State v. Kent

2026 UT App 127 THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF UTAH, Appellee, v. JAMES CHRISTIAN KENT, Appellant. Amended Opinion * No. 20230563-CA Filed August 13, 2026 Third District Court, Salt Lake Department The Honorable Vernice S. Trease No. 201902922 Andrea J. Garland, Attorney for Appellant Derek E. Brown and Hwa Sung Doucette, Attorneys for Appellee JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES RYAN D. TENNEY and AMY J. OLIVER concurred. HARRIS, Judge: ¶1 James Christian Kent was convicted of enticing a minor after he tried to meet up—ostensibly for sex—with a person he’d been texting on a dating app. The person had told Kent that she was a thirteen-year-old girl, but the person turned out to be an undercover police officer. Kent now appeals his conviction, * This amended opinion replaces the opinion that was issued on June 25, 2026. In response to a petition for rehearing filed by the State, and after calling for a response from Kent, we have made certain revisions to this opinion, largely in Part II.A. To that extent, we grant the petition for rehearing. But in all other respects, that petition is denied. Indeed, the other parts of our opinion, as well as our ultimate conclusions, stand unchanged.  State v. Kent asserting that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred in rejecting his efforts to have the case dismissed on the basis of entrapment, (3) his trial attorney rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance, and (4) the court erred in excluding evidence regarding “catfishing.” For the reasons discussed, we reject Kent’s arguments and affirm his conviction. BACKGROUND 1 The Interactions Between Kent and Jen ¶2 An undercover police officer (Sergeant) created a profile for a persona named “Jen” on an online dating app. On the profile, Sergeant listed Jen’s age as “19” and attached photos of an adult woman who was “over 18” years old. Sergeant also used another photo of the same woman later, when he responded to Kent’s request for a picture of Jen. ¶3 Kent—a man in his fifties—sent Jen a message on the app. Jen responded, and the two of them had a text-message conversation that continued for about a week. At first, they talked about what they were looking for on the app. Kent told Jen that he was looking for “[s]ome one to chill with and have some good times not really looking for stings and shit,” and said he was “down for whatever.” 2 He then asked her, “You look way young 1. “When reviewing a jury verdict, we examine the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, and we recite the facts accordingly. In so doing, we present conflicting evidence only when necessary to understand issues raised on appeal.” State v. Repsher, 2025 UT App 50, n.1, 568 P.3d 1095 (cleaned up). 2. In reciting Kent and Jen’s texts, we generally retain the original spelling and grammar. 20230563-CA 2 2026 UT App 127  State v. Kent are you really 19[?]” Jen didn’t respond to this question and instead said, “Stings and shit? What’s that[?]” Kent responded, “You know the shit that comes from boyfriend girlfriend shit, drama I mean is like to be open and honest you know no expectionns.” “Well I ain’t looking for a bf,” Jen said back, to which Kent replied, “Just everything else lol.” ¶4 After these first few messages, Kent inquired again about Jen’s age. She told him that she was “really only 13 but almost 14 and . . . mature” and that she was “lookin to hook up with a cool older guy.” Instead of stopping the conversation at that point, Kent responded, “Dam that sucks I got a daughter your age[.] As older guy like how old and what are you looking to do with him if you find him[?]” Jen then said, “I guess it just depends on if he is cool,” and she noted that “his age doesn’t matter.” A few minutes later, Kent asked Jen, “Where is your mom and dad and what would they think about all that[?]” Then he asked if Jen had any siblings, and Jen told him she lived with her mom and that her mom worked. Kent then asked Jen if she was “home alone all night” and if she went to school during the day. Jen replied, “Yes I’m in middle school.” Kent later told Jen that he “like[d] younger chicks” but that he had “been scammed many times” before, and he asked Jen to participate in a video call with him. In response, Jen said she “[didn’t] have face time” and she couldn’t join a video call because her “phone is just old and it sucks.” ¶5 The text conversation between Kent and Jen then began to turn more explicitly sexual. It proceeded as follows: Kent: You’ve been on [the dating app] for a minute, how many guys have [you] been with off there Jen: Only one Kent: how old was he 20230563-CA 3 2026 UT App 127  State