State v. Prestwich

2026 UT App 159 THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF UTAH, Appellee, v. KENT DANIEL PRESTWICH, Appellant. Opinion No. 20240036-CA Filed October 22, 2026 First District Court, Logan Department The Honorable Spencer D. Walsh No. 231101275 Wendy M. Brown and Debra M. Nelson, Attorneys for Appellant Derek E. Brown and Lindsay Combs, Attorneys for Appellee JUDGE AMY J. OLIVER authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred. OLIVER, Judge: ¶1 Kent Daniel Prestwich was charged with ten counts of sexual exploitation of a minor after law enforcement found files containing child sexual abuse materials (CSAM) on Prestwich’s computer. Prestwich ultimately pleaded guilty to two counts, and the State agreed to recommend that Prestwich receive a suspended prison sentence, serve 200 days in jail, and serve forty- eight months of probation. The district court accepted Prestwich’s guilty plea as knowing and voluntary but declined to follow the parties’ recommendation, instead imposing a prison sentence of one to fifteen years for each count, with the sentences running  State v. Prestwich concurrently. Prestwich now challenges both his plea and sentence. We are unpersuaded by his arguments and affirm. BACKGROUND ¶2 In 2023, law enforcement identified an IP address belonging to Prestwich as having received CSAM. Based on this, officers executed a search warrant at Prestwich’s residence, which revealed CSAM files on Prestwich’s computer. After his arrest, Prestwich waived his Miranda rights and admitted he “messed up a little” and had searched for and downloaded CSAM. He further admitted he had been doing so for the past fifteen years and had viewed CSAM as recently as the morning of the search. Prestwich also admitted he had viewed CSAM featuring children as young as five years old, but he “preferred female children in the twelve- year-old range.” He explained he had “previously sought out help from his [c]hurch” regarding this behavior but thought it had not helped. At the time, Prestwich lived with his wife and three children, including his twelve-year-old and eight-year-old daughters. He also volunteered with young children through his church. ¶3 The State charged Prestwich with ten counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, all second-degree felonies. Prestwich agreed to plead guilty to two counts, and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. In the written plea agreement, Prestwich and the State agreed to the following joint sentencing recommendation, which appeared in bold text: The Defendant agrees to stipulate to a joint recommendation that he be sentenced 1 to 15 years in the Utah State Prison on each count and concurrent to one another. The prison sentence will be suspended pending successful completion of probation. Defendant and the State jointly agree to 20240036-CA 2 2026 UT App 159  State v. Prestwich recommend that the Defendant serve a jail term of 200 days, with credit for time served . . . . ¶4 The plea agreement also contained the following paragraph: Judge Not Bound: I understand that if the prosecutor agrees to make a sentencing or restitution recommendation, or agrees to make no recommendation, that agreement binds only the prosecutor. I understand that other branches of the State, including law enforcement agencies and Adult Probation and Parole, are allowed to make sentencing recommendations to the court that are different from those made by the prosecutor, and that the court, in deciding what my sentence will be, is not bound by any of the recommendations. Other persons, including any victims of my crime(s), are entitled to address the judge before I am sentenced. I know that the judge is bound only by the law, not by anyone’s recommendation or prediction. No matter what my defense attorney, the prosecutor, any victim, or anyone else recommends or predicts, the judge alone will determine my sentence, within the limits of the law. ¶5 Two paragraphs below this, Prestwich signed acknowledgments to statements that he was entering the plea “of [his] own free will and choice,” that he had read the plea agreement or had it read to him by his attorney and he understood its contents, and that he believed himself “to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of understanding the[] proceedings and the consequences of [his] pleas.” ¶6 At the change-of-plea hearing, the court engaged in a colloquy with Prestwich during which the court verified that 20240036-CA 3 2026 UT App 159  State v. Prestwich Prestwich had reviewed the plea agreement, 1 did not have questions regarding the plea agreement, and was of sound mind. Upon learning that Prestwich was taking prescribed medication, the court asked if the medication affected his ability to understand the courtroom proceedings. Prestwich replied, “I don’t think so.” The court then asked him, “Are you thinking clearly today?” to which