United States v. Yanthonic Herrera
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket25-3145
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 25-3145
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
YANTHONIC HERRERA,
Appellant
_____________________________
On Appeal from the U.S. District Court, E.D. Pa
Judge Kelley B. Hodge, No. 2:23-cr-00096-001
Before: SHWARTZ, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
Submitted: Nov. 10, 2026; Filed: Nov. 19, 2026
_____________________________
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION ∗
MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judge.
Yanthonic Herrera was charged with possession with intent to distribute one kilo-
gram or more of heroin and 400 grams or more of fentanyl and aiding and abetting this
offense, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. To escape punishment,
he fled to the Dominican Republic. After being brought back to the United States, Herrera
was convicted and sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment. Herrera appeals his conviction
and sentence, arguing that the District Court erred by denying his motion to suppress evi-
dence, denying his motion to dismiss the indictment, and applying several enhancements
to his sentence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”). Because the
∗
This is not an opinion of the full Court and, under 3d Cir. IOP 5.7, is not binding precedent.
District Court committed no reversible error, we will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
This case began when the Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”) received a tip
that Herrera was distributing heroin in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Law enforcement of-
ficers began an investigation and surveilled Herrera. The investigation revealed that Her-
rera was a Dominican Republic citizen and that he had a long-time girlfriend, Myriam
Sevilla. They learned that Sevilla lived in Apartment 7131 of an apartment complex in
Elkins Park, Pennsylvania. They also observed Herrera and Sevilla driving a Buick En-
clave, which Herrera parked in the apartment complex for long periods of time. Based on
these observations, the officers concluded that Herrera also lived in Apartment 7131.
During the investigation, Herrara became a suspect in an alleged kidnapping in Phil-
adelphia. According to the victim, Herrera picked up the victim in the Buick Enclave and
accused him of burglarizing a trap house controlled by Herrera. After learning this infor-
mation, officers obtained a warrant for Herrara’s arrest. They later observed Herrera near
Apartment 7131 and saw him leave a property on Lawrence Street in Philadelphia, which
they had confirmed was another trap house for his drug organization. They pursued Her-
rera, who fled in the Buick Enclave, collided with an FBI agent’s car attempting to block
his path, and drove through a park before eventually abandoning his car and escaping on
foot.
Thereafter, law enforcement searched the Lawrence Street property and the Buick
Enclave and found packaging material consistent with illicit drug distribution. Law
2
enforcement then obtained and executed a search warrant on Apartment 7131, recovering
approximately 5,228 grams of fentanyl without heroin, 118 grams of heroin without fenta-
nyl, and 4,619 grams of fentanyl and heroin mixed. They also found checks bearing Her-
rera’s name and photos of Sevilla, Herrera, and their child. After the search, officers pulled
Apartment 7131’s lease, which named only Sevilla. But the apartment’s manager con-
firmed that Herrera lived there. A search of Herrera’s cellphones showed further evidence
of Herrera counting money and communicating with others about drug sales, testing, and
transactions. Based on this evidence, the FBI charged Herrera with possession with intent
to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin and 400 grams or more of fentanyl and aiding
and abetting.
To escape punishment, Herrera fled to the Dominican Republic. Nearly three years
later, Dominican Republic officials working with the U.S. Marshals Service arrested Her-
rera in the Dominican Republic. According to Herrera, these officials broke into his resi-
dence, physically assaulted him, stole valuables, tried to extort money from him, and forced
him to sign documents falsely stating that he is a U.S. citizen to facilitate his return to the
United States. For its part, the Government admits that the U.S. Marshals were involved
in Herrera’s arrest and that his travel documents were “not accurate” as to his citizenship.
Appendix (hereinafter “App. __”) 220. Once in the United States, Herrera was arrested,
and a grand jury indicted him on violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) and 18
U.S.C. § 2.
Before trial, Herrera moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of
3
Apartment 7131 on the grounds that the warrant lacked probable cause. The District Court
denied the motion. Then, Herrera moved to dismiss the indictment based on his alleged
illegal return back to the United States and requested an evidentiary hearing. The District
Court denied the request and the motion. Herrera proceeded to trial, and a jury found him
guilty. The District Court sentenced him to 300 months’ imprisonment after overruling
Herrera’s objections to several Guidelines enhancements.
Herrera timely appealed.
II. ANALYSIS1
In this appeal, Herrera argues the District Court erred in (1) denying his motion to
suppress the evidence found in Apartment 7131; (2) denying his motion to dismiss the
indictment; and (3) applying several Guidelines enhancements to his sentence. We address
each argument in turn.