v. Kent Jen: 28 he said Kent: You slept with him Kent: ?? Kent: Kinda personal? Jen: I gave him oral. Sorry is that bad Kent: Why you telling me sorry I guess if that’s what you wanted to do I was only asking to find out your integrity and see where your head is on that have you slept with anyone im wondering? Jen: Ok I was just bein honest I guess. I won’t tell u more if don’t want Kent: That’s what I wanted you to do that’s cool so have you Jen: What do you mean Kent: Are you still a virgin Kent: � Jen: No I had sex with my old bf last year Kent also asked whether she thought it was “common for kids [her] age to be having sex,” explaining that he was “kinda concerned about how much [his] daughter has gotten into it with her bf.” Jen told Kent that he should “maybe be concerned,” and then she asked Kent whether he was “a little bit interested” in her. ¶6 Kent didn’t immediately respond to that query. But the next day, he asked Jen why she appeared to be interested in him, 20230563-CA 4 2026 UT App 127  State v. Kent and Jen responded, “Ok if you don’t want me to be I won’t. Sorry.” Kent then changed the subject, asking if Jen was in school at that moment. After telling Kent that she was in school right then, Jen asked Kent to explain “really what [he was] hoping for with” the two of them. Kent expressed doubt that “somebody like [Jen] would be interested in someone like” him and said, “If . . . you’re seriously not trying to get me caught up with the law then i kind of wanna know what is going on in your head and why and maybe I can prevent my daughter from doing the same shit you know.” Jen replied that she wasn’t “a cop” and that she was “honestly . . . hoping for something physical,” but she reassured Kent that it was “cool” if he didn’t “want that.” ¶7 Two days later, Kent asked Jen if she had “any way to get around,” and he offered to pay her to come over and clean his house. Jen didn’t respond until the next day, at which point she told Kent that she was “not wanting to clean.” Kent replied, “I’m thinking if you were to give it a try you might end up pretty happy.” Jen said that sounded more interesting and to “tell [her] more,” and Kent told her that she’d have to come over so he “[could] show [her] what [he needed] done” and so they could discuss “what [he would] pay” for those services. But no meeting happened because Kent decided they wouldn’t have enough time. He told Jen, “[W]e are going to need allot more time than that i promise especially if it’s going to be any kind of fun you know what I mean[?]” He also told Jen that he “really wanted to see [her]” that night but that “good things come to those who wait.” ¶8 In the meantime, the two shared photos of themselves not on their profiles. After receiving a photo, Kent responded, “Hell Yea” and “Your awesome and hella sexy.” After he sent a photo of his own, he told Jen to delete it as well as their text messages. ¶9 The next day, Kent disclosed to Jen that his mother had “stage 4 lung cancer.” He explained that his mother had always helped out with his children and that he needed “to find anybody [who] want[ed] to help [him].” In this context, he said, “I’m kind 20230563-CA 5 2026 UT App 127  State v. Kent of scared can’t afford to have anything happen to me you know . . . my kids need me my mom needs me.” Jen asked how she could help, and Kent asked her to “promise [him] [she wasn’t] a cop or working with the cops,” which she did. Then Kent asked her when he could pick her up at a transit station for a meeting. ¶10 Jen wanted to know what they were going to do once she got there, and Kent responded evasively. He said, “Honestly I’m not going to talk about what we’re going to do on the phone but . . . whatever you want to do have fun for real.” Jen replied, “K I ain’t tryna get in trouble I just was hopin we could maybe hookup and have that kinda fun but if that’s not what you wanna do just say you don’t.” Kent then responded with this message: Babe i wanna be In your To this, Jen clarified, “So in my what[?]” Kent replied, “I’m not saying s*** on this stupid ass communication device you know what I mean I’m sure you’re smart enough girl you figure it out . . . .” Jen said she was only asking because she was “nervous.” Kent then texted, “[I]t’s all good I know what you want.” He explained that what they were going to do was “really dumb” but that he was “down to give [Jen] whatever [she] want[ed].” ¶11 During their week-long back-and-forth, Jen and Kent also talked over the phone on three separate occasions, with a female detective (Detective) voicing Jen. Detective later explained that she was “trying to mimic a 13-year-old female” and “was implying that [she] was suggesting something sexual” in