its discretion because Karapetkov has not demonstrated the requisite prejudice.12 Karapetkov identifies only speculative harm. See id. As represented by defense counsel, Dr. Marshall indicated that his mother’s fall “may change some of her findings” if it proved to be a suicide attempt. Counsel did not proffer the substance of his mother’s anticipated testimony, and he did not identify how any of Dr. Marshall’s conclusions or treatment recommendations would change. In the record before us, prejudice does not stem from a contingent and unspecified possibility of an expert changing their findings upon some future incident that may not occur. See Salmon, 32 Va. App. at 595. Karapetkov’s remaining grounds do not establish prejudice either. As to his mother’s role as a rebuttal witness, his mother’s planned testimony would have addressed a recorded jail call between her and Karapetkov. The circuit court stated it would give no weight to this jail call, which removed any need for that rebuttal. And Karapetkov’s wish for his mother to be present as support, however understandable, itself does not show how the denial prevented Karapetkov 12 We do not reach the Commonwealth’s contention Karapetkov failed to proffer his mother’s testimony or the substance of any change to Dr. Marshall’s findings. Because the absence of prejudice is dispositive, we assume without deciding the claim was preserved and properly presented. - 11 - from presenting his case. The circuit court received Dr. Marshall’s written evaluation, heard her testimony at length, and determined the report and testimony were sufficient for the limited purpose of the reconsideration motion. On this record, any asserted harm from that decision remains speculative. Karapetkov’s challenge therefore fails on the prejudice prong, and we do not reach whether the circuit court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion. Bolden, 49 Va. App. at 290. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the motion to continue. II. The Sentence A circuit court’s sentencing decision, and its denial of a motion to modify a sentence under Code § 19.2-303, are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Minh Duy Du v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 555, 563 (2016); Cellucci v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. App. 36, 45-46 (2023) (en banc). An abuse of discretion requires more than a debatable ruling; it requires either (1) a decision no reasonable jurist could reach or (2) one factually or legally flawed at its foundation. See Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620 (2009). A. The Within-Range Sentence A circuit court acts within its sentencing authority when it fixes punishment at a point within the range the legislature has established. Minh Duy Du, 292 Va. at 564-65. Karapetkov faced up to life imprisonment for arson of an occupied dwelling and up to ten years for arson of personal property valued at $1,000 or more, and his sentences fall within those ranges. That his active term exceeds the discretionary guidelines is not grounds for reversal. Nothing in the record establishes that the circuit court failed to consider the mitigating evidence that Karapetkov now advances; we presume, without affirmative evidence to the contrary, that courts consider all evidence properly before them. Cellucci, 77 Va. App. at 52. - 12 -  B. The Eighth Amendment Karapetkov next asks this Court to conduct a proportionality review of his sentence under the Eighth Amendment. Such review is not available for any sentence less than life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Cole v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 642, 654 (2011). Although Karapetkov invites us to depart from that rule, we are bound by Cole under the rule of inter-panel accord and may not overrule it; only this Court sitting en banc or the Supreme Court of Virginia may do so. Butcher v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 392, 397 n.6 (2020). The circuit court did not impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Karapetkov’s Eighth Amendment claim is therefore foreclosed, and we need not decide whether it was preserved. Karapetkov’s parallel claim under Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution of Virginia fails for the same reason, as that provision affords no greater protection than the Eighth Amendment. See Vlaming v. W. Point Sch. Bd., 302 Va. 504, 528 (2023); Dunaway v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 281, 311, 313 (2008). C. Due Process and the Sentencing Guidelines Karapetkov also maintains that departing from the discretionary sentencing guidelines by more than six times their upper end is so arbitrary as to deny him due process. The guidelines, however, are advisory, and the General Assembly has provided that the failure to follow them “shall not be reviewable on appeal or the basis of any other post-conviction relief.” Code § 19.2-298.01(F). Further, this Court has held that excluding decisions concerning the application of the discretionary guidelines from appellate review does not deny due process. Jett v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 252, 257 (2001). Karapetkov’s due process argument is accordingly without merit, and we need not decide whether it was preserved. Karapetkov does not argue that Article I, Sections 8 and 11 of the Virgina Constitution provide any greater - 13 - protection than its federal counterpart, so we do not reach that question. Shivaee v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 112, 119 (2005). D. The Motion to Reconsider Finally, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider under Code § 19.2-303. The court considered Karapetkov’s mental-health evidence and found it insufficient to alter the sentence; it was not obligated to find