he replied, “Yeah.” After this assurance, the court asked Prestwich to explain what was happening. Prestwich explained, “I’m doing a plea deal. So I’m admitting guilt, basically.” The court then asked, “[D]o you believe that you are thinking clearly and fully understand what’s happening right now?” Prestwich replied, “Yes.” The court also offered Prestwich the opportunity “to come back a different day” if he felt that he was not thinking clearly. Following this questioning, the court found Prestwich’s plea was “knowingly and voluntarily entered.” The court did not, however, orally inform Prestwich that it was not bound by the parties’ sentencing recommendation. ¶7 A presentence investigation report (the PSR) was then prepared. The PSR recommended a limited jail sentence followed by probation, consistent with the plea agreement. The PSR noted that Prestwich had a history of mental illness, including “[s]uicide attempts/threat.” Additionally, while the PSR contained Prestwich’s acknowledgment that what he did was wrong and a concession that the children in the material were victimized, it also included Prestwich’s statement that “some of the children posed and performed sexual acts willingly.” ¶8 At sentencing, Prestwich’s counsel (Counsel) and the State requested that the court impose a sentence consistent with the PSR and the agreement of the parties. However, there were numerous facts about the case that “really concern[ed]” the court. 1. When asked by the court whether Prestwich had an opportunity to review the plea agreement, Prestwich responded, “He read it to me, yeah.” 20240036-CA 4 2026 UT App 159  State v. Prestwich Given Prestwich’s fifteen years of viewing CSAM, the court expressed concern for what it described as Prestwich’s “dangerous addiction to child pornography” and his “sexual attraction to children,” noting it was “a really grave public safety threat.” The court also identified as particularly disturbing Prestwich’s statement in the PSR that he believed “some of the children posed and performed sex acts willingly.” Due to Prestwich’s long-standing conduct viewing CSAM, his admissions of sexual attraction toward children, and his erroneous belief that some of the children willingly participated, the court felt Prestwich “pose[d] a danger to children,” and deviated from the recommended sentence. The court imposed a prison sentence of one to fifteen years for each count, with the sentences running concurrently. The court also recommended that Prestwich receive sex offender treatment as soon as possible. Prestwich timely appealed. ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶9 First, Prestwich contends the district court’s failure to orally advise him that it was not bound by his plea agreement rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary. Because Prestwich did not preserve this argument below, he asks us to review it for plain error. “Plain error is a question of law reviewed for correctness.” State v. Rosecrans, 2024 UT App 128, ¶ 17, 557 P.3d 617 (cleaned up). ¶10 Second, Prestwich argues Counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not attempting to present a tentative plea agreement for approval by the district court as permitted under rule 11(i) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. “When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on appeal, there is no lower court ruling to review and we must decide whether the defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law.” State v. Newton, 2018 UT App 194, ¶ 20, 437 P.3d 429 (cleaned up). 20240036-CA 5 2026 UT App 159  State v. Prestwich ¶11 Third, Prestwich argues the district court erred by failing to hold a competency hearing sua sponte. This issue was not preserved, and we review it only for plain error. See State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ¶ 45, 63 P.3d 731. ¶12 Fourth, Prestwich asserts the district court imposed an illegal sentence under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing to orally inform him that the court was not bound by the plea agreement. This issue was not raised before the district court, and the parties disagree as to whether traditional preservation rules apply. The previous version of rule 22(e) operated as a “limited exception to the preservation doctrine.” State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 20, 353 P.3d 55. In State v. Mullins, however, our supreme court held that the current version of rule 22(e) requires “that a defendant first file a [rule] 22(e) motion with the district court.” 