order to “figure out what [Kent’s] intent was with” Jen. The first call didn’t last very long because Jen said she was still in school, and Kent told her to call him back later. In the second call, Kent told Jen to “call [him] right back,” and the call only lasted about thirty seconds. In the third call, Kent explained to Jen that he had needed 20230563-CA 6 2026 UT App 127  State v. Kent her to call back before because her “phone [had been] echoing bad” and “sound[ed] like somebody’s got . . . another line on it.” On the call, Kent suggested to Jen that they should “kick it” and “talk.” And when Jen said she thought that would be “boring,” Kent replied, “I’m hardly ever boring.” Later in the call, he acknowledged that he was “[k]ind of scared” of “going to jail” because he “st[ood] to lose everything.” But as the call ended, they still decided they would meet up sometime later. ¶12 In one of their final texts, when Kent thought Jen was on her way over to see him, Jen asked Kent how he was going to “make sure” she didn’t “get pregnant.” He told her he had “that covered.” A few minutes later, when Kent arrived at the meeting location, officers detained him. In a subsequent search of Kent’s vehicle, they found no condoms or sex toys. The Interview with Police ¶13 After Kent was detained, he was interviewed by Sergeant and another officer (Officer). At the start of the interview, Officer told Kent that they needed to talk to him because “a mom called . . . very concerned about . . . a text message conversation between . . . her daughter and an adult male.” Kent said he understood because he also had a thirteen-year-old daughter. When discussing Jen, Kent admitted that Jen had told him that “she was under 18.” When Officer pressed him further, Kent answered that he believed Jen to be “[a]lmost the same age as [his] daughter”— “13, almost 14” years old. Kent explained that he had been talking to Jen because he was “concerned” and “curious,” and because he “wanted to . . . be friends with her and . . . needed some help in [his] house for cleaning . . . because [his] mom’s got cancer.” ¶14 Officer also asked Kent about why he was concerned about Jen’s police involvement and sexual experience. Kent said he “had to” ensure that Jen was not a police officer “[b]ecause [he] didn’t want to get in trouble.” And Kent acknowledged that engaging in “sexual stuff” with minors would be “illegal.” When Officer 20230563-CA 7 2026 UT App 127  State v. Kent asked Kent about the questions he had posed to Jen, Kent denied that he had asked any of them with sexual intent, explaining that he had just been “lonely” and had continued the conversation because he “[w]ant[ed] to hang out.” Instead, he said that Jen had “opened th[e] door” to the “sexual parts of the conversation.” ¶15 Throughout the interview, Officer expressed to Kent that he understood what Kent was going through. Later, he told Kent that a person’s “psyche . . . who is willing to meet up with a 13 year old . . . build[s] over time.” And he told Kent he knew this because he had been to multiple trainings “on how this works in a guy’s mind.” Officer said to Kent, “[Y]ou’re smart enough not to say I want to have sex with a 13 year old on the phone because you don’t want that as evidence. . . . That tells me that’s what’s going on.” Kent told Officer he was “[p]artially” correct but that he “wasn’t looking forward to that.” Officer said, “I know that that’s what happened at this point. I know that that’s what was probably going to happen,” and he told Kent that, in his view, Kent was only “giving [him] half truths.” Both Sergeant and Officer then reassured Kent that they understood where he was coming from, but Kent remained consistent in his answers, maintaining that he “[h]onestly” “just wanted to hang out with [Jen] and talk to her.” Officer then said, “I’m going to be able to tell if you lie to me because I can tell every lie that comes out of your mouth. I’ve been able to tell from the beginning.” Officer next asked Kent, “[o]n a scale of 1 to 10,” how attracted he was to “13 year old[s].” Kent rated himself a “5 maybe.” He claimed “younger is more of the taste,” but he attempted to clarify, “[S]exual activity with a 13 . . . year old, I’m not even seeing that. I really ain’t.” And he maintained that he hadn’t even been “entertaining the thought of getting in her pants.” ¶16 Officer then told Kent, “I can sit across from someone, based on the way they move, the way they act, and how they speak, I can tell when they’re telling me the truth. And you are not right now.” And Officer stated that there was “no doubt in [his] mind that if [Jen] was willing, that [Kent] would have done 20230563-CA 8 2026 UT App 127  