Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana No. 06-26-00013-CR CINDI RAWLINS BAKER, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 97th District Court Clay County, Texas Trial Court No. 2020-0015C-CR Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens MEMORANDUM OPINION A Clay County1 jury convicted Cindi Rawlins Baker of murdering her husband, James Wayne Baker, II, and assessed punishment at twenty-three years’ imprisonment. Baker claimed self-defense for stabbing James. In her sole issue, Baker argues that the trial court erred by prohibiting her domestic-violence expert from testifying to her opinion that Baker was the victim in the relationship. Because we find that the trial court was within its discretion to exclude the expert from testifying, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. I. Applicable Facts After midnight on November 19, 2019, Baker called her and James’s daughter, Emily, and told her that “she had stabbed [James] and [that] he was dead.” Emily drove about two hours to her parents’ home and called 9-1-1 after she found her father dead in his bedroom. On November 19, Jacob Sisson, a deputy with the Clay County Sheriff’s Office (CCSO), was dispatched to a murder call. Baker was sitting on the couch when he arrived. Emily was sitting on the floor in her parents’ bedroom next to James, crying. Sisson found James lying on a pallet on the bedroom floor, without his shirt, with an entry wound in his chest and a kitchen knife beside him. Sisson testified that Baker appeared intoxicated. Before Sisson could ask her any questions, Baker told him that “[James] had told [her] to stab him, so [she] did.” Sisson read Baker her Miranda2 warnings and put her in his patrol unit. Elizabeth Ventura, the chief medical 1 This appeal was transferred to this Court from the Second Court of Appeals pursuant to a Texas Supreme Court docket equalization order. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Supp.). Accordingly, we apply the precedent of the Second Court of Appeals in deciding this case to the extent that it conflicts with our own. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. 2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 2 examiner for the Collin County Medical Examiner’s Office, testified that (1) James died of one fatal-stab wound to his chest, (2) there were no other indications that he had been in a struggle, (3) his blood-alcohol concentration was 0.267, and (4) he had no defensive injuries. Captain and felony investigator, Richard “Donny” Johns, with the CCSO, testified that Baker told him during her jail interview that she and James “were both laying side by side in the bed and that he handed [Baker] . . . the knife, she took it with her right hand and went across . . . and put it into [James’s] chest.” Baker told Johns that because she was scared, she stabbed James in self-defense. Baker also informed him that James had two cases pending in Lubbock for assaulting her. The State also offered prior altercations between Baker and James. James Rindlisbacher, an officer with the Lubbock Police Department, testified that he arrested James for domestic violence after he responded several years earlier to a domestic disturbance where he observed bruises on Baker’s thighs and a small puncture wound on James’s arm. Emily testified that her parents frequently argued, Baker had caused injuries to James, and that James had recently told Emily that he had broken Baker’s hand after Baker attempted to stab him, which resulted in a stab wound to his upper chest. Michael Bush, Baker’s brother, testified that Baker told him that she and James had prior domestic altercations. Shay Rucker, Baker’s sister, testified that she observed Baker with a black eye, broken fingers, and a broken wrist. Melora “Missy” Webber, an investigator with Child Protective Services, testified that she thought Baker was “more of the aggressor.” Penny Colvin, James’s sister, testified that Baker had previously stabbed James, and that he was hospitalized because of a punctured lung. 3 Baker called Kelly Slaven, a licensed clinical-social worker supervisor, to testify “about how trauma affects the mind, what a history of trauma does both physically and mentally to a person, and being able to explain that [could] give the [j]ury insight into what Ms. Baker was thinking and feeling at the time of the offense.” The State objected, and the trial court held a hearing outside the jury’s presence. At the hearing, Slaven testified as follows: [BY THE STATE:] And is it your intent to provide an opinion about who was the abuser in the relationship based on your two-hour meeting with Cindi Baker? [BY SLAVEN:] Yes. [BY THE STATE:] Do you believe that you have sufficient information to give that basis? [BY SLAVEN:] I do. The trial court sustained the State’s objection and stated that Slaven “[could] explain domestic violence generally and those things generally, but . . . sustain[ed] the objection as to her testifying to [Baker] being the victim in the case.” The jury found Baker guilty of murder, rejected her self-defense claim, and sentenced her to twenty-three years’ imprisonment. II. No Abuse of Discretion to Limit Testimony of Baker’s Expert Witness In her sole issue, Baker argues that the trial court erred by prohibiting Baker’s domestic- violence expert from testifying to her opinion that Baker was the victim in the relationship. A. Standard of Review “A trial judge’s ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard and will not be disturbed if it is within the zone of reasonable 4 disagreement.” Wolfe v. State, 509 S.W.3d 325, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). “The trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to any guiding rules and principles or acts arbitrarily or unreasonably.” Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). “We will respect the discretion of trial court judges in performing their gatekeeping function and will not disturb their rulings on the reliability of expert testimony unless it appears from the record they acted without reference to the pertinent guiding rules or principles.” Hernandez v. State, 53 S.W.3d 742, 752 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d). B. Applicable Law In Wolfe, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated, The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Texas Rule of Evidence 702, which provides that “[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Wolfe, 509 S.W.3d at 335 (alteration in original) (quoting TEX. R. EVID. 702). Even so, “[a]n expert’s opinion is inadmissible if the underlying facts or data do not provide a sufficient basis for the opinion.” TEX. R. EVID. 705(c); see Petriciolet v. State, 442 S.W.3d 643, 650 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d). “For expert testimony to be admissible under these rules, the proponent of the expert scientific evidence must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the testimony is ‘sufficiently reliable and relevant to help the jury in reaching accurate results.’” Wolfe, 509 S.W.3d at 335 (quoting Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). “In other words, the proponent must prove two prongs: (1) the testimony is based on a reliable scientific 5 foundation, and (2) it is relevant to the issues in the case.” Tillman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “The substance of the [expert’s] testimony must be considered. . . . [A]n expert’s bald assurance of validity is not enough. . . . The underlying data should be independently evaluated in determining if the opinion itself is reliable.” Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711–13 (Tex. 1997) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). “The trial court will examine the basis for such expert opinion and determine whether the disclosure of such facts would be more prejudicial than probative to the jury’s consideration.” Joiner v. State, 825 S.W.2d 701, 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). “In some cases, however, the source upon which an expert’s opinion relies is of such little weight that the jury should not be permitted to receive that opinion.” Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987). C. Analysis In Vela v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that “[w]ithout more than credentials and a subjective opinion, an expert’s testimony that ‘it is so’ is not admissible.” Vela v. State, 209 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (quoting Viterbo, 826 F.2d at 424). There, the expert did not review any medical tests or academic literature and solely relied on what the patient told him to diagnose the patient. Id. The court stated that the expert’s opinion was merely the patient’s own account “dressed up and sanctified as the opinion of an expert.” Id. (quoting Viterbo, 826 F.2d at 424). Thus, even though the trial court gives “wide latitude” to experts in selecting the sources, the trial court is required to evaluate the reliability of those sources because the basis of an opinion may be “of such little weight that the jury should not be 6 permitted to receive that opinion.” Id. at 134–35 (quoting Viterbo, 826 F.2d at 422). The trial court is the gatekeeper and must “determine the reliability, relevancy, and admissibility of scientific evidence.” Id. at 136 (quoting Vela v. State, 159 S.W.3d 172, 180 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2004), vacated, 209 S.W.3d 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). “A jury should evaluate credibility, but unreliable evidence should never make it to the jury.” Id. at 135– 36. Here, the trial court could have reasonably determined that the information Slaven relied upon to form her expert opinion was incomplete, and thus unreliable. Slaven had one meeting with Baker that lasted approximately two hours, and she had not reviewed police reports or video recordings and had not spoken with any other witness. Even though Slaven testified that it was standard practice in the industry to base an opinion such as this solely on information from the interviewee, the trial court heard evidence of Baker’s potential culpability in previous altercations as a mutual wrongdoer or combatant. Slaven also testified that additional information could have changed her analysis, and a one-sided portrayal could mislead the jury. Additionally, there is no indication in the record that Slaven reassessed her opinion after being informed of that information. For these reasons, we find that the record does not show an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. As a result, we overrule Baker’s sole issue.3 3 Baker also argues that Articles 38.36 and 38.371 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure allow the expert testimony at issue here. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.36, art. 38.371 (Supp.). Baker did not present Article 38.36 to the trial court, and Article 38.371 explicitly states, “subject to the Texas Rules of Evidence or other applicable law.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.371(b); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.36(b); TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1). 7 III. Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Scott E. Stevens Chief Justice Date Submitted: September 3, 2026 Date Decided: September 25, 2026 Do Not Publish 8