2025 UT 57, ¶ 30, cert. denied, Oct. 19, 2026 (U.S. No. 25-1115). As a result, “traditional preservation rules on appeal” now apply to issues raised under rule 22(e). Id. But our supreme court made the preservation requirement prospective and placed “future defendants who challenge their sentences as illegal on notice” of the preservation requirements. Id. ¶ 31. Because Prestwich raised the rule 22(e) issue prior to the court’s decision in Mullins, “we will not require him to show an exception to preservation.” Id. We therefore address Prestwich’s argument on the merits. “Whether a sentence is illegal and qualifies for review under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is an issue we review for correctness.” State v. Garner, 2008 UT App 32, ¶ 10, 177 P.3d 637 (cleaned up). ¶13 Finally, Prestwich argues the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced him by ignoring the parties’ sentencing recommendation. “District courts are afforded wide latitude in sentencing, and we will reverse a sentencing decision only if the court abused its discretion.” State v. Robinson, 2018 UT App 227, ¶ 13, 438 P.3d 35. 20240036-CA 6 2026 UT App 159  State v. Prestwich ANALYSIS I. Knowing and Voluntary Plea ¶14 Prestwich first contends that the district court plainly erred by failing to orally inform him that it was not bound by the sentencing recommendation in the plea agreement. He argues that this failure rendered his plea not knowing and voluntary. To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must show “(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the [district] court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome.” State v. Anderson, 2024 UT App 65, ¶ 18, 549 P.3d 101 (cleaned up). ¶15 “A plea is not knowing and voluntary when the record demonstrates that the accused does not understand the nature of the constitutional protections that he [or she] is waiving, or when he [or she] has such an incomplete understanding of the charge that his [or her] plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt.” State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶ 16, 279 P.3d 371 (cleaned up). Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure was created “to assist courts in determining whether a plea is knowingly and voluntarily made.” Id. ¶ 24. Compliance with rule 11 ensures that “defendants receive adequate notice of their rights.” State v. Candland, 2013 UT 55, ¶ 14, 309 P.3d 230. As a result, the determination of whether the district court complied with rule 11 is “an appropriate step in evaluating whether the defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary.” Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶ 24. However, “district courts are not constitutionally obligated to follow rule 11.” Candland, 2013 UT 55, ¶ 14. Thus, a violation of rule 11 does not automatically render a plea unknowing and involuntary. See Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶¶ 26–27; Utah R. Crim. P. 11(l) (“Failure to comply with this rule is not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea.”). Instead, the ultimate inquiry is whether “defendants knew of their 20240036-CA 7 2026 UT App 159  State v. Prestwich constitutional rights and fully understood the charges.” Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶ 25. ¶16 Prestwich asserts that the district court failed to comply with rule 11(h)(2), which requires a district court to “advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court.” Utah R. Crim. P. 11(h)(2). The parties disagree as to whether the district court satisfied this requirement, with Prestwich arguing that “personally” means “orally” and the State arguing that “personally” is satisfied by the written plea agreement. But we need not resolve this dispute because compliance with rule 11 is not constitutionally required. Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶ 25. Moreover, “even if there was a violation of rule 11 . . . , [we] must continue to inquire into whether there is evidence that the plea was nonetheless knowingly and voluntarily made.” Id. Doing so here, we conclude that Prestwich’s plea was knowing and voluntary. ¶17 The record reveals that Prestwich initialed and signed the plea agreement. At the plea hearing, Prestwich confirmed that he had been provided with sufficient time to confer with Counsel about the decision to plead guilty, that Counsel had read him the agreement, and that he had no questions about anything contained in the agreement. This court has previously held that guilty pleas entered under similar circumstances were knowing and voluntary. See State v. Smith, 2018 UT App 144, ¶ 28, 427 P.3d 1251 (rejecting the contention that a plea was unknowing and involuntary when the plea affidavit had been signed by the defendant and included the correct standard for withdrawing the plea, despite the district court’s later misstatement of the standard during the plea colloquy). Most notably, we have previously rejected the contention that a plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily where the trial court failed to orally inform the defendant of the nonbinding nature of the sentencing recommendation during the relevant plea colloquy but the written plea agreement informed the defendant of this fact. See 20240036-CA 8 2026 UT App 159  State v. Prestwich Chavez v. State, 2007 UT App 400U, paras. 