State v. Kent something sexual with her.” Kent responded, “I don’t know if I would have.” Officer expressed skepticism that someone “who was so sexual in text messages and so willing to meet up with” a person who was “clearly a minor” would have no “thought” of “want[ing] to [do] something sexual.” But Kent insisted that he only wanted simple “company” and “interaction . . . with a female,” and that any physical contact would have been limited to “[v]isual contact like touching, holding and kissing hands.” Kent told Officer that he was “scared” and that he “wouldn’t want [his] daughter to find out [he] was with a 13 year old.” Eventually, though, Kent agreed with Sergeant that, although he “wouldn’t have initiated it,” he may have “been down” with “kissing and stuff.” And later, Kent acknowledged that “maybe it would have gotten sexual,” and he said, “I mean, it could have gone that way, yeah, sure. It could have.” ¶17 While Officer went through Kent’s phone, Sergeant asked Kent what he meant by his cartoon text. Kent told Sergeant that he was “not sure exactly” what he had meant but that he “was trying to get [Jen] to agree to” meet him “because [he] thought she wasn’t going to come with [him] and kick it if [he] wasn’t going to say something to her.” Kent said he “didn’t want to say anything sexual on the phone” and “didn’t have plans on doing anything with” Jen, but he just thought that “if she didn’t get sex from [him], she wasn’t going to come and meet up with [him].” Sergeant asked Kent if sex would have occurred if Jen had been “willing,” to which Kent replied, “I’m not saying it wouldn’t have happened, but I’m saying that I can tell you honestly I don’t know if it would have happened because I don’t feel comfortable about it even talking to you.” The Trial ¶18 The State charged Kent with one count of enticing a minor, a second-degree felony, and the case proceeded toward trial. 20230563-CA 9 2026 UT App 127  State v. Kent ¶19 Kent filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the State had entrapped him as a matter of law. The court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion, where it heard testimony from Sergeant and reviewed the text messages, the phone calls, and Jen’s online profile. Kent’s attorney (Counsel) argued that the comments Detective made to Kent over the phone “were part of the enticing comments in the entrapment.” Counsel also contended that the “constant[]” “comments or questions through the text messages” asking, “What are you looking for? What do you want to do?” also pointed towards entrapment. Counsel further argued that it had been Jen (and not Kent) that brought up “oral sex,” “sex,” and “the topic of getting pregnant.” In response, the State argued that Kent had “br[ought] up sex” and had “initiate[ed] . . . the sexual conduct of the call.” The State also emphasized Kent’s suggestive cartoon text and his response to Jen’s pregnancy concerns. ¶20 After the hearing, the court denied Kent’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Kent had not been entrapped as a matter of law and that, on the facts presented, the question of entrapment was one for the jury. In making its decision, the court observed that “[l]aw enforcement in this case did not use personalized high- pressure tactics.” And the court noted that “[e]ven if . . . Kent went on the app for non-criminal reasons, when [Kent] was informed that the person he was texting with was a 13-year-old girl, [Kent] expressed interest in engaging in the alleged criminal activity without impermissible prompting or inducement.” The court agreed with the State that in “looking at the totality of the circumstances,” anything sexual said by Jen was just in response “to a question that was being asked by” Kent. The court also concluded that Jen “asking to clarify what it is that [Kent] means is not an unlawful inducement,” especially where it was “apparent from the texts that [Kent] appear[ed] to be careful about stating things in the texts and . . . about sexual innuendoes.” This, the court believed, showed that Kent was “obviously concerned about what . . . he kn[ew] would be a crime.” 