Full Opinion

This opinion is subject to revision before final publication in the Pacific Reporter 2026 UT 34 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH STATE OF UTAH, Appellant, v. ALEXANDER JOHN BOWCUT, Appellee. No. 20230609 Heard November 3, 2025 Filed November 19, 2026 On Direct Appeal Third District Court, Salt Lake County The Honorable Kara L. Pettit No. 181908051 Attorneys: Derek E. Brown, Att’y Gen., David A. Simpson, Deputy Solic. Gen., William M. Hains, Asst. Solic. Gen., Salt Lake City, for appellant Michael D. Zimmerman, LaShel Shaw, Ann Marie Taliaferro, Salt Lake City, for appellee JUSTICE PETERSEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which INTERIM CHIEF JUSTICE POHLMAN, JUDGE LUTHY, and JUDGE MABEY joined. JUSTICE NIELSEN authored an opinion concurring in the judgment. __________________________________________________________  As of January 31, 2026, “The Supreme Court consists of seven justices.” UTAH CODE § 78A-3-101(1). Pursuant to Utah Supreme Court Standing Orders No. 18 and 19, this court sat and rendered judgment in this matter as a division of five justices. STATE v. BOWCUT Opinion of the Court Due to his retirement, JUSTICE PEARCE did not participate herein; DISTRICT COURT JUDGE JENNIFER A. MABEY sat. Before this case was decided, CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT recused himself from this case and JUSTICE HAGEN stepped down from the court. JUSTICE NIELSEN and COURT OF APPEALS JUDGE JOHN D. LUTHY, having reviewed the briefs and listened to a recording of the oral argument, substituted for CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT and JUSTICE HAGEN and participated fully in this decision. JUSTICE JORGENSEN, JUSTICE DENT, JUSTICE BELL, and JUSTICE MENSSEN became members of the Court after oral argument in this matter and did not participate. JUSTICE PETERSEN, opinion of the Court: INTRODUCTION ¶1 After a jury convicted Alexander Bowcut of rape, he challenged his conviction on the basis of juror misconduct. He asserted that a juror who served on his case had been dishonest during jury selection, and that honest answers would have justified striking the juror for cause. The district court agreed with Bowcut and granted him a new trial. ¶2 A party moving for a new trial based on juror dishonesty during jury selection must demonstrate that “a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire” and that “a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984). “Both elements are necessary to successfully challenge the participation of the juror in question.” State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 104, 299 P.3d 892 (cleaned up). ¶3 Here, the district court found that the juror’s answers were false because she omitted information that the court concluded she should have provided. We emphasize, however, that the falsity analysis requires courts to look carefully at the questions asked. Here, the juror was asked general, high-level questions. And she provided general, high-level answers that were substantively accurate. Bowcut could have asked additional follow-up questions to obtain more details. But he did not. And the juror was not dishonest for failing to provide specifics that were never requested. Ultimately, the fact that the juror’s answers lacked certain information is a reflection of the questions asked, not dishonesty. 2 Cite as: 2026 UT 34 Opinion of the Court ¶4 On this basis, we determine that some of the district court’s falsity determinations were clearly erroneous. And we conclude that the remaining inaccuracies in the juror’s answers do not provide a basis to strike her for cause. ¶5 Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order arresting judgment and granting a new trial, and we reinstate Bowcut’s conviction. BACKGROUND ¶6 Alexander Bowcut was charged with one count of rape and two counts of forcible sodomy. The jury acquitted him of the forcible sodomy charges but convicted him of rape. He moved the district court to arrest the judgment or order a new trial, arguing that one juror—Juror 21—had committed misconduct by answering questions dishonestly during jury selection. The district court agreed and granted Bowcut’s motion. Jury Selection ¶7 Shortly before trial, the district court sent prospective jurors a written questionnaire, which they were to complete and return. Relevant here, the questionnaire asked jurors whether they were “related to or close friends with an attorney.” Juror 21 answered “Yes.” ¶8 On the first day of trial, the district court began voir dire1 and advised the jury pool—also referred to as the “venire”—that the charges against Bowcut “involve[d] rape and forcible sodomy.” After explaining other trial logistics, the court posed a series of questions to the venire. Relevant here, the court reiterated that the “case involve[d] allegations of sexual misconduct” and asked if there was “any reason” prospective jurors “would not be entering with an open mind.” Juror 21 did not respond affirmatively to this question. Later, the court asked if anyone had “ever been involved in any groups whose goals are to make changes in the criminal justice system.” Juror 21 raised her hand. Juror 21 also raised her hand when the court asked the venire, “Have you, any of your family members, or close