Dakari Jahi Lenear v. the State of Texas

Opinion issued August 13, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00747-CR ——————————— DAKARI JAHI LENEAR, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 179th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1723781 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Dakari Jahi Lenear, appeals from his murder conviction for the killing of his wife, Rhonda Lenear. He contends the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress a live recording of the events surrounding Rhonda’s death obtained from a pink Samsung cell phone recovered next to Rhonda’s hand, in the marital home. In seeking to suppress that live recording, Appellant challenges both the seizure of the phone and the subsequent search of the phone. We reject both challenges. First, the seizure. Assuming for these purposes that Appellant has standing to challenge the seizure of the cell phone from the marital home,1 we nevertheless conclude that the officers lawfully seized the cell phone under the plain view doctrine. The police officers were lawfully inside the residence, with a warrant allowing them to be there. The phone was in plain view next to Rhonda’s hand (still actively recording), the officers had lawful access to it, and its incriminating character was immediately apparent. Second, the search. Also assuming for these purposes that Appellant has standing to challenge the subsequent search of the phone, we nevertheless conclude that this record presents no violation of the Fourth Amendment. The hallmark of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Here, the record supports the officer’s reasonable belief, based on all facts known to him at the time (including that the phone found by Rhonda’s hand was still actively recording when the police arrived, and it had visibly been recording for three hours), that Rhonda’s mother—who then 1 Whether a defendant has standing for purposes of the Fourth Amendment is not a jurisdictional question. See Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. 395, 411 (2018). 2 gave the officers that phone’s passcode, enabling them to access Rhonda’s recording—consented to the search. The trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. We affirm. BACKGROUND A. The Shooting The underlying facts are undisputed. On May 19, 2021, Appellant shot and killed his wife Rhonda in their home. At the time of the shooting, Rhonda was audio-recording on a pink cell phone. The recording captured the events preceding the shooting, the gunshots, and the aftermath. The phone was still recording when the officers later entered the home with a warrant. Immediately following the shooting, the couple’s teenaged daughter, Kari, called 9-1-1 and reported that her father had just shot her mother. Police officers arrived, and Appellant surrendered. Officers entered the home to conduct a welfare check and found Rhonda deceased; she had suffered significant blood loss and apparent gunshot wounds. Later that day, police obtained a warrant to search the residence. During the search, officers found a cell phone next to Rhonda’s hand—still recording—and seized it. Police subsequently accessed and listened to the audio recording of the shooting. Appellant was indicted for murder. 3 B. Motion to Suppress Hearing Appellant filed two motions to suppress the live-recording evidence obtained from the cell phone, arguing that the police acquired that evidence in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.2 First, he challenged the seizure of the phone under the residence search warrant, arguing that no probable-cause nexus supported seizure of the phone. Second, he challenged the later search of the phone, arguing that the police conducted the search without a warrant or an applicable exception to the warrant requirement. The trial court held a hearing on the motions to suppress. Investigator Crain of the Harris County Sheriff’s Office testified at the hearing. Crain explained that he was notified of the homicide investigation and informed that a search warrant was needed before investigators could enter and process the scene. He therefore prepared and obtained a warrant to search the residence. Crain testified that when law enforcement initially arrived, Appellant was holding a camouflage cell phone. After Appellant was detained, investigators collected that phone. 2 Appellant also argued below that the evidence was acquired in violation of Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution and Article 38.23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Appellant does not assert those arguments here and focuses only on the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because he does not separately brief an argument under the Texas Constitution or Article 38.23, we focus our analysis on the United States Constitution’s Fourth Amendment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Young v. State, 563 S.W.3d 325, 329 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d). 