United States v. Dwayne Fountain
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-2694
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 25-2694
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DWAYNE FOUNTAIN,
Appellant
_____________________________
Appeal from U.S. District Court, D. Del.
Judge Colm F. Connolly, No. 1:23-cr-00049-001
Before: KRAUSE, PORTER, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
Submitted Sep. 22, 2026. Filed: November 20, 2026
_____________________________
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION ∗
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, Appellant Dwayne Fountain challenges the
District Court’s denials of his motions to suppress and its imposition of two sentencing
enhancements. Perceiving no error, we will AFFIRM.
I.
Fountain contends the District Court erred (1) in denying his motion to suppress
evidence seized in the search of his apartment; (2) in denying his motion to suppress
evidence obtained from the Government’s wiretaps of the telephones used in drug-
trafficking operations; and (3) in applying two-point sentencing enhancements for
∗
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding
precedent.
maintaining a drug premises under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) and for his leadership role in
drug trafficking operations U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). We address each below.
A. The Apartment Search
Fountain argues that the drug-trafficking evidence from a residence he rented and
used, “Apartment 909,” should have been suppressed because deliberate falsehoods in the
search warrant affidavit precluded a finding of probable cause. He also argues he was
entitled to a hearing, pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), to dispute the
affidavit’s validity. Neither argument is persuasive.
When evaluating probable cause determinations, we “review the record to ensure
that the proper procedure for determining probable cause was followed,” Dempsey v.
Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 469 (3d Cir. 2016), and we, like the District Court, will
affirm the magistrate so long as the affidavit provides a “substantial basis” for her probable-
cause determination, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983).
Here, we can add little to the District Court’s detailed, thorough analysis. The Court
discerned “more than a substantial basis” for the magistrate’s probable cause
determination, SA 62-66, and determined that Fountain had failed to make a “substantial
showing of an intentional or reckless material falsehood” in the affidavit, SA 67-72. It
found, for example, that “Sargeant Martinek’s reported observation . . . of Fountain leaving
his apartment with the Smiley Face bag in hand,” together with “the markings on and shape
of the wrapping . . . and the white powdery remnants” inside, established the factual nexus
between Fountain’s “alleged drug dealing and the apartment.” SA 67. It also observed
that, even if officers had not observed Fountain leaving Apartment 909, mere “conclusory
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assertions” that officers lied to obtain probable cause were “insufficient to overcome the
presumptive validity of the affidavit.” SA 69 (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 171). Additional
evidence both “confirmed that Fountain lived in [A]partment 909” and undermined
Fountain’s assertion that “Martinek could not have observed the door to [A]partment 909
without compromising his surveillance position.” SA 69-70.
Given these observations, we see no error in the District Court’s denial of a Franks
hearing, which would only have been necessary if Fountain had made a “substantial
preliminary showing” that (1) the affidavit contained false statements made “knowingly
and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth,” and that (2) “the allegedly false
statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.” 438 U.S. at 155-56. The District
Court reasonably concluded he had not.
B. The Wiretap Application
Fountain next argues that wiretap evidence should have been suppressed because
the wiretap application for Target Telephones 1 and 3 (TT1 and TT3) did not establish
either probable cause or necessity. A district judge authorizing a wiretap must ensure the
application satisfies 18 U.S.C. § 2518, which requires a showing of probable cause, 1 as
well as necessity, meaning that “other investigative procedures have been tried and failed
or [that] they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed or to be too dangerous.” United
1
The Government must “show probable cause in three different contexts. The first is that
an individual has or is about to commit one of several enumerated offenses . . . ; the
second: that particular communications relating to the charged offense will be obtained
through the interception; third: the premises where the interception will be made are
being used in connection with the charged offense.” United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d
29, 35 (3d Cir. 1975); 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(e).
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States v. Bailey, 840 F.3d 99, 114 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting § 2518(1)(c)). We review a
district court’s authorization de novo. United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 345 (3d
Cir. 1992).
Here, again, the District Court exhaustively laid out how the affidavit demonstrated
“more than a substantial basis to justify [the] probable cause finding,” SA 47-51, and “why
other methods of investigation were insufficient to accomplish the purposes of the
investigation,” SA 51-56.
