State v. Bowcut
CourtUtah Supreme Court
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketCase No. 20230609
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter
2026 UT 34
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellant,
v.
ALEXANDER JOHN BOWCUT,
Appellee.
No. 20230609
Heard November 3, 2025
Filed November 19, 2026
On Direct Appeal
Third District Court, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Kara L. Pettit
No. 181908051
Attorneys:
Derek E. Brown, Att’y Gen., David A. Simpson, Deputy Solic.
Gen., William M. Hains, Asst. Solic. Gen., Salt Lake City,
for appellant
Michael D. Zimmerman, LaShel Shaw, Ann Marie Taliaferro,
Salt Lake City, for appellee
JUSTICE PETERSEN authored the opinion of the Court, in which
INTERIM CHIEF JUSTICE POHLMAN, JUDGE LUTHY,
and JUDGE MABEY joined.
JUSTICE NIELSEN authored an opinion concurring in the judgment.
__________________________________________________________
As of January 31, 2026, “The Supreme Court consists of seven
justices.” UTAH CODE § 78A-3-101(1). Pursuant to Utah Supreme
Court Standing Orders No. 18 and 19, this court sat and rendered
judgment in this matter as a division of five justices.
STATE v. BOWCUT
Opinion of the Court
Due to his retirement, JUSTICE PEARCE did not participate herein;
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE JENNIFER A. MABEY sat.
Before this case was decided, CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT recused
himself from this case and JUSTICE HAGEN stepped down from the
court. JUSTICE NIELSEN and COURT OF APPEALS JUDGE JOHN D.
LUTHY, having reviewed the briefs and listened to a recording of
the oral argument, substituted for CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT and
JUSTICE HAGEN and participated fully in this decision.
JUSTICE JORGENSEN, JUSTICE DENT, JUSTICE BELL, and
JUSTICE MENSSEN became members of the Court after oral
argument in this matter and did not participate.
JUSTICE PETERSEN, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 After a jury convicted Alexander Bowcut of rape, he
challenged his conviction on the basis of juror misconduct. He
asserted that a juror who served on his case had been dishonest
during jury selection, and that honest answers would have justified
striking the juror for cause. The district court agreed with Bowcut
and granted him a new trial.
¶2 A party moving for a new trial based on juror dishonesty
during jury selection must demonstrate that “a juror failed to
answer honestly a material question on voir dire” and that “a correct
response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for
cause.” McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556
(1984). “Both elements are necessary to successfully challenge the
participation of the juror in question.” State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46,
¶ 104, 299 P.3d 892 (cleaned up).
¶3 Here, the district court found that the juror’s answers were
false because she omitted information that the court concluded she
should have provided. We emphasize, however, that the falsity
analysis requires courts to look carefully at the questions asked.
Here, the juror was asked general, high-level questions. And she
provided general, high-level answers that were substantively
accurate. Bowcut could have asked additional follow-up questions
to obtain more details. But he did not. And the juror was not
dishonest for failing to provide specifics that were never requested.
Ultimately, the fact that the juror’s answers lacked certain
information is a reflection of the questions asked, not dishonesty.
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Opinion of the Court
¶4 On this basis, we determine that some of the district court’s
falsity determinations were clearly erroneous. And we conclude
that the remaining inaccuracies in the juror’s answers do not
provide a basis to strike her for cause.
¶5 Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order arresting
judgment and granting a new trial, and we reinstate Bowcut’s
conviction.
BACKGROUND
¶6 Alexander Bowcut was charged with one count of rape
and two counts of forcible sodomy. The jury acquitted him of the
forcible sodomy charges but convicted him of rape. He moved the
district court to arrest the judgment or order a new trial, arguing
that one juror—Juror 21—had committed misconduct by
answering questions dishonestly during jury selection. The district
court agreed and granted Bowcut’s motion.
Jury Selection
¶7 Shortly before trial, the district court sent prospective
jurors a written questionnaire, which they were to complete and
return. Relevant here, the questionnaire asked jurors whether they
were “related to or close friends with an attorney.” Juror 21
answered “Yes.”