4  Crain testified that upon entering the home, he observed a pink Samsung cell phone “lying next to the victim’s hand.” He could see from the cell phone’s screen that the phone was actively recording. He also saw that the audio recording was three hours long, and the cell phone had only 13% battery remaining. Crain testified that he confirmed the pink Samsung phone belonged to Rhonda. He further explained that Rhonda’s mother gave the phone’s passcode to another officer. Crain used the passcode provided by Rhonda’s mother to access the phone and extract the audio recording of the offense. Crain testified that he believed Rhonda’s mother had implicitly consented to him accessing and downloading the phone’s contents at issue under the circumstances. The parties’ daughter, Kari, also testified. Kari testified that her mother’s phone was “a Samsung with a pink case on it” and that her father’s (the Appellant’s) phone “was also a Samsung but it had like a camo[uflage] case on it.” Kari testified that her mother’s phone was passcode-protected and that she (Kari) gave the passcode to her grandmother (Rhonda’s mother) to give to law enforcement.3 When asked whether Appellant used her mother’s phone, Kari replied, “Not - - not really, no.” Kari further testified that Appellant used his own Samsung phone. The defense did not call any witnesses. The only evidence produced by Appellant was his declaration stating that he “managed the family’s cell phone 3 There is no evidence that law enforcement knew this fact at the time of the search. 5 accounts, including paying the bills” and that “Rhonda and I did not have a premarital agreement designating any separate property.” During the hearing, the parties stipulated that Appellant and Rhonda were married. The State conceded it had no tracing evidence showing separate-property funds were used to purchase the pink Samsung phone. The State also conceded, for purposes of the hearing, that the phone was community property. C. The Trial Court’s Denial of Appellant’s Motions to Suppress At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s motions to suppress. As to the seizure of the pink Samsung phone from the marital home, the trial court concluded that the seizure was proper and covered by the search warrant; the court further explained that “the phone [was] in plain view and [was] on recording,” circumstances that “support the reasonableness for them to seize the phone.” As to the search, the trial court concluded that Appellant did not have standing to challenge the search of the cell phone. The court concluded that he had not met his burden to prove a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of the phone.4 4 The trial court addressed Appellant’s asserted community property interest in the phone solely in connection with a privacy inquiry. It then concluded that Appellant did not establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone. The trial court did not delve into the question of whether, under the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment and a property-based view, Appellant would have standing (or not) in light of Appellant’s property argument and the State’s concession that the phone was community property. See infra pp. 9–11. 6 The trial court determined that Appellant had “some personal connection to the phone” because Appellant “managed the family’s cell phone accounts including paying the bills,” but that this alone did not establish a reasonable expectation of privacy. The trial court noted that the cell phone was protected by a password, it was pink, and it was Rhonda who was using the cell phone. The trial court later memorialized its oral findings into written findings of fact and conclusions of law, including, in relevant part: 29. Once Investigator Crain entered the residence, he observed a cellular phone lying next to the victim’s hand (the complainant’s pink Samsung cell phone) and he collected the phone pursuant to the search warrant. 30. Investigator Crain testified the complainant’s pink Samsung cell phone was lying face up where the screen of the phone was visible and was actively recording the sounds from within the room. He further observed the time stamp on that recording was right at three hours. 31. Investigator Crain collected the complainant’s pink Samsung cell phone, and noticed the phone had a password and it was locked. 32. Thr[ough]out his investigation Investigator Crain learned that when Defendant was detained, the Defendant had a camouflage phone with him. 33. Investigator Crain testified that he learned that[,] within two hours of the recovery of the complainant’s pink Samsung phone, the complainant’s mother provided deputies a passcode to get into what he believed was the complainant’s phone. 34. Investigator Crain testified he believe[d] that after the complainant’s mother provided the password to the deputies, he had implicit consent from the complainant’s mother to download the phone. *** 7  41. [Kari], the Complainant’s and Defendant’s daughter, testified that the pink Samsung cellphone belong[ed] to the complainant and the complainant used her phone. 42. [Kari] further testified the camouflaged cell phone was the Defendant’s phone and that he used that phone. 