personal friends ever been employed by __________________________________________________________ 1 Voir dire “refers to the jury-selection phase of a trial.” Voir Dire, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). It is the “preliminary examination of a prospective juror by a judge or lawyer to decide whether the prospect is qualified and suitable to serve on a jury.” Id. 3 STATE v. BOWCUT Opinion of the Court or volunteered in any way with a victim support or advocacy group or a group that advocates [for] changes in criminal laws?” ¶9 The court then followed up individually with jurors based on their responses to the written questionnaire and the questions asked of the jury pool. Addressing Juror 21, the district court asked about her involvement in the groups she had indicated. Involvement in Victim Support or Advocacy Groups Q: So you raised your hand on a couple of those questions. Let me start there. As far as . . . involve[ment] in groups whose goals are to make changes in the criminal justice system, as well as victim support or advocacy groups. Can you explain the nature of your involvement in those different groups? A: Yeah. [A]s far as victims, I am a member of the Victims’ Rights Community Group. I’ve been on that one not quite a year. And as far as . . . I do not have any . . . personal contact with any of the victims [on] the different things that we’ve had to address, like compensation or anything like that. Just being able to listen to some of the -- some of the funds that have been allocated . . . for victims of crimes that -- Q: Okay. So it’s a committee that would -- you would approve disbursements to different individuals, or what’s the -- A: Yes. Yes. Q: And how often does that group meet? A: We meet about every three months. Q: Okay. Who else is on it with you? A: Ooh, I don’t remember their names. It’s about seven of us. Q: Okay. Is there anybody from the Salt Lake District Attorney’s Office? A: No. Q: Any criminal defense attorneys on it? A: No, I don’t think so. 4 Cite as: 2026 UT 34 Opinion of the Court Involvement in the Association ¶10 The court then asked Juror 21 about the other group with which she had indicated involvement. Q: Okay. And then what about the group that you’ve been involved with whose goals are to make changes in the criminal justice system? A: That’s through the [Association].2 I’m President of the [Association], and we work with just different community groups, law enforcement, legislators, you know, overall things like that. Things that might be any type of legislation that we could make changes on. ¶11 The court then asked whether Juror 21’s “involvement in either of those capacities would affect [her] ability to be fair and impartial to both sides, knowing the nature of this case.” And Juror 21 answered, “No.” Familial Relations or Close Friendships with Attorneys ¶12 The district court then asked about one of Juror 21’s answers on the written questionnaire. Q: And then the next question on the questionnaire was whether you are related or close friends with an attorney, and you indicated, [“Yes.”] Can you elaborate? A: Yes. Through my [Association], I work with attorneys throughout the state just for different, you know, issues or cases, some that serve on the Executive Committee for the [Association]. But none that I have, you know, worked with or be[en] involved in cases, where I wouldn’t be able to be . . . regardless of what’s going on, I would be able to look at it fairly. Q: Okay. Do you know if any of them have a criminal defense or prosecution practice? A: I think one might have some practice in criminal. __________________________________________________________ 2 While Juror 21 identified the name of the organization with which she was involved, we refer to it in general terms to protect Juror 21’s privacy. 5 STATE v. BOWCUT Opinion of the Court ¶13 When Juror 21 named that attorney, the court asked, “Do you talk with her about her caseload at all or her work?” And Juror 21 answered, “No.” Follow-up Questions from Defense Counsel ¶14 The court then asked the parties if they had any questions for Juror 21. The State had no additional questions. The defense inquired further about Juror 21’s community involvement: Q: [I]n your work with the -- it sounds like it might be the Crime Victims Reparations Fund. So you’re paying -- oftentimes, paying out funds prior to an adjudication in the criminal case. So would your work, essentially -- assuming that someone is a victim prior to adjudication in court . . . -- would you carry that view into this case if selected? A: No, I would not. Q: Okay. So your work on that board, would there be any potential where it could impact you from just analyzing this case by the facts that you hear and the evidence? A: No. ¶15 The defense posed no further questions about Juror 21’s involvement with this board, nor did it ask any questions about her involvement with the Association, her work with attorneys in her capacity as president of the Association, or her work with law enforcement. ¶16 Both parties declined to challenge Juror 21 for cause, and Juror 21 was seated on the jury. At trial, she served as foreperson and delivered the jury’s verdict. Verdict and Post-Verdict Motion ¶17 The jury convicted Bowcut of rape and acquitted him of both counts