United States v. Jose Tavares
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date FiledAugust 17, 2026
Docket25-1489
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 25-1489
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JOSE TAVARES,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(District Court No. 3:24-cr-00025-001)
District Judge: Honorable Robert Kirsch
________________
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 26, 2026
Before: HARDIMAN, SCIRICA*, and AMBRO, Circuit
Judges
(Opinion filed August 17, 2026)
Adam W. Toraya
Bailey & Toraya, LLP
24 Commerce Street
10th Floor
Newark, NJ 07102
Counsel for Appellant
Mark E. Coyne
John F. Romano
Office of United States Attorney
970 Broad Street
Room 700
Newark, NJ 07102
R. David Walk, Jr.
Office of United States Attorney
401 Market Street
Camden, NJ 08101
Counsel for Appellee
*
The Honorable Anthony J. Scirica was unavailable to
participate in the decision in this case after submission to the
merits panel. This opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) and 3d Cir. I.O.P. 12.1(b).
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OPINION OF THE COURT
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
A jury convicted Jose Tavares of conspiracy to obtain
fraudulently COVID-19 unemployment benefits. He contends
that the District Court mishandled his proffered statements and
character evidence at trial and then imposed an unreasonable
sentence without properly granting him a reduction. Because
we perceive no error, we will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Between July 2020 and February 2021, Tavares
participated in a conspiracy to obtain funds from temporary
federal unemployment insurance programs created for the
COVID-19 pandemic by using stolen identities. Recruited by
his then-romantic partner, Christopher Valerio, Tavares and his
co-conspirators submitted fraudulent online benefits
applications to the New York Department of Labor (the
“Department”) in the names of about 20 victims. The agency
approved those applications and mailed dozens of debit cards
to addresses where the co-conspirators retrieved them. They
withdrew the proceeds at ATMs throughout New Jersey and
New York and used them to purchase designer goods, finance
international trips, and obtain cosmetic procedures.
In December 2021, the Government filed a criminal
complaint charging Tavares with participating in the scheme.
He retained counsel and entered into a written proffer
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agreement (the “Agreement”) with the Government. He
consented to participate in an interview with investigators
conducted under the Agreement. The Government agreed not
to use his admissions against him at trial or in sentencing,
except “to rebut any evidence or arguments offered on [his]
behalf.” App. 34. In effect, Tavares agreed that, should
statements of evidence he introduces at trial contradict what he
admitted by proffer, his right to object would be waived.
During a December 2022 proffer session, Tavares
admitted that he knew of Valerio’s scheme and became
personally involved starting in July 2020. He said that he
created fraudulent email addresses using victims’ personal
information that Valerio provided, received the debit cards at
his residence, sent photos confirming their receipt to Valerio,
and participated in weekly certification of the fraudulent
unemployment claims with the Department. Tavares said he
pretended to play the fool because he did not want any trouble.
In January 2024, a federal grand jury returned a one-count
indictment charging him with conspiracy to commit wire fraud
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349.
At trial, defense counsel in his opening statement told
the jury that Tavares had been Valerio’s “sacrificial pawn,”
believed Valerio’s money came from legitimate work as a
masseuse, and that Tavares had “no idea” about the scheme.
App. 159–61. The Government argued that those statements
directly contradicted Tavares’s proffered admissions and
moved to introduce those admissions under the waiver
provision in the Agreement. The District Court granted the
motion.
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Before Tavares testified, the Court ruled that he could
not testify as to his immigration status and that he had no prior
criminal record. The Court concluded that evidence would
constitute inadmissible character evidence, although it later
permitted limited testimony regarding Tavares’s permanent
residency to avoid juror speculation that he was in the U.S.
illegally.
The jury found Tavares guilty. At sentencing, he sought
up to a four-point reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. He
asserted that Valerio was the primary architect of the scheme
by “filling out the applications, making the calls, [and] going
to the ATMs.” App. 708. After considering the factors in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), the District Court denied the request to make
any downward adjustment. It sentenced Tavares to 40 months
in prison and ordered restitution in the amount of $570,077.
Tavares appeals.
