Full Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo No. 07-26-00042-CR No. 07-26-00043-CR JOSE M. PORTALATIN, APPELLANT V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE On Appeal from the Criminal District Court 2 Tarrant County, Texas1 Trial Court Nos. 1562451, 1592061, Honorable William A. Knight, Presiding September 9, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ. By separate indictments in 2018, Appellant, Jose M. Portalatin, agreed to plead guilty to criminal mischief and stalking.2 In 2022, as part of a plea agreement, the trial 1 This cause was originally filed in the Second Court of Appeals and was transferred to this Court by a docket-equalization order of the Supreme Court of Texas. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001. Where there is a conflict with the precedent of this Court, this appeal has been decided in accordance with the precedent of the Second Court of Appeals. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3; Mitschke v. Borromeo, 645 S.W.3d 251, 254 (Tex. 2022). 2 See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 28.03(b)(4)(A), 42.072(b). court deferred adjudication of guilt on both charges and placed Appellant on community supervision for four years. On November 20, 2025, the State filed its petition to proceed to adjudication based on Appellant’s disagreement with the Global Positioning System (GPS) monitor exclusion zones. The trial court found the alleged violation true in each case, found Appellant guilty of criminal mischief and stalking, and sentenced Appellant. On appeal from that adjudication, Appellant presents two issues for our review, challenging the trial court’s finding that he violated a condition of community supervision and asserting his due process rights. We affirm. BACKGROUND When deferred adjudication was ordered on March 29, 2022, in addition to various standard conditions of community supervision, Appellant was also ordered to refrain from any contact with his former wife, M.C., who was the complainant in the stalking charges against Appellant. Additionally, Appellant was ordered to wear a GPS monitor and comply with exclusion zones until released by the trial court. The GPS monitoring was to be reevaluated after at least six months. In April 2023, the trial court released Appellant from GPS monitoring. The State noted that Appellant was not perfectly compliant with the exclusion zones, pointing out that Appellant’s occupation as a truck driver resulted in him having entered excluded areas occasionally. The State did not seek adjudication in response to what it ostensibly considered these minor violations. However, throughout 2024 and early 2025, Appellant allegedly violated the no- contact condition by contacting M.C. on several occasions. On October 25, 2025, the State filed to proceed with adjudication based on these violations of the no-contact 2 condition. But the State negotiated with Appellant to avoid proceeding to adjudicate guilt. Thus, in November 2025, conditioned upon Appellant’s agreement to comply with GPS monitoring for the remaining four months or so of his community supervision term, the State moved to dismiss its petition to proceed to adjudication. The trial court granted the State’s motion. The same day, Appellant reviewed the amended condition with community supervision officer Diana Ramirez. Appellant confirmed that his attorney reviewed the amended condition with him and that he agreed with the terms of GPS monitoring with exclusion zones, as evidenced by his having signed the amended conditions. Appellant’s earlier compliance with GPS monitoring also involved exclusion zones. Officer Ramirez acknowledged that the precise areas covered by the exclusion zones were not known at the time she and Appellant signed the amendment. The following day, during his interactions with another supervision officer, Appellant refused to install the GPS monitor due to the exclusion zones. The State promptly filed a second petition to proceed to adjudication, this time alleging violation of the condition that Appellant comply with GPS monitoring with exclusion zones. The trial court heard evidence on that allegation, found it to be true, adjudicated Appellant guilty of criminal mischief and stalking, and sentenced Appellant to twenty-four months in a state-jail facility for criminal mischief to run concurrently with his sentence of four years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for the felony offense of stalking. 3 ANALYSIS Standard of Review We review a decision to proceed to an adjudication of guilt and revoke deferred adjudication community supervision in the same manner as a revocation of ordinary community supervision. Cantu v. State, 339 S.W.3d 688, 691 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.). We review an order revoking community supervision under an abuse of discretion standard. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Little v. State, 376 S.W.3d 217, 219 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. ref’d). In a revocation proceeding, the State bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a probationer violated the terms of his probation. See Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc); Little, 376 S.W.3d at 219. The trial judge is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, and we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Little, 376 S.W.3d at 219. Proof of a single violation of the conditions of supervision supports an adjudication of guilt. Velasco v. State, No. 02-24-00219-CR, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 6206, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 14, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Issue One—Sufficiency of the Evidence Appellant first contends that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that Appellant violated the GPS monitoring condition of his probation. We disagree. 