Luis Herrera v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 5th District (Dallas)
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket05-25-01097-CR
JudgeLee
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Affirm and Opinion Filed November 19, 2026
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-25-01097-CR
LUIS HERRERA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F23-48545
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Smith, Lewis, and Lee
Opinion by Justice Lee
After appellant Luis Herrera pled guilty for stalking, he was placed on
deferred adjudication community supervision for a period of five years. Seven
months later, the State filed its Motion to Revoke Community Supervision or
Proceed with an Adjudication of Guilt. The court found two of the five probation
violations1 true and assessed a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment.
1
The two allegations found true were violation of a protective order and contact with restricted
individuals.
Herrera raises three issues. One concerns a modification to the judgment,
another requests a modification to the bill of costs, and the third challenges whether
his sentence furthers the objectives of the Penal Code.
BACKGROUND
In the State’s motion to adjudicate, Herrera was alleged to have violated his
deferred adjudication by:
1. Violating a protective order;
2. Contacting B.S. and A.S.2 directly at their residence;
3. Failing to report to his probation officer in May 2025;
4. Failing to participate in intensive outpatient substance counseling; and
5. Failing to participate in psychological/psychiatric counseling.
Herrera pled not true to the allegations.
At the adjudication hearing, the State presented Herrera’s probation officer
who stated Herrera failed to report in May 2025 and failed to participate in intensive
outpatient substance counseling. Herrera also told her he was receiving
psychological treatment, but she had not seen any verification in the narrative or in
any of the scans.
The State also called B.S., the complainant in the underlying stalking case,
who testified regarding three incidents he believed threatened his family’s safety.
2
As the individuals’ names are not relevant to our disposition, we have provided pseudonyms to protect
their privacy.
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After B.S. and Herrera argued, Herrera said he was “going to beat [B.S.’s]
wife like a man and drag her body up and down this alley for everyone to see.” After
B.S.’s wife was chased on her evening jog, B.S. asked Herrera what his problem was
and Herrera responded that B.S.’s daughter had been sneaking out of the house in
the middle of the night and he was trying to tell B.S.’s wife about it. After reviewing
their home camera footage, B.S. determined this was untrue.
On another occasion, Herrera was screaming expletives and calling B.S.’s
wife names. Herrera demanded that B.S.’s wife come outside. B.S. explained that
these encounters with his wife happened when his truck or work vehicle were gone
from the house. B.S. and his wife were subsequently granted lifetime protective
orders.
At Herrera’s adjudication hearing, the court found two of the allegations true
— violation of a protective order and contacting B.S. and A.S. at their residence.
Herrera was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment.
This appeal ensued.
ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
PUNISHMENT
In his first issue, Herrera contends the trial court’s imposition of the maximum
sentence of ten years does not further the objectives of rehabilitation and preventing
recurrence of criminal acts. Instead, Herrera asserts the sentence was based on
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ensuring the personal safety of B.S. and his family rather than furthering the
objectives identified in the Penal Code.
The State contends Herrera’s complaint is not preserved for review and is not
supported by the record. Herrera did not object to his sentence or file a motion for
new trial. Even if he had preserved the complaint, the State argues that the sentence
was within the statutory punishment range for the offense.
Analysis
Generally, a defendant may not complain on appeal about his sentence when
he failed to preserve the complaint in the trial court. Hunter v. State, 691 S.W.3d
247, 254 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2024); TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). This Court has
consistently rejected arguments held unpreserved that contend a sentence
contravenes the objectives of the Penal Code when the defendant failed to raise the
argument in the trial court.3
The first step in our analysis is to determine whether Herrera preserved this
complaint for appellate review. He did not. Because Herrera neither objected when
sentence was imposed nor raised the complaint in a motion for new trial, he forfeited
this complaint. Rezac v. State, 782 S.W.2d 869, 870-71 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
We overrule Herrera’s first issue as unpreserved.
3
See Patrick v. State, No. 05-25-00106-CR, 2026 WL 2499101, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 25,
2026, no pet.); Bradshaw v. State, No. 05-24-00495-CR, 2025 WL 1482856, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas May
23, 2025, no pet.); Hunter v. State, 691 S.W.3d 247, 254 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2024); Albiar v. State, No.
05-22-00558-CR, 2023 WL 5814273, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 8, 2023, no pet.).
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MODIFICATIONS
A. “Not True” Plea
Herrera asks this Court in his second issue to modify the judgment to reflect
that he pled “not true” to the State’s motion to adjudicate. Alternatively, Herrera
requests that this Court vacate any conflicting judgment which incorrectly reflects a
plea of “true.”
This Court has the power to correct and reform a trial court judgment to make
the record speak the truth when it has the necessary data and information to do so,
or make any appropriate order as the law and nature of the case may require. Asberry
v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d).
There are three different versions of the Judgment Adjudicating Guilt in the
record. Two of these ostensible judgments are dated August 21, 2025, but neither
were signed by the trial court. The actual judgment signed by the trial court was
entered August 22, 2025.4 The judgment reflects Herrera’s plea of “not true.”
Before sentencing, Herrera’s counsel explicitly entered a plea of “not true” on
his behalf, and the trial court expressly acknowledged that plea. The signed judgment
likewise reflects Herrera’s correct plea.
Accordingly, Herrera’s second issue is without merit and is overruled.
4
The signed judgment was within a supplemental clerk’s record which was provided to this Court after
Herrera’s brief.