¶8 On the first day of trial, the district court began voir dire1
and advised the jury pool—also referred to as the “venire”—that
the charges against Bowcut “involve[d] rape and forcible sodomy.”
After explaining other trial logistics, the court posed a series of
questions to the venire. Relevant here, the court reiterated that the
“case involve[d] allegations of sexual misconduct” and asked if
there was “any reason” prospective jurors “would not be entering
with an open mind.” Juror 21 did not respond affirmatively to this
question. Later, the court asked if anyone had “ever been involved
in any groups whose goals are to make changes in the criminal
justice system.” Juror 21 raised her hand. Juror 21 also raised her
hand when the court asked the venire, “Have you, any of your
family members, or close personal friends ever been employed by
__________________________________________________________
1 Voir dire “refers to the jury-selection phase of a trial.” Voir
Dire, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). It is the
“preliminary examination of a prospective juror by a judge or
lawyer to decide whether the prospect is qualified and suitable to
serve on a jury.” Id.
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Opinion of the Court
or volunteered in any way with a victim support or advocacy group
or a group that advocates [for] changes in criminal laws?”
¶9 The court then followed up individually with jurors based
on their responses to the written questionnaire and the questions
asked of the jury pool. Addressing Juror 21, the district court asked
about her involvement in the groups she had indicated.
Involvement in Victim Support or Advocacy Groups
Q: So you raised your hand on a couple of those
questions. Let me start there. As far as . . .
involve[ment] in groups whose goals are to make
changes in the criminal justice system, as well as
victim support or advocacy groups. Can you explain
the nature of your involvement in those different
groups?
A: Yeah. [A]s far as victims, I am a member of the
Victims’ Rights Community Group. I’ve been on that
one not quite a year. And as far as . . . I do not have
any . . . personal contact with any of the victims [on]
the different things that we’ve had to address, like
compensation or anything like that. Just being able to
listen to some of the -- some of the funds that have
been allocated . . . for victims of crimes that --
Q: Okay. So it’s a committee that would -- you would
approve disbursements to different individuals, or
what’s the --
A: Yes. Yes.
Q: And how often does that group meet?
A: We meet about every three months.
Q: Okay. Who else is on it with you?
A: Ooh, I don’t remember their names. It’s about
seven of us.
Q: Okay. Is there anybody from the Salt Lake District
Attorney’s Office?
A: No.
Q: Any criminal defense attorneys on it?
A: No, I don’t think so.
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Opinion of the Court
Involvement in the Association
¶10 The court then asked Juror 21 about the other group with
which she had indicated involvement.
Q: Okay. And then what about the group that you’ve
been involved with whose goals are to make changes
in the criminal justice system?
A: That’s through the [Association].2 I’m President of
the [Association], and we work with just different
community groups, law enforcement, legislators, you
know, overall things like that. Things that might be
any type of legislation that we could make changes
on.
¶11 The court then asked whether Juror 21’s “involvement in
either of those capacities would affect [her] ability to be fair and
impartial to both sides, knowing the nature of this case.” And
Juror 21 answered, “No.”
Familial Relations or Close Friendships with Attorneys
¶12 The district court then asked about one of Juror 21’s
answers on the written questionnaire.
Q: And then the next question on the questionnaire
was whether you are related or close friends with an
attorney, and you indicated, [“Yes.”] Can you
elaborate?
A: Yes. Through my [Association], I work with
attorneys throughout the state just for different, you
know, issues or cases, some that serve on the
Executive Committee for the [Association]. But none
that I have, you know, worked with or be[en]
involved in cases, where I wouldn’t be able to be . . .
regardless of what’s going on, I would be able to look
at it fairly.
Q: Okay. Do you know if any of them have a criminal
defense or prosecution practice?
A: I think one might have some practice in criminal.
__________________________________________________________
2 While Juror 21 identified the name of the organization with
which she was involved, we refer to it in general terms to protect
Juror 21’s privacy.
