MCDONALD, MADISON v. the State of Texas

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS NO. PD-0147-25 MADISON MCDONALD, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS ON APPELLANT=S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS DALLAS COUNTY WALKER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which SCHENCK, P.J., and RICHARDSON, NEWELL, and MCCLURE JJ., joined. YEARY and PARKER, JJ., joined Part V only. FINLEY, J., joined Parts I–IV and V(A)(1)–(3). PARKER, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which YEARY, J., joined. FINLEY, J., filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. KEEL, J., concurred. OPINION We are being asked to answer whether the court of appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court’s decision to allow a State-sponsored expert to testify.  2 Appellant, Madison McDonald, claims that (1) the expert violated her Fifth Amendment rights during a competency evaluation by asking her about her mens rea during the commission of the offense, even though the expert was hired by the State, and (2) the trial court incorrectly appointed the expert as a disinterested expert for her insanity exam. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46C.101(a). The Fifth District Court of Appeals held that Appellant failed to preserve her arguments. McDonald v. State, No. 05-23-00419-CR, — S.W.3d —, 2024 WL 4784421, at *12 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 14, 2024, pet. granted). But it then stated that even if Appellant had preserved her claims, and even if the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the expert to testify, Appellant failed to show she was harmed, and the expert’s testimony did not have a “substantial and injurious” effect on the jury’s verdict. Id. at *12–13; see Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). After a review of the record, we find that Appellant preserved both her constitutional and statutory arguments. Nevertheless, we agree with the Fifth District Court of Appeals that even if it was error to allow the State’s expert to testify, that error did not affect Appellant’s substantial rights. Additionally, we hold that even though the constitutional Fifth Amendment question was preserved, there was no constitutional error. I — Background Facts  3 On April 5, 2021, Appellant killed her two daughters, A.H. and L.M., by asphyxiation after attempting to sedate them with various medications. A.H. was six- years-old and L.M. was almost two-years-old at the time of their deaths. Afterward, Appellant drove to the Irving Police Department where she used a phone in the lobby to call 911. She told the dispatcher that she wanted to report “child pornography and murder.” Appellant said she had sedated and smothered her daughters to protect them from being forced to make child pornography. Police approached Appellant while she was in the lobby still on the phone with 911. She was subsequently arrested. The next day, detectives interviewed Appellant. She again admitted to the killings and described the events of the day before. Appellant stated she killed the girls to protect them from her ex-husband sexually abusing them, but she could not provide proof of any abuse or wrongdoing. Unquestionably, Appellant has an extensive history of mental health issues. She was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, which causes Appellant to manifest both schizophrenic and bipolar disorder symptoms, including auditory hallucinations, manic episodes, depression, obsession, paranoia, and insomnia. In the months before the murders, Appellant had been experiencing extreme paranoia and delusions. She was convinced that her ex-husband was abusing  4 her daughters and was trying to sell them into sex-slavery in Europe; that her ex- husband and her mother were forcing the girls to participate in child pornography; and that her ex-husband was filming sexual videos of Appellant without her consent and was uploading the videos to the dark web. Also, Appellant believed her house had been broken into, her medications were being tampered with, and her technological devices had been hacked and bugged. Months before the killings, Appellant made several reports to the Irving Police Department about the illegal actions she believed her ex-husband and mother were perpetuating. The police investigated the complaints and determined the allegations were not true. Instead, the police felt Appellant’s beliefs were part of a mental health crisis. This led to Appellant being involuntarily hospitalized in November 2020, and A.H. and L.M. were removed from her custody. In February 2021, after intensive inpatient and outpatient treatment, the girls were returned to Appellant’s care. Two months later, Appellant took their lives. II — Competency and Insanity Issues Before and During Trial At the outset, the defense hired Dr. Lisa Clayton, a psychiatrist, to evaluate Appellant’s competency to stand trial. In July 2021, Dr. Clayton determined that Appellant was not competent. But Dr. Clayton’s report was untimely filed. The State  5 suggested that Dr. Kristi Compton, a forensic psychologist, could perform a second competency exam instead. The defense agreed. In August 2021, Dr. Compton met with Appellant after several months of her being on consistent medications while awaiting trial. During the competency exam, Dr. Compton asked Appellant about her state of mind during the commission of the offense. Ultimately, Dr. Compton found Appellant was competent to stand trial. Dr. Clayton reevaluated Appellant and agreed. Then, on June 14, 2022, Appellant filed her notice of intent to raise an insanity defense at trial. In response, the State filed a motion for a court-ordered insanity examination and report. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46C.101(a). It requested that Dr. Compton perform the insanity evaluation as a disinterested expert. Id. (“If notice of intention to raise the insanity defense is filed . . . the court may, on its own motion or motion by the defendant, the defendant’s counsel, or the attorney representing the state, appoint one or more disinterested experts to: (1) examine the defendant with regard to the insanity defense; and (2) testify as to the issue of insanity at any trial or hearing involving that issue.”) (emphasis added). The trial court granted the motion. In her insanity report, Dr. Compton found that Appellant was not legally insane at the time of the offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.01(a)  6 (“as a result of severe mental disease or defect, [the actor] did not know that [her] conduct was wrong”). Before trial was set to begin, the State and Appellant’s defense counsel discussed the competency and insanity exams. The conversation raised questions about who had actually hired Dr. Compton for the competency exam, the trial court or the State. The State investigated the issue and learned that the previous prosecutor who had been handling the case had authorized the State itself to retain Dr. Compton for competency. On April 5, 2023, the State confirmed to defense counsel that it, not the trial court, had hired and paid for Dr. Compton’s opinion. On April 11, 2023, a jury was picked, and trial began the next day. Then, on April 15, during its case-in-chief, the record indicates the defense filed a motion to suppress Dr. Compton’s testimony.1 Specifically, the defense asserted that (1) while acting as an agent of the State, Dr. Compton violated Appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights during the competency exam by asking about her mental state at the time of the offense without proper Miranda admonishments; 2 and (2) Dr. Compton was not a disinterested expert when she was appointed by the trial court for the insanity exam 1 As a note, the actual motion to suppress is not available in the Clerk’s Record. Though, the trial transcript indicates that a motion was filed, a lengthy hearing was held on the motion, and neither party disputes that a motion was filed. (See 7RR175–8RR66). 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–68 (1966).  7 because she had been hired and paid for by the State. 3 The parties had a hotly contested hearing on the issue, but Appellant’s motion was overruled when the parties and the court could not agree on a proper remedy. After the ruling, Dr. Clayton testified for the defense. She first recounted Appellant’s initial competency exam, when she determined Appellant was not competent to stand trial. Dr. Clayton also discussed Appellant’s mental health history and the process in which she was restored to competency. On the issue of insanity, Dr. Clayton believed Appellant was insane at the time of the offense because her actions were the result of her mental illness and Appellant believed the killings would not be wrong or thought of as wrong by individuals who were not part of the sexual abuse conspiracy. She testified that Appellant had thought the only possible way to protect her daughters was to take their lives, but she also believed that the girls would eventually come back to life because they were not permanently dead. It was not until eight months after the offense that Appellant fully understood the gravity of her actions and that her girls were not coming back. As a State’s rebuttal witness, Dr. Compton agreed that Appellant suffered a mental defect (schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type), but advanced that she did not 3 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46C.101(a).  8 meet the legal definition for not guilty by reason of insanity because Appellant was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of her actions at the time of the offense, despite her delusions. Dr. Compton’s opinion was highly influenced by the 911 call that Appellant made, the police body cam footage that captured Appellant’s conversation with officers in the police station lobby, the interview that Appellant had with the detectives the day after the killings, and the fact that Appellant turned herself in, at all. Overall, Dr. Compton opined that her interpretation of Appellant’s actions indicated an awareness or knowledge of wrongdoing. Dr. Compton also told the jury that she had been hired by the State when she conducted the competency exam and then was later hired by the court for an opinion on insanity. Ultimately, the jury found Appellant guilty of committing capital murder against A.H. 4 Because the State had waived the death penalty, Appellant was automatically sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. III — The Court of Appeals On direct appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeals held that Appellant had failed to preserve her complaints for review. McDonald, 2024 WL 4784421, at *12. First, it found that Appellant’s motion was untimely because she did not object pre- 4 Appellant was tried in April 2023 only for killing A.H. There has not been a trial for L.M.’s death.  