Full Opinion

Affirm and Opinion Filed November 19, 2026 S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-25-01097-CR LUIS HERRERA, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F23-48545 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Smith, Lewis, and Lee Opinion by Justice Lee After appellant Luis Herrera pled guilty for stalking, he was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for a period of five years. Seven months later, the State filed its Motion to Revoke Community Supervision or Proceed with an Adjudication of Guilt. The court found two of the five probation violations1 true and assessed a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment. 1 The two allegations found true were violation of a protective order and contact with restricted individuals. Herrera raises three issues. One concerns a modification to the judgment, another requests a modification to the bill of costs, and the third challenges whether his sentence furthers the objectives of the Penal Code. BACKGROUND In the State’s motion to adjudicate, Herrera was alleged to have violated his deferred adjudication by: 1. Violating a protective order; 2. Contacting B.S. and A.S.2 directly at their residence; 3. Failing to report to his probation officer in May 2025; 4. Failing to participate in intensive outpatient substance counseling; and 5. Failing to participate in psychological/psychiatric counseling. Herrera pled not true to the allegations. At the adjudication hearing, the State presented Herrera’s probation officer who stated Herrera failed to report in May 2025 and failed to participate in intensive outpatient substance counseling. Herrera also told her he was receiving psychological treatment, but she had not seen any verification in the narrative or in any of the scans. The State also called B.S., the complainant in the underlying stalking case, who testified regarding three incidents he believed threatened his family’s safety. 2 As the individuals’ names are not relevant to our disposition, we have provided pseudonyms to protect their privacy. –2– After B.S. and Herrera argued, Herrera said he was “going to beat [B.S.’s] wife like a man and drag her body up and down this alley for everyone to see.” After B.S.’s wife was chased on her evening jog, B.S. asked Herrera what his problem was and Herrera responded that B.S.’s daughter had been sneaking out of the house in the middle of the night and he was trying to tell B.S.’s wife about it. After reviewing their home camera footage, B.S. determined this was untrue. On another occasion, Herrera was screaming expletives and calling B.S.’s wife names. Herrera demanded that B.S.’s wife come outside. B.S. explained that these encounters with his wife happened when his truck or work vehicle were gone from the house. B.S. and his wife were subsequently granted lifetime protective orders. At Herrera’s adjudication hearing, the court found two of the allegations true — violation of a protective order and contacting B.S. and A.S. at their residence. Herrera was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. This appeal ensued. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS PUNISHMENT In his first issue, Herrera contends the trial court’s imposition of the maximum sentence of ten years does not further the objectives of rehabilitation and preventing recurrence of criminal acts. Instead, Herrera asserts the sentence was based on –3– ensuring the personal safety of B.S. and his family rather than furthering the objectives identified in the Penal Code. The State contends Herrera’s complaint is not preserved for review and is not supported by the record. Herrera did not object to his sentence or file a motion for new trial. Even if he had preserved the complaint, the State argues that the sentence was within the statutory punishment range for the offense. Analysis Generally, a defendant may not complain on appeal about his sentence when he failed to preserve the complaint in the trial court. Hunter v. State, 691 S.W.3d 247, 254 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2024); TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). This Court has consistently rejected arguments held unpreserved that contend a sentence contravenes the objectives of the Penal Code when the defendant failed to raise the argument in the trial court.3 The first step in our analysis is to determine whether Herrera preserved this complaint for appellate review. He did not. Because Herrera neither objected when sentence was imposed nor raised the complaint in a motion for new trial, he forfeited this complaint. Rezac v. State, 782 S.W.2d 869, 870-71 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). We overrule Herrera’s first issue as unpreserved. 3 See Patrick v. State, No. 05-25-00106-CR, 2026 WL 2499101, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 25, 2026, no pet.); Bradshaw v. State, No. 05-24-00495-CR, 2025 WL 1482856, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 23, 2025, no pet.); Hunter v. State, 691 S.W.3d 247, 254 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2024); Albiar v. State, No. 05-22-00558-CR, 2023 WL 5814273, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 8, 2023, no pet.). –4– MODIFICATIONS A. “Not True” Plea Herrera asks this Court in his second issue to modify the judgment to reflect that he pled “not true” to the State’s motion to adjudicate. Alternatively, Herrera requests that this Court vacate any conflicting judgment which incorrectly reflects a plea of “true.” This Court has the power to correct and reform a trial court judgment to make the record speak the truth when it has the necessary data and information to do so, or make any appropriate order as the law and nature of the case may require. Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). There are three different versions of the Judgment Adjudicating Guilt in the record. Two of these ostensible judgments are dated August 21, 2025, but neither were signed by the trial court. The actual judgment signed by the trial court was entered August 22, 2025.4 The judgment reflects Herrera’s plea of “not true.” Before sentencing, Herrera’s counsel explicitly entered a plea of “not true” on his behalf, and the trial court expressly acknowledged that plea. The signed judgment likewise reflects Herrera’s correct plea. Accordingly, Herrera’s second issue is without merit and is overruled. 