A. Motion to Suppress
Herrera first challenges the District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress, arguing
that the search warrant for Apartment 7131 lacked probable cause. We disagree. 2
Probable cause exists “when, viewing the totality of the circumstances, ‘there is a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’”
Hodge, 246 F.3d at 305 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). We have
1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
2
Our review of the District Court’s suppression ruling is plenary. United States v. Hodge,
246 F.3d 301, 305 (3d Cir. 2001).
4
recognized that evidence of a drug crime “is likely to be found where the [drug] dealers
reside.” United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 103 (3d Cir. 2002) (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Whitner, 219 F.3d 289, 297–98 (3d Cir. 2000)). But this inference
applies only if the Government presents some evidence to show the Magistrate “(1) that
the person suspected of drug dealing is actually a drug dealer; (2) that the place to be
searched is possessed by, or the domicile of, the dealer; and (3) that the home contains
contraband linking it to the dealer’s drug activities.” Id. at 104; see United States v. Stearn,
597 F.3d 540, 568 (3d Cir. 2010). The warrant affidavit here satisfies these requirements.
First, the affidavit provided evidence that Herrera was a drug dealer. According to
it, a reliable confidential informant and the alleged kidnapping victim stated that Herrera
sold drugs. And officers found drug-packing materials during searches of Herrera’s Law-
rence Street property and the Buick Enclave. This evidence is sufficient to show that Her-
rera was a drug dealer. See Stearn, 597 F.3d at 563.
Second, the affidavit provided evidence that Herrera resided at Apartment 7131.
According to the affidavit, officers saw Herrera, on multiple occasions, driving his Buick
Enclave and other cars in the apartment complex’s parking lot and parking them “for long
period[s] of time[],” including “overnight.” App. 65. Officers also saw Sevilla drive Her-
rera’s Buick Enclave, and Sevilla held the lease for Apartment 7131. This evidence is
sufficient to show that Herrera resided at Apartment 7131. See Burton, 288 F.3d at 104.
Third, the affidavit sufficiently showed that the apartment contained contraband. It
described the evidence linking Herrera to Apartment 7131, the drug-packing materials
5
found in his Buick Enclave, and the detective’s experience that “[i]t is common for large
scale drug dealers to secrete contraband . . . within their residences.” App. 68. These
descriptions are enough. See Burton, 288 F.3d at 104–05 (explaining that “we generally
accept the common sense proposition that drug dealers often keep evidence of their trans-
actions at home” and that we may rely on the “training and experience” of officers as to
where contraband is hidden).
So the District Court did not err in concluding that there was “a substantial basis for
finding probable cause.” 3 Hodge, 246 F.3d at 305.
B. Motion to Dismiss Indictment
Herrera next argues that the District Court committed two errors in denying his mo-
tion to dismiss the indictment. According to Herrera, the District Court misapplied the
Ker–Frisbie doctrine when concluding his forced return to the United States did not violate
his due process rights. And worse, he says, the District Court did so after erroneously
denying his request for an evidentiary hearing. Both arguments fail. 4
First, the District Court did not misapply the Ker–Frisbie doctrine. This doctrine
establishes that “a court’s power to try a defendant is ordinarily not affected by the manner
in which the defendant is brought to trial.” United States v. Best, 304 F.3d 308, 311 (3d
3
Because probable cause existed, we need not address whether the good faith exception
applies. See United States v. Shields, 458 F.3d 269, 280 n.9 (3d Cir. 2006).
4
Our review of the District Court’s denial of a motion to dismiss indictment is plenary as
to the law and clear error as to the facts. United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287, 291 (3d Cir.
2013). “[We] review a district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discre-
tion.” United States v. Cuevas-Almonte, 156 F.4th 319, 325 (3d Cir. 2025).
6
Cir. 2002) (citing Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S.
436, 444 (1886)). In other words, a court may still try a defendant no matter how he was
brought to trial. But the Ker–Frisbie doctrine does not apply “where a person is forcibly
abducted from a country in violation of an extradition treaty to which the United States is
a party.” Id. at 314 (citing United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 662
(1992)). To qualify for this exception, “a defendant must demonstrate, by reference to the
express language of a treaty and/or the established practice thereunder, that the United
States affirmatively agreed not to seize foreign nationals from the territory of its treaty
partner.” Id. (citation omitted). Notably, the treaty must “specifically prohibit the abduc-
tion of foreign nationals.” Id. Because Herrera points to no specific prohibition on abduc-
tion in any treaty between the United States and the Dominican Republic, this exception
does not apply.
Alternatively, Herrera asks us to recognize two more exceptions to the Ker–Frisbie
doctrine: (1) shocking governmental conduct and (2) fraud. We have already rejected the
first exception. 5 Best, 304 F.3d at 312–13 (quoting Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 669–70).
And several of our sister Circuits have rejected the second exception. E.g., United States
v. Wilson, 732 F.2d 404, 410–11 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 900–
02 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Struckman, 611 F.3d 560, 573–74 (9th Cir. 2010). So
5
We also note that Herrera’s allegations of physical assault do not come close to the torture
at-issue in the case where such an exception was adopted. See United States v. Toscanino,
500 F.2d 267, 269–75 (2d Cir. 1974) (noting defendant was tortured and interrogated for
17 days while federal agents stood by).