of forcible sodomy. Bowcut subsequently filed a “Motion to Arrest Judgment or Alternatively, Motion for New Trial.” He argued, among other things, that Juror 21 had committed misconduct by failing to: honestly and accurately answer[] the voir dire questions about her strong personal biases, her position on the board of the [Utah Office for Victims of Crime], her involvement in sexual assault cases, 6 Cite as: 2026 UT 34 Opinion of the Court specific legislation that she has worked on, legislation that she has supported and advocated for, and her relationships with prosecutors. ¶18 With respect to the victim support group, Bowcut asserted that Juror 21 had been dishonest because she misidentified the name of the group, understated its work on behalf of crime victims, and failed to say that Davis County Attorney Troy Rawlings was also on the board. Specifically, while Juror 21 had stated that she was on the “Victims’ Rights Community Group,” Bowcut asserted that she was actually on the board of the “Utah Office for Victims of Crime (UOVC).” He also claimed that the mission of the UOVC was broader than merely the disbursement of funds to victims, and he quoted its “explicit mission” as being “to advocate for the rights and needs of crime victims in Utah by assisting in their restoration through financial compensation and other victim services.” He also produced meeting minutes indicating that at one meeting, the board discussed an agenda item called, “Sexual Assault Initiatives,” and that at another meeting, the board discussed an increase in compensation for Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) exams.3 ¶19 Bowcut also offered evidence that as the president of the Association, Juror 21 had advocated for various pieces of legislation supporting sexual assault survivors and other crime victims. And he argued that her failure to mention her work on this legislation was dishonest. ¶20 Finally, Bowcut argued that “the most glaring omission” was in Juror 21’s answers about her relationships with prosecuting attorneys. For example, Bowcut produced social media posts showing Salt Lake County District Attorney Sim Gill speaking to a conference hosted by the Association, with Juror 21 standing to the side of the podium; a post from Juror 21 of a photo of Gill and a state senator at a street-naming event; photos of Juror 21 and multiple others, including Gill, at the state capitol; photos of Juror 21 and multiple others, including Attorney General Sean Reyes, at a banquet hosted by the Association at which Reyes spoke; posts indicating that Attorney General Reyes had asked Juror 21 to serve on an Opioid Task Force and to attend a luncheon __________________________________________________________ 3 A SANE exam is a medical forensic assessment for patients who have experienced sexual assault. 7 STATE v. BOWCUT Opinion of the Court featuring Yusef Salaam;4 and a post advertising a “Hatch Center webinar,” which featured a panel discussion that included Attorney General Reyes, Juror 21, and five others. ¶21 The district court granted Bowcut’s motion. It agreed that Juror 21 had provided dishonest answers in voir dire, reasoning that Juror 21 had failed to disclose information “that would have been responsive to the questions asked.” The court based its decision on a number of findings. It observed that when Juror 21 was asked about her involvement in groups whose goals are to make changes in the criminal justice system, she answered broadly that the Association works with “different community groups, law enforcement, legislators . . . [on] any type of legislation that we could make changes on,“ but did not identify specific legislation she had worked on involving sexual assault. And the court found that Juror 21 “advocat[ed] for changes to Utah’s rape law,” including a bill “that would require affirmative consent for sexual conduct.” It also found that Juror 21 was “instrumental in passing” a different victims’ rights bill and had recently posted on social media about improvements that should be made to the bill. ¶22 Additionally, the court found that Juror 21 had misstated or omitted information about the victim support group with which she was involved. The court found that the group “was actually the Utah Office of Victims of Crime”; she had served on it “for more than two years, not less than a year”; its mission was not “just disbursing funds” but also “advocat[ing] for the rights and needs of crime victims”; and at one meeting held “shortly before” Bowcut’s trial, “sexual assault initiatives were discussed.” ¶23 Finally, the court found that despite the social media posts showing that Juror 21 associated with District Attorney Gill and Attorney General Reyes at civic events, she “[d]id not disclose working with them at all.” The court found that Juror 21 had an “ongoing relationship and association” with Gill and that “he is one of the attorneys that she works throughout the state with that does __________________________________________________________ 4 Yusef Salaam is a member of the “Central Park Five,” a group of young Black and Latino men who were wrongfully convicted in the 1989 “Central Park jogger” case and were later exonerated. Yusef Salaam Biography, N.Y.C. COUNCIL, https://council.nyc. gov/yusef-salaam/ (last visited May 5, 2026). Salaam is now a speaker, activist, and poet, id., and was visiting Salt Lake City to talk about his experiences. 