9 trial to Dr. Compton’s testimony. Id. As early as April 5, Appellant was put on notice that the State, not the trial court, had hired Dr. Compton for the competency exam. Id. Appellant then waited ten days, until the middle of trial, to contest Dr. Compton’s testimony. Id. This delay prevented the trial court from having the ability to appoint a different expert in Dr. Compton’s place. Id. Additionally, the court of appeals found Appellant’s arguments on appeal did not comport with those made at trial. Id. It stated that her arguments related to evidentiary claims arising under Article 38.23(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 5 and Texas Rule of Evidence 7036, rather than the Fifth Amendment and Article 46.101C(a). Id. Because the grounds raised at trial were not the same as those on appeal, Appellant had failed to properly present her issues for review. Id. Finally, the court of appeals held that even if the claims were preserved, and even if it was error to allow Dr. Compton to testify, Appellant’s substantial rights 5 “No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23(a). 6 “An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of, reviewed, or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted.” Tex. R. Evid. 703.  10 were not harmed. Id. at *12–13; see Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). We granted discretionary review. IV — Preservation We first answer the question of preservation. To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a “timely request, objection, or motion” must have been made to the trial court. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1). The complaining party must have stated its position with sufficient specificity “to make the trial court aware of the complaint,” and the trial court must have ruled on it. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A). The complaining party should “let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks he is entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the trial court is in a proper position to do something about it.” Everitt v. State, 407 S.W.3d 259, 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting Layton v. State, 280 S.W.3d 235, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)). After reviewing the record, we believe Appellant’s objection was timely and her arguments on appeal comported with those raised at trial. IV(A) — Appellant’s objection to Dr. Compton’s testimony was timely. In general, an objection “is timely if the party makes the complaint as soon as the grounds for it become apparent.” Gillenwaters v. State, 205 S.W.3d 534, 537 (Tex.  11 Crim. App. 2006). An objection must be lodged before the evidence is admitted. Ethington v. State, 819 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The purpose is to give the opposing party the opportunity to respond and the trial court an opportunity to correct potential error. Gillenwaters, 205 S.W.3d at 537. Here, because Appellant made her objection before Dr. Compton testified, her complaint was timely. Appellant filed her motion to suppress on April 15, 2023, during her case-in-chief, right before she called Dr. Clayton. The State presumably intended to call Dr. Compton in rebuttal. At this moment, the issue was “apparent” for preservation purposes. The motion to suppress gave the trial court the opportunity to prevent potential error and make a ruling before either expert testified before the jury. Additionally, the State had an opportunity to respond, and it did so at length. In Appellant’s case, this process was sufficient. The court of appeals relied on Loredo v. State to determine that Appellant’s complaint was not timely. McDonald, 2024 WL 4784421, at *12 (citing Loredo v. State, 159 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). But Appellant’s case differs from Loredo. There, the defendant’s claim was found to be waived because he remained silent and failed to draw the trial court’s attention to an error. Loredo, 159 S.W.3d at 923–24. In contrast, here, Appellant did object and she drew the trial court’s  12 attention to the error—a hearing was held on the motion to suppress before either expert testified. While Appellant could have lodged a complaint as early as April 5 once she was on notice that the State had retained Dr. Compton, and making these arguments pre-trial would have better ensured judicial economy, she was not explicitly required to object at this point. The State understandably was concerned that the mid-trial motion to suppress was filed to “sandbag” its case. And while we never condone such a strategy, the specific