43. [Kari] further testified she was aware of the complainant’s phone passcode, and that she gave it to her grandmother, for her grandmother (the complainant’s mother) to give it to the investigators. (Citations omitted.) DISCUSSION Because Appellant’s challenges to the seizure and subsequent search of the phone fail under Texas law, we affirm. We address each in turn. A. Standard of Review We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review. Armstrong v. State, 713 S.W.3d 893, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025). “At the hearing on the motion, the trial court is the sole factfinder and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given their testimony.” Id. Therefore, we afford “almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts that the record supports.” State v. Pettit, 713 S.W.3d 834, 839 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025). We defer to the trial court’s findings as to historical facts unless they are unsupported by the record. See id.; State v. Espinosa, 666 S.W.3d 659, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). However, we review de novo legal questions and mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on credibility and demeanor. Espinosa, 8 666 S.W.3d at 667; see also Sandoval v. State, 665 S.W.3d 496, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (specifying de novo review for “application-of-law-to-fact questions that do not turn on credibility and demeanor”). We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences “in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling,” and we must uphold the trial court’s ruling “if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct under a theory of law applicable to the case.” Espinosa, 666 S.W.3d at 667. We may reverse only if a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is arbitrary, unreasonable, or outside the zone of reasonable disagreement, or if the trial court misapplied legal principles to the factual disputes and credibility issues as resolved. See Armstrong, 713 S.W.3d at 902; State v. Mazuca, 375 S.W.3d 294, 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). B. Standing We start by briefly addressing standing. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects[ ] against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights” and “may not be vicariously asserted.” Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 59 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (quoting source omitted). A criminal defendant seeking to suppress evidence “must show that ‘his own Fourth Amendment rights were infringed by the search or seizure which he seeks to challenge.’” United States v. Beaudion, 979 F.3d 1092, 1097 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation 9 modified and emphasis in original) (quoting Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. 395, 403 (2018)). Courts call this requirement “standing.” Id. In this context, standing is not jurisdictional; it is part of the Fourth Amendment analysis. Byrd, 584 U.S. at 411 (“Because Fourth Amendment standing is subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine, it is not a jurisdictional question and hence need not be addressed before addressing other aspects of the merits of a Fourth Amendment claim.”). Here, as to the seizure of the phone from the marital home, the trial court appears to have assumed standing and moved on to the merits, where Appellant’s claim failed. We do the same below. As to the search of the phone, in concluding that Appellant lacked standing, the trial court addressed Appellant’s property argument solely in connection with a privacy inquiry and concluded that Appellant did not establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone.5 Under current law, one can theoretically establish a Fourth Amendment interest through a privacy-based approach or a property-based one. See Beaudion, 979 F.3d at 1097 (“A defendant can establish this personalized interest in one of two ways. First, he may object to the physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected 5 See, e.g., Beaudion, 979 F.3d at 1099, for a helpful explanation of relevant law on privacy. 10 area in which he has a property interest. And second, he may object to government action that violates a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched.” (citation modified) (first citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), then citing Byrd, 584 U.S. at 405)). In Byrd, the United States Supreme Court explained that “recent Fourth Amendment cases have clarified that the test most often associated with legitimate expectations of privacy, which was derived from the second Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), supplements, rather than displaces, ‘the traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment.’” Byrd, 584 U.S. at 403–04 (emphasis added) (quoting source omitted). And in Chatrie v. United States, the Court reaffirmed that a traditional property-based approach remains viable. 146 S. Ct. 2193, 2204–05 & n.5 (2026) (noting that “sometimes the privacy and property approaches will ‘align’”—and “when such an alignment of the two approaches occurs, then all the better”). In any event, we need not address Appellant’s standing arguments because, even assuming Appellant had standing, his challenge to the search fails on the merits. See Byrd, 584 U.S. at 411. So, we assume standing and proceed to the merits. 11 C. Seizure: The record supports affirming the denial of the motion to suppress as to the seizure; the police officers lawfully seized the cell phone under the plain view doctrine. Assuming Appellant has standing to challenge the seizure of the cell phone from the couple’s marital home, we nevertheless conclude that the officers lawfully seized the cell phone under the plain view doctrine.6 Under Texas law, the plain view doctrine authorizes a warrantless seizure when three requirements are met: (1) the police officer must lawfully be where the object can be plainly viewed; (2) the incriminating character of the evidence in plain view must be immediately apparent to the police officer; and (3) the police officer must have the right to access the evidence. See State v. Betts, 397 S.W.3d 198, 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); accord Gomez-Aldana v. State, 712 S.W.3d 731, 735–36 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.). All three requirements are satisfied here. First, the record shows—and Appellant does not meaningfully dispute—that the officers were lawfully inside the residence, with a valid warrant to search the 6 Because the seizure of the physical phone was independently valid under the plain view doctrine, we need not address Appellant’s additional argument that the warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause to seize the cell phone. 