State v. Castillo

This opinion is subject to revision before final publication in the Pacific Reporter 2026 UT 26 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH STATE OF UTAH, Appellee, v. SALVADOR GALLAGA CASTILLO, Appellant. No. 20230316 Heard December 8, 2025 Filed July 30, 2026 On Direct Appeal Third District Court, West Jordan The Honorable William K. Kendall No. 191404038 Attorneys: Derek E. Brown, Att’y Gen., Michael Palumbo, Asst. Solic. Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellee Andrea J. Garland, Salt Lake City, for appellant ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE POHLMAN authored the opinion of the Court, in which JUSTICE PETERSEN, JUSTICE JORGENSEN, JUSTICE DENT, and JUDGE NEIDER joined. Having recused himself, JUSTICE NIELSEN did not participate herein; DISTRICT COURT JUDGE CAMILLE L. NEIDER sat. Before this case was decided, CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT recused himself from this case and JUSTICE HAGEN stepped down from the __________________________________________________________  As of January 31, 2026, “The Supreme Court consists of seven justices.” UTAH CODE § 78A-3-101(1). Pursuant to Utah Supreme Court Standing Order No. 18, this court sat and rendered judgment in this matter as a division of five justices.  STATE v. CASTILLO Opinion of the Court court. JUSTICE JORGENSEN and JUSTICE DENT, having reviewed the briefs and listened to a recording of the oral argument, substituted for CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT and JUSTICE HAGEN and participated fully in this decision. ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE POHLMAN, opinion of the Court: INTRODUCTION ¶1 Salvador Castillo sexually abused and raped his niece (Niece) when she was a child. When Niece became an adult, she reported Castillo to local authorities, who pursued charges against him. A jury convicted Castillo on four counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child and one count of rape of a child. Castillo appeals his convictions and asserts multiple claims of error. ¶2 First, Castillo claims errors related to an expert witness, who testified at trial about his experience interviewing children and the reasons they might delay disclosing sexual abuse. Because we determine that Castillo waived much of his challenge under Utah Rule of Evidence 702 and that he has not shown why his trial counsel performed deficiently in doing so, we do not consider these challenges on appeal. Castillo also asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object, request a curative instruction, or move for mistrial when the expert testified that it is “rare” for children to make false allegations of sexual abuse. We reject this argument because Castillo has not established that his counsel performed deficiently by addressing the testimony through cross- examination and in closing argument. ¶3 Second, Castillo claims errors related to the use of the word “victim” at trial. Castillo asserts he received constitutionally ineffective assistance when his trial counsel did not at least object to the use of the word and when counsel used it himself. Castillo also asserts that the trial court plainly erred by allowing the statements. We conclude that Castillo’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by not objecting to the word “victim” or by using it himself. Reasonable trial counsel could have determined the general references to victims did not bolster Niece’s credibility or impair Castillo’s presumption of innocence. Castillo similarly has not shown that the trial court committed plain error by allowing these uses because he does not sufficiently explain what action the court should have taken or that it was obviously wrong not to intervene. 2  Cite as: 2026 UT 26 Opinion of the Court ¶4 Third, Castillo asserts he received ineffective assistance because his trial counsel did not object to Niece’s testimony about self-harm. We reject Castillo’s challenge because he has not established that his counsel performed deficiently by forgoing an objection and choosing to address the testimony on cross- examination consistent with his primary trial strategy of undermining Niece’s credibility. ¶5 Fourth, Castillo contends that under State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, 210 P.3d 288, the trial court should have disregarded Niece’s testimony as inherently improbable and therefore determined that the State’s evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Because we determine that Castillo did not preserve his inherent improbability challenge, we review the issue for ineffective assistance of counsel and conclude that he hasn’t shown his trial counsel performed deficiently by not bringing a futile motion. ¶6 Accordingly, we affirm. BACKGROUND1 The Aggravated Sexual Abuse and Rape ¶7 When Niece was five or six years old, her family immigrated to the United States and moved in with Castillo and his family. Although they later moved out, Niece and her family still visited Castillo’s house “pretty often.” And when Niece was about nine years old, Castillo started to behave in ways that she “didn’t like.” For example, he would awkwardly stare at her, and, at the end of her visits, he would kiss her on the mouth instead of on the cheek. ¶8 