timeline in this case supports that Appellant raised her objection when the issue became apparent. Thus, Appellant’s objection to Dr. Compton’s testimony was timely. IV(B) — Appellant properly presented her arguments to the court of appeals. A complaint is made with sufficient specificity when “the party lets the trial judge know what he wants and why he is entitled to it.” Gillenwaters, 205 S.W.3d at 537. To be preserved, the party’s arguments must comport with those made before the trial court. Pena v. State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). In determining if arguments to the court of appeals are properly presented, “we consider the context in which the complaint was made and the parties’ shared understanding at that time.” Id.  13 Here, the court of appeals should have understood the context of Appellant’s complaints to be about her Fifth Amendment rights being violated and Dr. Compton’s appointment violating Article 46C.101(a). At trial, these were explicitly the grounds Appellant maintained during the motion to suppress hearing. To the Fifth District Court of Appeals, Appellant clearly argued that Dr. Compton was not a disinterested expert. But she went further, citing Estelle v. Smith to say the privilege against self-incrimination applies to psychiatrists and psychologists who disclose information to the State about a defendant’s mental state. 451 U.S. 454, 467–69 (1981). In Smith, the Supreme Court answered a Fifth Amendment question about a State-sponsored expert witness who examined the defendant without admonishments and testified during punishment about statements the defendant made about the crime. Id. at 458–60. Appellant analogized her case to Smith, aiding her overall Fifth Amendment argument.7 The court of appeals believed that Appellant’s arguments centered primarily around Article 38.23(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Texas Rule of Evidence 703. McDonald, 2024 WL 4784421, at *12. And while Appellant does use these provisions to lend support to her position, the court of appeals’s interpretation 7 Appellant also distinguished her case from Kansas v. Cheever, 571 U.S. 87 (2013) and Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). These cases both address Fifth Amendment issues. See Cheever, 571 U.S. at 89–90; Penry, 903 S.W.2d at 758–60.  14 ignored the heart of her argument. She has always alleged that when Dr. Compton interviewed her, Dr. Compton illegally obtained mens rea evidence while acting as an agent of the State which violated Appellant’s Fifth Amendment rights, and thus Dr. Compton’s testimony should have been suppressed. Appellant’s arguments were properly presented to the court of appeals. Therefore, Appellant’s claims were preserved for appellate review. V — Reviewing error and harm. Again, Appellant raises two issues for our review: (1) whether her Fifth Amendment rights were violated when Dr. Compton asked her questions about her mens rea during the offense; and (2) whether it was error to appoint Dr. Compton as a disinterested expert under Article 46C.101(a). V(A) — Dr. Compton’s testimony did not cause substantial harm. First, we address Appellant’s claim that Dr. Compton was improperly appointed as an expert pursuant to Article 46C.101(a) because she was not disinterested as required by the statute. Declining to answer the question of error, the court of appeals found that even if error occurred, Appellant’s substantial rights would not have been harmed by Dr. Compton’s testimony, despite her not being a disinterested expert. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). We agree.  15 An alleged statutory error—one that is not constitutional in nature—must be disregarded if it does not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). A defendant’s substantial rights are affected if “the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The potential error has “a substantial and injurious effect or influence if it substantially swayed the jury’s judgment.” Thomas v. State, 505 S.W.3d 916, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). But, if the alleged error did not influence the jury or only had a “slight effect,” the verdict should stand. Id.; see also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946) (explaining that the issue is “whether the error itself had substantial influence,” not merely whether there was enough without the evidence to support the result). Neither party has the burden to show harm under the substantial rights test—it is the court which must conduct a record review to determine if the error influenced the jury’s decision in light of the remaining evidence. Thomas, 505 S.W.3d at 926. To evaluate harm, we consider the following non-exhaustive list of factors: the testimony and physical evidence admitted for the jury’s consideration; the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict; the character of the alleged error and how it might be considered in connection to other evidence; whether the State emphasized the complained-of error; the theory of the case; closing arguments; the jury  16 instructions; and relevant voir dire if applicable. Id. at 927; Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Schutz