Full Opinion

Opinion filed November 19, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-25-00162-CR __________ RICHARD PATRICK CHIPMAN, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 161st District Court Ector County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. B-23-0369-CR MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Richard Patrick Chipman, was indicted for the state jail felony offense of theft of copper valued at less than $20,000. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a), (e)(4)(F)(iii) (West Supp. 2026). The jury convicted Appellant of the charged offense, and the trial court assessed Appellant’s punishment at two years’ confinement in the State Jail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and a $1,000 fine. See id. § 12.35(a), (b). In four issues, Appellant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted extraneous offense evidence—Appellant’s prior conviction for theft of copper; (3) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to use Appellant’s custodial statement for impeachment purposes when the statement was taken without proper compliance with Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and Miranda;1 and (4) alternatively, cumulative error denied Appellant a fair trial. We affirm. I. Factual Background This case concerns a break-in and theft of copper wire from a location in West Odessa. A. Testimony of Deputy Chad Hewitt At approximately 3:15 a.m. on October 28, 2022, Deputy Chad Hewitt with the Ector County Sheriff’s Office was dispatched to a possible theft in progress. Appellant had been detained about one and one-half blocks away and “[w]ell within walking distance” from the location of the theft. Deputy Hewitt testified that Appellant “appeared to be dirty. His jacket had stickers on it. It appeared [as if] he had been rolling around on the ground. He had some minor scratches on his hands.” Appellant was also wearing dark clothing and the scratches on his hands appeared to be fresh. Shortly thereafter, Deputy Hewitt drove to the location of the theft—a yard associated with Oxy 2—and made contact with Oxy’s head of security, Ruben Arredondo, who advised that a theft had occurred. Deputy Hewitt observed copper wire on the ground—some of which had been cut from the spool, and some was still on it. This copper wire and some tools were next to a hole in a chain link fence on the property, which he testified was indicative of an unlawful entry. In the yard, there is a warehouse with a wall that appeared to have been “pulled apart.” 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2 There is some ambiguity regarding which entity owns the property in question, which is discussed further below. 2 Arredondo showed Deputy Hewitt a surveillance video recording of Oxy’s yard from that night, and Deputy Hewitt believed that Appellant was captured in the surveillance video based on the clothing that Appellant was wearing. When compared to another person shown in the surveillance video, Appellant “had the same dark navy color jacket, dark shirt[,] [a]nd probably the most telling sign was the rope or bungee homemade modified suspender that [Appellant] was wearing from the front center to the back center.” Deputy Hewitt also stated that Appellant’s physical appearance and race was consistent with both persons shown in the surveillance video, who were shown going inside the fence with bolt cutters. Photographs of the scene taken by Deputy Hewitt showed copper wire situated both by the hole in the fence and inside the gate. Because one photograph depicted the copper wire with affixed tags that read “Oxy,” Deputy Hewitt concluded that Oxy was the owner of the copper wire. Photographs taken after his arrest show that Appellant was wearing a jacket with a red patch on the left side and he had a “rope or bungee cord that goes from the front middle to the back middle.” This matched the profile of one person that Deputy Hewitt observed in the surveillance video. On cross-examination, Deputy Hewitt acknowledged that the photographs of Appellant’s “bungee cord” show only the front of it—there were no pictures that show Appellant with his jacket off or how the bungee cord looked in the back. Deputy Hewitt confirmed that when Appellant was detained, he was not at the gate to the Oxy yard but was somewhere down the road and did not have bolt cutters in his possession at the time. 3 B. Testimony of Ruben Arredondo On the date of the theft, Arredondo was employed as a security coordinator for Oxy. Oxy had security cameras installed on the front gate at its West Odessa storage yard. Arredondo was alerted to unauthorized persons gaining access to Oxy’s West Odessa storage yard and he later viewed the yard’s surveillance video. The State offered footage from that security camera, which showed a person crawling through the gate with, as Arredondo described, “some type of belt or something attached to his belt loop.” Referencing the surveillance video, Arredondo further described “an individual with bolt cutters going in underneath our fence[,]” and identified “the [individual’s] jacket with the brand of patch on the left shoulder, as well as