United States v. Thomas Waters
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket24-1287
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 24-1287
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
THOMAS WATERS,
Appellant
_____________________________
On Appeal from the U.S. District Court, M.D. Pa.
Judge Malachy E. Mannion, No. 3:23-cr-00079-001
Before: RESTREPO, MCKEE, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
Argued: Sept. 23, 2026; Filed: Nov. 19, 2026
_____________________________
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION*
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Thomas Waters appeals his conviction and sentence on three counts of assaulting
federal corrections officers during an altercation at the prison where he was housed. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In January 2023, Waters, a federal inmate, became involved in an altercation with
three corrections officers. Officer James Grizzanti noticed Waters wearing conflicting
religious items as he passed through a metal detector. An inmate at the prison may
possess only religious items associated with the religious preference he has declared with
the Chaplain’s Office. An inmate may not register under more than one religion at a time.
*
This is not an opinion of the full Court and, under 3d Cir. IOP 5.7, is not binding precedent.
Contrary to policy, Waters was wearing a string of beads associated with the Santeria
religion and a multicolored bandana associated with a Native American religion.
Officer Grizzanti asked Waters to step out of line to determine which, if any, items
he had permission to wear. When he grew increasingly argumentative in response,
Grizzanti attempted to deescalate the situation by placing Waters in a bathroom holding
cell and called the prison’s Supervisory Chaplain, who confirmed Waters had received
approval to purchase Santeria beads.
Officer Grizzanti returned to the bathroom holding cell to explain to Waters why
he could not wear the bandana. He grew agitated and belligerent. A physical altercation
followed. Several other corrections officers, including Lieutenant William Rosler and
Lieutenant Russell Keen, attempted to subdue and restrain Waters. He and the three
named officers all sustained physical injuries. Three counts of assaulting federal
corrections officers and inflicting bodily injury followed for violations of 18 U.S.C.
§ 111(a)(1) and (b).
The case proceeded to trial, where Officer Grizzanti testified that Waters instigated
the fight. After Grizzanti attempted to confiscate Waters’s bandana, Waters allegedly
advanced on him and struck his head repeatedly with a closed fist, causing Grizzanti to
fall to the ground and momentarily lose consciousness.
Several other officers testified that they responded to Officer Grizzanti’s calls for
help. Lieutenant Rosler testified to assisting staff in placing Waters on the floor to
restrain him. As Lieutenant Rosler was attempting to gain control of Waters’s upper
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body, Waters bit him in the arm. When Lieutenant Keen stepped in to assist, Waters
allegedly bit him on the finger. At some point, Grizzanti lost his radio, handcuffs, and
baton. (He testified to having no recollection of how those items became separated from
his belt. He discovered they were missing only when he arrived at the prison infirmary.)
The officers gave conflicting accounts on whether Waters used the baton to strike
Officer Grizzanti. Lieutenant Young observed Waters striking Grizzanti in the head with
the baton but testified he managed to grab it from Waters after the first strike. Grizzanti
himself recalled only being struck four times in the head by Waters’s fists. Warden Eric
Rokosky never saw Waters using a baton but recalled seeing one under his stomach as
officers were trying to restrain him on the ground.
Waters also testified at trial and claimed he acted in self-defense. He accused
Grizzanti as the instigator by disparaging Waters’s ethnic background and religious
beliefs before trying to confiscate his bandana. When Grizzanti struck Waters in the ribs
with his baton, Waters feared for his safety and attempted to remove the baton from
Grizzanti. Waters denied hitting Grizzanti with the baton, and he claimed that he
removed it from the Officer’s hand only to prevent being hit. Waters admitted to biting
Lieutenant Rosler but denied biting Lieutenant Keen. The jury found Waters guilty on all
three counts.
At sentencing, the Government asked the District Court to apply a sentencing
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B) for using a dangerous weapon, based on
Waters’s use of the baton on Officer Grizzanti, and an enhancement under U.S.S.G.
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§ 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice, based on Waters’s perjurious statements at trial—
namely, denying he bit Officer Keen and claiming he hit Officer Grizzanti in self-
defense. The Court applied both enhancements but varied downward because the
Guidelines range of 210 to 262 months “was outside the bounds of a just sentence in light
of the circumstances even though they’re serious.” App. 481.
Waters appeals, arguing the District Court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by
failing to conduct a Faretta inquiry in response to his two requests to proceed pro se. He
also contends it erred by applying the enhancements for using a dangerous weapon and
for obstruction of justice.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
We conduct de novo review of legal questions relating to the right to proceed pro
se. See United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 2002). We review
sentencing-related factual findings for clear error but exercise independent review over a
district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Wise,
515 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 154 (3d Cir.