v. State, 63 S.W.3d 442, 444–45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). We also consider the overwhelming evidence of guilt in our Rule 44.2(b) analysis. See Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 357 (discussing the standard under former Rule 81(b)(2)). Here, the Fifth District Court of Appeals held that Dr. Compton’s testimony did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. McDonald, 2024 WL 4784421, at *13. It reasoned that there was overwhelming evidence that Appellant knew her actions were wrong, particularly based on Appellant’s statements in the 911 call and from her interactions with police. Id. We agree with the court of appeals’s finding of no substantial harm.8 It is undisputed that Appellant killed A.H. The defense conceded as much throughout the trial. Rather, the jury was tasked with having to determine if Appellant met the legal definition for insanity. Insanity is an affirmative defense. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.01(a). A person is legally insane when “at the time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did not 8 The court of appeals also held that the State could have nonetheless presented Dr. Compton as a rebuttal witness, even if she was found to be an interested expert. McDonald, 2024 WL 4784421, at *13 (citing Lagrone v. State, 942 S.W.2d 602, 609–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); and then Polvon v. State, 682 S.W.3d 651, 660–61 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, pet. ref’d)). We decline extend this holding, as the issue can be resolved using the traditional Rule 44.2(b) factors.  17 know that his conduct was wrong.” Id. “[W]rong in this context means illegal.” Ruffin v. State, 270 S.W.3d 586, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). To support a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, after the State has proven the offense was committed beyond a reasonable doubt, the defense must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was “insane at the time of the alleged conduct.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46C.153(a). The State did not contest that Appellant had a mental disease or defect. She undeniably had a lengthy history of mental health struggles relating to her bipolar disorder, schizoaffective type diagnosis. Appellant was actively prescribed medications for the disease, and consistently exhibited symptoms of her illness, including paranoia, delusions, obsession, mania, and depression. In the battle of the experts, both Dr. Clayton and Dr. Compton came to virtually the same conclusion regarding Appellant’s mental health history. The case turned on whether, at the time Appellant committed the offense, she knew her conduct was wrong, or rather whether she knew her conduct was illegal. See Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at 592 (“Thus, the question for deciding insanity is this: Does the defendant factually know that society considers this conduct against the law, even though the defendant, due to his mental disease or defect, may think that the conduct is morally justified?”) Where allegedly erroneously admitted expert testimony is at issue, each case must be evaluated on its  18 own set of facts, “taking into account the specific evidence and the probable impact of the erroneously admitted” testimony. Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). V(A)(1) — The expert testimony. The competing expert testimony implicates at least three of the substantial rights factors: the character of the error, how it might be considered in relation to the other evidence, and the theories of the case. See Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355–56. Each expert presented her own theory, and it is likely that the jury would have assigned at least some weight to each expert’s opinion. At a minimum, the experts were standing on equal footing with their conflicting opinions. In the defense’s case-in-chief, Dr. Clayton stated that she believed Appellant did not know her conduct was wrong at the time of the offense because Appellant only believed people who were part of the sexual abuse conspiracy would find her actions to be wrong. Appellant had explained to Dr. Clayton that initially she did not believe she would be arrested when she went to the police station. She thought the police would investigate the child pornography allegation and take her accusations against her ex-husband and her mother seriously.  