the hair cut and bolt cutters [and] the strap that he had over his . . . shoulder.” The surveillance video shows two white males crawling through a gap in the gate with one person carrying bolt cutters. The person behind him is not carrying bolt cutters but has a visible strap over his shoulder that is connected to the back of his pants and is carrying a black jacket. A man in a white jacket and white hat can be seen carrying spools of cable and twice dropping them by the gate. The two individuals then crawl through the gate again—one is wearing a white jacket and white hat, and the other is wearing the black jacket with a logo on the front left and the strap on the back of his pants is visible. Both are carrying what appear to be bolt cutters and spools of copper wire. Arrendondo testified that the security camera is not continually active and only begins recording when it is activated by motion. Arredondo confirmed that the people depicted in the surveillance video were not Oxy employees and were not authorized to be at the Oxy yard. Arredondo stated that the tools that were found near the copper wire by the fence “would aid in the taking of copper [wire]” and that there was no reason for this copper wire to have been moved to the fence line because it belongs in the warehouse. The copper wire 4 belonged to Oxy, was labeled “Oxy,” and was to be used for one of Oxy’s project sites. Based on Arredondo’s observations and training and experience, the value of the copper wire that was stolen from Oxy’s West Odessa storage yard was less than $20,000. Arredondo was a representative of Oxy, and the main aspect of his job was protecting Oxy’s assets. On cross-examination, Arredondo acknowledged that although the surveillance video was not dated or time-stamped, he was certain that the recording depicted the morning of October 28, 2022. C. Testimony of Layne Young The defense called Layne Young, who at the time of Appellant’s trial was the chief appraiser for the Ector County Appraisal District. Young testified that the owner of the land where the theft occurred is Occidental Limited, not Oxy. On cross- examination, Young stated that Oxy USA sent a merger acquisition letter form in 2000 that changed the title of the land to Occidental Limited, but he believes that Occidental Limited and Oxy are separate entities. D. Testimony of Appellant Appellant testified that in the early morning hours of October 28, 2022, he was at a friend’s house waiting for a ride home that never showed up, so he began walking home. As he was walking home, a sheriff’s deputy detained him. Appellant testified that he has numerous physical limitations that affect his stamina, mobility, and ability to lift heavy objects. Appellant stated that it would be physically impossible for him to have bent down and cut any fence, and that he did not have “burrs or stickers” on him and had not been crawling on the ground that night. Appellant admitted that he was wearing a bungee cord as a substitute for a belt, a black shirt, jeans, and a jacket with a patch on it when he was detained. Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court ruled, over Appellant’s objection, that evidence of Appellant’s 2018 felony conviction for theft of copper 5 was admissible (1) to impeach Appellant under Rule 609 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, which the State did, and, (2) under Rule 404(b) to show intent and to rebut Appellant’s defensive theory that he was in the wrong place at the wrong time. On cross-examination, Appellant stated that he was not at the Oxy yard on the night of the theft. He further testified that he did not tell the deputy that he was in the yard that night. The State offered law enforcement’s bodycam footage for impeachment purposes, wherein Appellant stated that he was there. At a hearing outside the presence of the jury, Appellant’s trial counsel argued that Appellant’s statement to law enforcement was not admissible because of “a Miranda issue.” The trial court ruled that Appellant’s statement to law enforcement—that he was at the Oxy yard that night—was admissible for impeachment purposes. When the jury returned, the State asked Appellant what he told law enforcement, and Appellant explained that he thought he was telling the deputy where he was coming from and did not know that they were referring to a specific yard. Appellant later conceded that he told Deputy Hewitt that he was “in the yard and not the building.” Appellant admitted that he was wearing a blue coat and blue jeans that night and that his coat had a patch. He also confirmed that the bungee cord he was wearing was hooked onto his back belt loop. II. Analysis A. Sufficiency of the Evidence In his first issue, Appellant argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, Appellant argues that there is insufficient evidence to prove (1) identity, (2) appropriation, (3) ownership of the property, (4) the value of the property, and (5) his status as a party to the crime. 1. Legal Standard We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of whether it is framed as a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, under the standard of 6 review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d 756, 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, including improperly admitted evidence. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Lee v. State, 676 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, no pet.). We defer to the factfinder’s credibility and weight determinations because the factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is to be afforded. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.13 (West 2007); Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762; Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. This standard is deferential and accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 761; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. We may not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence to substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 762; Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Thus, if the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 761; Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. 7 Because the standard of review is the same, we treat direct and circumstantial evidence equally. Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The evidence need not directly prove the defendant’s guilt; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence, alone, can be sufficient to establish guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13); Lee, 676 S.W.3d at 915. Each fact need not point directly and independently to the defendant’s guilt if the cumulative force of all incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Therefore, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Finally, we measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the charged offense as defined in a hypothetically correct charge for the case. Morgan v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see also Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In this regard, to determine whether the State has met its burden to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under the Jackson standard, we compare the elements of the offense to the evidence adduced at trial. Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240). The hypothetically correct charge “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240. 8 2. Application A person commits the offense of theft “if he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of property.” PENAL § 31.03(a). “Appropriate” means “to acquire or otherwise exercise control over property other than real property.” Id. § 31.01(4)(B). As relevant to this case, appropriation is unlawful if the property is appropriated “without the owner’s effective consent.” Id. § 31.03(b)(1). An “[o]wner” is one who “has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor.” Id. § 1.07(a)(35)(A). The offense is a state jail felony if “the value of the property stolen is less than $20,000 and the property stolen is . . . copper.” Id. § 31.03(e)(4)(F)(iii). a. Identity The jury could have reasonably determined from the evidence presented that Appellant was a participant in the theft of the copper wire from the Oxy storage yard. We have previously analyzed a sufficiency of the evidence challenge in a robbery case where the appellant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to show that he was the person who committed the robbery. See Bien v. State, No. 11-18-00206- CR, 2020 WL 4873805, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 20, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). There, we rejected the appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence when the evidence presented at his trial showed that he sold metal to a scrap store the day before it was robbed, testimony described a person with the same description as the appellant in the area of the robbery on the day it occurred, and a witness saw a person wearing clothing similar to that of the robber hurriedly enter the vehicle of the appellant’s girlfriend. Id. An eyewitness also positively identified the appellant as being in the area around the time of the robbery. See id. 9 Here, like the circumstantial evidence of the appellant’s identity in Bien, the evidence presented in Appellant’s trial shows that Appellant matched the description and depiction of the person who was seen crawling through the hole in the fence and carrying bolt cutters, and that he was arrested one and one-half blocks away from the location of the theft, appearing as if he had been crawling in the dirt. Specifically, Arredondo and Deputy Hewitt were able to point out a bungee cord—a remarkably distinct item attached to his clothing—that is visible in the security footage, which goes over the person’s shoulder and is secured to the back belt line, along with a jacket bearing a distinct logo on the front left. Then, the photographic evidence shows that he is wearing the bungee cord and the jacket with the previously described logo when Appellant is detained shortly thereafter near the Oxy storage yard. As in Bien, the evidence shows Appellant’s presence near the theft around the time that it occurred and a positive identification