20230563-CA 10 2026 UT App 127  State v. Kent ¶21 At trial, the State presented three witnesses—Sergeant, Detective, and Officer, and they testified consistently with the events described above. The State also submitted as evidence, among other things, Jen’s dating app profile, the text messages between Kent and Jen, and recordings of the phone calls between Kent and Jen. And the State played for the jury, but did not submit as an exhibit, Kent’s interview with police. ¶22 The State first examined Sergeant about his text conversations (as Jen) with Kent. Sergeant testified that he posted Jen’s profile on the dating app in question because that app “was known to [police] to be a social media . . . where many men were seeking to engage in . . . relationships, sexual, with children.” He testified that after he started conversations with people on the app, “[m]ost of the people that [he] had contact with” “immediately cease[d] conversing with” him “once they [found] out or believe[d] that [the persona was] 13” years old. Sergeant testified that in order for the users to verify who they are talking to, they usually “look for confirmation” through photos or phone calls. Specific to his conversation (as Jen) with Kent, Sergeant offered his view that when Kent asked Jen if she stayed at “home alone all night,” “the intent of that [question]” was to “understand[] that [Jen was] 13.” And when Sergeant met up with Kent, he made sure Detective was there to “verify that [Kent] did have the intent to meet with a 13 year old” and to ensure that Kent didn’t just happen to be in the wrong place at the right time. ¶23 During cross-examination, Counsel specifically asked Sergeant if he was familiar with a Utah statute that makes it “illegal to impersonate an individual online with the intent to harm [and] defraud.” See Utah Code § 76-12-206. 3 Sergeant agreed 3. After the events giving rise to this case had taken place, this statute was amended and renumbered. No party to this appeal contends that any of the relatively minor changes to this statute are material here. Thus, for convenience, we cite the current version of the statute. 20230563-CA 11 2026 UT App 127  State v. Kent that the statute existed, but he testified that he didn’t think that was “what [they] were doing in this case.” Counsel also pointed out that the statute contains an exemption for law enforcement, to which Sergeant agreed. See id. § 76-12-206(4)(g). Counsel asked Sergeant if he knew what the term “catfishing” meant. Sergeant responded that he did, and he defined it as “posing or defrauding and scamming somebody.” He also agreed that a “fake online identity created to begin a deceptive relationship” would fit under that definition. ¶24 On redirect, with regard to the cartoon text message Kent sent to Jen, the State asked Sergeant if he knew of any “vernacular or slang regarding a part of [the] body and a cat.” Sergeant testified that it was his understanding, “[b]ased on [his] training [and] experience,” that a “vagina can be referred to as a kitty, a cat, kitty-cat, such things as that.” And the State specifically asked Sergeant if he had “ever heard the vernacular ‘pussy’ for a woman’s vagina,” to which he said he had. But Sergeant acknowledged, on re-cross, that Kent “didn’t specifically outright say” that the cat cartoon was a reference to female genitalia. ¶25 Next, the State called Officer to testify about Kent’s interview. The State asked about Officer’s approach during interviews and whether “rapport building” is “important in an interview.” Officer testified that rapport building is “[a]lways” important because he tries to “get to know” the interviewee so he can “relate to them in as many ways” as possible. He also stated that it is “a very common tactic . . . used since before [his] time, either not to reveal information or to lie, . . . in order to better ascertain the truth.” ¶26 On cross-examination, Counsel asked Officer whether he was really “all knowing” and could “know absolutely when somebody’s not telling the truth.” Officer acknowledged that he did not actually possess any such ability, but he said he uses that “technique . . . on a regular basis because [he] want[s] people to believe that [he] can tell when they’re lying.” 20230563-CA 12 2026 UT App 127  State v. Kent ¶27 Counsel also attempted to ask Officer—as he had with Sergeant—about “catfishing” and Utah’s online impersonation statute. This time, the State objected, arguing that Counsel had already broached this subject with Sergeant and that it was irrelevant in any event. Counsel countered that discussing the statute was relevant because the entrapment defense “talks about improper police conduct.” Counsel acknowledged that Officer and Sergeant couldn’t be charged with violating this statute due to its exemption for law enforcement, but he explained that he wanted to argue that the underlying conduct would “still [be] a crime” for anyone else. The court sustained the State’s objection and barred Counsel from asking Officer about catfishing, because “there is a statute that says [Officer’s and Sergeant’s conduct here was] not improper.” ¶28 On redirect, Officer testified that in post-detention interviews with suspects in these sorts of cases, he likes to maintain the ruse—that there really