19 Dr. Clayton further testified that Appellant told her that she believed her children would eventually come back to life. Dr. Clayton acknowledged that Appellant did not tell police this, but explained that Appellant omitted the information because she then started to believe that the police were “part of the conspiracy” once they arrested her. A large portion of Dr. Clayton’s testimony highlighted Appellant’s mental health history. Dr. Clayton also suggested potential explanations for Appellant’s actions: Appellant believed killing the girls was the only way to protect them; a voice named Mark told Appellant that death was the only way to protect the girls; Appellant was not reliable during her interview with detectives because of her mental health issues; and Appellant did not understand the seriousness of her actions until after she became lucid from the continuous administration of medication while in jail awaiting trial. These apparent justifications do not necessarily contradict whether or not Appellant believed killing her daughters was wrong at the time of the offense. Even if Appellant simultaneously held these beliefs, her own moral justification does not negate her knowledge of wrongdoing. See Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at 592. Dr. Compton, as a rebuttal witness, took the opposite stance and testified that she believed Appellant knew her actions were wrong at the time of the offense. She explained that she came to this conclusion after watching the digital evidence—the  20 911 call, the police body cam footage, and the video footage of Appellant’s interview with detectives. Dr. Compton testified to the exact statements from Appellant’s interview with detectives which informed her opinion on insanity. It is unclear how much of an impact Dr. Compton’s testimony actually had in light of all of the evidence presented at trial. The same evidence that Dr. Compton said caused her to not believe Appellant was insane was independently presented to the jury. The jury heard the 911 call and saw the police station lobby footage. It watched the entirety of Appellant’s interview with the police. Dr. Compton’s testimony merely readdressed the same evidence the jury had already seen. Because Dr. Compton’s testimony largely reemphasized the evidence already before the jury, it is unlikely that it would have unduly impacted the jury’s perception of the wrongfulness of Appellant’s actions. Further, Dr. Compton never testified about what mens rea evidence she obtained from Appellant during the competency exam. Her testimony focused primarily on the digital evidence that she independently reviewed after the competency evaluation, and that digital evidence is what ultimately swayed her. Even though the jury was faced with a battle-of-the-experts problem in an insanity case where jurors were surely putting stock into both experts’ opinions, it is unlikely Dr.  21 Compton’s testimony would have had a “substantial or injurious effect or influence” on the jury’s verdict. See King, 953 S.W.2d at 271. V(A)(2) — The digital evidence. We also consider the overwhelming degree of additional evidence indicating guilt in a substantial rights analysis. Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 357. Because guilt itself was not at issue, we review the evidence the jury considered in deciding whether Appellant was insane at the time of the offense. Relevant here, we look at the digital evidence—Appellant’s 911 call, her interactions with police at that time through the police’s body cam footage, and Appellant’s interview with detectives the day after the murders. First, on the 911 call that Appellant made while in the Irving Police Station lobby, Appellant told the dispatcher she was calling to report “child pornography and murder.” She stated that she had murdered her daughters to protect them from being forced to make child pornography. Appellant said the killings had happened about an hour before. 9 During the call, Appellant mentioned that she was not hearing voices, 9 The 911 call was made at 10:10 PM. The jury later heard evidence that Appellant had killed L.M. earlier in the day, at approximately 1:36 PM. For the rest of the day, she stayed with A.H. while they did all of A.H.’s favorite things and ordered her favorite foods. So, while Appellant told the dispatcher that the murders had happened an hour earlier, it is only A.H.’s murder that happened approximately an hour before the 911 call.  22 and she knew for certain that both children were deceased. She also told dispatch that she had left the door unlocked for police to be able to enter her apartment. The jury then saw police body cam footage of officers confronting Appellant in the station lobby while she talked with 911. After hanging up, she told officers, “This is unfortunate, and no one will understand, but as a mother, you’d do anything in this world that you can do to keep them safe, and if that means I had to eliminate them and then pay the price for the rest of my life I will.” Appellant stated she did what she felt like she needed to do and there were no other options because time was running out before her mom and ex-husband were going to try to take the kids again. During that interaction, Appellant directed officers to where they would find A.H. and L.M.’s bodies in her apartment and gave them keys for entry. Both the 911 call and body cam evidence indicate that Appellant knew her actions were “legally” wrong. The very act of seeking out the police and calling 911 to turn herself in shows that she knew her actions were criminal and warranted police involvement. Many times in the past, Appellant had called police requesting their help in situations where she believed a crime had been committed, namely for the alleged sexual abuse. Here, Appellant reported “child pornography and murder”— lumping together what she knows is a crime (child pornography) with