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Opinion of the Court
¶13 When Juror 21 named that attorney, the court asked, “Do
you talk with her about her caseload at all or her work?” And
Juror 21 answered, “No.”
Follow-up Questions from Defense Counsel
¶14 The court then asked the parties if they had any questions
for Juror 21. The State had no additional questions. The defense
inquired further about Juror 21’s community involvement:
Q: [I]n your work with the -- it sounds like it might be
the Crime Victims Reparations Fund. So you’re
paying -- oftentimes, paying out funds prior to an
adjudication in the criminal case. So would your
work, essentially -- assuming that someone is a victim
prior to adjudication in court . . . -- would you carry
that view into this case if selected?
A: No, I would not.
Q: Okay. So your work on that board, would there be
any potential where it could impact you from just
analyzing this case by the facts that you hear and the
evidence?
A: No.
¶15 The defense posed no further questions about Juror 21’s
involvement with this board, nor did it ask any questions about her
involvement with the Association, her work with attorneys in her
capacity as president of the Association, or her work with law
enforcement.
¶16 Both parties declined to challenge Juror 21 for cause, and
Juror 21 was seated on the jury. At trial, she served as foreperson
and delivered the jury’s verdict.
Verdict and Post-Verdict Motion
¶17 The jury convicted Bowcut of rape and acquitted him of
both counts of forcible sodomy. Bowcut subsequently filed a
“Motion to Arrest Judgment or Alternatively, Motion for New
Trial.” He argued, among other things, that Juror 21 had committed
misconduct by failing to:
honestly and accurately answer[] the voir dire
questions about her strong personal biases, her
position on the board of the [Utah Office for Victims
of Crime], her involvement in sexual assault cases,
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Opinion of the Court
specific legislation that she has worked on, legislation
that she has supported and advocated for, and her
relationships with prosecutors.
¶18 With respect to the victim support group, Bowcut asserted
that Juror 21 had been dishonest because she misidentified the
name of the group, understated its work on behalf of crime victims,
and failed to say that Davis County Attorney Troy Rawlings was
also on the board. Specifically, while Juror 21 had stated that she
was on the “Victims’ Rights Community Group,” Bowcut asserted
that she was actually on the board of the “Utah Office for Victims
of Crime (UOVC).” He also claimed that the mission of the UOVC
was broader than merely the disbursement of funds to victims, and
he quoted its “explicit mission” as being “to advocate for the rights
and needs of crime victims in Utah by assisting in their restoration
through financial compensation and other victim services.” He also
produced meeting minutes indicating that at one meeting, the
board discussed an agenda item called, “Sexual Assault
Initiatives,” and that at another meeting, the board discussed an
increase in compensation for Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner
(SANE) exams.3
¶19 Bowcut also offered evidence that as the president of the
Association, Juror 21 had advocated for various pieces of
legislation supporting sexual assault survivors and other crime
victims. And he argued that her failure to mention her work on this
legislation was dishonest.
¶20 Finally, Bowcut argued that “the most glaring omission”
was in Juror 21’s answers about her relationships with prosecuting
attorneys. For example, Bowcut produced social media posts
showing Salt Lake County District Attorney Sim Gill speaking to a
conference hosted by the Association, with Juror 21 standing to the
side of the podium; a post from Juror 21 of a photo of Gill and a
state senator at a street-naming event; photos of Juror 21 and
multiple others, including Gill, at the state capitol; photos of
Juror 21 and multiple others, including Attorney General Sean
Reyes, at a banquet hosted by the Association at which Reyes
spoke; posts indicating that Attorney General Reyes had asked
Juror 21 to serve on an Opioid Task Force and to attend a luncheon
__________________________________________________________
3 A SANE exam is a medical forensic assessment for patients
who have experienced sexual assault.
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STATE v. BOWCUT
Opinion of the Court
featuring Yusef Salaam;4 and a post advertising a “Hatch Center
webinar,” which featured a panel discussion that included
Attorney General Reyes, Juror 21, and five others.