8 Cite as: 2026 UT 34 Opinion of the Court have, clearly, a public and well-known, high-profile prosecution practice.” The district court found that Juror 21’s failure to supply these details made her responses “objectively inaccurate.” ¶24 The court then determined that, had Juror 21 disclosed this information, the court “would have stricken her for cause.” The court looked to rule 18(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides grounds for striking a juror for cause. The court concluded that, had it known of “the ongoing association and working relationship between Juror 21 and Mr. Gill, as well as her advocating for victims’ rights legislation over the past decade,” the court “would not have been convinced” that Juror 21 “would have been able to act fairly and impartially.” And this finding, in turn, would have led the court to strike the juror for cause. ¶25 Because it concluded that “Juror 21 failed to disclose material information in response to material questions that were asked during the voir dire process, which information, if disclosed, would have supported a valid basis to challenge the juror for cause,” the district court granted Bowcut’s motion.5 ¶26 The State timely appealed. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶27 We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to grant a new trial. State v. Torres-Orellana, 2024 UT 46, ¶ 6, 562 P.3d 706.6 “We review the legal standards applied by the trial court . . . for correctness and review the trial court’s factual findings for __________________________________________________________ 5 In granting Bowcut’s motion, the district court did not distinguish between his requests to arrest the judgment and to order a new trial. 6 While Bowcut styled his motion as a motion to arrest the judgment or, alternatively, a motion for a new trial, we do not distinguish between the two motions because the district court did not distinguish between them, and they are both governed by the same standard of review. See State v. Billingsley, 2013 UT 17, ¶ 23, 311 P.3d 995 (“The trial court abused its discretion when it arrested judgment and granted a new trial.”); State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 265–66 (Utah 1998) (applying an abuse of discretion standard where the defendant challenged the denial of his motions to arrest judgment and to grant a new trial). 9 STATE v. BOWCUT Opinion of the Court clear error.” State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 103, 299 P.3d 892 (cleaned up). ¶28 Here, the district court granted Bowcut a new trial based on juror dishonesty during voir dire. To prevail on such a claim, the movant must first show that “a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire.” McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984). This is a factual question, which we review for clear error. State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1992); State v. Shipp, 2005 UT 35, ¶ 20, 116 P.3d 317. Second, the movant must show that “a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” Thomas, 830 P.2d at 245 (cleaned up). We review this determination for an abuse of discretion. West v. Holley, 2004 UT 97, ¶¶ 11, 13, 103 P.3d 708. ANALYSIS ¶29 The State argues that Bowcut should not receive a new trial because Juror 21 was not dishonest in her responses, and the additional information the district court determined Juror 21 should have provided does not justify striking her for cause. ¶30 We first review whether Juror 21 provided objectively false answers to material questions on voir dire. We conclude that, for the most part, she did not. Most of Juror 21’s answers were correct, as far as they went; she just did not include additional details that the district court found she should have provided. While an omission can make an answer objectively false, careful attention must be paid to the questions that prompted the answers. When we do that, we conclude that most of Juror 21’s responses were true. And we conclude that the district court clearly erred in finding these answers to be false. However, two of Juror 21’s answers were incorrect. She misstated the name of the victim reparations board on which she served. And she said she had served on the board for under a year when she had actually served for more than two years. ¶31 With respect to these two answers, we move to step two of the McDonough test. And we conclude that correct responses would not have provided a valid basis to strike Juror 21 for cause. And as both falsity and cause “are necessary to successfully challenge the participation of the juror,” State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 104, 299 P.3d 892 (cleaned up), a failure to satisfy either element justifies denying a new trial motion. 