Walter Manson, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA Record No. 1254-25-2 WALTER MANSON, JR. v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA Present: Judges Athey, Ortiz and Causey Opinion Issued November 4, 2026* FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DINWIDDIE COUNTY Dennis M. Martin, Sr., Judge (Steven P. Hanna, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. (Jay Jones, Attorney General; William K. Hamilton, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. MEMORANDUM OPINION PER CURIAM Following a jury trial, the trial court convicted Walter Manson, Jr., of impersonating a law enforcement officer and feloniously obstructing justice. The court sentenced Manson to 10 years and 12 months of incarceration, with all but 1 year suspended. On appeal, Manson argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove the offenses. For the following reasons, we affirm his convictions.1 * This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 While appellant waived argument, the Commonwealth did not. However, having examined the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is unnecessary because “the dispositive issue or issues have been authoritatively decided, and the appellant has not argued that the case law should be overturned, extended, modified, or reversed.” See Code § 17.1-403(ii)(b); Rule 5A:27(b).  BACKGROUND2 On August 18, 2023, Sergeant Randall Fish of the Dinwiddie County Sheriff’s Office was pursuing Manson’s relative, James Edward Manson, Jr. (James), by vehicle. Eventually, the pursuit became a foot chase through a neighborhood, where Sergeant Fish captured James and tackled him to the ground. “[A]t least fifteen” individuals gathered around the scene of James’s detention; thus, Sergeant Fish drew his taser for his protection. Moments later, Manson approached and stood a few feet from Sergeant Fish and James.3 Sergeant Fish asked, “Who are you?” and Manson responded, “I’m federal police, that’s who I am. Washington . . . federal police.” Manson then moved closer to the officer. Manson had a badge displayed at his waist and a semi-automatic handgun holstered on his right hip. With his taser pointed at the ground, Sergeant Fish repeatedly ordered Manson to “stay back” and “get back” because he was encroaching on the officer’s zone of safety. Manson refused and stated he was going to “stay right there” and watch what the sergeant was doing. When Sergeant Fish told Manson, “You know you’re obstructing justice,” Manson replied, “I ain’t obstructing shit, I’m staying the fuck here watching what you doing.” He moved closer to Sergeant Fish and stated, “Threaten me if you want,” “if you put your taser on me[,] I’m gonna blow your head off.” Manson told Sergeant Fish to “put that taser down.” After Manson put his hand on his firearm, Sergeant Fish withdrew his taser, intending to draw his own gun. Sergeant Fish called for backup assistance and reported that “federal police 2 “In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Stilwell v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. App. 278, 280 n.1 (2024) (quoting Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472 (2018)). “On appeal, we discard any of appellant’s conflicting evidence, and regard as true all credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from that evidence.” Id. 3 At trial, the Commonwealth introduced a recording of the incident from the sergeant’s body-worn camera. -2- [were] threatening to shoot” him. Manson again threatened to shoot Sergeant Fish if the officer pulled out his gun. Sergeant Fish responded that if Manson was a law enforcement officer, he would know to retreat and again ordered him to “get back.” Manson retreated, but repeated his threat to shoot if the officer drew his taser or gun. After an exchange about why Sergeant Fish had apprehended James, and questioning the lawfulness of the arrest, Manson eventually walked away. When the police later arrested Manson on October 1, 2023, he possessed a badge and a United States Navy credential card. On the back of the card was a statement that read: “The person named above retired in good standing as a law enforcement officer. This card does not grant the bearer any authority to act on the agency’s behalf or to exercise any law enforcement authority. This identification card is not to be used as a LEOSA credential.” Manson testified that, before his retirement, he had served as a military police officer in Maryland and Washington, D.C., an NYPD community affairs officer, and a federal police officer for the Department of Defense. Manson stated that on August 18, 2023, he was visiting a family member in Dinwiddie County and heard a commotion outside. He observed the officer apprehending James and, “because it is a high area of drug activity and firearms,” decided to “provide aid” to Sergeant Fish. Manson claimed that when he approached Sergeant Fish, he told him he was a retired federal police officer. He said that he and the sergeant “bickered” and then he “backed off.” When questioned about his threatening statements towards the sergeant, Manson stated that he was “playacting” to protect the officer and keep the crowd away until backup arrived; Manson claimed that he did so for 20 minutes. He denied threatening Sergeant Fish with bodily harm. Manson explained that he put his hand on his weapon to prevent a member of the crowd from grabbing it. He denied that he was exercising law enforcement authority and stated he “was -3- acting as a public citizen” and “rendering aid” to the sergeant. Manson said he left the scene when he saw backup assistance arrive. The jury found Manson guilty of impersonating a law enforcement officer and feloniously obstructing justice. This appeal followed. ANALYSIS “When faced with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction, an