of his clothing. Finally, there was testimony that Appellant’s physical appearance, hairstyle, and race was the same as the person depicted in the surveillance video. See Conyers v. State, 864 S.W.2d 739, 740–41 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d) (rejecting the defendant’s sufficiency challenge to a robbery charge based on identity when “[t]he only identification evidence was the store camera’s videotape, the still photos derived from the videotape, and the identification by [the defendant’s manager]”). Thus, considering all the evidence together, direct and circumstantial, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Appellant was the person who was shown in the surveillance video entering the Oxy storage yard and committing the theft. b. Appropriation Similarly, the jury could have reasonably found that Appellant appropriated copper wire from the Oxy storage yard. Here, the evidence shows a person matching Appellant’s physical description and clothing crawl through the property’s gate 10 carrying bolt cutters along with another person. The surveillance video recording shows that person carrying copper wire to the fence, and the wire laying near the hole in the gate that Appellant crawled through; Arredondo also testified that the copper wire belonged in the warehouse on the property, not on the ground by the gate. Thus, given Appellant’s actions at the Oxy storage yard and how the copper wire was moved, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that Appellant removed the copper wire, or was a participant in removing it, from the warehouse—notably to the location where he entered the yard—and therefore, appropriated the copper wire. See Edwards v. State, 440 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (“The segregation of the property from the building was an appropriation of the property.”). While Appellant argues that the jury could only speculate that he appropriated the copper wire, a logical connection could be made from the circumstantial evidence described above that Appellant did appropriate it. See Attebury v. State, No. 07-18-00344-CR, 2019 WL 2094314, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 13, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (rejecting the defendant’s sufficiency challenge to the appropriation element when the evidence showed that property went missing the day after the defendant was in the store where the property was located and the store owner later identified the property in the defendant’s vehicle and which was later found in the defendant’s mother’s garage). Therefore, the cumulative force of the evidence was sufficient for the jury to reasonably conclude that Appellant appropriated the copper wire. c. Ownership From the evidence, the jury could have determined that “OXY USA” or Ruben Arredondo were the owners of the stolen copper wire, as alleged in the indictment. Appellant argues that because the evidence showed that the land where the yard is located is owned by Occidental Permian Ltd., a material variance existed between the proof at trial and the allegations in the indictment. However, the Court 11 of Criminal Appeals has not taken such a narrow approach to the State’s obligation of proving the “owner” of property when theft is the underlying offense. See Byrd v. State, 336 S.W.3d 242, 251–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In Byrd, the court held that, “[a]lthough the name of the owner is not a substantive element of theft, the State is required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person (or entity) alleged in the indictment as the owner is the same person (or entity)—regardless of the name— as shown by the evidence.” Id. at 252 (emphasis omitted). The court provided an illustrative example of this: The State proved that the defendant injured “Buddy Fuller” or “Mr. Fuller.” But there was no dispute at trial that the person who was injured was the very same person as was alleged in the indictment, despite whatever discrepancies might exist in the “real” and “alleged” names. Suppose the elderly man in that case had testified that his real name was Quincy Magoo, but everyone called him Olen M. Fuller. That is a variance, but it may well be immaterial if the record shows that the person—whether known as Mr. Magoo or Mr. Fuller—is the same person as alleged in the indictment. Id. at 252–53 (internal citations omitted). Therefore, “it is the identity of the person, not his formal name, that controls and guides the sufficiency of the evidence review.” Id. at 253 (emphasis added). The court additionally held that “variances that do not prejudice a defendant’s substantial rights are immaterial.” Id. at 247–48. “[A] conviction that contains a material variance that fails to give the defendant sufficient notice or would not bar a second prosecution for the same [crime] requires reversal, even when the evidence is otherwise legally sufficient to support the conviction.” Id. at 248. In this instance, any alleged variance would be immaterial so long as the evidence showed that the owner of the copper wire had the same identity as the entity or person alleged in the indictment, regardless