Then, when Niece was about nine or ten, Castillo sexually abused her “two or three times.” On one occasion, he pulled her out of the upstairs bathroom into his adjoining bedroom and touched her breasts and buttocks over her clothing. And on another occasion, Castillo again pulled Niece into his bedroom where he kissed her and told her she was beautiful and that he loved her. Castillo then touched her breasts and her vagina over and under her clothes. __________________________________________________________ 1 “When reviewing a jury verdict, we examine the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the verdict, reciting the facts accordingly. We present conflicting evidence only when necessary to understand issues raised on appeal.” State v. Hunt, 2025 UT 54, n.1, 582 P.3d 772 (cleaned up). 3  STATE v. CASTILLO Opinion of the Court ¶9 Sometime after the abuse began, Castillo started texting Niece, telling Niece that she was “precious” and that he loved her. He also instructed her to delete the messages and “not to tell [her] parents” about the abuse because he’d get in trouble and leave her cousins without a dad. That affected Niece because she “really care[d] about [her] cousins.” ¶10 Niece moved with her family to an apartment in West Jordan when she was around eleven or twelve years old. While there, Niece and her younger brother were often home alone on weekdays before school. Niece was responsible for waking up her brother, who would usually sleep until 7:00 a.m. ¶11 One morning, while her brother was asleep, Castillo knocked on the sliding glass door at the back of the apartment and asked if Niece’s father was home. When Niece said he wasn’t, Castillo came inside. Once in, Castillo started to undress himself and Niece, and he started touching her breasts and buttocks. He then started kissing Niece, grabbed her vagina, and “grab[bed] [her] hand to grab his penis.” Castillo then laid Niece on the floor and raped her, telling her that “it’s normal and this happens.” When Castillo would leave the apartment, Niece “would just cry and clean [her]self up.” Her body would shake, and she would be in pain. ¶12 Niece didn’t tell her parents about the sexual abuse or rape, but her mother eventually discovered Castillo’s text messages to Niece, including a text saying he “wanted to make love to her again.” When her mother asked Niece who the texts were from, Niece said that she didn’t know. But after her parents looked up the phone number in their own phones, they asked if the messages were from Castillo and Niece nodded yes. ¶13 Upon this discovery, Niece’s parents took her to Castillo’s home to talk to him. Castillo, Castillo’s wife, and Niece’s grandparents were at the house, but her grandparents went into the hall. Niece’s parents again asked her if anything had happened between her and Castillo, and Niece “would just cry—cry a lot” and shake her head no. She didn’t disclose what had happened because she was “embarrassed” and “didn’t want to mess up [her] family.” Also, Castillo had told her not to tell anyone, and he “was there staring at [her],” which “made [her] more uncomfortable.” ¶14 When asked to explain the text messages, Castillo initially denied sending them and suggested his seven-year-old son could have sent them. Castillo then claimed both that it was a mistake— 4  Cite as: 2026 UT 26 Opinion of the Court “he wanted to put something else” in the texts—and that they “were just messages” and not “anything important.” Later, Castillo told Niece’s parents that “he had actually tried to send those messages to another woman.” ¶15 One morning a few weeks after the confrontation, Niece’s father came home to take the children to school and found Castillo standing outside the sliding glass door. Niece’s father asked Castillo why he was there, and he said he came to talk to Niece’s mother. Niece’s father expressed some doubt because he believed Castillo knew Niece’s mother would be at work, but Castillo said that “he wanted to apologize and stuff.” When Niece’s mother arrived home, Castillo again said that “he wanted to apologize for everything that had happened.” When asked what he was apologizing for, since he had previously denied any wrongdoing, Castillo said that “he felt bad about everything” and “didn’t want to be sent to Mexico.” Castillo was crying and told Niece’s parents “that he didn’t want the same thing to happen to his daughter.” ¶16 Despite the text messages and the apologies, Niece did not disclose the rape or sexual abuse for many more years. In the meantime, Niece and her family would still visit Castillo’s house to see Niece’s grandparents and Castillo’s wife, but Niece stayed close to her mother, who “never spoke to [Castillo] again.” When Niece’s mother would occasionally ask Niece whether anything had happened with Castillo, Niece might cry and hug her mother, but she didn’t disclose the abuse because she was “scared and confused.” When Niece was about thirteen or fourteen years old, she started cutting herself and having suicidal thoughts. Niece’s Report of the Rape and Sexual Abuse ¶17 After years of denials, Niece, at twenty years old disclosed that Castillo had raped and sexually abused her as a child. Having become a mom herself, Niece knew how it felt to want to protect her daughter, so she told her mother during a shopping trip at Sam’s Club. A few months later, she also told her father and then her boyfriend, whom she later married. Niece then reported Castillo’s crimes to the police. ¶18 The State charged Castillo with four counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child and one count of rape of a child. All five charges are first-degree felonies. 