2002); United States v. Bell, 947 F.3d 49, 54 (3d Cir. 2020).
III. DISCUSSION
A. The District Court did not violate Waters’s right to proceed pro se.
“The right to counsel embodied within the Sixth Amendment carries as its
corollary the right to proceed pro se.” United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120, 129 (3d
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Cir. 2002). But there is “no right to hybrid representation,” that is, partial self-
representation and partial representation by counsel. United States v. Turner, 677 F.3d
570, 578 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[S]ince a person cannot
secure the right to proceed pro se without sacrificing the right to counsel,” we have
“required [a] defendant[] to assert the right to proceed pro se affirmatively and
unequivocally.” Peppers, 302 F.3d at 129. If he asserts “his desire to proceed pro se
clearly and unequivocally,” the court must “inquire thoroughly” to ensure he understands
the risks of self-representation and “is competent to stand trial.” Id. at 132 (cleaned up).
This is known as “a Faretta inquiry” from Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
Id.
Though represented by counsel throughout his entire case, Waters asked the Court
to allow him to proceed pro se in August 2023 and in January 2024. He claims the Court
violated his Sixth Amendment rights by failing to conduct a Faretta inquiry in response
to these requests. We disagree.
First, Waters framed his August 2023 request as a “motion for new counsel” based
on his disagreements with his lawyer’s legal strategy. App. 29. Only in the last sentence
of the motion did he alternatively ask to proceed pro se. When a “defendant seeks new
counsel, or, in the alternative, opts to represent himself,” a district court conducts two
inquiries. United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 187 (3d Cir. 1982). Do “the reasons for
the defendant’s request for substitute counsel constitute good cause”? Id. If the court
declines to substitute counsel, forcing the defendant either to proceed with his current
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counsel or move forward pro se, it must then conduct a Faretta inquiry. Id. The District
Court held a hearing and granted Waters’s request for substitute counsel. During the
hearing, Waters never expressed a desire to represent himself and even agreed with the
Court’s statement that proceeding pro se would be a “major mistake.” App. 48. The
District Court therefore had no duty to conduct a Faretta inquiry.
Second, Waters’s January 2024 request to proceed pro se was limited. In that
motion, titled “motion to proceed pro se at 4th amendment hearing,” he asked to
represent himself at a “requested 4th amendment hearing under Franks 438 U.S. 154 doc
#’s 18 and 36 as well as a hearing on motion to suppress doc #21.” App. 51–52. But he
never asked to represent himself fully. See App. 52 (explaining that he “[did] not wish to
waive [his] rights to be heard on these issues” but failing to request pro se representation
for the entirety of the trial). This was, at most, a request for a hybrid-representation
arrangement, which the District Court had no obligation to consider. See Turner, 677
F.3d at 578.
Waters reiterated his desire to proceed with counsel at a pretrial conference the
following week. His lawyer there explained that he and Waters had discussed Waters’s
denied pro se motions and the issue of representation. Counsel stated, “I believe
[Waters] wants me to proceed as his trial counsel,” and Waters responded, “Yes, trial
counsel[.]” App. 60. When the Court sought to confirm Waters was “satisfied to have
[counsel] continue to represent you at trial,” he responded, “Yes, sir. Yes, sir.” App. 60–
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61. Because Waters never requested to proceed pro se “affirmatively and
unequivocally,” it did not err. See Peppers, 302 F.3d at 129.
B. The District Court did not clearly err by enhancing Waters’s sentence under
U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B) for using a dangerous weapon.
The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a four-level enhancement of a defendant’s
sentence if he used “a dangerous weapon” during an aggravated assault. U.S.S.G.
§ 2A2.2(b)(2)(B). The Government has the burden of proving the enhancement applies
by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Quiver, 805 F.3d 1269, 1272 (10th
Cir. 2015). Here, the District Court applied the enhancement by finding Waters had used
the baton, a dangerous weapon, to strike Officer Grizzanti. See United States v. Dixon,
982 F.2d 116, 123–24 (3d Cir. 1992) (broadly defining “dangerous weapon” for
enhancement purposes, emphasizing “fear and the threat of violence” as key). Waters
contends that this finding was clearly erroneous.