4 The signed judgment was within a supplemental clerk’s record which was provided to this Court after Herrera’s brief. –5– B. Bill of Costs In his third issue, Herrera argues the bill of costs contain three errors; it (1) recites the incorrect statutory authority, (2) assesses an incorrect fee amount, and (3) incorrectly requires him to pay costs and fees within thirty-one days of judgment, which Herrera contends conflicts with language in the judgment that allows him to make payment arrangements upon release from confinement. Trial court judgments must be accurate and complete. Cardona v. State, No. 05-24-00161-CR, 2025 WL 1632117, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 9, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). This Court has the power to modify a judgment to speak the truth when we have the necessary information to do so. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b). This Court also has the power to modify a bill of costs. Floyd v. State, No. 05-24-00549-CR, 2025 WL 1334641, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 7, 2025, pet. ref’d). As Herrera points out, the bill of costs recites an incorrect time payment fee statute as well as an incorrect fee amount. The bill of costs recites: A TIME PAYMENT FEE OF $25 WILL BE ASSESSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH TEXAS GOVERNMENT CODE, SECTION 133.103 FOR ANY FINES AND OR COURT COSTS REMAINING ON OR AFTER THE 31ST DAY FROM THE DATE OF JUDGMENT ASSESSING THE FINE AND COURT COST. The time for payment provision in the bill of costs does not accurately reflect the current law governing the imposition of a time payment fee. Effective January 1, 2020, section 133.103 of the Texas Local Government Code was redesignated –6– as Article 102.030 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and sections 133.103(b) and (d) were repealed. Act of May 23, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 1352, §§ 2.54, 4.40(33), 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 3981, 4010, 4035. Article 102.030 allows for the assessment of a $15 fee for any court cost remaining after the thirty- first day from the date of the judgment assessing the court cost. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 102.030(b). Here, however, the bill of costs warns that a $25 fee will be assessed for any remaining costs and cites a repealed statute. Herrera also claims there is a conflict between the judgment and the bill of costs regarding the timeframe in which he is required to pay or make payment arrangements. According to Herrera, the language in the judgment ordering him to pay or to make arrangements to pay his court costs “upon release from confinement” conflicts with the language in the bill of costs’ time payment fees that assess such fee “for any fines and or court costs remaining on or after the 31 st day from the date of judgment.” We ascertain no conflict. The bill of costs specifies what amount is payable by Herrera, and the judgment specifies when Herrera must pay those amounts. The bill of costs’ imposition of the time payment fee does not set a due date for the payment of costs. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.030(a). Article 102.030(a) serves simply to impose a fee if the convicted person pays any part of a court cost after the thirty-first day after the date on which a judgment is entered assessing the court costs, id., or if tolled by appeal, after the thirty-first day after –7– the date on which mandate is issued. Dulin v. State, 620 S.W.3d 129, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (“The pendency of an appeal stops the clock for purposes of the time payment fee.”). The judgment may make those payments payable, as it did here, at a later date. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.15. Although the amount imposed by the bill of costs does not explicitly conflict with the judgment’s specification of when the amounts must be paid, article 103.001(b) provides that a certified bill of cost is payable on receipt. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 103.001(b); Contreras v. State, No. 05-24-01500- CR, 2026 WL 1593046, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 3, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding “a cost is not payable by the person charged with the cost until a written bill containing the items of cost is: (1) produced; (2) signed by the officer who charged the cost or the officer who is entitled to receive payment for the cost; and (3) provided to the person charged with the cost”) (citing Abad v. State, 729 S.W.3d 108, 123 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.))). To correct the errors regarding the amount of, and statutory authority for, the time payment fee in the bill of costs and to make clear that Herrera is not ordered to pay his court costs until his release from confinement, we modify the bill of costs by deleting the statement, A TIME PAYMENT FEE OF $25 WILL BE ASSESSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH TEXAS GOVERNMENT CODE, SECTION 133.103 FOR ANY FINES AND OR COURT COSTS REMAINING –8– ON OR AFTER THE 31ST DAY FROM THE DATE OF JUDGMENT ASSESSING THE FINE AND COURT COST. and insert the statement, A Time Payment Fee of $15.00 may be assessed should any fine, court costs, reimbursement fees, or restitution remain unpaid on the 31st day from the date the appellate mandate issues. In accordance with the trial court’s judgment, any fines, court costs, reimbursement fees, and restitution are to be paid without unnecessary delay to the District Clerk’s office, or any other office designated by the Court or the Court’s designee, upon Luis Herrera’s release from confinement. –9– CONCLUSION We modify the judgment as follows: We delete the following paragraph from all cause numbers’ bill of costs: • A TIME PAYMENT FEE OF $25 WILL BE ASSESSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH TEXAS GOVERNMENT CODE, SECTION 133.103 FOR ANY FINES AND OR COURT COSTS REMAINING ON OR AFTER THE 31ST DAY FROM THE DATE OF JUDGMENT ASSESSING THE FINE AND OR COURT COST. We substitute the following: • A Time Payment Fee of $15.00 may be assessed should any fine, court costs, reimbursement fees, or restitution remain unpaid on the 31st day from the date the appellate mandate issues. In accordance with the trial court’s judgment, any fines, court costs, reimbursement fees, and restititution are to be paid without unnecessary delay to the District Clerk’s office, or any other office designated by the Court or the Court’s designee, upon Luis Herrera’s release from confinement. As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and direct the trial court to order the district clerk to prepare a corrected bill of costs consistent with this opinion. Do Not Publish /Mike Lee/ Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) MIKE LEE JUSTICE –10–