that the evidence mitigated his offenses. Cellucci, 77 Va. App. at 52. Because we affirm both the sentence and the denial of the motion to reconsider, no remand under Code § 19.2-303 issues, and we therefore have no occasion to resolve the parties’ dispute over whether, under Harris v. Commonwealth, 85 Va. App. 497 (2025), the circuit court would retain jurisdiction to modify the sentence on such a remand. For the same reason, we deny as unnecessary Karapetkov’s alternative request that we stay this appeal pending the Supreme Court of Virginia’s disposition of the petition for appeal in Harris. III. Restitution Lastly, Karapetkov argues the trial court erred “when it failed to set the amount of restitution and instead delegated that responsibility to ‘a Probation/Parole Officer.’” Karapetkov asks us to apply the ends of justice exception, and, consequently, remand the case back to the trial court. We are not persuaded that Karapetkov’s restitution-related assignment of error merits review on appeal because the explicit terms of the plea agreement, accepted by the court and entered by court order, states that no restitution is owed.13 13 The record must affirmatively establish the appellant’s asserted error. Smith v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 710, 724 (2012). We read the sentencing order only to decide whether the record affirmatively establishes a clear, substantial, and material error; we express no view on the merits of the delegation claim. - 14 -  A. The Plea Agreement Before sentencing, Karapetkov entered into a plea agreement, wherein he and the Commonwealth agreed that Karapetkov would not pay restitution.14 During the plea colloquy, the trial court accepted Karapetkov’s plea without amending the agreement. In a subsequent conviction order, the trial court wrote that it “accepts and agrees to abide by the terms and conditions set forth in the Plea Agreement.” (Emphasis added). The trial court thus adopted the no-restitution term of the plea agreement in a legally enforceable court order. We treat plea agreements as written contracts between a defendant and the Commonwealth. Bardales v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 737, 743 (2020); Wright v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 58, 62 (2006) (“[B]asic rules of contract law apply to plea agreements.”); Griffin v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 714, 718 (2016) (“Once accepted, courts generally treat plea agreements as binding contracts[.]”); Esparza v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 600, 606 (1999) (“[T]he law in force on the date a contract is formed determines the rights of its parties.”). Because plea agreements are binding contracts, Virginia jurisprudence is replete with appellants who sought to vacate plea agreements that they or their counsel deemed ill-advised. We have generally held these parties liable to the terms to which they agreed. See generally Perry v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 410, 412 (2000) (“[A] voluntary and intelligent [Alford] guilty plea by an accused is a waiver of all defenses other than those jurisdictional.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Howell v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 737 (2012) (upholding plea agreement where defendant argued a “manifest injustice” because of ineffective counsel when he sought to withdraw his guilty plea); Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 14 Paragraph (15)(f) of the plea agreement provides that “[n]o restitution is owed in this case.” - 15 - No. 2350-02-1, 2004 Va. App. LEXIS 89 (Feb. 24, 2004) (upholding plea agreement where defendant argued that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily tendered because his attorney advised that he could withdraw it after discussing it with his mother); Lynch v. Commonwealth, No. 0512-00-2, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 275 (May 22, 2001) (upholding plea agreement where defendant moved to vacate guilty plea after discovering witnesses who would testify on his behalf).15 In its contract with Karapetkov, the Commonwealth agreed to waive whatever restitution Karapetkov may have owed the victim, the victim’s family, or the Commonwealth for the damage to property resulting from his arson conviction. When a defendant, whose freedom is at stake, feels they wrongfully entered a plea agreement, we hold that a contract is a contract. Now, when the Commonwealth adopts a position16 that would evade the terms of the plea agreement, 15 These instances are provided purely as examples where defendants were held to the benefit of their bargain. Unpublished opinions have no precedential value but “are nevertheless persuasive authority.” Samartino v. Fairfax Cnty. Fire and Rescue, 64 Va. App. 499, 508 n.2 (2015). 16 The Commonwealth posits a procedural default argument, urging this Court to implement Special Condition 12 because, while “it was improper for a trial court to delegate the determination of a restitution amount to a probation officer” (citing Wilson v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 82, 89 (2016), abrogated on other grounds by Cilwa v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 259 (2019)), ultimately “such an order was voidable, rather than void ab initio, and therefore was not subject to a collateral attack” (citing id. at 90). Following the Commonwealth’s argument to its logical conclusion would provide this Court two options. One, we could issue a mandate allowing restitution to be set by the probation officer, merely because Karapetkov did not object when the trial court listed Special Condition 12 in its sentencing order. Or two, we could remand to allow the trial court to amend the sentencing order to precisely align with the plea agreement and the trial