In applying the enhancement, the Court credited the trial testimony of Lieutenant
Young, the sole officer who witnessed Waters striking Grizzanti with the baton. Waters
attempts to poke holes in this testimony. He points out Young’s contemporaneous
incident report stated only that Waters attempted to strike staff. Only when Young
discussed his testimony with Government prosecutors a few days before trial did he
explain there had been a first, successful strike before he stepped in to stop the second.
According to Waters, Young’s testimony also contradicts that of Warden Rokosky, who
never witnessed Waters grabbing or using Grizzanti’s baton.
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The District Court did not err in concluding Waters used the baton to strike Officer
Grizzanti. A factual finding by a district court is “clearly erroneous” only if our Court,
after reviewing the entire body of evidence, is left with a “definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir.
2007) (en banc) (quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Contr. Laborers
Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993)). “Where there are two permissible
views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”
United States v. Waterman, 755 F.3d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Anderson v. City
of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)). This Court has also remarked that it affords
“special deference to credibility findings, based on the lower court’s superior position to
evaluate a witness.” United States v. Terry, 572 F.3d 430, 434 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Having presided over the entire trial, the District Court was well positioned to
assess witness credibility and other related factual findings in support of the
enhancement. Indeed, the purported contradictions are explained by a deeper review of
the record. Lieutenant Young may have overlooked the successful first strike in his
report because he drafted it only twenty minutes after the incident occurred. Warden
Rokosky may not have witnessed the first strike because he arrived while the officers
were already trying to restrain Waters. In any event, the District Court did not err by
finding by a preponderance of the record evidence that Waters used the baton.
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C. The District Court did not clearly err by enhancing Waters’s sentence under
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice.
The Sentencing Guidelines allow for a two-level enhancement for willfully
obstructing justice. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. For the enhancement to apply to perjury, “a
defendant must give ‘false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent
to provide false testimony.’” United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 75 (3d Cir. 2008)
(quoting United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993)). “[N]ot every accused who
testifies at trial and is convicted” commits perjury because “an accused may give
inaccurate testimony due to confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.” Dunnigan, 507 U.S.
at 95. The defendant’s “testimony may be truthful, but the jury may nonetheless find the
testimony insufficient to excuse criminal liability or prove lack of intent.” Id.
The District Court based its application of the enhancement on Waters’s testimony
denying he bit Officer Keen and claiming he hit Officer Grizzanti in self-defense. At oral
argument, the parties agreed it had addressed both the truthfulness and materiality
elements. The disputed question is whether it found willfulness. Nowhere in the
sentencing colloquy did it address that element explicitly. Yet this omission does not end
the inquiry. While “it is preferable for a district court to address each element of the
alleged perjury in a separate and clear finding,” express findings are not required. Id. at
95 (explaining a district’s court’s application of the enhancement is sufficient if it
“encompasses all of the factual predicates for a finding of perjury”). What the Court did
here suffices.
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On Waters’s denial of the bite, the District Court explained there was
“corroborat[ion]” by an incident in 2022 when Waters bit a prison staff member. App.
468. His history of a similar attack makes it more likely that he bit Officer Keen and less
likely that he sincerely believed he did not do it. The unequivocal nature of Waters’s
testimony—which the District Court characterized as “completely adverse” to Officer
Keen’s, App. 467—further suggests Waters gave the testimony with willful intent “rather
than as a result of confusion, mistake or faulty memory.” United States v. Boggi, 74 F.3d
470, 479 (3d Cir. 1996) (explaining the district court’s characterization of the defendant’s
testimony as “flat denials” constituted a finding of willfulness) (quoting Dunnigan, 507
U.S. at 95). The Court thus did not clearly err by applying the enhancement based on the
bite testimony.
Although that testimony alone justifies application of the enhancement, the Court
likewise found Waters willfully lied by testifying he hit Officer Grizzanti in self-defense.
As with the bite, the self-defense testimony directly contradicted Grizzanti’s testimony
that he never removed the baton from his belt, which the Court credited over Waters’s
claim that Grizzanti beat him over the head with the baton. It also found Waters’s injuries
“completely inconsistent” with a baton beating. App. 469. Were he so beaten, physical
evidence would have supported such a finding. There is none, thus flatly contradicting
Waters’s account. The District Court did not err on this point.
*****
We thus affirm Waters’s conviction and sentence.
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Counsel for Appellant(s)
Julie A. McGrain [Argued]
Office of Federal Public Defender
Counsel for Appellee(s)
Jeffery F. St. John [Argued]
Patrick J. Bannon
Carlo D. Marchioli
Office of United States Attorney
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