5  STATE v. CASTILLO Opinion of the Court The State’s Blind Expert ¶19 Before trial, the State provided notice of its intent to call a Children’s Justice Center (CJC) forensic interviewer (Expert) to provide expert testimony about CJC interviews and the disclosure of child sexual abuse. The State proposed Expert as a “blind witness,” which means that he would not meet the victim or learn the facts of the case, and would “provide the jury with general information, rather than case-specific information.” The State explained that Expert would inform the jury about the “proper procedure for questioning children regarding possible child sexual abuse and the reasoning that undergirds those procedures,” and would “help the jury understand the dynamics of children confronted with sexual assault and how they may or may not communicate their circumstances.” ¶20 Castillo moved to exclude Expert from testifying at trial, contending among other things that the State had not satisfied the admissibility threshold of rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Specifically, Castillo argued that the State’s notice failed to show that the principles or methods underlying Expert’s anticipated testimony “(1) are reliable, (2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (3) have been reliably applied to the facts.” (Quoting UTAH R. EVID. 702(b).) ¶21 After an evidentiary hearing, the parties argued the motion. Castillo’s counsel identified two problems: (1) Expert had expertise on CJC interviews, but “there is no CJC interview for him to opine on”; and (2) the State intends to ask questions that Expert is not qualified to testify about. ¶22 Regarding the second point, counsel drew a distinction between permissible and impermissible topics of inquiry. For example, counsel asserted that he thought it “proper and okay for [Expert] to say that we have seen late reportings [of child sexual abuse], and there’s lots of reasons why someone may make a late reporting and possibly include all the possibilities.” But, counsel continued, “the problem is I don’t think he can quantify it. [And] that is my main concern about having him testify.” In other words, counsel reiterated his “main concern is not necessarily that [Expert] can say there’s lots of reasons for late reporting, such as fear, retaliation, uncertainty.” In fact, he was “okay with that kind of stuff.” What caused him concern was Expert’s attempts to “quantify[] things without studies” and to testify that certain reporting behaviors are “common” or “rare.” 6  Cite as: 2026 UT 26 Opinion of the Court ¶23 In response, the State explained that Expert’s testimony was “key” to the jury understanding the dynamics of intrafamilial abuse and how those dynamics affect a victim’s disclosure of sexual abuse. And when pressed by the court about defense counsel’s concern over quantifying experiences, the State conceded that “exact numbers and percentages” may be prohibited. However, the State pushed back on defense counsel’s view that Expert testifying about certain behaviors being “common” or “rare” is inappropriate. ¶24 In rebuttal, defense counsel began by asserting, “Again, don’t have an issue of generalities of possible explanations.” Instead, his concern was with Expert testifying that certain reporting behaviors were common or rare when Expert had not “scientifically verified” those quantitative assessments. According to counsel, Expert could not quantify certain reporting behaviors because Expert had not conclusively determined whether the children reporting child abuse to him were telling the truth about the abuse. ¶25 After taking the motion to exclude Expert’s testimony under advisement, the trial court granted it in part and denied it in part. The court concluded that while Expert’s testimony was admissible under rule 702, its scope was limited to “the behavioral characteristics of child abuse victims and the reasons they might make multiple or differing disclosures about the abuse they suffered.” And the court specifically concluded that “it would be improper for [Expert] to express opinion on the frequency of false accusations, either in the form of numerical probability or by using terms like ‘common’ or ‘rare.’” ¶26 At trial, Expert testified that in the six years he had worked as an interviewer at the CJC, he had interviewed almost 900 children. He also testified that as part of his duties, he reviewed literature in the field of child abuse. Expert further explained that he was unfamiliar with the facts of the case and that he was there “to provide general information to the . . . jury about child abuse.” ¶27 When asked if, based on his experience, children report sexual abuse “right away,” Expert said, “Not always.” And when asked why, Expert said that very young children may not understand that abuse has occurred, while other children may fear the consequences of disclosure—for example, children may have been told not to tell or have been threatened, they may fear not being believed, and they may believe that the abuse was their fault. 