of whether their formal names matched. A 2001 letter addressed to the Ector County Appraisal District states that the name of the property’s owner where the theft occurred was changed to 12 “Occidental Permian Ltd.” However, this notice was sent on letterhead bearing Oxy’s logo and the name “OXY USA Inc.” Furthermore, the footer of the letter reads “An Occidental Oil and Gas company.” It follows, then, that “Oxy” and “Occidental” are affiliated. Additionally, one of the spools of wire found by the fence was marked with a tag labeled “Oxy,” and Arredondo testified that the wire belonged to Oxy for use at their job sites throughout the Permian Basin. Therefore, while the evidence may have shown that the formal name of the Oxy entity may have been different from what was alleged in the indictment, the identity of the entity that the copper wire was stolen from was not. The indictment and the evidence shows that whether known formally as Oxy or Occidental, both referred to the same entity that owned the stolen copper wire. Further, Arredondo testified that Appellant did not have permission to remove the copper wire from the Oxy warehouse. See Garza v. State, 344 S.W.3d 409, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (holding that when the owner is not a natural person, an employee of the entity may be a “special owner” and may testify as an agent of the entity); Byrd, 336 S.W.3d at 252 (describing how the special owner can testify at trial that the corporate entity did not give consent for the property to be taken). Appellant also argues that because the indictment alleges that the copper wire was owned by Oxy or Arredondo, “[t]he disjunctive allegation . . . risks non unanimity and notice problems.” However, when “one person owns the property, and another has the possession of the same, the ownership thereof may be alleged to be in either.” CRIM PROC. art. 21.08 (West 2009); Byrd, 336 S.W.3d at 251–252; Billings v. State, 725 S.W.2d 757, 762 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ). In Billings, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that, where the owners of the property appeared to be connected, it was proper for the trial court to submit the issue of ownership to the jury in the disjunctive. See Billings, 725 S.W.3d at 761– 13 62. Similarly, Oxy and Arredondo are associated by an employer-employee relationship, and it was proper to allege ownership in the disjunctive and include the disjunctive phrasing in the trial court’s charge. See id. (“[I]t was only necessary that the state prove that one of the alleged owners was the true owner of the [property] in question.”). Therefore, the cumulative force of the evidence was sufficient for the jury to reasonably conclude that the stolen copper wire was owned by either Oxy or Arredondo. d. Value of the Property The evidence showed, and the jury could have reasonably found, that the value of the stolen copper wire was less than $20,000. “The State was not required to prove an exact value amount; instead, the State was only required to prove ‘the value of the property [was] less than $20,000 and the property stolen [was] . . . copper.’” 3 Hillman v. State, No. 07-25-00130-CR, 2025 WL 2490070, at *2 (Tex. App.— Amarillo Aug. 28, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (first citing PENAL § 31.03(e)(4)(F)(iii); and then citing State v. Empey, 502 S.W.3d 186, 190–94 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.)). In Hillman, the Seventh Court of Appeals found that value was properly established as “less than $20,000” when there was testimony that the value of the stolen copper wire was less than $20,000. Id. (“Considering this testimony, the jury could rationally conclude the value of the copper was worth something, albeit less than $20,000.”). Here, Arredondo testified that he was familiar with the value of the copper wire and that based on his training and experience, the value of the amount unlawfully taken by Appellant was less than $20,000. See Sanchez v. State, 521 S.W.3d 817, 821–22 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 3 Appellant does not argue that the stolen material was not copper. 14 Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d) (holding that an opinion that a car had a value of “more than $1,500 and less than $20,000” was sufficient to establish fair market value). Therefore, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the value of the stolen copper wire was less than $20,000. e. Party to a Crime Finally, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Appellant was criminally responsible for the theft of the copper wire because of his status as a party to the crime. A person is liable for the actions of another when “acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense.” PENAL § 7.02(a)(2). Appellant correctly points out that one’s mere presence at the scene of the crime, without more, is not sufficient to establish party liability. Gross v. State, 380 S.W.3d 181, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing Thompson v. State, 697 S.W.2d 413, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). However, one’s presence at the scene