court’s order enforcing it. Either option would require us to read Special Condition 12 in isolation, wholly ignoring the legally binding plea agreement precipitating Karapetkov’s conviction. We must decline the opportunity to do so. Remand is unnecessary; the court must abide by the contract that Karapetkov signed. The plea agreement, as accepted by the trial court, waived the Commonwealth’s burden of proof required to convict the defendant. The plea agreement cannot now be undone, as it would risk prejudicing Karapetkov, who may have relied on the no-restitution provision in his decision to plead guilty. See Commonwealth v. Sandy, 257 Va. 87, 91 (1999) (holding that a Commonwealth’s Attorney may not withdraw from a plea agreement after the entry of a guilty plea by a defendant or any other change of position by the defendant resulting in prejudice to him because of reliance upon the agreement). - 16 - we must again hold that a contract is a contract. See Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 417 (1988) (“No litigant, even [the Commonwealth] in a criminal case, will be permitted to approbate and reprobate.”). Those same principles guide the interpretation in this case. “The fundamental question before [an appellate court] in construing a contract is ‘what did the parties agree to as evidenced by their contract,’ and the ‘guiding light’ for such construction is ‘the intention of the parties as expressed by them in the words they have used.’” RECP IV WG Land Invs. LLC v. Cap. One Bank (USA), N.A., 295 Va. 268, 283 (2018) (quoting Schuiling v. Harris, 286 Va. 187, 192 (2013)). The contract between the Commonwealth and Karapetkov is clear and unambiguous. See Bentley Funding Grp., L.L.C. v. SK&R Grp., L.L.C., 269 Va. 315, 329 (2005) (“[W]hen contract terms are clear and unambiguous, we must construe those terms according to their plain meaning.” (alteration in original) (quoting Lansdowne Dev. Co., L.L.C. v. Xerox Realty Corp., 257 Va. 392, 400 (1999))).17 Here, under Paragraph (15)(f) of the plea agreement, Karapetkov and the Commonwealth jointly agreed that “[n]o restitution is owed in this case.” The binding language is plain as can be: Karapetkov will not owe restitution in this matter. The dissent suggests that Code §§ 19.2-305.1(A) and 19.2-305.1(B) disallowed the trial court from entering the plea agreement with the no-restitution provision. Code § 19.2-305.1(B) provides that “any person who . . . commits, and is convicted of, a crime in violation of any provision in Title 18.2 shall make at least partial restitution for any property damage or loss caused by the crime.” Code § 19.2-305.1(A) states that no person convicted of a property damage crime “shall be placed on probation” unless they pay part restitution, perform community service, or submit a plan “for doing that which appears . . . feasible under the 17 A court’s interpretation of a plea agreement is governed by contract law and is subject to de novo review. Bardales, 71 Va. App. at 743. - 17 - circumstances.” While true that restitution must be paid as a default requirement, “most legal rights—whether common law, statutory, or constitutional—can be waived if the requisite formalities are observed.” Congdon v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 692, 695 (2011). See also Paul v. Paul, 214 Va. 651, 653 (1974) (“The law effective when the contract is made is as much a part of the contract as if incorporated therein.”). Here, by entering the plea agreement with Karapetkov, the Commonwealth waived the requirements of Code § 19.2-305.1. B. Special Condition 12 Karapetkov assigns error to the trial court’s failure to set the amount of restitution and its delegation of that responsibility to “a Probation/Parole Officer,” in accordance with provision 12 of the “Special Conditions of Suspended Sentence and Supervised Probation” of the July 9, 2024 sentencing order (herein “Special Condition 12”). Special Condition 12 orders that Karapetkov, “[i]f directed by a Probation/Parole Officer, or otherwise by a specific court order of the Commonwealth of Virginia, pay restitution, fines and costs associated with this matter.” Karapetkov argues that, pursuant to this condition, the trial court erred by delegating to an executive branch employee its judicial authority under Code § 19.2-305.1(D) to determine a defendant’s sentence. Karapetkov challenges the trial court’s order that states he must, “[i]f directed by a [probation officer] . . . , pay restitution.” (Emphasis added). Assuming without deciding that the trial court in fact acted in this manner, we agree with Karapetkov that any delegation of judicial action would be in error. See Fazili v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 239, 254 (2019) (“[C]ircuit courts may not delegate to probation officers [those] responsibilities that are the sole province of the circuit courts.”).18 Indeed, under Code § 19.2-305.1, the amount of restitution is within the sole province of the sentencing court and may not be delegated to the 18 Code § 19.2-305.1(D) mandates that “[a]t the time of sentencing, the court shall determine the amount to be repaid by the defendant and the terms and conditions thereof.” (Emphasis added). - 18 - executive branch, especially when that sentence could lead to a defendant’s extended incarceration. See Wilson v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 82, 89 (2016). However, we nonetheless decline to apply the ends of justice exception to reach Karapetkov’s assignment of error because the plea agreement—a binding contract signed by both the Commonwealth and Karapetkov and explicitly accepted by the trial court—shows that a restitution payment will not occur, as “[n]o restitution is owed in this case.” In other words, the record suggests that the complained-of error, assigning the task of set