7  STATE v. CASTILLO Opinion of the Court He also explained that some of the children he interviewed delayed disclosure “for a substantial period of time.” ¶28 The State then asked Expert to explain why a child might retract claims of sexual abuse. Expert said it could be that the allegation was false, but he opined that false allegations are “rare” and that “more often times” children retract allegations of abuse because of feelings of guilt or pressure from others. Castillo’s counsel asked to approach the bench and then requested a “short break” to “remind [Expert]” to not “make statements like rare.” And at the court’s invitation, the State took a “sidebar” with Expert after which the examination continued with the State asking Expert if familial relationships affect disclosures. Expert then testified that “a lot of times” if the perpetrator is related to the child, the child may be “more reluctant” to disclose the abuse, resulting in “delayed disclosure.” And when asked how abuse comes out, Expert said, “A lot of times the initial disclosure will come out to a trusted parent, but that’s not always the case.” Expert also testified that “typically, the longer . . . the perpetrator’s been in the child’s life, the more likely they are to delay disclosure.” This testimony came in without objection. ¶29 In cross-examining Expert, Castillo’s counsel asked Expert whether it was his job as a CJC interviewer to challenge the child’s assertions. Expert said that he might challenge what a child says in seeking clarification, but that he isn’t there to test the veracity of the child’s statements. Expert also conceded that false allegations are possible and that a child might make a false allegation “for a host of unknown reasons.” Alleged Inconsistencies ¶30 In addition to cross-examining Expert, Castillo’s counsel cross-examined the State’s witnesses and called some of his own to try to establish inconsistencies in the testimony supporting the State’s case. These alleged inconsistencies include:2 • Niece testified at trial that Castillo’s sexual abuse began when she was nine or ten years old, and that he raped her __________________________________________________________ 2 Some of the inconsistencies Castillo’s counsel suggested at trial are unsupported by the preliminary hearing transcript. But because neither Niece nor the State challenged counsel’s representations, we recite Niece’s preliminary hearing testimony consistent with those representations. 8  Cite as: 2026 UT 26 Opinion of the Court when she was eleven or twelve. Niece initially told police that “[w]hen [she] was 11 or 12 years old,” Castillo “sexually touched [her],” but that “it might have been much younger.” • The first example of sexual abuse Niece described at trial involved the touching of her breasts and buttocks. At the preliminary hearing, she testified that Castillo “touched her breasts and legs,” but said nothing about her buttocks. • Niece testified at trial that Castillo put his fingers in her vagina. At the preliminary hearing, she had testified only that he “probably” did that because she later heard that men do that “when they’re being intimate.” When asked at trial about the difference, she said that she didn’t remember at the time, and that “with time everything’s coming more back.” • Niece testified at trial that Castillo raped her “two or three times.” She initially reported to law enforcement that Castillo raped her once. When asked to explain the inconsistency, she testified that she initially underreported the instances “[b]ecause it’s embarrassing to tell people how many times it did happen.” • Niece testified at trial that she and her brother were often home alone in the mornings before school, and that her grandma would watch him “sometimes.” Castillo’s counsel asked Niece if she remembered testifying at the preliminary hearing that her brother was at her grandma’s “during the time period” of the rape. She said, “Yes, there would be times they would take him over there.” Niece’s father also testified at trial that he or his wife would take Niece’s little brother to their grandma’s house before work in the morning. • Niece testified that Castillo raped her at her family’s West Jordan apartment, and that the sexual abuse stopped after her parents discovered Castillo’s text messages on her phone. Niece’s father testified that his wife discovered Castillo’s text messages to Niece before the family moved to the West Jordan apartment. • Niece and her parents testified at trial that when the parents confronted Castillo about the text messages, Castillo’s wife and Niece’s grandpa were present. Niece’s grandpa and Castillo’s wife testified that there was no confrontation. 