is an actual teenager involved—because he “find[s] that [he] receive[s] the truth from the suspect a lot more.” And he testified that during such interviews, he often uses a technique called “stopping the denial,” where he will “continue to offer the alternate excuses . . . to try and gain [the] truth.” Speaking specifically about Kent’s interview, Officer characterized Kent as “not very forthcoming.” ¶29 After the State rested, Counsel made a motion for a directed verdict. First, he argued that the State had not presented sufficient evidence to show that Kent was “soliciting, seducing, luring, or enticing” Jen. Second, he argued that the State had not “met [its] burden” to prove that Kent “reasonably believed . . . that [Jen] was a minor.” Third, he argued that Kent had been entrapped because the State initiated the sexual nature of the conversation and maintained the ruse of the “Jen” persona even after Kent was detained. The State disagreed, arguing that Kent’s statements in texts and during the interview showed that Kent knew Jen was a minor and that he intended to engage in “sexual activity” with her, as “expresse[d] through the[] little cartoons” in 20230563-CA 13 2026 UT App 127  State v. Kent his text message. Ultimately, the court denied Kent’s directed verdict motion. ¶30 Kent then testified in his own defense. He talked about his phone calls with “Jen,” and he stated his belief that the second phone call was “tapped and that [he] was set up” because “it was echoing in the background.” He also testified that he did not believe that Jen was a minor. Kent stated that Jen did not “look” or “sound” like a minor and that “[n]othing added up to her being a minor.” He explained that he believed this because “[y]ou don’t have a 13 year old in a sting operation.” To know for sure, though, he testified that he decided to go and meet Jen. As to the cartoons in the text message, Kent insisted that they “had no sexual innuendoes at all,” explaining that his phone automatically suggests emojis when he is sending a text message and that he “wasn’t meaning to send” the mountain emoji. Kent also explained that he offered to have Jen come over and clean his house because he “actually needed help.” ¶31 During Kent’s closing argument, Counsel discussed catfishing, telling the jury that it “might be wondering why [he] talked about catfish[ing],” and explaining that it was “one of [the defense’s] theories of the case.” He reiterated the definition of catfishing for the jury—“catfish is someone who makes a fake account of someone on social media . . . to lure [someone else] into a relationship with a false identity”—and he argued that that is “what happened” here, emphasizing that even the officers had “admitted that the definition of catfishing applies.” ¶32 The jury ultimately found Kent guilty as charged. The trial court later sentenced Kent to prison, but it suspended that sentence and placed him on probation, with conditions, including a 180-day stint in jail. 20230563-CA 14 2026 UT App 127  State v. Kent ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶33 Kent appeals his conviction, and he presents four issues for our review. First, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict. In particular, he asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that he knew Jen was thirteen years old or that he intended to have sex with her. We review a trial court’s “denial of a motion for directed verdict for correctness.” State v. Palmer, 2025 UT App 135, ¶ 27, 577 P.3d 1285 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 585 P.3d 46 (Utah 2026). “However, where a defendant challenges the denial of a motion for a directed verdict based on the sufficiency of the evidence, the applicable standard of review is highly deferential to the jury verdict.” Id. (cleaned up). In such situations, “we will uphold the [trial] court’s denial if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, some evidence exists from which the State could prove beyond a reasonable doubt” the challenged elements of the crime. Id. (cleaned up). ¶34 Second, Kent challenges the trial court’s rejection of his efforts—both in a pretrial motion to dismiss and in a directed verdict motion—to have the case dismissed on the basis of entrapment. “An entrapment ruling involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Dickerson (Dickerson I), 2022 UT App 56, ¶ 14, 511 P.3d 1191 (cleaned up). Thus, “[w]hen considering a [trial] court’s entrapment determination, we review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions for correctness.” State v. Hernandez, 2020 UT App 58, ¶ 4, 462 P.3d 1283. Here, Kent asked the trial court to dismiss the case, arguing that the facts