12 home. Nor does he dispute (and the record shows) that the phone was located in the authorized search area in plain view, lying next to Rhonda’s hand. Moreover, the record further shows that the incriminating character of the phone was immediately apparent. In this context, “immediately apparent” does not mean “quickly apparent”; rather, it means that the incriminating character of the item must be apparent “without the necessity of any further search.” State v. Dobbs, 323 S.W.3d 184, 189 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The standard requires probable cause to associate the item with criminal activity, not actual knowledge that the item is evidence of a crime. See id.; Gomez-Aldana, 712 S.W.3d at 737; see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (under plain view doctrine, “probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime” (citation modified)). The trial court found that when Investigator Crain entered the residence, he observed the pink Samsung cell phone next to Rhonda’s deceased hand, face up, and actively recording sounds from within the room. The court further found that the recording reflected approximately three hours of elapsed time. These findings are supported by the record and are entitled to deference. See Pettit, 713 S.W.3d at 839. 13  On this record, an officer of reasonable caution could conclude that a phone lying next to a murder victim’s hand and visibly recording (and having recorded for three hours) events inside the room likely contained evidence of what had just occurred there. See Brown, 460 U.S. at 742. Texas courts have upheld plain view seizures of electronic evidence when the device’s incriminating value was externally apparent from the surrounding facts. See, e.g., Gomez-Aldana, 712 S.W.3d at 736– 37 (upholding plain view seizure of surveillance video where the incriminating value of the recording was immediately apparent because the detective knew an individual had been stabbed, the defendant was the suspect, and the video visually depicted the defendant with the weapon); Stocker v. State, __ S.W.3d __, __, No. 14-21-00412- CR, 2025 WL 1033949, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 8, 2025, pet. granted) (upholding warrantless seizure of a cell phone under plain view where officers knew homicide detectives wanted the phone in connection with a murder investigation). Accordingly, even assuming Appellant had standing to challenge the seizure of the phone, the officers lawfully seized the phone under the plain view doctrine. They were lawfully inside the residence, the phone was in plain view next to the victim’s hand, the officers had lawful access to it, and its incriminating character was immediately apparent from its visible status as an actively recording device at the homicide scene. We overrule Appellant’s first issue. 14 D. Search: The record also supports affirming the denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress as to the search of the phone (through which the police obtained the live recording). We likewise affirm the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s search-based motion to suppress Rhonda’s audio recording. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, and based on all of the facts known to Investigator Crain at the time, the record supports the conclusion that Crain reasonably believed Rhonda’s mother had the authority to and did consent to law enforcement’s search of the phone under the circumstances. A warrantless search is ordinarily unreasonable, but a search conducted pursuant to voluntary consent is one of the “well-defined” exceptions to the warrant requirement. Limon v. State, 340 S.W.3d 753, 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Consent may be given either by the person whose property is searched or by a third party who possesses actual or apparent authority over the place or thing to be searched. See State v. Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d 1, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Hubert v. State, 312 S.W.3d 554, 560–61 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “A person’s consent to search can be communicated to law enforcement in a variety of ways, including by words, action, or circumstantial evidence showing implied consent.” Meekins v. State, 340 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We focus on apparent authority here. “Even if actual authority does not exist, consent may be validly obtained from an individual with apparent authority over the 15 [item at issue].” Limon, 340 S.W.3d at 756 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990)). If a police officer reasonably believes that a “third party purporting to provide consent has actual authority over the place or thing to be searched, apparent authority exists,” rendering the search reasonable. Hubert, 312 S.W.3d at 561 (citing Illinois, 497 U.S. at 186). The test for apparent authority is objective: “would the facts available to the officer at the moment warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises [or thing searched]?” Limon, 340 S.W.3d at 756 (quoting Illinois, 497 U.S. at 188). “The reasonableness of apparent authority depends on ‘widely shared social expectations’ . . . .” Gonzalez v. State, 608 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. ref’d) (quoting Limon, 340 S.W.3d at 756–77). “A third party has apparent authority to consent to a search if, based on objective appearance and reasonable assumption, that person appears to exercise control and authority over a thing or place to be searched.” Id. (emphasis in original). “The State must prove actual or apparent authority by a preponderance of the evidence.” Limon, 340 S.W.3d at 757. We emphasize that the hallmark of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness; after all, the text of the amendment itself focuses on reasonableness. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; State v. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d 784, 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 16 reasonableness.”). Whether an officer’s reliance on consent is reasonable is a question to be determined by examining the totality of the circumstances. Hubert, 312 S.W.3d at 560. Courts have applied apparent authority principles to digital devices, holding that third‑party consent and apparent authority extend to cell phones. See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 887 F.3d 780, 783–84 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he third-party consent exception to the warrant requirement applies to cell phones all the same, just like other essential ‘effects’ protected by the Fourth Amendment.”). Applying this law, we conclude that the record supports the conclusion that a man of reasonable caution would believe, under all the facts known to Investigator Crain at the moment, that consent was satisfied. Limon, 340 S.W.3d at 756. In other words, the facts available to him at the time would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that Rhonda’s mother had authority to consent (and did consent) to the search of the phone at issue. See id. Several circumstances support that conclusion. Start with facts known to Crain about the pink phone at issue. As the trial court found, and as Crain testified, when officers arrived, Appellant was holding a camouflage cell phone (not the pink phone found next to Rhonda). As to the pink phone, Crain testified that when he arrived at the homicide scene, he observed a pink cell phone lying next to Rhonda’s hand. Crain observed that that phone was actively recording, and the recording had 17 been running for three hours; the recording reasonably appeared likely to contain evidence of events surrounding the homicide. As the trial court found, Crain reasonably believed the pink cell phone belonged to Rhonda. The circumstances confronting Crain were notable. The record supports a reasonable inference that Rhonda activated the recording while she was alive to make a record of what transpired for others to later hear. It is reasonable to infer that Rhonda wanted others to see the recording. The recording continued for three hours, and the phone remained actively recording until the police (including Crain) arrived at the scene and saw the phone lying next to her. Rhonda’s children were gathered outside the residence while the situation was happening. Next, the events immediately following the homicide further informed Crain’s understanding. Crain testified that Rhonda’s mother—her intimate family member—then provided the recording pink phone’s passcode to an investigator, who then provided it to Crain. As the trial court reasonably found, Rhonda’s mother provided the police the passcode “to get into” the phone. From Crain’s perspective, these circumstances reasonably supported an inference that Rhonda intentionally activated the recording capturing the events to be accessed by others. Then, Rhonda’s mother voluntarily provided investigators with the correct passcode to her deceased daughter’s phone—the very phone that had been actively recording the events surrounding Rhonda’s death. Nothing in the 18 record suggests that Rhonda’s mother attempted to limit law enforcement’s use of the passcode or otherwise restrict access to the device such that they could not obtain the recording at issue. Quite the opposite. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for Crain to believe that this record reflects consent by Rhonda’s mother. Again, consent can be shown through conduct and circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Meekins, 340 S.W.3d at 458 (implied consent may be shown through conduct and circumstantial evidence); see also Gomez-Aldana, 712 S.W.3d at 734–36 (officers lawfully viewed a home-surveillance video by consent where defendant’s wife guided officers to the surveillance system and assisted them in accessing the recording); United States v. Bermel, 88 F.4th 741, 746 (8th Cir. 2023) (officers reasonably inferred consent where family member turned over video camera, officers announced they intended to examine it, and family member did not object). Moreover, on the unique facts available to Crain at the time here, the record supports Crain’s reasonable belief that Rhonda’s mother had apparent authority to consent to the search at issue. Courts have recognized that family members or close associates who possess, unlock, use, or otherwise demonstrate access to a digital device may furnish apparent authority for officers to rely upon, depending on the circumstances. In Gonzalez, for example, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that officers could reasonably believe the defendant’s wife had apparent authority 19 over a passcode-protected iPad when she “brought the iPad from her family’s home and entered the iPad’s passcode” to display its contents to police. 