9  STATE v. CASTILLO Opinion of the Court • At trial, Niece testified that Castillo only denied sending the text messages when her parents confronted him. She also agreed that she previously “claim[ed] that [Castillo] apologized at that meeting.” • Niece originally testified that she “would want to cut [her]self,” and “would have thoughts about killing [her]self with pills or cutting [her] veins.” When Castillo’s counsel asked whether she had actually cut herself, she stated that it was “mostly thoughts.” But when counsel noted that she had testified during the preliminary hearing that she did, in fact, cut herself, she explained that when she was responding to counsel’s questions, she was referring to suicide, not the cutting. • Niece testified that the day she disclosed Castillo’s abuse to her mother at Sam’s Club, a family friend saw her crying. Castillo called the friend to testify at trial. While wearing a shirt with Castillo’s name on it, the friend stated that she never saw Niece crying at Sam’s Club. Niece’s DACA Status ¶31 In his opening statement at trial, Castillo’s counsel suggested that Niece accused Castillo of sexual abuse and rape “to get permanent residency” in the United States. ¶32 On direct examination, Niece addressed her immigration status. She testified that she is authorized to work through the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. Niece also testified that she has not pursued any other immigration status other than what is provided by DACA. ¶33 Castillo’s counsel cross-examined Niece about her status, but she denied that she was afraid of deportation or that she had spoken to others about the ability to get permanent legal status in the United States if she was a crime victim. Castillo also called an immigration attorney to testify about DACA and ways someone in the DACA program can obtain a path to citizenship. The expert testified that there is no pathway to citizenship through DACA, but that a person may be able to obtain a U visa if the person is the “victim of a fairly heinous crime” and they participate in a criminal prosecution. 10  Cite as: 2026 UT 26 Opinion of the Court Use of the Word “Victim” at Trial ¶34 During the trial, some of the State’s witnesses used the word “victim.” • When explaining why a child might delay disclosing sexual abuse, Expert said it could be due to the perpetrator’s “relationship with the victim.” • Expert opined that “if the perpetrator relationship to the victim or to the child is . . . a familial one, they may be more reluctant [to disclose abuse].” • A detective called by the State identified himself as a “detective for the special victims unit.” • Castillo’s trial counsel asked Expert on cross-examination: “And your testimony today is just talking about your own personal experiences and what you’ve seen and what some studies have said, various different reasons why child victims may or may not make statements timely and piecemeal, all that; correct?” • Referring to Expert, the prosecutor argued in closing, “He gave you a lot of reasons why in his experience interviewing children they don’t want to talk about abuse right away. A lot of those were present here—familial relationship, pressure put on the victim.” End of Trial ¶35 At the close of evidence, Castillo moved for a directed verdict, seeking the dismissal of all counts. Castillo’s argument, in its entirety, was that there was “not credible sufficient evidence that a jury could find proof beyond a reasonable doubt that these cases were committed.” The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the State had presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could convict Castillo of the charged crimes. ¶36 During closing argument, Castillo’s counsel focused on the inconsistencies in and contradictions between the witnesses’ testimonies. He also addressed Expert’s testimony, telling the jury that “what we heard from [Expert] when he talked about children statements, he said something very crucial. . . . False allegations occur; and they occur for a host of unknown reasons.” 11  STATE v. CASTILLO Opinion of the Court ¶37 After deliberating, the jury found Castillo guilty on all four counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child and guilty on the count of rape of a child. Castillo appeals. ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶38 Castillo first contends that the trial court erred in admitting Expert’s testimony under rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. We review preserved challenges to the admission of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Lopez, 2018 UT 5, ¶ 18, 417 P.3d 116. Castillo contends that, to the extent we conclude his rule 702 evidentiary challenge to be unpreserved, his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Because that issue is raised for the first time on appeal, there is no standard of review. See State v. Hunt, 2025 UT 54, ¶ 35, 582 P.3d 772. ¶39 Castillo next contends that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not objecting to or seeking a mistrial when Expert testified that false allegations of child sexual abuse are rare; for not objecting to use of the word “victim” at trial and for using the word himself; for not objecting to Niece’s testimony about the emotional and psychological impact of the sexual abuse; and for not preserving an inherent improbability argument. Castillo also contends that the trial court committed plain error in “allowing” the use of the word “victim” by witnesses and counsel. There is no standard of review because Castillo raises these claims for the first time on appeal. See id. ¶40 Lastly, Castillo contends that because Niece’s testimony was inherently improbable, the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict. We