¶21 The district court granted Bowcut’s motion. It agreed that
Juror 21 had provided dishonest answers in voir dire, reasoning
that Juror 21 had failed to disclose information “that would have
been responsive to the questions asked.” The court based its
decision on a number of findings. It observed that when Juror 21
was asked about her involvement in groups whose goals are to
make changes in the criminal justice system, she answered broadly
that the Association works with “different community groups, law
enforcement, legislators . . . [on] any type of legislation that we
could make changes on,“ but did not identify specific legislation
she had worked on involving sexual assault. And the court found
that Juror 21 “advocat[ed] for changes to Utah’s rape law,”
including a bill “that would require affirmative consent for sexual
conduct.” It also found that Juror 21 was “instrumental in passing”
a different victims’ rights bill and had recently posted on social
media about improvements that should be made to the bill.
¶22 Additionally, the court found that Juror 21 had misstated
or omitted information about the victim support group with which
she was involved. The court found that the group “was actually the
Utah Office of Victims of Crime”; she had served on it “for more
than two years, not less than a year”; its mission was not “just
disbursing funds” but also “advocat[ing] for the rights and needs
of crime victims”; and at one meeting held “shortly before”
Bowcut’s trial, “sexual assault initiatives were discussed.”
¶23 Finally, the court found that despite the social media posts
showing that Juror 21 associated with District Attorney Gill and
Attorney General Reyes at civic events, she “[d]id not disclose
working with them at all.” The court found that Juror 21 had an
“ongoing relationship and association” with Gill and that “he is one
of the attorneys that she works throughout the state with that does
__________________________________________________________
4 Yusef Salaam is a member of the “Central Park Five,” a group
of young Black and Latino men who were wrongfully convicted in
the 1989 “Central Park jogger” case and were later exonerated.
Yusef Salaam Biography, N.Y.C. COUNCIL, https://council.nyc.
gov/yusef-salaam/ (last visited May 5, 2026). Salaam is now a
speaker, activist, and poet, id., and was visiting Salt Lake City to
talk about his experiences.
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Opinion of the Court
have, clearly, a public and well-known, high-profile prosecution
practice.” The district court found that Juror 21’s failure to supply
these details made her responses “objectively inaccurate.”
¶24 The court then determined that, had Juror 21 disclosed this
information, the court “would have stricken her for cause.” The
court looked to rule 18(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which provides grounds for striking a juror for cause. The court
concluded that, had it known of “the ongoing association and
working relationship between Juror 21 and Mr. Gill, as well as her
advocating for victims’ rights legislation over the past decade,” the
court “would not have been convinced” that Juror 21 “would have
been able to act fairly and impartially.” And this finding, in turn,
would have led the court to strike the juror for cause.
¶25 Because it concluded that “Juror 21 failed to disclose
material information in response to material questions that were
asked during the voir dire process, which information, if disclosed,
would have supported a valid basis to challenge the juror for
cause,” the district court granted Bowcut’s motion.5
¶26 The State timely appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶27 We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision
to grant a new trial. State v. Torres-Orellana, 2024 UT 46, ¶ 6, 562
P.3d 706.6 “We review the legal standards applied by the trial court
. . . for correctness and review the trial court’s factual findings for
__________________________________________________________
5 In granting Bowcut’s motion, the district court did not
distinguish between his requests to arrest the judgment and to
order a new trial.
6 While Bowcut styled his motion as a motion to arrest the
judgment or, alternatively, a motion for a new trial, we do not
distinguish between the two motions because the district court did
not distinguish between them, and they are both governed by the
same standard of review. See State v. Billingsley, 2013 UT 17, ¶ 23,
311 P.3d 995 (“The trial court abused its discretion when it arrested
judgment and granted a new trial.”); State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262,
265–66 (Utah 1998) (applying an abuse of discretion standard
where the defendant challenged the denial of his motions to arrest
judgment and to grant a new trial).