10 Cite as: 2026 UT 34 Opinion of the Court ¶32 Accordingly, because erroneous factual findings undermine the new trial order, we reverse. See Smith v. Volkswagen SouthTowne, Inc., 2022 UT 29, ¶ 100, 513 P.3d 729 (“An abuse of discretion exists . . . where there is no evidentiary basis for the trial court’s ruling.” (cleaned up)). I. JUROR 21 GAVE TWO FALSE ANSWERS TO MATERIAL QUESTIONS A. This Court’s Interpretation of the McDonough Standard ¶33 Under McDonough, a party moving for a new trial must first show “that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire.” McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984). Thus, this element has two components: (1) a material question; and (2) a dishonest answer. ¶34 In McDonough, the U.S. Supreme Court did not discuss the meaning of “material” in the specific context of voir dire questions. Generally, “material” means having “a natural tendency to influence, or [being] capable of influencing” the relevant decisionmaker. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999) (cleaned up) (defining materiality in the context of fraud); see also Material, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (defining “material” as being “[o]f such a nature that knowledge of the item would affect a person’s decision-making”); UTAH CODE § 76-8-501(2) (defining “material” in the perjury context as “capable of affecting the course or outcome of an official proceeding”). This general definition of material, however, does not identify which decision the “material question” must tend to influence. ¶35 Other courts that have examined the meaning of “material question” in the McDonough context have concluded that “a voir dire question is material if a response to it ‘has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing,’ the judge’s impartiality determination.” Sampson v. United States, 724 F.3d 150, 165 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 16); see also Cooke v. State, 97 A.3d 513, 555 n.270 (Del. 2014) (citing the standard from Sampson); Martin v. State, 322 So. 3d 25, 34–35 (Fla. 2021) (employing the same standard). ¶36 We agree with this definition. McDonough rejected the notion that a new trial was required where a juror’s dishonest answer to a voir dire question prejudiced a party’s exercise of a peremptory challenge. 464 U.S. at 549. Thus, materiality does not refer to the impact of the question on a party’s decision of whether to use a peremptory challenge. Rather, McDonough held that a new 11 STATE v. BOWCUT Opinion of the Court trial is not required unless “a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” Id. at 556. Accordingly, we hold that a voir dire question is material if a response to it would tend to influence a district court’s decision of whether to remove a juror for cause. ¶37 A dishonest answer to a material question is one that was “false at the time it was given.” State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 105, 299 P.3d 892. We have said that this is an objective, not a subjective, standard. State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 246 (Utah 1992); Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶¶ 105, 107, 110–12. ¶38 In Thomas, we noted that some other courts had interpreted McDonough’s first step to be satisfied only when prospective jurors subjectively knew their answers to be false, while other courts had read McDonough to set an objective standard in which jurors’ subjective intent was irrelevant. Thomas, 830 P.2d at 246. This court saw the objective standard as the “better- reasoned approach” and adopted it. Id. Thus, since Thomas, we have treated prospective jurors’ intentionally dishonest answers and inadvertently incorrect answers the same for purposes of the McDonough analysis, on the theory that an answer that a prospective juror “subjectively believes to be an honest [one]” may nonetheless be “objectively incorrect and therefore suggest[] that the individual would be a biased juror in the particular case.” Id. (quoting McDonough, 464 U.S. at 559 (Brennan, J., concurring)); cf. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 111 (concluding that a juror’s response was not “objectively dishonest in light of the ambiguous nature of the question”); State v. Shipp, 2005 UT 35, ¶ 22, 116 P.3d 317 (concluding that a juror who responded accurately to the question posed “did not fail to answer truthfully”). Thus, it may often be the case that “dishonest” is a misnomer, and we may use more fitting terms, like false, incorrect, or inaccurate.7 __________________________________________________________ 7 The State asks us to revisit and overturn the objective standard we adopted in State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 246 (Utah 1992). And the concurrence agrees, arguing that the Thomas court misinterpreted McDonough on this point. See infra ¶¶ 75–95. Both the concurrence and the State raise some thought-provoking points. But ultimately, this case does not turn on whether the first step of the McDonough analysis should be objective or subjective. Thus, we leave for another day whether and how a prospective juror’s intent factors into the falsity analysis. 