review a trial court’s denial of a directed verdict for correctness. State v. Stricklan, 2020 UT 65, ¶ 30, 477 P.3d 1251. ANALYSIS ¶41 Castillo argues that his convictions cannot stand for several reasons. He first claims errors in the trial court’s admittance of Expert’s testimony and constitutionally deficient assistance in his trial counsel’s response to that testimony. Castillo then claims errors by the trial court and ineffective assistance by his trial counsel for their handling of statements at trial using the word “victim.” Next, he claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not objecting to Niece’s testimony about self-harm. He then claims that we should disregard Niece’s testimony as inherently improbable and determine there isn’t sufficient evidence 12  Cite as: 2026 UT 26 Opinion of the Court to support Castillo’s convictions. Finally, Castillo asks us to cumulate his asserted errors if any alone doesn’t warrant reversal. We address each contention in turn and ultimately deny them all. I. EXPERT TESTIMONY AND RULE 702 ¶42 Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence permits opinion testimony from “a witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” But that expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge must “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” UTAH R. EVID. 702(a). And before that knowledge serves as a basis for that testimony, the rule requires that there be a “showing that the principles or methods” underlying that testimony (1) are reliable, (2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (3) have been reliably applied to the facts. Id. R. 702(b). This “threshold showing . . . is satisfied if the underlying principles or methods, including the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by the relevant expert community.” Id. R. 702(c). ¶43 Castillo contends that the trial court erred in admitting Expert’s testimony because, according to Castillo, Expert’s testimony about the behaviors and disclosures of sexually abused children did not meet the threshold admissibility requirements of rule 702(b). Specifically, Castillo argues that Expert’s methods were unreliable, his testimony was based on insufficient facts or data, and Expert’s methods were neither reliably applied to the facts of this case nor generally accepted. Castillo insists that his trial counsel preserved this issue in the trial court. But, if we disagree, he also argues that counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to preserve it. He also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to or requesting a mistrial or curative instruction for Expert’s testimony “that false allegations are rare.” ¶44 As we explain below, we conclude that Castillo’s arguments under rule 702(b) are not preserved for our review because they were abandoned in the trial court and are therefore waived. We also conclude that Castillo has not overcome the strong presumption that his counsel’s decisions relative to Expert’s testimony fell within the range of reasonable professional assistance. 13  STATE v. CASTILLO Opinion of the Court A. Castillo Waived Many of His Reliability and Sufficiency Arguments Under Rule 702 ¶45 Castillo contends that he preserved his rule 702(b) objections in his pretrial motion and the ensuing arguments related to Expert’s testimony. The State argues that Castillo intentionally abandoned many of his reliability and sufficiency arguments below. We agree with the State. ¶46 We have said that “[w]aiver, in the context of raising an issue before a court, is generally the relinquishment or abandonment of an issue before a trial or appellate court.” State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 16 n.4, 416 P.3d 443. “Waiver may be express, such as through a stipulation of the parties,” or it may be “implied, such as by failing to raise an issue or argument at the required time.” Id. And we agree with other courts that have “held that an abandoned objection is waived.” United States v. Carrasco-Salazar, 494 F.3d 1270, 1272–73 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing United States Supreme Court and circuit authority for the proposition that a party waives its objection when it abandons it). Also, Utah’s appellate courts have “decline[d] to review an alleged error . . . when ‘counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the trial court that he or she had no objection to the proceedings.’” Butterfield v. Sevier Valley Hosp., 2010 UT App 357, ¶ 23, 246 P.3d 120 (cleaned up) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ¶ 54, 70 P.3d 111). ¶47 For example, in State v. Gilling, 2025 UT App 125, 576 P.3d 1170, our court of appeals concluded that counsel’s initial evidentiary objection was waived when counsel later represented that counsel was “okay with” a question that arguably violated the court’s earlier evidentiary ruling. Id. ¶ 31. Similarly, in State v. Tafuna, 2012 UT App 243, 286 P.3d 340, the court concluded that counsel waived any objection to a juror’s partiality or ability to serve when counsel had an opportunity to object but stated that he thought the juror would be a “conscious and a good juror.”3 Id. ¶ 15. __________________________________________________________ 3 Utah courts, at times, have referred to such waivers as “invited error,” which precludes the ability of a party to seek plain error review on appeal. See, e.g., Butterfield, 2010 UT App 357, ¶¶ 23–24; State v. Williams, 2020 UT App 67, ¶ 33, 462 P.3d 832. That overlap is perhaps understandable given that “invited error is a species of (continued . . .) 