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Opinion of the Court
clear error.” State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 103, 299 P.3d 892
(cleaned up).
¶28 Here, the district court granted Bowcut a new trial based
on juror dishonesty during voir dire. To prevail on such a claim,
the movant must first show that “a juror failed to answer honestly
a material question on voir dire.” McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v.
Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984). This is a factual question, which
we review for clear error. State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah
1992); State v. Shipp, 2005 UT 35, ¶ 20, 116 P.3d 317. Second, the
movant must show that “a correct response would have provided
a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” Thomas, 830 P.2d at 245
(cleaned up). We review this determination for an abuse of
discretion. West v. Holley, 2004 UT 97, ¶¶ 11, 13, 103 P.3d 708.
ANALYSIS
¶29 The State argues that Bowcut should not receive a new trial
because Juror 21 was not dishonest in her responses, and the
additional information the district court determined Juror 21
should have provided does not justify striking her for cause.
¶30 We first review whether Juror 21 provided objectively
false answers to material questions on voir dire. We conclude that,
for the most part, she did not. Most of Juror 21’s answers were
correct, as far as they went; she just did not include additional
details that the district court found she should have provided.
While an omission can make an answer objectively false, careful
attention must be paid to the questions that prompted the answers.
When we do that, we conclude that most of Juror 21’s responses
were true. And we conclude that the district court clearly erred in
finding these answers to be false. However, two of Juror 21’s
answers were incorrect. She misstated the name of the victim
reparations board on which she served. And she said she had
served on the board for under a year when she had actually served
for more than two years.
¶31 With respect to these two answers, we move to step two of
the McDonough test. And we conclude that correct responses would
not have provided a valid basis to strike Juror 21 for cause. And as
both falsity and cause “are necessary to successfully challenge the
participation of the juror,” State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 104, 299
P.3d 892 (cleaned up), a failure to satisfy either element justifies
denying a new trial motion.
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Opinion of the Court
¶32 Accordingly, because erroneous factual findings
undermine the new trial order, we reverse. See Smith v. Volkswagen
SouthTowne, Inc., 2022 UT 29, ¶ 100, 513 P.3d 729 (“An abuse of
discretion exists . . . where there is no evidentiary basis for the trial
court’s ruling.” (cleaned up)).
I. JUROR 21 GAVE TWO FALSE ANSWERS TO MATERIAL QUESTIONS
A. This Court’s Interpretation of the McDonough Standard
¶33 Under McDonough, a party moving for a new trial must
first show “that a juror failed to answer honestly a material
question on voir dire.” McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood,
464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984). Thus, this element has two components:
(1) a material question; and (2) a dishonest answer.
¶34 In McDonough, the U.S. Supreme Court did not discuss the
meaning of “material” in the specific context of voir dire questions.
Generally, “material” means having “a natural tendency to
influence, or [being] capable of influencing” the relevant
decisionmaker. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999) (cleaned
up) (defining materiality in the context of fraud); see also Material,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (defining “material” as
being “[o]f such a nature that knowledge of the item would affect a
person’s decision-making”); UTAH CODE § 76-8-501(2) (defining
“material” in the perjury context as “capable of affecting the course
or outcome of an official proceeding”). This general definition of
material, however, does not identify which decision the “material
question” must tend to influence.
¶35 Other courts that have examined the meaning of “material
question” in the McDonough context have concluded that “a voir
dire question is material if a response to it ‘has a natural tendency
to influence, or is capable of influencing,’ the judge’s impartiality
determination.” Sampson v. United States, 724 F.3d 150, 165 (1st Cir.
2013) (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 16); see also Cooke v. State, 97 A.3d
513, 555 n.270 (Del. 2014) (citing the standard from Sampson);
Martin v. State, 322 So. 3d 25, 34–35 (Fla. 2021) (employing the same
standard).