3–5 (per curiam). In Chavez, the defendant argued that his plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because “neither the trial court nor his counsel made it clear to him that the trial court was not bound to the sentencing recommendations in the plea agreement.” Id. para. 2. We rejected that argument because the defendant had signed a statement in support of the guilty plea that “unequivocally stated that the district court was not bound by the sentencing recommendations” and he had “informed the trial court that he had both read the statement and understood it.” Id. para. 3. ¶18 Here, Prestwich argues that the plea agreement, standing alone, cannot support the assertion that the subsequent plea was knowing and voluntary because the document was “internally contradictory.” Prestwich specifically contends that “the paragraph outlining the parties’ joint sentencing agreement contradicted the language in the judge-not-bound advisory.” The paragraph outlining the sentencing recommendation provided, in bold, The Defendant agrees to stipulate to a joint recommendation that he be sentenced 1 to 15 years in the Utah State Prison on each count and concurrent to one another. The prison sentence will be suspended pending successful completion of probation. Defendant and the State jointly agree to recommend that the Defendant serve a jail term of 200 days, with credit for time served . . . . Prestwich claims the second sentence of this paragraph—“The prison sentence will be suspended pending successful completion of probation”—uses “concrete, unwavering language” that the district court must follow. We disagree with this reading because the agreement, when viewed in its entirety, clearly conveys the nonbinding nature of the sentencing recommendation. 20240036-CA 9 2026 UT App 159  State v. Prestwich ¶19 At the outset, the plea agreement explained it was between Prestwich, his attorney, and the prosecutor. The first paragraph also noted that the State “agreed to recommend” the sentence contained in the agreement. Additionally, the phrase Prestwich relies on is sandwiched between two sentences that emphasize the agreed-upon punishment would be “recommended” by the parties. Finally, on the next page of the agreement, two paragraphs above where Prestwich first initialed, is the judge-not- bound advisory. That paragraph conveys, in a variety of ways, the nonbinding nature of any sentencing recommendation. Specifically, it states “that the judge is bound only by the law, not by anyone’s recommendation or prediction” and warns that regardless of recommendations, “the judge alone will determine [the] sentence, within the limits of the law.” Thus, taken as a whole, the plea agreement clearly conveys that any sentencing recommendation is not binding on the district court. As a result, the record indicates that Prestwich possessed “a sufficient understanding” of the nonbinding nature of the sentencing recommendation. 2 Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶ 31. ¶20 Thus, we conclude that Prestwich’s plea was knowing and voluntary, as the record indicates that Prestwich possessed the requisite “knowledge of the nature of the charges, of the constitutional rights being waived, and of the likely consequences of entering the guilty plea.” State v. Candland, 2013 UT 55, ¶ 13, 309 P.3d 230. Because compliance with rule 11 is not required and the record reflects the plea was knowing and voluntary, there are no errors for us to review. 2. While Prestwich also takes issue with the fact that the plea agreement was read to him, this does not render the plea unknowing and involuntary. See State v. Collins, 2015 UT App 214, ¶¶ 7, 9, 359 P.3d 664 (rejecting the argument that a plea was made unknowingly and involuntarily when a defendant was read the plea affidavit). 20240036-CA 10 2026 UT App 159  State v. Prestwich II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel ¶21 Prestwich next asserts that Counsel provided ineffective assistance by not attempting to present a tentative plea agreement for approval by the court as permitted under rule 11(i) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. To prevail on this claim, Prestwich “must show (1) that Counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” State v. Anderson, 2024 UT App 65, ¶ 24, 549 P.3d 101 (cleaned up). “If either is lacking, the claim fails and this court need not address the other.” State v. Bush, 2025 UT App 87, ¶ 20, 572 P.3d 449 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 585 P.3d 44 (Utah 2026). Here we elect to decide the issue based on lack of prejudice. ¶22 “To show prejudice in the plea-bargain context, an appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he [or she] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Collazo-Collazo v. State, 2015 UT