II. JURISDICTION
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over
Tavares’s federal offense under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have
appellate jurisdiction over his conviction and sentencing
challenges under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
III. DISCUSSION
Tavares raises four challenges to his conviction and
sentence. He contends that the District Court erred by (1)
admitting statements from his proffer session, (2) precluding
testimony that he had no prior criminal record or was a law-
abiding person, (3) denying him a mitigating role reduction
under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, and (4) imposing a procedurally and
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substantively unreasonable sentence. We address each
argument in turn.
A. The District Court did not err by admitting
Tavares’s proffered statements.
We review the District Court’s decision to admit
Tavares’s proffered statements for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Hardwick, 544 F.3d 565, 570 (3d Cir. 2008). The
parties do not dispute the enforceability of the Agreement. The
sole question is whether, in the opening statement, Tavares’s
counsel triggered the Agreement’s waiver provision and
allowed the Government to introduce his proffered admissions
during its case-in-chief. We conclude that it did.
At trial, the District Court focused on the Agreement’s
provision allowing the Government to introduce proffered
admissions “to rebut any evidence or arguments offered on
[Tavares’s] behalf.” App. 295. The Court found that defense
counsel’s opening statement—portraying Tavares as an
unwitting participant—was “squarely contradicted” by his
proffered admissions acknowledging knowledge of the
fraudulent scheme and his active participation. App. 295–96.
In response, defense counsel objected on the basis that opening
statements are not “evidence” that can be rebutted under the
waiver provision. App. 291. Although the Court agreed that
“opening statements [are] not evidence,” it held that counsel
had nonetheless given the jury information that contradicted
the proffered statements. App. 294, 298. As a result, the Court
permitted the Government to introduce those statements at
trial.
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Tavares asserts this was an abuse of discretion. He
alleges the opening statement presented no affirmative
evidence or argument contradicting his proffered statements—
and, in any event, opening statements do not constitute
“evidence” that can be rebutted under the Agreement. App.
291–92. He also argues that the statement merely challenged
the sufficiency of the Government’s evidence of his knowledge
and intent, which is not enough to trigger the waiver provision.
Tavares distinguishes his case from Hardwick, where we
affirmed admission of a proffered statement under a similar
waiver provision only after defense counsel elicited testimony
directly contradicting the defendant’s admissions. Hardwick,
544 F.3d at 571. In our case, he argues, counsel merely asserted
that the Government failed to prove knowledge and intent
beyond a reasonable doubt.
We disagree. We have characterized waivers like the
one here—forgoing objecting to the admission of proffered
statements to “rebut any evidence or arguments offered on [the
defendant’s] behalf”—as “expansive.” Id. at 570 (emphasis in
original). We have also already found that this language is not
limited to the defendant’s own testimony, as Tavares argues,
but may extend to the defense’s cross-examination of other
witnesses. Id. at 570–71. We hold that this language extends
further to opening statements where defense counsel
affirmatively advances factual arguments inconsistent with the
defendant’s proffered admissions.
Tavares is correct that opening statements are not
evidence. See United States v. DeRosa, 548 F.2d 464, 470 (3d
Cir. 1977) (“An opening statement is not designed to be an
evidentiary recitation….”). The waiver provision, however,
permits the Government to use Tavares’s proffered statements
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to rebut both evidence and arguments advanced by the defense.
Ordinarily, the purpose of an opening statement is to “state
what evidence will be presented,” not to argue legal issues in
the case. DeRosa, 548 F.2d at 471 (citing United States v.
Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 612 (1976) (concurring opinion)). Yet
here, defense counsel went further than outlining the evidence.
He advanced a factual theory that Tavares had “no idea” about
the scheme, believed Valerio’s money came from legitimate
work, and he was merely a “sacrificial pawn.” App. 159–61.
That was an argument directly contradicting the proffered
admissions and sufficient to trigger the waiver provision.
Both the Second and Fifth Circuits have similarly
distinguished between opening statements that merely hold the
Government to its burden of proof and those that affirmatively
advance a factual theory inconsistent with a defendant’s
proffer.1 See United States v. Lyle, 919 F.3d 716, 732–33 (2d
Cir. 2019); United States v. Scott, 70 F.4th 846, 857–58 (5th
Cir. 2023). In Lyle, defense counsel’s opening statement did
not simply argue that the Government lacked credible evidence
that the defendant was a drug dealer. Lyle, 919 F.3d at 732–33.
