Full Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA Record No. 1453-25-3 BRANDON GREY RECTOR v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA Present: Judges Beales, Lorish and Duffan Opinion Issued November 10, 2026* FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CARROLL COUNTY Brett L. Geisler, Judge (Gregory G. Goad; Gregory G. Goad, Attorney at Law, P.C., on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. (Jay Jones, Attorney General; Matthew J. Beyrau, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE KEVIN M. DUFFAN Brandon Grey Rector was convicted by a Carroll County Circuit Court jury for second- degree murder and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony in violation of Code § 18.2-32 and Code § 18.2-53.1, respectively. Appealing his convictions, Rector argues that the Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient evidence to conclude that he acted with malice—a defining element of second-degree murder. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment.1 * This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 Having examined the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is unnecessary because “the dispositive issue or issues have been authoritatively decided, and the appellant has not argued that the case law should be overturned, extended, modified, or reversed.” See Code § 17.1-403(ii)(b); Rule 5A:27(b). We also note that Rector’s counsel waived oral argument in this case. BACKGROUND “We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 85 Va. App. 257, 266 (2025) (quoting Camann v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. App. 427, 431 (2024) (en banc)). “Doing so requires that we ‘discard’ the defendant’s evidence when it conflicts with the Commonwealth’s evidence, ‘regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth,’ and read ‘all fair inferences’ in the Commonwealth’s favor.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). Morgen Brewer and her family had known Rector for many years prior to Brewer’s death. Rector was friends with Brewer’s ex-husband and had also known Brewer’s sister, Rhiannon, since she was nine years old. In May of 2023, Rector and Brewer began dating. By October of that year, however, Brewer had started to become active on a dating website. During the first few days of January 2024, Rector and Brewer had a discussion over Facebook Messenger in which Brewer stated that she felt “patronized” and that she wanted a “[h]iatus” until things have “blown over.” Rector responded by pleading with Brewer not to leave him and not to “break [his] heart.” A week later, on January 12, 2024, Rector and Brewer travelled together to a cabin on the New River. Later that day, they returned to the home where Rector was living with his mother. The two walked upstairs to Rector’s room to retrieve a gun to pawn. While in the room, Rector shot Brewer. He immediately called 911 and told the dispatcher that he had a negligent discharge. The dispatcher asked Rector if it was an “accidental occurrence,” and Rector responded yes. The dispatcher then asked Rector if Brewer was cleaning the gun. Rector responded by saying that he was “just messing around” and “it just went off.” He said that he “thought it was empty.” Before the call concluded, Rector told the dispatcher that Brewer was -2- no longer responsive and that he thought she was dead. The medical examiner later determined in her autopsy report that Brewer died as a result of gunshot wounds to the chest and right arm. Less than two hours after the shooting, Special Agent James Graham with the Virginia State Police interrogated Rector. At questioning, Rector explained again that he thought the gun was unloaded and did not think it would fire. He noted that the gun was a single action revolver. He added that none of the guns should have been loaded because there were kids around. At Rector’s jury trial, Special Agent Graham testified that after the interview, he obtained a search warrant for the house where the shooting occurred. During the search, Special Agent Graham recovered four pistols and the revolver involved in the shooting. Some of the guns were loaded, others were not. Brewer’s phone was also recovered during the search, and a subsequent download of the phone data revealed Brewer’s previous dating site activity and Facebook messages with Rector. Special Agent Matthew Cocke also testified for the Commonwealth. He described how he photographed and retrieved the revolver used in the shooting from the crime scene. He noted that he found the revolver with one cartridge case to the right of the barrel. Special Agent Cocke further explained that to fire the revolver one cannot “just pull the trigger,” instead one must “manually cock [the hammer] back.” He highlighted that cocking the hammer rotates the cylinder “[c]lockwise from the operator’s position” and “aligns” the round with the barrel. If the operator has cocked the hammer, pulling the trigger will fire the weapon, there is “no other way to shoot it.” To shoot again, one must repeat the process. Special Agent Cocke explained that the empty cartridge was “advanced” past the barrel. At the end of the Commonwealth’s case, Rector moved to strike the evidence. He argued that the Commonwealth failed to prove malice, an essential element of murder. The circuit court noted that “at this point, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the Court has to deny -3- [the motion].” After presenting his case, Rector renewed his motion to strike the evidence. He again argued that that the Commonwealth had not proved the shooting was malicious. The court again denied the motion, pointing to an inference of malice “with regard to the use of a firearm.” The jury found Rector guilty of second-degree murder and using a firearm during the commission of a felony. The circuit court sentenced Rector to 43 years’ imprisonment with 