App 111, ¶ 10, 349 P.3d 776 (cleaned up). A reasonable probability requires a defendant to “show that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.” Id. (cleaned up). “An appellant’s mere allegation that he [or she] would have insisted on trial but for his [or her] trial counsel’s errors . . . is ultimately insufficient to entitle him [or her] to relief. Rather, we look to the factual circumstances surrounding the plea to determine whether [the] defendant would have proceeded to trial.” Id. (cleaned up). ¶23 Prestwich fails to show prejudice as he “has not demonstrated that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.” Id. ¶ 11. Instead, he has simply posited that “[i]f the district court had heard the terms of the tentative plea agreement and indicated that it would not abide by them, [he] could have decided to take his case to trial.” This bare allegation is insufficient to show prejudice. 20240036-CA 11 2026 UT App 159  State v. Prestwich ¶24 Moreover, when the factual circumstances surrounding Prestwich’s plea are examined, it is evident it would not have been rational for him to have rejected the plea bargain and proceeded to trial. In Rhinehart v. State, our supreme court concluded that it would not have been rational for the defendant to go to trial given “the weight of the inculpatory evidence against her.” 2012 UT App 322, ¶ 9, 290 P.3d 921. Similarly, Prestwich faced significant evidence against him in this case. First, he was found in possession of numerous CSAM files. Next, he confessed to searching for, downloading, and viewing CSAM for the past fifteen years. This confession alone would likely have made conviction at trial on each of the ten counts of sexual exploitation of a minor “all but inevitable.” Collazo-Collazo, 2015 UT App 111, ¶ 12. Nowhere does Prestwich explain why it would have been rational to go to trial on all ten counts, particularly where each count has a maximum penalty of fifteen years in prison. See Utah Code § 76-3-203(2). Given the weight of evidence against him, Prestwich rationally exchanged a guilty plea for the dismissal of eight of the ten charges against him. See Collazo-Collazo, 2015 UT App 111, ¶ 13. ¶25 Because Prestwich fails to show that Counsel’s alleged deficient performance prejudiced his defense, his ineffective assistance claim fails. III. Competency Hearing ¶26 Prestwich further argues that the district court committed plain error by failing to order a competency hearing sua sponte. Again, plain error requires a defendant to “establish that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the [district] court; and (iii) the error is harmful.” State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ¶ 15, 95 P.3d 276 (cleaned up). ¶27 A defendant must be competent to plead guilty. See State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ¶ 47, 63 P.3d 731; York v. Shulsen, 875 P.2d 590, 594 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Utah Code § 77-15-1 (providing that 20240036-CA 12 2026 UT App 159  State v. Prestwich an incompetent individual “may not be tried for a public offense”). A defendant is incompetent to proceed if he or she is “either (1) unable to have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him [or her] or of the punishment specified for the offense charged or (2) unable to consult with his [or her] counsel and to participate in the proceedings against him [or her] with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.” State v. Wolf, 2014 UT App 18, ¶ 19, 319 P.3d 757 (cleaned up). “In the absence of a competency petition, a [district] court must hold a competency hearing when there is a substantial question of possible doubt as to a defendant’s competency at the time of the guilty plea.” Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ¶ 49 (cleaned up). “In determining whether the lower court should have ordered a competency hearing, we consider only those facts that were before the [district] court when the plea was entered.” Id. ¶ 50 (cleaned up). ¶28 Prestwich raises three bases for the assertion that “a substantial question of possible doubt as to [his] competency” existed “at the time of the guilty plea.” Id. ¶ 49 (cleaned up). We address each in turn. ¶29 First, Prestwich points to his erroneous belief that “some of the children posed and performed sex acts willingly” and his statement that there were no victims in the case. But these statements were contained in the PSR and were not before the district court at the time of the plea. As a result, they could not have raised a substantial question of possible doubt as to Prestwich’s competency at the time of the plea. Regardless, these facts do not create substantial doubt as to Prestwich’s competency. In the PSR, Prestwich also acknowledged that what he did was wrong and conceded that the children in the material were victimized. The above statements therefore appear to be Prestwich’s