14  Cite as: 2026 UT 26 Opinion of the Court ¶48 Here, Castillo waived many of his arguments about reliability and the sufficiency of facts and data during oral argument on his motion to exclude Expert’s testimony. Although he had argued in his written motion that Expert’s anticipated testimony did not meet any of the three threshold admissibility requirements of rule 702(b), during the argument he conceded that certain topics were “proper and okay.” For example, Castillo argued that he thought it was appropriate for Expert to say that he has seen delayed reports of child sexual abuse and to explain that there are “lots of reasons” for someone to delay reporting and to identify what those are. He even anticipated that Expert would testify that a child might delay reporting due to “fear, retaliation, [or] uncertainty,” and that he was “okay with that kind of stuff.” What concerned him instead was the possibility that Expert would quantify those reporting behaviors and testify that certain behaviors are “common” or “rare.” See supra ¶ 22. ¶49 These assertions by Castillo’s counsel to the trial court waived his objection to the reliability and sufficiency of Expert’s testimony insofar as it related to the reasons a child might delay reporting sexual abuse. Castillo repeatedly assured the trial court that he did not object to Expert testifying about the behaviors of children reporting child abuse, including that they sometimes delay reporting for a variety of reasons. Thus, we will not consider his challenge to this testimony on appeal. See Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 16 (noting that when an “issue is waived” it “will typically not be addressed” on appeal).4 __________________________________________________________ waiver.” Williams, 2020 UT App 67, ¶ 33 (cleaned up). For purposes of this case, we need not decide whether Castillo’s counsel’s statements rose to the level of invited error because Castillo doesn’t seek plain error review of this issue. It is enough that the relevant objections were waived. 4 Castillo asks, in the alternative, that we review the waived portions of his rule 702 argument through the lens of ineffective assistance of counsel. This argument is inadequately briefed. Castillo contends that counsel performed deficiently in not preserving the argument, but he does not attempt to demonstrate that it was unreasonable for counsel to make the choices he did in challenging Expert’s testimony. Castillo must show not only that the testimony about reporting was inadmissible under rule 702, but (continued . . .) 15  STATE v. CASTILLO Opinion of the Court ¶50 Before leaving this topic, we note that Castillo did not abandon his argument that it would be improper for Expert to quantify reporting behaviors. The trial court agreed with Castillo on this part of his argument and ruled that it would not allow Expert to opine “on the frequency of false accusations, either in the form of numerical probability or by using terms like ‘common’ or ‘rare.’” Still, despite the court’s order, Expert’s testimony strayed into this area at trial, and Castillo has argued that his counsel performed deficiently by not objecting to that testimony or seeking other relief. Thus, we address that argument below. B. Castillo Has Not Shown that His Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance in Addressing Expert’s Testimony ¶51 Castillo contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not objecting to Expert’s testimony that false reports of child sexual abuse are “rare” or, alternatively, not moving for a mistrial or requesting a curative instruction to address it. Castillo has not shown that his counsel’s performance was deficient. ¶52 Pretrial, the trial court ruled that “it would be improper” for Expert to opine on the frequency of false accusations, including by labeling them “rare.” Still, when the State asked Expert to explain why a child might retract claims of sexual abuse, Expert said it could be that the allegation was false and then remarked that false allegations are “rare.” ¶53 Rather than object to the testimony as outside the bounds of the court’s pretrial order, Castillo’s counsel requested a “short break” so that Expert could be reminded not to quantify reporting behaviors and use terms like “rare.” Castillo also points to Expert’s use of the words “typically,” “often,” or “a lot of times,” when testifying about the effect of a familial relationship on a child’s disclosure of sexual abuse. This testimony came in without objection. __________________________________________________________ that it was unreasonable for counsel not to make concessions under the circumstances. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (stating that courts “indulge a strong presumption” of reasonable assistance, so a “defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy” (cleaned up)). Having not engaged in that analysis, Castillo’s claim fails. 16  Cite as: 2026 UT 26 Opinion of the Court ¶54 We e