It affirmatively disputed that he was a dealer, triggering the
waiver provision. Id. Likewise in Scott, the Court held that
defense counsel’s opening statement went beyond a mere
allusion to the Government’s lack of evidence but instead
1
Although we have not previously addressed this question in a
precedential opinion, two of our nonprecedential decisions
affirmed the admission of proffered statements after defense
counsel advanced a trial theory or opening statement
inconsistent with the client’s admissions. See United States v.
Raisley, 466 F. App’x 125, 130 (3d Cir. 2012); United States
v. Vella, 414 F. App’x 400, 405 (3d Cir. 2011).
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asserted a new factual theory—that missing cell phones may
have been in the police department’s lost-and-found rather than
thrown into a swamp, as the defendant had admitted during his
proffer. Scott, 70 F.4th at 857–58. The Court held that the
opening statement therefore triggered the waiver provision. Id.
We do not suggest that every opening statement can
trigger a proffer waiver. Defense counsel may remind the jury
that the Government bears the burden of proof that its evidence
is sufficient. But where, as here, a defendant’s counsel
affirmatively advances a factual narrative that materially
contradicts his client’s admissions at a proffer session, rebuttal
“evidence or arguments” become proper. The District Court
therefore did not abuse its discretion by admitting Tavares’s
proffered statements.
B. The District Court properly excluded
evidence of Tavares’s character.
Tavares argues he should have been allowed to testify
that he had no criminal record under Federal Rule of Evidence
405 to prove his good character. Because he never objected to
the District Court’s exclusion of such testimony, we review
this issue for plain error. United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d
558, 567 (3d Cir. 2010). This requires an error that was plain,
affected a defendant’s rights substantially enough to influence
the outcome, and “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v.
Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010) (citation modified).
We conclude there was no error here, let alone a plain
one. Rule 405 provides that character evidence, if admissible,
must be proved through reputation or opinion testimony. Fed.
9
R. Evid. 405(a). Evidence of “specific instances of conduct”
may be introduced only when character is an essential element
of a charge, claim, or defense. Fed. R. Evid. 405(b). Here,
Tavares asserts that testimony should have been admitted
because it bears on the pertinent character trait of “honesty”
directly implicated by the conspiracy charge against him.
Appellant’s Br. 19–20. However, he never sought to introduce
reputation or opinion testimony by other witnesses, only his
own testimony. The Court therefore addressed only whether
Tavares could testify about his lack of a criminal record. It
properly prevented him from doing so because, as we have
previously held, “testimony as to an absence of prior arrests
does not, standing alone, constitute evidence of good character
admissible as such under Rule 405(a).” Gov’t of V.I. v. Grant,
775 F.2d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1985).
Tavares also suggests that testimony concerning his
lack of a criminal record was admissible under Rule 405(b).
However, honesty or lack thereof is not an essential element of
the wire fraud conspiracy charge or its defense. See Fed. R.
Evid. 405 advisory committee’s note (explaining that evidence
of specific instances of conduct is reserved for cases “in which
character is, in the strict sense, in issue and hence deserving of
a searching inquiry”). To prove conspiracy to commit wire
fraud, the Government had to show that Tavares shared a unity
of purpose with his co-conspirators, intended to achieve a
common illegal goal, and agreed to work toward that goal. See
United States v. Boria, 592 F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 2010).
Whether he was generally an honest person did not establish or
negate any of those elements. The Court therefore did not
plainly err in excluding the proposed testimony.
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C. The District Court did not err by denying
Tavares a mitigating role reduction.
Tavares’s challenge to the District Court’s denial of a
mitigating role reduction of two to four levels in his offense
level is primarily factual and therefore reviewed for clear error.
United States v. Womack, 55 F.4th 219, 243 (3d Cir. 2022)
(quoting United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1207 (3d. Cir.
1994) (citations omitted)).
A mitigating role adjustment is appropriate only where
the defendant is “substantially less culpable than the average
participant in the criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt.
n.3(A). “[D]istrict courts are allowed broad discretion in
applying [section 3B1.2], and their rulings are left largely
undisturbed by the courts of appeal.” United States v. Isaza-
Zapata, 148 F.3d 236, 238 (3d Cir. 1998). In making that
determination, they consider, among other factors, the
defendant’s awareness of the scope of the enterprise,
relationship to other participants, and importance to the
venture’s success. United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 819
(3d Cir. 2001).