attempt to rationalize or minimize his actions, emphasizing that he did not directly abuse any of the victims. Thus, while Prestwich may have failed to appreciate the full harm 20240036-CA 13 2026 UT App 159  State v. Prestwich to the victims in the CSAM, these statements do not raise a substantial doubt regarding Prestwich’s ability to understand and participate in the proceedings. ¶30 Prestwich next points to his history of mental illness and suicidal ideation as outlined in the PSR. Again, this information was not before the district court at the time of the plea. Moreover, “mental illness is not equivalent to incompetency to stand trial.” State v. Biebinger, 2018 UT App 123, ¶ 24, 428 P.3d 36; see also Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT 17, ¶ 16, 20 P.3d 382 (“The fact that a person is mentally ill, displays bizarre, volatile, and irrational behavior, or has a history of mental illness, does not mean that he or she is incompetent . . . .” (cleaned up)). And as Prestwich concedes, “suicidal thoughts and a history of mental illness do not automatically [render] a defendant incompetent.” Thus, even assuming Prestwich’s history of mental illness and suicidal ideation were before the district court at the time of the plea, these facts, without more, would not raise a substantial question of doubt regarding Prestwich’s competency. This is especially true given that the record shows Prestwich was coherent during the change-of-plea hearing, responded appropriately to the district court’s questions, and exhibited no mental impairment at the hearing. See Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ¶¶ 53–54 (determining that a substantial question of possible doubt as to a defendant’s competency was not present when the defendant was coherent during the plea hearing, responded to questions appropriately, and exhibited no cognitive impairments during the hearing). ¶31 Finally, Prestwich contends that the plea colloquy indicates that the district court “knew, or at least suspected,” that he may have been incompetent at the time of the plea. However, the record shows that Prestwich was coherent and appeared to clearly understand the proceedings. He affirmed that he was thinking clearly and that his prescribed medication was not affecting his ability to comprehend what was occurring. Additionally, he explained he was admitting guilt and confirmed he understood 20240036-CA 14 2026 UT App 159  State v. Prestwich the role of each party. These responses in no way raised a substantial question of doubt as to Prestwich’s competency. Thus, the district court did not plainly err by failing to sua sponte order a competency hearing. IV. Legality of the Sentence ¶32 Prestwich argues that the district court imposed an illegal sentence after the court failed to advise him that it was not bound by the sentencing recommendation contained in the plea agreement. Prestwich asserts that by failing to inform him of the nonbinding nature of the sentencing recommendation, the district court imposed a sentence that “omit[ted] a condition required by statute.” Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)(1)(F). ¶33 Prestwich’s argument “is exactly the type of argument that Utah courts have determined is not permissible under rule 22(e).” State v. Jones, 2013 UT App 106, ¶ 5, 300 P.3d 783. “Defendants cannot use rule 22(e) as a veiled attempt to challenge the underlying conviction by challenging the sentence.” Id. ¶ 3 (cleaned up); see also State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995) (“[I]ssues concerning the validity of a conviction are not cognizable under rule 22(e).”). “Instead, rule 22(e) applies only when a sentence is patently or manifestly illegal.” Jones, 2013 UT App 106, ¶ 3 (cleaned up). “Complaints regarding the district court’s conduct during the plea process do not establish that the sentence was manifestly or patently illegal.” Id. ¶ 5 (cleaned up). Thus, when a defendant attempts to use rule 22(e) to attack “the plea affidavit, the plea colloquy, and the district court’s adherence to rule 11 prior to sentencing,” such a claim is “merely a veiled attempt to challenge the underlying conviction by challenging the sentence, and this court is barred from considering [it].” Id. ¶¶ 5–6. ¶34 Here, Prestwich’s entire rule 22(e) claim seeks to attack the district court’s adherence to rule 11 during the plea colloquy. 