4 In exchange for the State dismissing its October 25 petition to proceed to adjudication alleging other violations related to contact with M.C., Appellant agreed to comply with the following condition: You are ordered to participate in and successfully complete the program(s) and/or condition(s) indicated below, pay all fees required, and continue to participate and/or comply with the rules and procedures established by CSCD and/or service providers, until released by the court. 1. GPS monitoring (with exclusion zones) until released by the Court. Install by 11/18/2025. To remain on throughout duration of community supervision. The day after Appellant signed this amended community supervision condition related to GPS monitoring, he refused to install and comply with the GPS monitoring. The State then filed its second petition to proceed to adjudication. In it, the State alleged that Appellant violated only the GPS monitoring condition: “In violation of this condition, Defendant refused to sign and comply with the Global Positioning System monitor exclusion zones as instructed by the Court or supervision officer on or about November 18, 2025.” Appellant claims that he “fully complied with the GPS monitor.” He contends that the condition of probation at issue required him to comply with the GPS monitor with the exclusion zones, not that he “agree” to the zones themselves. But Appellant’s argument is rhetorically flawed, regardless of whether he agreed with the specific exclusion zones. He did not agree to comply only with the rules, procedures, or zones of the new condition that he found to be agreeable or convenient, nor did he agree to comply with only 5 unrestricted GPS monitoring. He simply agreed to comply with GPS monitoring with exclusion zones. At the revocation hearing, Appellant testified to his refusal to comply with the exclusion-zones element of the ordered GPS monitoring. Officer Ramirez’s testimony corroborated this testimony. She reflected that, after Appellant got the monitor bracelet, he learned that the exclusion zones were more restrictive than he wished or anticipated and refused to comply any further. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding on this evidence that Appellant violated the amended condition. Proof that Appellant violated a condition of community supervision supports the trial court’s adjudication of guilt. See Velasco, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 6206, at *8. We overrule Appellant’s first issue. Issue Two—Adjudication as Punishment for Assertion of Rights By his second issue, Appellant maintains that “[t]he trial court abused its discretion by punishing Appellant for exercising his due process rights.” That is, he contends, the trial court adjudicated appellant guilty of the original offenses to “directly punish[]” him for asserting his due process rights.3 On the contrary, the record reveals that, while Appellant did complain at the adjudication proceeding that the exclusion zones were too restrictive to permit him to 3 To be clear, we do not read his argument as one presenting to us an assertion of his right to due process. He explains that he asserted his right to due process by objecting to the exclusion zones and that his objection to the exclusion zones was the reason he was adjudicated guilty of criminal mischief and stalking. Appellant does not cite authority to suggest that his argument advances the position that proceeding to adjudication on these facts is, in itself, a violation of due process. Nor does he raise the issue before us that the restrictive exclusion zones violated his right to due process. We have only vague characterizations of the proposed zones and cannot speak to their propriety. 6 work, there was no explicit objection or contention that the zones violated his due process rights. Nor does it appear the proposed exclusion zones were ever admitted into evidence to undergo any type of scrutiny. While perhaps Appellant’s protests regarding the exclusion zones could be understood as in the nature of due process assertions, no assertion of due process was urged before the trial court in the adjudication hearing or otherwise. So, to the extent Appellant’s second issue has constitutional undertones, any constitutional concerns as to the trial court’s decision to adjudicate guilt has been forfeited by failing to advance it below. See Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In fact, almost all error—even constitutional error—may be forfeited if the appellant failed to object.”); Donovan v. State, 508 S.W.3d 351, 354 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014), aff’d, 2015 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 479 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (restating Fuller’s principle of forfeiture as it relates to due process argument). The record reveals that the trial court had before it the State’s allegation that Appellant violated the condition that he agreed to undertake in exchange for dismissal of other allegations of violations. The trial court heard evidence from the community supervision officer that Appellant refused to comply fully with the new condition and heard evidence from Appellant conceding as much. There is no evidence that the trial court indirectly or directly punished Appellant for asserting his right to due process. We overrule Appellant’s second issue for the same reasons we overrule his first issue: sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Appellant violated the condition that he comply with GPS monitoring with exclusion zones. 7 CONCLUSION Having overruled Appellant’s two issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgments adjudicating Appellant guilty of criminal mischief and stalking. Laura A.W. Pratt Justice Do not publish. 8