can support a finding of party liability when other evidence supports it. See id. at 188. Appellant relies on Gross to support his argument that the evidence is insufficient to find him liable under the law of parties. In Gross, there was no evidence that the defendant anticipated that the person he was alleged to have assisted would shoot the victim. Id. The uncontroverted testimony showed that the shooter started the altercation with the victim and there was no encouragement or assistance rendered by the defendant during the commission of the offense. Id. Unlike the mere presence of the defendant in Gross, Appellant was there and was seen on Oxy’s security camera surveillance video, under the cover of night, crawling through a fence on Oxy’s yard where copper wire is stored while carrying bolt cutters. See Jackson v. State, 672 S.W.3d 649, 653 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (rejecting the defendant’s argument of “mere presence” when the way the defendant positioned his vehicle allowed the jury to conclude that this 15 positioning was done to assist a burglary). Moreover, Appellant is seen on the surveillance video entering the Oxy storage yard after the other person had and is then hurriedly following him once they are inside the yard. This is all in addition to Appellant’s presence at the scene of the crime and subsequent flight. Therefore, a jury could have reasonably found that Appellant was not merely present when the theft occurred, but rather assisted in or encouraged its commission. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue. B. Admission of Prior Copper-Theft Conviction In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of Appellant’s prior conviction for theft of copper under Rules 403, 404(b), and 609 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. See TEX. R. EVID. 403, 404(b), 609. 1. Standard of Review We review a trial court’s ruling on evidentiary matters—including the use of prior criminal convictions for impeachment purposes and the admission of extraneous offenses—for an abuse of discretion. See Powell v. State, 63 S.W.3d 435, 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Theus v. State, 845 S.W.2d 874, 881 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). So long as the trial court’s decision to admit evidence of prior convictions or extraneous offenses lies within the zone of reasonable disagreement, the trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed. Powell, 63 S.W.3d at 438; Theus, 845 S.W.2d at 881. Further, we will uphold the trial court’s evidentiary ruling on appeal if it is correct on any theory of law that finds support in the record. Loza v. State, 659 S.W.3d 491, 502 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, no pet.) (citing Gonzalez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 114, 125–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). 2. Application As an initial matter, Appellant argues, in addition to the points addressed below, that Rule 403 should have barred the admission of his prior theft conviction. However, Appellant did not assert in the trial court that Rule 403 was a basis to 16 exclude his prior conviction, apart from addressing this argument in his motion in limine. However, a motion in limine does not preserve error for appellate review. See Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“Motions in limine do not preserve error.”). Therefore, Appellant’s Rule 403 argument is not properly before us. See Brewer v. State, 367 S.W.3d 251, 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (holding that when the grounds for the objection are not raised at the trial court, error is not preserved for appeal). a. Rule 609 Texas courts have long recognized the principle that when a criminal defendant elects to testify, he is typically subject to impeachment the same as any other witness. See Bowley v. State, 310 S.W.3d 431, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Generally, a witness may be impeached with evidence of certain prior criminal convictions to attack the witness’s character for truthfulness. TEX. R. EVID. 609(a). Evidence of a prior criminal conviction must be admitted to impeach a witness if “the crime was a felony or involved moral turpitude, regardless of punishment[,]” and “the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to a party.” Id. When considering the probative effect of evidence compared to its prejudicial effect, we presume that the trial court conducted the balancing test, which need not be shown on the record. Loza, 659 S.W.3d at 502. The Court of Criminal Appeals in Theus set forth a list of factors to guide our Rule 609 analysis: (1) the impeachment value of the prior crime, (2) the temporal proximity of the past crime relative to the charged offense and the witness’ subsequent history, (3) the similarity between the past crime and the offense being prosecuted, (4) the importance of the defendant’s testimony, and (5) the importance of the credibility issue. Theus, 845 S.W.2d at 880. We will discuss the application of each factor in turn. 17 The impeachment value of crimes that involve deception, such as theft, are higher