20240036-CA 15 2026 UT App 159  State v. Prestwich Because such a claim is not permissible under rule 22(e), we do not consider it. V. Sentencing ¶35 Finally, Prestwich maintains that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing him to one to fifteen years in prison. District courts have “wide latitude and discretion in sentencing that will only be overturned in very narrow circumstances.” State v. Legg, 2018 UT 12, ¶ 34, 417 P.3d 592 (cleaned up). “While failure to consider all legally relevant sentencing factors is an abuse of discretion, a sentencing court is not required to weigh all the factors equally.” State v. Sexton, 2016 UT App 238, ¶ 10, 391 P.3d 297 (cleaned up). Indeed, “[o]ne factor in mitigation or aggravation may weigh more than several factors on the opposite scale.” State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990). A district court’s weighing of the relevant factors is only an abuse of discretion if a defendant “can show . . . that no reasonable person would take the view [adopted] by the sentencing court.” State v. McDaniel, 2015 UT App 135, ¶ 10, 351 P.3d 849 (cleaned up). “Mere disagreement with how the court weighed mitigating and aggravating factors” is insufficient. State v. Wilkes, 2020 UT App 175, ¶ 35, 479 P.3d 1142 (cleaned up). While Prestwich advances various arguments for why the district court abused its discretion, these arguments fail to establish that the court did not consider all relevant factors or that its weighing of those factors was unreasonable. ¶36 First, Prestwich argues that the district court abused its discretion by rejecting the recommended sentence contained in the plea agreement and supported by the PSR. However, the district court was not bound by either the plea agreement or the recommendation contained in the PSR. See State v. Hamilton, 2018 UT App 202, ¶ 23, 437 P.3d 530; State v. Monzon, 2016 UT App 1, ¶ 12, 365 P.3d 1234. Additionally, “in considering a sentence, there is no entitlement or right to probation, but rather, granting 20240036-CA 16 2026 UT App 159  State v. Prestwich probation is within the complete discretion of the district court.” Wilkes, 2020 UT App 175, ¶ 34 (cleaned up). As a result, the district court’s failure to follow the plea agreement and the PSR recommendation does not, by itself, establish an abuse of discretion. ¶37 Prestwich also takes issue with the imposed sentence by pointing to a lack of specifically enumerated aggravating factors and the existence of mitigating factors. However, there is no evidence that the district court did not weigh these factors when imposing the sentence. See State v. Moa, 2012 UT 28, ¶ 35, 282 P.3d 985 (“As a general rule, we presume that the district court made all the necessary considerations when making a sentencing decision.” (cleaned up)); State v. Bunker, 2015 UT App 255, ¶ 3, 361 P.3d 155 (“If the record shows that the trial court has reviewed information regarding the relevant legal factors, we can infer that the trial court adequately considered those factors.”). The district court reviewed the PSR and noted various factors that it found of particular concern. In light of those concerns, the district court chose to sentence Prestwich to prison, “the default sentence for second-degree felonies.” 3 State v. Corry, 2024 UT App 142, ¶ 35, 558 P.3d 128; see also Utah Code § 76-3-203. That Prestwich “views his situation differently” does not prove the district court failed to consider all legally relevant factors. State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, ¶ 14, 40 P.3d 626 (declining to find an abuse of discretion where defendant merely “point[ed] out indicia that tend[ed] to suggest a sentencing outcome more to his favor”). Prestwich merely points to the existence of mitigating circumstances and asks us “to reweigh aggravating and mitigating factors.” Corry, 2024 UT App 3. Moreover, “because defendants are not entitled to have sentences run concurrently, an even longer sentence than the one [Prestwich] received would still have aligned with the presumptive sentence assigned by the legislature.” State v. Corry, 2024 UT App 142, ¶ 35, 558 P.3d 128 (cleaned up); see also Utah Code § 76-3-401(1)–(2). 20240036-CA 17 2026 UT App 159  State v. Prestwich 142, ¶ 37 (cleaned up). But “second-guess[ing] a district court’s sentencing determination” is not the proper role of an appellate court. Id. (cleaned up). ¶38 Given the foregoing, Prestwich has failed to show that the district court did not properly consider all relevant factors or that the court unreasonably sentenced him to prison. He has thus failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its wide discretion in this area. CONCLUSION ¶39 The district court did not plainly err in accepting Prestwich’s plea because compliance with rule 11 is not constitutionally required and the plea was knowing and voluntary. Prestwich has failed to show prejudice as a result of any failure on the part of Counsel to present a tentative plea agreement to the district court for approval. The district court did not plainly err by failing to sua sponte order a competency hearing, as Prestwich’s competency was not the subject of a substantial question of doubt. Prestwich’s rule 22(e) claim is improper, as it seeks to attack the district court’s adherence to rule 11. And finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Prestwich. Accordingly, we affirm. 20240036-CA 18 2026 UT App 159