another crime that she had committed an hour earlier (murder). This showed an awareness that  23 Appellant knew both were crimes and people typically call the police to report crimes. Additionally, she told the dispatcher that she had left the door unlocked for police to get inside, and she gave officers her keys when they confronted her in the lobby. This further indicates that Appellant anticipated police involvement; she wanted to assist the police in being able to easily access her home and daughters. Finally, by Appellant’s own admission, she told officers that she had to “eliminate” her children, and she knew that it might mean that she would “pay the price” for the rest of her life. She knew unequivocally that both girls were dead, that their deaths were caused by her own hand, and that there might be consequences because of her actions. Nobody but Appellant truly knows for certain what her thoughts were during the killings. But the 911 call and the events that occurred at the police station are the most contemporaneous evidence to the time of the offense that the jury was able to consider. By at least this time, approximately an hour after having killed A.H., the evidence shows Appellant knew her actions constituted a legal wrong. Appellant knew that people report crimes to the police and that the police would likely get involved based on her report. And she knew she might have to “pay the price.”  24 Additionally, the jury was shown video footage from the interview Appellant had with detectives the day after the murders and her arrest. There, Appellant made numerous references to knowledge of wrongdoing, including: • “I felt like I did what I had to do to protect my kids, and it is not what I wanted to do. I don’t - I’m not okay with it, I don’t think it’s right. I think I do deserve to be arrested and serve time. But I couldn’t go another day knowing they were in harm.” • “I felt I had no other option. I mean, it’s like I literally every single night would stay up as late as I could, even if I was lying in bed, mentally I would stay up and just think what I could do better, what can we do more, what can I show them, who can I call, how can I tell somebody that we’re in danger and it’s just like no one listened. And you know, after I hurt them – it’s hard to say that I killed them – I know I did. But, after I hurt them, I wanted to just hurt myself, but I thought I’ve gotta have one last chance. And I’ve gotta go talk to someone and I’ve got to admit to what I did to make it right. Because I do understand morals and values and ethics and respecting, and I mean I get right from wrong, but it’s been eating me alive . . .” • “I do know who they are in my heart and soul, I’ll never be able to prove it. And by the time I’m done being in prison for the rest of my life, it’ll never be proven. But I at least spoke it.” • “So we were gonna have a day. I thought, okay, well I have a Xanex prescription. So, I’ll just put them to sleep. You know, just overdose them. Quick and easy. Again, I know it’s wrong, but all I wanted to do was the calmest and kindest thing.” • “I don’t think you – you don’t feel. You’re numb, you’re aware, but it’s like everything’s just floating and you don’t know where to go from there because you know there is no more. You know what I mean, like I knew I would spend the rest of my life in prison.” • “Okay, well, I’m gonna preface with this, first off, this is now a mental health crisis because I have murdered my children, okay?” • “I do sound crazy. If you thought I was sane right now, you’d probably be crazy. But I’m not. The sad thing is something is happening and has been happening to me, and then affecting my children, and then to my children.  25 And I think that they thought I would just go crazy and they’d get the kids, and unfortunately that didn’t happen. Unfortunately, I hurt them instead.” • “Some days I feel like I just have depression and that life is getting me and then some days like today I feel like something’s wrong. But I also did just kill my children.” • “I remember, yes, there were specific things, but I don’t remember what they are now, like I said, I’m kind of in a haze. So, you’re gonna have to bear with me because this is the most overwhelming thing I’ve ever felt or will ever feel and I feel like I’m gonna live the rest of my life knowing that everyone’s gonna be labeling me as a murderer and that’s hard. Capital murderer at that.” • “Maybe if we can start with some smaller things and it wouldn’t be so hard to think because I guess committing murder takes a toll.” • “I’m – this is – this has killed me. It’s taken my soul. And I just think now it’s time for me to serve my time and I don’t know what else to say because everybody around me already knows and they’ve seen and I’ve tried to get help, like I said.” • “Well they – they didn’t do anything last time, so they won’t do anything this time. And I know that. I’ll just get charged and I’ll go. And they’ll never get caught and they’ll continue doing what they’re doing. But my kids won’t be a part of it anymore.” • “Well, I meant that as in like I’m not – I don’t believe I was in like a form of psychosis or anything when I did it b