12 Cite as: 2026 UT 34 Opinion of the Court ¶39 Both misstatements and omissions may constitute a false answer. See West v. Holley, 2004 UT 97, ¶ 11, 103 P.3d 708. However, a juror’s answer is not objectively false where it “incorrect[ly] predict[s] . . . how [the] juror will behave in a certain instance,” Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 105 (cleaned up); omits subject matter not inquired about in voir dire, see Thomas, 830 P.2d at 246; or “fails to reveal relevant information because of a clearly ambiguous question,” id. B. Juror 21’s Challenged Answers ¶40 The district court found that Juror 21 gave false answers about “the nature of her involvement” with “victim support or advocacy groups” and “groups whose goals are to make changes in the criminal justice system,” and about her relationships with attorneys—most importantly Salt Lake County District Attorney Sim Gill and, to a lesser extent, Attorney General Sean Reyes. ¶41 As a threshold matter, we agree with the district court that these are material questions. The nature and degree of a juror’s involvement in victim-support or criminal-justice-reform groups, and a juror’s close personal relationships with attorneys— especially prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys—are relevant to impartiality in criminal cases. Thus, answers to these questions would tend to influence a trial court’s decision about whether a juror should be stricken for cause. ¶42 We now move to the district court’s findings that Juror 21 answered these material questions falsely. 1. Membership on the Crime Victim Reparations and Assistance Board ¶43 We first analyze the district court’s finding that Juror 21 falsely “explain[ed] the nature of [her] involvement” in “victim support or advocacy groups.” In doing so, we pay close attention to the questions that Juror 21 was asked. ¶44 Early in the voir dire process, the district court asked the venire if any of them had “ever been employed by or volunteered in any way with a victim support or advocacy group or a group that advocates [for] changes in criminal laws.” And Juror 21 raised her hand. ¶45 Later, the court followed up with her individually and asked her to “explain the nature of [her] involvement” in the group. She answered: 13 STATE v. BOWCUT Opinion of the Court Yeah. [A]s far as victims, I am a member of the Victims’ Rights Community Group. I’ve been on that one not quite a year. And as far as . . . I do not have any . . . personal contact with any of the victims [on] the different things that we’ve had to address, like compensation or anything like that. Just being able to listen to some of the -- some of the funds that have been allocated . . . for victims of crimes . . . ¶46 The court then asked a series of specific questions about the group. In response, Juror 21 affirmed that the group “would approve disbursements to different individuals.” And she explained that the group met about every three months, that there were about seven members, and that she could not remember the other members’ names. The court then asked whether anyone from the Salt Lake District Attorney’s Office or any criminal defense attorneys were members of the group, and Juror 21 said she did not think so. ¶47 Bowcut’s counsel then had an opportunity to ask Juror 21 follow-up questions. Based on her answers up to that point, he surmised that the group “sound[ed] like it might be the Crime Victims Reparations Fund.” Counsel asked whether the fact that the group would “oftentimes, pay[] out funds prior to an adjudication” would cause Juror 21 to “assum[e] that someone is a victim prior to an adjudication in court.” She answered that it would not. Counsel then asked whether her “work on that board . . . could impact [her] from just analyzing this case by the facts that [she] hear[d] and the evidence.” She again answered in the negative. Counsel had no additional questions for Juror 21. ¶48 After trial, the district court reviewed the evidence that Bowcut submitted with his motion for a new trial and found these answers to be objectively false for a few reasons. ¶49 First, the court found that Juror 21 misidentified the group she was involved with. The court found that Juror 21 was actually on the board of the Utah Office for Victims of Crime (UOVC). The UOVC is an entity created by statute. See UTAH CODE § 63M-7-501 (2022).8 __________________________________________________________ 8 We cite to the 2022 version of the statute because the relevant procedures—the preliminary jury questionnaire, voir dire, and jury (continued . . .) 14 Cite as: 2026 UT 34 Opinion of the Court ¶50 We agree with the district court that Juror 21’s misidentification of the board’s name qualifies as false under our objective standard. The official, statutory name of the board of the UOVC, on which Juror 21 served, was the “Crime Victim Reparations and Assistance Board.” Id. §§ 63M-7-502(2), -504 (2022).9 Juror 21 referred to it instead as the “Victims’ Rights Community Group.” However, as explained at greater length in Part II, infra, defense counsel deduced from Juror 21’s description of the group that the work involved “the Crime Victims Reparations Fund,” which was a “special revenue fund” administered and distributed by the UOVC. See id. §§ 63M-7- 502(18), -526 (2022). In other words, her answers largely conveyed the nature of the board and its relation to the UOVC, even though her misidentification of the board’s name satisfies McDonough’s first prong. ¶51 The court also found that Juror 21 incorrectly stated how long she had served on the board. While Juror 21 said she had been on the board for less than a year, the court found she had served for over two years. And we defer to the court’s finding that Juror 21’s answer was incorrect. ¶52 Finally, the court found that Juror 21 gave false