As to the former, Fountain objects that there was little to no connection established
between TT1 and him specifically. But, as the District Court observed, “wiretaps are
directed, not at persons, but at phone communications for which there is probable cause to
believe that evidence of crime will be revealed.” SA 46 (citing United States v. Tehfe, 722
F.2d 1114, 1117 (3d Cir. 1983)). The Court also found the affidavit contained a substantial
basis to conclude that a co-conspirator, William Warren, was engaged in drug trafficking,
and that TTI was being used in connection with Warren and Fountain’s drug-trafficking
operation.
As to the latter, Fountain objects that the affidavit contained only “broad, generic
statements that could apply to any drug investigation.” Op. Br. 26. But, as the Court noted,
the affidavit “explained how law enforcement exhausted the normal investigative
techniques,” and how alternatives would not succeed, with respect to the investigation of
Fountain and his co-conspirators specifically. SA 52. For example, “counter-surveillance
techniques” had “rendered physical surveillance challenging and unfruitful,” SA 53, and
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alternatives, like pole-mounted cameras and GPS trackers, had been “previously
unsuccessful” or were too limited in scope, see, e.g., SA 54-55.
And while Fountain argues the District Court abused its discretion in “granting the
Government leave to cure a conceded deficiency,” Op. Br. 24-25, that discrepancy related
to the Government’s briefing, not to the wiretap application, for which the Court found
there to have been “a substantial basis to conclude . . . that there’s probable cause that TT1
was being used in connection with those drug transactions, and the law enforcement had
identified the individuals involved in those drug transactions,” App 266.
C. The Sentencing Enhancements
Next, Fountain challenges the District Court’s application of a two-level
enhancement for maintaining a drug premises under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12), and another
two-level enhancement for a leadership role under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). We review the
application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, United States v. Fountain, 792 F.3d 310,
318 (3d Cir. 2015), and review the Court’s factual findings and “whether the agreed-upon
set of facts fit within the enhancement requirements” for clear error, United States v. Fish,
731 F.3d 277, 279 (3d Cir. 2013). In this case, neither enhancement was applied in error.
Section 2D1.1(b)(12) applies where the defendant “(1) knowingly (2) open[ed] or
maintain[ed] any place (3) for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled
substance.” United States v. Carter, 834 F.3d 259, 261-62 (3d Cir. 2016) (citations
omitted). Fountain does not dispute he maintained the apartment. Instead, he points to the
commentary to Section 2D1.1, which states that trafficking must have been a “primary or
principal use[] for the premises,” not just a “incidental or collateral use[],” U.S.S.G. §
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2D1.1 cmt. n.17, and he argues that the trial evidence put the apartment in the latter
category.
Here, however, we have no cause to look to commentary. We accord it deference
only where the Guidelines’ text gives rise to “genuine ambiguity,” United States v.
Rodriguez, 40 F.4th 117, 122 n.1 (3d Cir. 2022), but we have already held that Section
2D1.1(b)(12) contains “no genuine ambiguity,” id. at 122 n.1. Rather, it authorizes an
enhancement “[i]f the defendant maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing
or distributing controlled substances,” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12), a phrase that we read as
requiring only that the premises had a “significant purpose of drug activity,” United States
v. Safehouse, 985 F.3d 225, 237-38 (3d Cir. 2021).
That “significant purpose” threshold was easily satisfied on the record. The Court
established at trial that Fountain rented and maintained Apartment 909 for over a decade,
and that it contained large quantities of drugs, as well as items used to package, mix, and
distribute drugs, and cash traced to controlled drug sales.
Section 3B1.1(c)’s enhancement applies where the defendant acted as an “organizer,
leader, manager, or supervisor,” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c), meaning he “exercised some degree
of control over at least one other person involved in the offense.” Fountain, 792 F.3d at
321. Here, again, the District Court found “overwhelming evidence” that Fountain held
“directive power or influence over” his co-conspirators. App 293-95; United States v.
Adair, 38 F.4th 341, 354 (3d Cir. 2022). That evidence included the facts that Fountain
oversaw the sale of controlled substances to an undercover officer, referred to co-
conspirators as “my guys” whom he had to “motivate,” App 169-70 (Gov. Ex. 206a), and
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was referred to by co-conspirators in terms like “the OG” and “big homey,” App 294. The
drugs and drug-related materials recovered from Apartment 909 further support the Court’s
findings.
On this record, the District Court did not err in enhancing Fountain’s sentence under
either U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) or U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12).
II.
For the foregoing reasons, we will AFFIRM the District Court’s judgment.
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