of the case established entrapment as a matter of law. Such a ruling is appropriate “[o]nly when reasonable minds [can] not differ” on the question. See State v. Haltom, 2005 UT App 348, ¶ 7, 121 P.3d 42. Thus, a trial court’s determination about whether entrapment has been established as a matter of law presents, by definition, a legal conclusion that we review for correctness. We apply that standard of review here. 20230563-CA 15 2026 UT App 127  State v. Kent ¶35 Third, Kent asserts that Counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. “When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on appeal, there is no lower court ruling to review and we must decide whether the defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law.” State v. Dew, 2025 UT App 22, ¶ 28, 566 P.3d 53 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 568 P.3d 264 (Utah 2025). ¶36 Finally, Kent argues that the trial court erred when it limited Counsel’s cross-examination of Officer regarding catfishing. “We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, and we will not reverse the trial court’s ruling on evidentiary issues unless it is manifest that the trial court so abused its discretion that there is a likelihood that injustice resulted.” State v. Gollaher, 2020 UT App 131, ¶ 21, 474 P.3d 1018 (cleaned up). ANALYSIS I. Insufficiency of the Evidence ¶37 Kent first challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for a directed verdict, asserting that—in two respects—the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. First, he claims there was insufficient evidence to support a determination that he believed Jen was a minor. Next, he says there was insufficient evidence to support a determination that he intended to entice Jen into engaging in sexual activity with him. We address each of these contentions in turn. A. Jen’s Age ¶38 Early in the text exchange, Jen told Kent that she was thirteen; thus, the question presented is whether there was sufficient evidence upon which a factfinder could reasonably ground a conclusion that Kent believed Jen’s representation. In response to Kent’s assertion that the evidence was insufficient on 20230563-CA 16 2026 UT App 127  State v. Kent this point, the State directs our attention first to the text messages and phone calls, offering its view that the statements Kent made to Jen in those settings “alone suffice to show that Kent believed Jen was a minor.” The State also points to statements Kent made during his post-detention interview, arguing that those statements provide “even more evidence.” We agree with the State that this evidence was more than sufficient to support the jury’s determination that Kent believed Jen to be a minor. ¶39 We begin with the text messages and phone calls. Near the beginning of the text exchange, after Jen told him she was thirteen, Kent appeared disappointed, saying, “Dam that sucks I got a daughter your age.” And throughout the conversation, Jen offered hints that supported her representation that she was thirteen. For instance, she told Kent she lived with her mother and was “in middle school.” And during a phone call, Jen told Kent she couldn’t talk long because she was at school right then. Many of Kent’s responses tended to indicate that he believed Jen’s representation about her age; for instance, Kent told Jen that he “like[d] younger chicks,” and he asked Jen whether it was “common for kids [her] age to be having sex.” (Emphasis added.) At one point, he asked Jen whether she would be “home alone all night,” a query Sergeant believed indicated that Kent believed Jen to be a minor. ¶40 Especially damning for Kent in this regard are his repeated comments expressing concern about police involvement in the situation. On two occasions during the text exchange, Kent asked Jen to promise him she was not working with the cops. And on other occasions, Kent seemed reluctant to expressly discuss, over text, the particular sexual activities they might engage in if they were to meet, because he was worried about the potential consequences of engaging in such activities with a minor. If Kent truly believed that Jen was nineteen years old, as her profile indicated, he would not have been concerned about the potential legal consequences of discussing sexual activity. 