18 years suspended, for a total of 25 years’ active sentence. Rector appeals. ANALYSIS Second-Degree Murder On appeal, Rector argues that the evidence was not sufficient to establish malice. We disagree.2 When analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence in a conviction, an appellate court’s role is “limited,” and “[t]he only relevant question is . . . whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 304 Va. 92, 100 (2025) (alterations in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Garrick, 303 Va. 176, 182 (2024)). Under this analysis, if “the evidence and the supporting inferences are ‘sufficient to support the conviction’” our inquiry ends as we are “not permitted to substitute [our] own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if [our] opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the trier of fact.” Garrick, 303 Va. at 182 (quoting Jordan v. Commonwealth, 286 Va. 153, 156-57 (2013)). Indeed, “[t]he judgment of the trial court is presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is ‘plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017) (quoting Code § 8.01-680). 2 The conviction for using a firearm during the commission of a felony is predicated on the second-degree murder conviction, thus we analyze only the second-degree murder conviction. -4- Murder at common law is a homicide committed with malice, either express or implied. Pugh v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 663, 667 (1982). In Virginia, any murder that is not aggravated murder or first-degree murder is second-degree murder. Code § 18.2-32. “Every unlawful homicide is presumed to be murder in the second degree.” Elliot v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 430, 436 (1999). The crux of second-degree murder is malice, for that is what distinguishes it from manslaughter. Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 480, 485 (1989) (“Malice, an essential element of all grades of murder, distinguishes murder from manslaughter.”). As noted above, malice can either be express or implied. See Coleman v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 197, 201 (1945). Express malice is “evidenced when ‘one person kills another with a sedate, deliberate mind, and formed design.’” Pugh, 223 Va. at 668 (quoting M’Whirt’s Case, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 594, 604 (1846)). Implied malice “exists when any purposeful, cruel act is committed by one individual against another without any, or without great provocation.” Id. A “common theme” links the two: both require that a “wrongful act be done ‘[willfully] or purposefully.’” Craig v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 155, 165 (2000) (quoting Essex v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 273, 280 (1984)). “Whether a shooting is intentional or accidental is ‘a matter peculiarly within the province of a jury to determine.’” Elliot, 30 Va. App. at 436 (quoting Compton v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 716, 731 (1979)). Moreover, “[t]he trier of fact may infer malice from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon unless the evidence raises a reasonable doubt whether malice existed.” Id. At the core of this case lies a fundamental dispute between two competing theories regarding Brewer’s death. The Commonwealth contends that Rector acted with intent and purposefully shot Brewer, whereas Rector maintains that the shooting was entirely accidental. To support its theory, the Commonwealth presented evidence that Brewer had been active on dating sites in months prior to January 2024 and had told Rector that she wanted a hiatus from -5- the relationship just days prior to her shooting. The Commonwealth also produced evidence that Rector was familiar with guns and had many of them throughout his bedroom. Special Agent Cocke described how one must cock the hammer to rotate the cylinder to the live round and then pull the trigger to fire the revolver. He then testified that when he found the revolver the spent shell was one slot to the right of the barrel—allowing the jury to infer that the hammer had been cocked and the trigger pulled after the live round was fired. The totality of the evidence, and especially the inferences afforded to Rector’s use of a deadly weapon, were sufficient to allow the jury to make a determination that Rector “[willfully] or purposefully”—and thus maliciously—shot and killed Brewer. See Craig, 34 Va. App. at 165 (noting that maliciousness requires a wrongful act to be done willfully or purposefully). While Rector’s argument that malice cannot be implied “if a killing results from negligence, however gross or culpable, and the killing is contrary to the defendant’s intention,” Essex, 228 Va. at 280, is a correct statement of the law, the decision to determine whether the killing was “intentional or accidental, is ‘a matter peculiarly within the province of a jury to determine,’” Elliot, 30 Va. App. at 436 (quoting Compton, 219 Va. at 731). Here, the jury weighed the evidence presented and determined that the shooting was intentional. On appeal, we may only intervene if the jury’s decision is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. See Pijor, 294 Va. at 512 (quoting Code § 8.01-680). Under these facts, we do not come to that conclusion. CONCLUSION Our role on appeal is “limited.” Wilkerson, 304 Va. at 100 (quoting Garrick, 303 Va. at 182). We examine only “whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Garrick, 303 Va. at 182). If “the evidence and the supporting inferences are ‘sufficient to support the conviction’” our inquiry ends. Garrick, 303 Va. at 182 (quoting Jordan, 286 Va. at 156-57). Here there was sufficient -6- evidence for the jury to conclude that Rector maliciously killed Brewer and used a firearm during the commission of that felony. We thus affirm the circuit court’s judgment. Affirmed. -7-