Tavares argued that he qualified for a reduction because
he was a mere pawn in a conspiracy in which Valerio played
the orchestral role of applying for unemployment benefits,
making phone calls, and withdrawing proceeds from ATMs.
The District Court rejected that characterization, finding that
Tavares knowingly participated in the scheme by creating
fraudulent email accounts, receiving correspondence and debit
cards tied to fraudulent claims, completing weekly
unemployment certifications, and sharing in the conspiracy’s
proceeds. It described him as “an active, integral participant”
11
in the conspiracy and stated that the “fraud would not have
been consummated in the way that it was without [him].” App.
710; see also App. 724–25, 729–30.
Those findings are well supported by the record. That
Valerio may have exercised a greater role in the conspiracy
does not establish that Tavares was “substantially less culpable
than the average participant.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(A).
Accordingly, the District Court did not clearly err in denying
the requested reduction.
D. The District Court Properly Sentenced
Tavares.
Federal sentencing involves a three-step process. The
District Court must calculate the advisory Guidelines range,
rule on any departure motions, and then determine an
appropriate sentence after considering the factors set forth in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237,
247 (3d Cir. 2006). We review first for procedural error and
then for substantive reasonableness. United States v. Tomko,
562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). In general, “[t]he
abuse-of-discretion standard applies to both . . . inquiries.” Id.
But where, as here, challenges to the reasonableness of a
sentence were not preserved, we review for plain error. United
States v. Valentin, 118 F.4th 579, 590 n. 19 (3d Cir. 2024). And
“the party challenging the sentence has the burden of
demonstrating unreasonableness” at both stages of our
analysis. Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567. Because Tavares did not do
so, we will affirm.
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1. The District Court imposed a
procedurally reasonable sentence.
Our first task on appeal is to “ensure that the [D]istrict
[C]ourt committed no significant procedural error.” Id.
(quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).
Examples of error include “failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as
mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting
a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id.
Tavares tells us that the District Court failed to give
sufficient weight to his history of childhood abuse and how
Valerio manipulated him as a “career con-artist.” App. 728–
29; Appellant’s Br. at 23. The record demonstrates otherwise.
The Court considered Tavares’s background and relationship
with Valerio before concluding that the seriousness of the
offense, Tavares’s knowing participation in the conspiracy, his
lack of genuine remorse, and the need for deterrence warranted
a within-Guidelines sentence. Because the Court adequately
considered the parties’ arguments and explained the basis for
the sentence it imposed, Tavares has not shown plain
procedural error.
2. The District Court imposed a
substantively reasonable sentence.
Absent a procedural error, we turn to whether the
District Court imposed a substantively reasonable sentence.
United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 218 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing
Gall, 552 U.S. at 597). “Ultimately, ‘[t]he touchstone of
“reasonableness” is whether the record as a whole reflects
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rational and meaningful consideration of the factors
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).’” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568
(quoting United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir.
2007) (en banc)). However, “‘we must give due deference to
the district court’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors, on
a whole,’ justify the sentence.” Id. (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at
597). And “the abuse-of-discretion standard by which
[reasonableness] must be judged . . . gives district courts broad
latitude in sentencing.” Id. (quoting United States v. Levinson,
543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008)). Thus, “if the … court’s
sentence is procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same
sentence.” Id.
In our case, the District Court imposed a 40-month
sentence within the advisory Guidelines range of 37 to 46
months. It explained at length why that sentence appropriately
reflected the seriousness of the offense, promoted respect for
the law, provided just punishment, and served the goals of
deterrence. Indeed, the Court noted that the 40-month sentence
was the “exact appropriate sentence, guidelines or no
guidelines.” App. 759. As the District Court is entitled to
substantial deference under our precedents, we perceive no
error in the sentence it imposed.
* * *
A proffer waiver reaching evidence or arguments
offered on a defendant’s behalf at trial extends to an opening
statement that affirmatively advances a factual theory
contradicting admissions at the proffer session. Tavares
identifies no error in the exclusion of his character testimony,
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the denial of a mitigating-role reduction, or the sentence
imposed. We will affirm.
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