20230563-CA 17 2026 UT App 127  State v. Kent ¶41 Finally, many of the statements Kent made to officers during his interview also supported the conclusion that he believed Jen to be a minor. During the interview, Kent told Officer he understood why Jen’s “mom” would be upset about their conversation because he also had a thirteen-year-old daughter. And he made statements indicating that Jen was “[a]lmost the same age as [his] daughter”—“13, almost 14” years old. He even stated that he “wouldn’t want [his] daughter” “to find out [he] was with a 13 year old.” He also told police that “[o]n a scale of 1 to 10” he would rate himself a “5 maybe” on how attracted he was to “13 year old[s].” Lastly, he explained to Officer that he had inquired if Jen was a cop “[b]ecause [he] didn’t want to get in trouble” for engaging in “illegal” “sexual stuff” with a minor. We therefore agree with the State that Kent’s statements—made in text messages, phone calls, and during the interview—provide strong evidence that Kent believed Jen to be a minor. ¶42 Kent resists this conclusion for two reasons. First, he argues that he only acknowledged Jen’s age after the police had first mentioned Jen’s age and said that her angry mother had contacted the police. But this argument does not account for the statements Kent made before the interview began. The text messages alone provide strong evidence that Kent knew and understood Jen’s age, as well as the consequences associated with engaging in sexual activity with a thirteen-year-old girl. And Kent’s argument also does not account for the fact that at no point during the interview did Kent claim that he disbelieved Jen’s assertion that she was a minor. In fact, all of his interview statements “assumed, as a premise, that [Jen] was a young minor.” See State v. Dickerson (Dickerson II), 2025 UT App 173, ¶ 23, 582 P.3d 1219, cert. denied, 585 P.3d 47 (Utah 2026). ¶43 Second, Kent asserts that he could not have reasonably believed Jen was a minor because the photos and voice used to represent her belonged to adults, and because Jen “claimed sexual experience in language unusual” for a minor. This argument is reminiscent of the argument made by the defendant in Dickerson 20230563-CA 18 2026 UT App 127  State v. Kent II. See id. ¶ 26. There, the defendant argued that because the online profile picture was of an adult woman, “neither he nor any reasonable person in his position would have believed that [the persona] was anything other than an adult.” Id. We rejected that argument, stating that “the question isn’t whether a reasonable person in [the defendant’s] position believed [the persona] was thirteen; instead, the question is whether [the defendant] believed she was thirteen.” Id. ¶ 27 (emphasis added). So too here. Regardless of Jen’s photos, voice, or claimed sexual experiences, the statements Kent made during the text messages, phone calls, and interview provide strong evidence that Kent believed Jen to be a minor, even if we assume—for purposes of the argument only—that a reasonable person may not have. ¶44 Thus, the trial court correctly concluded, on this record, that at least “some evidence exist[ed] from which the State could prove beyond a reasonable doubt” that Kent believed Jen to be a minor. See State v. Palmer, 2025 UT App 135, ¶ 27, 577 P.3d 1285 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 585 P.3d 46 (Utah 2026). B. Intent ¶45 The statute under which Kent was charged states that, to commit enticement, an actor must “knowingly . . . use[] an electronic communication . . . to . . . solicit, seduce, lure, or entice a minor . . . to engage in sexual activity that is a violation of state criminal law.” Utah Code § 76-5-417(2). 4 Kent argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he “attempted to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice” Jen into engaging in illegal sexual activity with him. We disagree because, again, the text messages clearly contain at least some evidence in support of this conclusion. 4. After the events giving rise to this case had taken place, this statutory section was renumbered, but no material changes were made to the relevant statutory text. We therefore cite the current version of the statute for convenience. 20230563-CA 19 2026 UT App 127  State v. Kent ¶46 At one point during the text exchange, Kent invited Jen to come over and clean his house. On its face, that offer was innocent enough, but it came accompanied with sexual undertones. When Jen told Kent she wasn’t interested in cleaning his house, he replied, “I’m thinking if you were to give it a try you might end up pretty happy.” And when Jen showed interest in that, Kent told her that she’d have to come over so that he could show her what he needed done and so that they could discuss what he would pay her for those services. When discussing whether it might work for Jen to come over, Kent remarked that they “would only have like a half [hour]” and told her they would “need allot more time than that . . . if [it was] going to be any kind of fun” and that “good things come to those who wait.” These messages presen