than other crimes such as those involving violence, because crimes of violence have a higher potential for prejudice. Id. at 881. It follows, then, that because Appellant’s prior conviction was for theft, the impeachment value of this conviction was relatively high. See Huerta v. State, 359 S.W.3d 887, 892 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (“Theft is a crime of moral turpitude involving elements of deception.”). Therefore, the first factor weighs in favor of admission. “[T]he second factor will favor admission if the past crime is recent and if the witness has demonstrated a propensity for running afoul of the law.” Theus, 845 S.W.2d at 881. In February 2018, Appellant was placed on three years’ deferred adjudication community supervision for felony theft of copper, and in November of that same year, he was adjudicated guilty of the underlying offense and sentenced to one year confinement in a state jail facility. Therefore, Appellant has shown a propensity to run afoul of the law by committing the same offense of theft of copper in 2018 and then violating the conditions of his community supervision. Additionally, Appellant was adjudicated guilty of the 2018 offense less than ten years before he was charged with and proceeded to trial on the instant theft offense. See Loza, 659 S.W.3d at 503 (holding that the second Theus factor weighed in favor of admission when the evidence showed the defendant demonstrated multiple instances of running afoul of the law and was imprisoned for the impeachment conviction less than ten years before trial). As such, the second factor weighs in favor of admission. When the prior conviction and the crime with which the defendant was on trial are similar, this factor will weigh against admission. See Theus, 845 S.W.2d at 881. Here, Appellant’s prior conviction for theft of copper under $20,000 is the 18 same offense with which he was on trial in this case. Therefore, this factor weighs against admission. The fourth and fifth factors are related “because both depend on the nature of a defendant’s defense and the means available to him of proving that defense.” Id. “When the case involves the testimony of only the defendant and the State’s witnesses, . . . the importance of the defendant’s credibility and testimony escalates.” Id. Which therefore escalates “the need to allow the State an opportunity to impeach the defendant’s credibility.” Id. (citing United States v. Fountain, 642 F.2d 1083, 1092 (7th Cir. 1981)). Appellant testified and claimed that he was merely in the wrong place at the wrong time and that he was walking not from the site of the theft, but instead from a friend’s home. Appellant also testified that it would be impossible for him to have crawled through the gate because of his physical impairments and limitations. Appellant’s version of events differed significantly from that advanced by the State, which alleged that Appellant was the person shown on the Oxy surveillance video stealing copper wire from Oxy’s storage yard on October 28, 2022. Therefore, the State’s need to impeach Appellant’s trial testimony was high. As such, these factors weigh in favor of admission. Considering the Theus factors together and the deferential standard of review that we must employ, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted Appellant’s prior felony conviction for theft of copper for impeachment purposes. b. Rule 404(b) Generally, evidence of prior extraneous offenses cannot be used to show that the defendant possesses a certain character trait and acted in accordance with that trait in committing the charged offense. TEX. R. EVID. 404(b). However, “[t]his evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or 19 lack of accident.” Id. Further, the State may introduce extraneous offense evidence under Rule 404(b) to rebut a defensive theory. Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). The evidence regarding Appellant’s recent prior conviction for theft of copper was admissible to rebut his defensive theory that he was in the wrong place at the wrong time and physically unable to commit the charged offense. In Moore, we analyzed how the defendant’s prior similar conduct was admissible to rebut her defensive theory that she was in the wrong place at the wrong time. Moore v. State, No. 11-19-00060-CR, 2021 WL 389258, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 4, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In Moore, the defendant was convicted of knowingly delivering narcotics, and the extraneous offense evidence of her prior drug conviction was admissible to show that her presence at the location of the drug deal was intended and not merely coincidental. Id. at *1–2, *5. Like the defense raised in Moore, here, Appellant explained that his presence near the location of the theft was only coincidental, that he was merely walking home from a friend’s home, and that he was physically unable to crawl through a fence or steal the copper wire. See Patterson v. State, 496 S.W.3d 919, 930–31 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (op. on reh’g) (holding that extraneous offenses were admissible to rebut the defense’s t