¶36 We agree with this definition. McDonough rejected the
notion that a new trial was required where a juror’s dishonest
answer to a voir dire question prejudiced a party’s exercise of a
peremptory challenge. 464 U.S. at 549. Thus, materiality does not
refer to the impact of the question on a party’s decision of whether
to use a peremptory challenge. Rather, McDonough held that a new
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Opinion of the Court
trial is not required unless “a correct response would have
provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” Id. at 556.
Accordingly, we hold that a voir dire question is material if a
response to it would tend to influence a district court’s decision of
whether to remove a juror for cause.
¶37 A dishonest answer to a material question is one that was
“false at the time it was given.” State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 105,
299 P.3d 892. We have said that this is an objective, not a subjective,
standard. State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 246 (Utah 1992); Maestas,
2012 UT 46, ¶¶ 105, 107, 110–12.
¶38 In Thomas, we noted that some other courts had
interpreted McDonough’s first step to be satisfied only when
prospective jurors subjectively knew their answers to be false,
while other courts had read McDonough to set an objective standard
in which jurors’ subjective intent was irrelevant. Thomas, 830 P.2d
at 246. This court saw the objective standard as the “better-
reasoned approach” and adopted it. Id. Thus, since Thomas, we
have treated prospective jurors’ intentionally dishonest answers
and inadvertently incorrect answers the same for purposes of the
McDonough analysis, on the theory that an answer that a
prospective juror “subjectively believes to be an honest [one]” may
nonetheless be “objectively incorrect and therefore suggest[] that
the individual would be a biased juror in the particular case.” Id.
(quoting McDonough, 464 U.S. at 559 (Brennan, J., concurring)); cf.
Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 111 (concluding that a juror’s response was
not “objectively dishonest in light of the ambiguous nature of the
question”); State v. Shipp, 2005 UT 35, ¶ 22, 116 P.3d 317 (concluding
that a juror who responded accurately to the question posed “did
not fail to answer truthfully”). Thus, it may often be the case that
“dishonest” is a misnomer, and we may use more fitting terms, like
false, incorrect, or inaccurate.7
__________________________________________________________
7 The State asks us to revisit and overturn the objective standard
we adopted in State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 246 (Utah 1992). And
the concurrence agrees, arguing that the Thomas court
misinterpreted McDonough on this point. See infra ¶¶ 75–95. Both
the concurrence and the State raise some thought-provoking
points. But ultimately, this case does not turn on whether the first
step of the McDonough analysis should be objective or subjective.
Thus, we leave for another day whether and how a prospective
juror’s intent factors into the falsity analysis.
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¶39 Both misstatements and omissions may constitute a false
answer. See West v. Holley, 2004 UT 97, ¶ 11, 103 P.3d 708. However,
a juror’s answer is not objectively false where it “incorrect[ly]
predict[s] . . . how [the] juror will behave in a certain instance,”
Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 105 (cleaned up); omits subject matter not
inquired about in voir dire, see Thomas, 830 P.2d at 246; or “fails to
reveal relevant information because of a clearly ambiguous
question,” id.
B. Juror 21’s Challenged Answers
¶40 The district court found that Juror 21 gave false answers
about “the nature of her involvement” with “victim support or
advocacy groups” and “groups whose goals are to make changes
in the criminal justice system,” and about her relationships with
attorneys—most importantly Salt Lake County District Attorney
Sim Gill and, to a lesser extent, Attorney General Sean Reyes.
¶41 As a threshold matter, we agree with the district court that
these are material questions. The nature and degree of a juror’s
involvement in victim-support or criminal-justice-reform groups,
and a juror’s close personal relationships with attorneys—
especially prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys—are
relevant to impartiality in criminal cases. Thus, answers to these
questions would tend to influence a trial court’s decision about
whether a juror should be stricken for cause.
¶42 We now move to the district court’s findings that Juror 21
answered these material questions falsely.
1. Membership on the Crime Victim Reparations and
Assistance Board
¶43 We first analyze the district court’s finding that Juror 21
falsely “explain[ed] the nature of [her] involvement” in “victim
support or advocacy groups.” In doing so, we pay close attention
to the questions that Juror 21 was asked.