answers about the “nature of her involvement” on the board. Juror 21 stated, in substance, that as a member of this board, she approved funds to reimburse and compensate individual crime victims. She agreed that this happened even before their claims had been adjudicated in court. And she explained that in this capacity, she did not meet any victims directly. ¶53 The court found this answer to be false because the UOVC’s mission was not merely to allocate funds to victims but, according to its statutory mission statement, to “advocate for the __________________________________________________________ selection—all occurred in October 2022. See State v. Clark, 2011 UT 23, ¶ 13, 251 P.3d 829 (explaining that we generally apply the version of the law in effect at the time of the events in question). So, we view Juror 21’s answers in light of the law as it stood when she provided them. 9 We use the past tense because the Crime Victim Reparations and Assistance Board no longer exists. See UTAH CODE § 63I-2- 263(11) (2024) (“Section 63M-7-504, Crime Victim Reparations and Assistance Board--Members, is repealed December 31, 2024.”). 15 STATE v. BOWCUT Opinion of the Court rights and needs of crime victims in Utah by assisting in the[ir] restoration through financial compensation or other victim services.” (Emphasis added). The district court also noted that “shortly before” Bowcut’s trial, the UOVC held a meeting at which “sexual assault initiatives” and compensation for SANE exams “were discussed.” So, essentially, the court found that Juror 21’s answers were false because they were incomplete, in that she did not mention that the UOVC “advocate[s] for the rights and needs of crime victims” through “other victim services” in addition to financial compensation, nor that the board talked about initiatives specific to sexual assault or compensation for SANE exams. ¶54 We conclude that the court clearly erred in finding Juror 21’s answer about her involvement in the Crime Victim Reparations and Assistance Board to be dishonest. Notably, the court did not find any of Juror 21’s affirmative answers on that topic to be false. And indeed, the statutory mandate of the UOVC principally concerns financial reparations to crime victims. See UTAH CODE § 75E-5-202. Rather, the court found that Juror 21’s answers lacked additional details that she should have provided. In other words, the court found that the UOVC does other things in addition to approving funds for crime victims, some of which are specific to sexual assault victims, which the court faulted Juror 21 for not mentioning. ¶55 When analyzing whether an omission renders an answer false, we must look closely at the question that was asked. And we analyze whether the question, combined with any information given to jurors about the nature of the charges, “should have made [the juror] aware of the need to bring” the undisclosed information “to the court’s attention.” Thomas, 830 P.2d at 246. ¶56 Here, Juror 21 was asked to “explain the nature of [her] involvement” in “victim support or advocacy groups.” This is a general question. And in response, Juror 21 gave a general answer. She could have gone into detail about specific items that were discussed in board meetings or tried to describe everything the UOVC does. But the fact that she did not does not render her answer false, because the question did not call for it. See Thomas, 830 P.2d at 246 (“A juror clearly cannot fail to answer honestly a material question if the juror was not asked a question regarding the subject matter alleged to have gone undisclosed.”). ¶57 Of course, Juror 21 knew that this case involved “rape and forcible sodomy.” And this contributed to the court’s concern about 16 Cite as: 2026 UT 34 Opinion of the Court Juror 21’s failure to mention that the board had recently heard about “sexual assault initiatives” and compensation for SANE exams. But Juror 21’s disclosure that she worked with an organization that provided financial support to crime victims necessarily included sexual assault victims. Bowcut could have followed up with specific questions on that topic; but he did not. And we agree with the U.S. Supreme Court that, because jury trials are “an important investment of private and social resources,” we do not “wipe the slate clean” merely “because counsel lacked an item of information which objectively he should have obtained” by conducting a more comprehensive inquiry. McDonough, 464 U.S. at 555; cf. State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ¶ 34, 992 P.2d 951 (“Voir dire is intended to provide a tool for counsel and the court to carefully and skillfully determine, by inquiry, whether biases and prejudices, latent as well as acknowledged, will interfere with a fair trial if a particular juror serves in it.” (cleaned up)). ¶58 Accordingly, we determine that the court clearly erred in finding Juror 21’s description of her involvement on the board to be false. But we agree with the district court’s findings that Juror 21 gave incorrect answers about the name of the board she was on and the duration of her service at the time of Bowcut’s trial. Below, we will examine whether these inaccuracies provide a valid basis to strike Juror 21 for cause. See infra Part II. 2. Membership in the Association ¶59 After d