appellate court is faced with the limited task of determining ‘whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Cuffee v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. ___, ___ (Apr. 16, 2026) (quoting Commonwealth v. Garrick, 303 Va. 176, 182 (2024)). “The judgment of the trial court is presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is ‘plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017) (quoting Code § 8.01-680). Thus, “[i]f there is evidentiary support for the conviction, a trial court’s judgment stands.” Reed v. Commonwealth, 85 Va. App. 196, 207 (2025). I. Impersonating a Police Officer Pursuant to Code § 18.2-174(A), “[a]ny person who falsely assumes or exercises the functions [of] . . . any local, city, county, state, or federal law-enforcement officer, or who, for the purpose of deceiving another, falsely assumes or pretends to be any such officer, is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.” The evidence proved that Manson tried to assert authority over Sergeant Fish by claiming to be a federal police officer, commanding the officer to put down his taser, and even threatening to shoot him. Manson also questioned whether the sergeant had probable cause to arrest James. He had a police badge displayed on his right hip and repeatedly stated he was going stand close by and watch the officer do his job. Manson claimed that he was acting as a public citizen, but the evidence showed that during the entire encounter he held -4- himself out as an authority figure, rather than standing back with the other individuals who had gathered nearby. Manson maintains that although the evidence proved he was retired from the Department of the Navy, the Commonwealth failed to exclude the reasonable hypothesis of innocence that he was a member of another law enforcement agency. “The Commonwealth need exclude only reasonable hypotheses of innocence that ‘flow from the evidence itself, and not from the imagination’ of the defendant.” Kelley v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 617, 629 (2019) (quoting Pijor, 294 Va. at 512). “Whether an alternate hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a question of fact and, therefore, is binding on appeal unless plainly wrong.” Cuffee, ___ Va. at ___ (quoting Lucas v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 334, 348 (2022)); accord Clark v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. App. 726, 752 (2023) (same). “If, based on the evidence presented, a jury reasonably rejects a proffered hypothesis of innocence, the hypothesis is not a reasonable one.” Cuffee, ___ Va. at ___. By Manson’s own testimony, he was retired and was not an active member of a law enforcement agency. Manson only named law enforcement positions he held before he retired. There was no evidence tending to prove, at the time of his encounter with Sergeant Fish, that Manson was a police officer. Accordingly, the jury reasonably rejected his hypothesis of innocence that he worked for another law enforcement agency on August 18, 2023, and the evidence was sufficient to convict him of impersonating a law enforcement officer. See id. II. Obstructing Justice “If any person by threats of bodily harm or force knowingly attempts to intimidate or impede . . . any law-enforcement officer, lawfully engaged in the discharge of his duty, . . . he is guilty of” obstruction of justice. Code § 18.2-460(C). Manson “concede[s] that the case law -5- tends to support the Commonwealth” but argues that given the “conditional” nature of his threats to shoot Sergeant Fish, the evidence was insufficient to prove the offense. We disagree. The plain language of Code § 18.2-460(C) does not differentiate between conditional and non-conditional threats. And this Court has affirmed convictions based on conditional threats of future harm. See, e.g., Polk v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 590, 592-93 (1987) (affirming conviction for obstruction of justice based on the statements, “If I lose, I’ll get you some other way,” “I’m going to get you,” and “I’m going to get even”). The Commonwealth must prove only “acts clearly indicating an intention on the part of the accused to prevent the officer from performing his duty, as to ‘obstruct’ ordinarily implies opposition or resistance by direct action.” Craddock v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 539, 553 (2003) (quoting Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 (1998)). Here, Manson repeatedly refused Sergeant Fish’s commands to “get back” when he encroached on the officer’s zone of safety. Instead, Manson moved closer to Sergeant Fish and threatened him at least three times. He repeatedly said he would shoot the sergeant if he aimed his taser or drew his gun. In furtherance of the threats, Manson placed his hand on the gun at his waistband, and the officer believed Manson intended to use it. “In its role of judging witness credibility, the fact finder is entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the accused and to conclude that the accused is lying to conceal his guilt.” Flanagan v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 681, 702 (2011) (quoting Marable v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10 (1998)). The jury had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses testifying and was entitled to disbelieve Manson’s testimony that he was “playacting” rather than making serious threats towards the sergeant. As recorded on the bodycam video, Manson repeatedly threatened Sergeant Fish with bodily harm to impede his -6- ability to make a lawful arrest. Upon this evidence, a reasonable finder of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Manson was guilty of feloniously obstructing justice. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Affirmed. -7-