¶44 Early in the voir dire process, the district court asked the
venire if any of them had “ever been employed by or volunteered
in any way with a victim support or advocacy group or a group
that advocates [for] changes in criminal laws.” And Juror 21 raised
her hand.
¶45 Later, the court followed up with her individually and
asked her to “explain the nature of [her] involvement” in the group.
She answered:
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Yeah. [A]s far as victims, I am a member of the
Victims’ Rights Community Group. I’ve been on that
one not quite a year. And as far as . . . I do not have
any . . . personal contact with any of the victims [on]
the different things that we’ve had to address, like
compensation or anything like that. Just being able to
listen to some of the -- some of the funds that have
been allocated . . . for victims of crimes . . .
¶46 The court then asked a series of specific questions about
the group. In response, Juror 21 affirmed that the group “would
approve disbursements to different individuals.” And she
explained that the group met about every three months, that there
were about seven members, and that she could not remember the
other members’ names. The court then asked whether anyone from
the Salt Lake District Attorney’s Office or any criminal defense
attorneys were members of the group, and Juror 21 said she did not
think so.
¶47 Bowcut’s counsel then had an opportunity to ask Juror 21
follow-up questions. Based on her answers up to that point, he
surmised that the group “sound[ed] like it might be the Crime
Victims Reparations Fund.” Counsel asked whether the fact that
the group would “oftentimes, pay[] out funds prior to an
adjudication” would cause Juror 21 to “assum[e] that someone is a
victim prior to an adjudication in court.” She answered that it
would not. Counsel then asked whether her “work on that board
. . . could impact [her] from just analyzing this case by the facts that
[she] hear[d] and the evidence.” She again answered in the
negative. Counsel had no additional questions for Juror 21.
¶48 After trial, the district court reviewed the evidence that
Bowcut submitted with his motion for a new trial and found these
answers to be objectively false for a few reasons.
¶49 First, the court found that Juror 21 misidentified the group
she was involved with. The court found that Juror 21 was actually
on the board of the Utah Office for Victims of Crime (UOVC). The
UOVC is an entity created by statute. See UTAH CODE § 63M-7-501
(2022).8
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8 We cite to the 2022 version of the statute because the relevant
procedures—the preliminary jury questionnaire, voir dire, and jury
(continued . . .)
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Opinion of the Court
¶50 We agree with the district court that Juror 21’s
misidentification of the board’s name qualifies as false under our
objective standard. The official, statutory name of the board of the
UOVC, on which Juror 21 served, was the “Crime Victim
Reparations and Assistance Board.” Id. §§ 63M-7-502(2), -504
(2022).9 Juror 21 referred to it instead as the “Victims’ Rights
Community Group.” However, as explained at greater length in
Part II, infra, defense counsel deduced from Juror 21’s description
of the group that the work involved “the Crime Victims
Reparations Fund,” which was a “special revenue fund”
administered and distributed by the UOVC. See id. §§ 63M-7-
502(18), -526 (2022). In other words, her answers largely conveyed
the nature of the board and its relation to the UOVC, even though
her misidentification of the board’s name satisfies McDonough’s
first prong.
¶51 The court also found that Juror 21 incorrectly stated how
long she had served on the board. While Juror 21 said she had been
on the board for less than a year, the court found she had served
for over two years. And we defer to the court’s finding that
Juror 21’s answer was incorrect.
¶52 Finally, the court found that Juror 21 gave false answers
about the “nature of her involvement” on the board. Juror 21
stated, in substance, that as a member of this board, she approved
funds to reimburse and compensate individual crime victims. She
agreed that this happened even before their claims had been
adjudicated in court. And she explained that in this capacity, she
did not meet any victims directly.
¶53 The court found this answer to be false because the
UOVC’s mission was not merely to allocate funds to victims but,
according to its statutory mission statement, to “advocate for the
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selection—all occurred in October 2022. See State v. Clark, 2011 UT
23, ¶ 13, 251 P.3d 829 (explaining that we generally apply the
version of the law in effect at the time of the events in question). So,
we view Juror 21’s answers in light of the law as it stood when she
provided them.