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B. Bill of Costs
In his third issue, Herrera argues the bill of costs contain three errors; it (1)
recites the incorrect statutory authority, (2) assesses an incorrect fee amount, and
(3) incorrectly requires him to pay costs and fees within thirty-one days of
judgment, which Herrera contends conflicts with language in the judgment that
allows him to make payment arrangements upon release from confinement.
Trial court judgments must be accurate and complete. Cardona v. State, No.
05-24-00161-CR, 2025 WL 1632117, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 9, 2025, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). This Court has the power to
modify a judgment to speak the truth when we have the necessary information to
do so. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b). This Court also has the power to modify a bill of
costs. Floyd v. State, No. 05-24-00549-CR, 2025 WL 1334641, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Dallas May 7, 2025, pet. ref’d).
As Herrera points out, the bill of costs recites an incorrect time payment fee
statute as well as an incorrect fee amount. The bill of costs recites:
A TIME PAYMENT FEE OF $25 WILL BE ASSESSED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH TEXAS GOVERNMENT CODE, SECTION
133.103 FOR ANY FINES AND OR COURT COSTS REMAINING
ON OR AFTER THE 31ST DAY FROM THE DATE OF JUDGMENT
ASSESSING THE FINE AND COURT COST.
The time for payment provision in the bill of costs does not accurately reflect
the current law governing the imposition of a time payment fee. Effective January
1, 2020, section 133.103 of the Texas Local Government Code was redesignated
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as Article 102.030 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and sections
133.103(b) and (d) were repealed. Act of May 23, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 1352,
§§ 2.54, 4.40(33), 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 3981, 4010, 4035. Article 102.030
allows for the assessment of a $15 fee for any court cost remaining after the thirty-
first day from the date of the judgment assessing the court cost. TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. art. 102.030(b). Here, however, the bill of costs warns that a $25 fee will
be assessed for any remaining costs and cites a repealed statute.
Herrera also claims there is a conflict between the judgment and the bill of
costs regarding the timeframe in which he is required to pay or make payment
arrangements. According to Herrera, the language in the judgment ordering him
to pay or to make arrangements to pay his court costs “upon release from
confinement” conflicts with the language in the bill of costs’ time payment fees
that assess such fee “for any fines and or court costs remaining on or after the 31 st
day from the date of judgment.”
We ascertain no conflict. The bill of costs specifies what amount is payable
by Herrera, and the judgment specifies when Herrera must pay those amounts.
The bill of costs’ imposition of the time payment fee does not set a due date for
the payment of costs. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.030(a). Article
102.030(a) serves simply to impose a fee if the convicted person pays any part of
a court cost after the thirty-first day after the date on which a judgment is entered
assessing the court costs, id., or if tolled by appeal, after the thirty-first day after
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the date on which mandate is issued. Dulin v. State, 620 S.W.3d 129, 133 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2021) (“The pendency of an appeal stops the clock for purposes of
the time payment fee.”). The judgment may make those payments payable, as it
did here, at a later date. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.15.
Although the amount imposed by the bill of costs does not explicitly conflict
with the judgment’s specification of when the amounts must be paid, article
103.001(b) provides that a certified bill of cost is payable on receipt. See TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 103.001(b); Contreras v. State, No. 05-24-01500-
CR, 2026 WL 1593046, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 3, 2026, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (holding “a cost is not payable by the person
charged with the cost until a written bill containing the items of cost is: (1)
produced; (2) signed by the officer who charged the cost or the officer who is
entitled to receive payment for the cost; and (3) provided to the person charged
with the cost”) (citing Abad v. State, 729 S.W.3d 108, 123 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.))).
To correct the errors regarding the amount of, and statutory authority for, the
time payment fee in the bill of costs and to make clear that Herrera is not ordered
to pay his court costs until his release from confinement, we modify the bill of
costs by deleting the statement,
A TIME PAYMENT FEE OF $25 WILL BE ASSESSED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH TEXAS GOVERNMENT CODE, SECTION
133.103 FOR ANY FINES AND OR COURT COSTS REMAINING
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ON OR AFTER THE 31ST DAY FROM THE DATE OF JUDGMENT
ASSESSING THE FINE AND COURT COST.
and insert the statement,
A Time Payment Fee of $15.00 may be assessed should any fine, court
costs, reimbursement fees, or restitution remain unpaid on the 31st day
from the date the appellate mandate issues. In accordance with the trial
court’s judgment, any fines, court costs, reimbursement fees, and
restitution are to be paid without unnecessary delay to the District
Clerk’s office, or any other office designated by the Court or the Court’s
designee, upon Luis Herrera’s release from confinement.
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CONCLUSION
We modify the judgment as follows:
We delete the following paragraph from all cause numbers’ bill of costs:
• A TIME PAYMENT FEE OF $25 WILL BE ASSESSED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH TEXAS GOVERNMENT CODE, SECTION
133.103 FOR ANY FINES AND OR COURT COSTS REMAINING ON
OR AFTER THE 31ST DAY FROM THE DATE OF JUDGMENT
ASSESSING THE FINE AND OR COURT COST.
We substitute the following:
• A Time Payment Fee of $15.00 may be assessed should any fine, court costs,
reimbursement fees, or restitution remain unpaid on the 31st day from the date
the appellate mandate issues. In accordance with the trial court’s judgment,
any fines, court costs, reimbursement fees, and restititution are to be paid
without unnecessary delay to the District Clerk’s office, or any other office
designated by the Court or the Court’s designee, upon Luis Herrera’s release
from confinement.
As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and direct the trial court to
order the district clerk to prepare a corrected bill of costs consistent with this opinion.
Do Not Publish /Mike Lee/
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) MIKE LEE
JUSTICE
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