7
we decline to “retreat from the established rule that illegal arrest or detention does not void
a subsequent conviction.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975).
Second, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct an
evidentiary hearing. Evidentiary hearings on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 12
motions “are not granted as a matter of course,” but they may be granted if the motion
“enable[s] the court to conclude that . . . there are disputed issues of material fact that will
affect the outcome of the motion.’” Cuevas-Almonte, 156 F.4th at 326 (second alteration
in original) (quoting United States v. Fattah, 858 F.3d 801, 810 (3d Cir. 2017)). Because
the alleged circumstances of Herrera’s forced return to the United States, even if true,
would not warrant an exception to the Ker–Frisbie doctrine, “the District Court reasonably
denied a hearing that would not affect the outcome of his motion.” Id. at 327.
So the District Court did not err in denying Herrera’s motion to dismiss the indict-
ment.
C. Sentence Imposition
Herrera challenges the District Court’s application of three Guidelines enhance-
ments to his sentence. These challenges fail too. 6
Herrera first argues that the District Court did not have sufficient evidence to sup-
port its application of a four-level enhancement under section 3B1.1(a) of the Guidelines,
6
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s interpretation of the Guidelines and
clear error review over its factual findings in support of an enhancement. United States v.
Miller, 172 F.4th 242, 246–47 (3d Cir. 2026). If “the legal issue decided by the district
court is, in essence, a factual question,” clear error review applies. United States v. Thung
Van Huynh, 884 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
8
which applies if “the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that in-
volved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Man-
ual § 3B1.1(a) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2025). “Setting up a network to obtain and distribute
drugs, deciding when and where sales would occur, coordinating drug sales with subordi-
nates, and deciding when and whether to extend credit indicate a leadership and organiza-
tional role.” United States v. Rodriguez, 40 F.4th 117, 121 (3d Cir. 2022) (citation modi-
fied). The District Court applied this enhancement based on several pieces of evidence:
(1) evidence of the large quantities of drugs found in Apartment 7131; (2) Herrera’s large
profits, (3) a conversation between Herrera and a drug supplier in which Herrera questioned
the amount of product received; (4) a document found in Apartment 7131 that identified
four individuals as employees (who the Government contends are employees of Herrera’s
drug organization) and tallied over $30,000 in net profits; and (5) record evidence showing
that multiple individuals (including Sevilla) participated in the drug operation. Given this
evidence, we are not left with “the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed,” so the District Court did not clearly err. United States v. Denmark, 13 F.4th
315, 317–18 (3d Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
Herrera next argues that the District Court did not have sufficient evidence to con-
clude that Apartment 7131 was a drug premises for the Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(12)’s two-
level enhancement. See Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(12). To justify that enhancement, “the
Government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant (1) know-
ingly (2) opened or maintained any place (3) for the purpose of manufacturing or
9
distributing a controlled substance.” United States v. Carter, 834 F.3d 259, 261 (3d Cir.
2016) (citation modified). The District Court determined that “half the apartment . . . or a
significant portion was being used solely for drugs.” App. 1395. As Herrera’s counsel
conceded at sentencing, trial evidence showed that “there was a substantial quantity of
narcotics that were packaged [in Apartment 7131] and . . . that was located . . . and recov-
ered [there].” App. 1391. That Sevilla held the lease for Apartment 7131 and Herrera also
lived there is “of no moment” to the applicability of the drug premises enhancement, given
the evidence of his illicit drug activities there. Rodriguez, 40 F.4th at 122; see Carter, 834
F.3d at 262–63 (concluding drug premises existed where associate “resided and carried out
his business for [defendant]’s organization”). Notably, even Sevilla complained that Her-
rera brought his business to the house. The evidence supports the District Court’s finding,
and this finding is entitled to “due deference.” Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59, 63
(2001) (citation modified). So the District Court did not clearly err.
Finally, Herrera argues that the District Court erred in applying a two-level enhance-
ment under the Guidelines § 3C1.2, which applies “[i]f the defendant recklessly created a
substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing
from a law enforcement officer.” Guidelines § 3C1.2. According to Herrera, this enhance-
ment is inapplicable because no one was injured when he fled from law enforcement in his
Buick Enclave in Philadelphia. The District Court applied this enhancement based on “the
time of day [Herrera’s flight] took place and the fact that it was through a park and through
these very condensed, congested streets of Philadelphia.” App. 1405. As the District Court
10
correctly noted, that no one was injured “does not negate the danger created by the act.”
United States v. Gray, 942 F.3d 627, 632 (3d Cir. 2019). The District Court did not clearly
err.
*****
Herrera has failed to show that the District Court erred in denying his motion to
suppress, denying his motion to dismiss the indictment, or applying several Guidelines
enhancements to his sentence. We will AFFIRM.
11