9 We use the past tense because the Crime Victim Reparations
and Assistance Board no longer exists. See UTAH CODE § 63I-2-
263(11) (2024) (“Section 63M-7-504, Crime Victim Reparations and
Assistance Board--Members, is repealed December 31, 2024.”).
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STATE v. BOWCUT
Opinion of the Court
rights and needs of crime victims in Utah by assisting in the[ir]
restoration through financial compensation or other victim services.”
(Emphasis added). The district court also noted that “shortly
before” Bowcut’s trial, the UOVC held a meeting at which “sexual
assault initiatives” and compensation for SANE exams “were
discussed.” So, essentially, the court found that Juror 21’s answers
were false because they were incomplete, in that she did not
mention that the UOVC “advocate[s] for the rights and needs of
crime victims” through “other victim services” in addition to
financial compensation, nor that the board talked about initiatives
specific to sexual assault or compensation for SANE exams.
¶54 We conclude that the court clearly erred in finding
Juror 21’s answer about her involvement in the Crime Victim
Reparations and Assistance Board to be dishonest. Notably, the
court did not find any of Juror 21’s affirmative answers on that
topic to be false. And indeed, the statutory mandate of the UOVC
principally concerns financial reparations to crime victims. See
UTAH CODE § 75E-5-202. Rather, the court found that Juror 21’s
answers lacked additional details that she should have provided.
In other words, the court found that the UOVC does other things
in addition to approving funds for crime victims, some of which
are specific to sexual assault victims, which the court faulted
Juror 21 for not mentioning.
¶55 When analyzing whether an omission renders an answer
false, we must look closely at the question that was asked. And we
analyze whether the question, combined with any information
given to jurors about the nature of the charges, “should have made
[the juror] aware of the need to bring” the undisclosed information
“to the court’s attention.” Thomas, 830 P.2d at 246.
¶56 Here, Juror 21 was asked to “explain the nature of [her]
involvement” in “victim support or advocacy groups.” This is a
general question. And in response, Juror 21 gave a general answer.
She could have gone into detail about specific items that were
discussed in board meetings or tried to describe everything the
UOVC does. But the fact that she did not does not render her
answer false, because the question did not call for it. See Thomas,
830 P.2d at 246 (“A juror clearly cannot fail to answer honestly a
material question if the juror was not asked a question regarding
the subject matter alleged to have gone undisclosed.”).
¶57 Of course, Juror 21 knew that this case involved “rape and
forcible sodomy.” And this contributed to the court’s concern about
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Opinion of the Court
Juror 21’s failure to mention that the board had recently heard
about “sexual assault initiatives” and compensation for SANE
exams. But Juror 21’s disclosure that she worked with an
organization that provided financial support to crime victims
necessarily included sexual assault victims. Bowcut could have
followed up with specific questions on that topic; but he did not.
And we agree with the U.S. Supreme Court that, because jury trials
are “an important investment of private and social resources,” we
do not “wipe the slate clean” merely “because counsel lacked an
item of information which objectively he should have obtained” by
conducting a more comprehensive inquiry. McDonough, 464 U.S. at
555; cf. State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ¶ 34, 992 P.2d 951 (“Voir dire
is intended to provide a tool for counsel and the court to carefully
and skillfully determine, by inquiry, whether biases and prejudices,
latent as well as acknowledged, will interfere with a fair trial if a
particular juror serves in it.” (cleaned up)).
¶58 Accordingly, we determine that the court clearly erred in
finding Juror 21’s description of her involvement on the board to
be false. But we agree with the district court’s findings that Juror 21
gave incorrect answers about the name of the board she was on and
the duration of her service at the time of Bowcut’s trial. Below, we
will examine whether these inaccuracies provide a valid basis to
strike Juror 21 for cause. See infra Part II.
2. Membership in the Association
¶59 After d