608 S.W.3d at 106 (“It was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe Gonzalez’s wife had the authority to disclose the contents of the iPad to the police.”). Similarly, in Gardner, the Sixth Circuit found apparent authority to consent to the search of a cell phone; there, the consenting party knew the phone’s passcode and provided that passcode to the police (in that case, the party also possessed the phone at the time of the search and used it). 887 F.3d at 784–85; see also United States v. Wright, 838 F.3d 880, 887–88 (7th Cir. 2016) (desktop computer); United States v. Thomas, 818 F.3d 1230, 1241–42 (11th Cir. 2016) (similar); cf. Smith v. State, 530 S.W.2d 827, 832–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (homicide victim’s surviving spouse had “sufficient relationship to the premises and effects” after victim’s death to consent to search of victim’s residence), overruled in part on other grounds by Comer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). This case too, with its particular facts, satisfies the reasonableness test. As explained, based on the facts known to Crain at the time, Rhonda’s mother was not a stranger, landlord, or mere bystander. She was the victim’s mother, a close family member, who supplied the passcode enabling the officers to access the recording. Nor was this just a phone that happened to be sitting on the premises (or a phone near Rhonda with unknown contents). Rhonda, the victim, had apparently activated 20 the recording on her phone to preserve a contemporaneous account of the events that culminated in her death. From Crain’s view, and under these circumstances, Rhonda’s mother demonstrated a concrete connection to the phone by supplying the correct passcode to the police. And, as the trial court found, which was supported, Rhonda’s mother did this so the officers could “get into” the phone (and thus access the recording). Under these circumstances, and consistent with “widely shared social expectations,” an objectively reasonable officer could conclude that Rhonda’s mother had authority to authorize access to the phone—and to the recording that her daughter created immediately before her death (which was the subject of the motion to suppress). In Gonzalez, the wife’s knowledge and use of the passcode reasonably conveyed authority to consent. 608 S.W.3d at 105–06. So too here. Here, Rhonda’s mother’s ability to unlock her daughter’s phone, coupled with the surrounding circumstances, reasonably signaled to Crain that Rhonda’s mother consented and had authority to do so. See id.; see also Limon, 340 S.W.3d at 756–77 (apparent authority turns on whether the officer’s belief is objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances and social expectations). Appellant argues that even if Rhonda’s mother had authority to consent, her consent could not override his refusal under Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006). But Appellant does not argue, nor does the record show, that officers asked 21 Appellant for permission to search the pink cell phone, much less that Appellant expressly refused consent to search that device. So that caselaw is inapposite.7 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and considering the facts known to Investigator Crain at the time, the record supports the conclusion that Crain reasonably believed Rhonda’s mother consented to law enforcement’s access at issue to the phone and possessed apparent authority to do so. See Limon, 340 S.W.3d at 756; Hubert, 312 S.W.3d at 560–61. Accordingly, the officers acted pursuant to a reasonable belief in valid consent when they accessed the phone using the passcode Rhonda’s mother supplied and obtained the recording 7 Appellant also contends that the warrantless search violated Article 18.0215 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But Appellant did not raise that complaint in the trial court, so it is not preserved for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Resendez v. State, 306 S.W.3d 308, 312–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see also Griffin v. State, __ S.W.3d __, __, No. 05-24-00987-CR, 2025 WL 3619439, at *4–5 (Tex. App.— Dallas Dec. 12, 2025, pet. ref’d) (defendant failed to preserve complaint under Article 18B.354 because his trial objection challenged the warrant generally and did not alert the trial court to the alleged statutory deficiency). Moreover, Article 18.0215 does not apply here. By its plain terms, the statute governs the search of a person’s cell phone conducted “pursuant to a lawful arrest.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 18.0215(a); Martinez v. State, 689 S.W.3d 30, 36 n.12 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2024, pet. ref’d) (explaining that Article 18.0215 “applies to a search of a person’s cell phone in the search-incident-to-arrest scenario” and did not apply there because “the phone was not searched incident to [defendant’s] arrest”); see also State v. Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d 122, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (under Article 18.0215, “to search a person’s cell phone after a lawful arrest, a peace officer must submit an application for a warrant to a magistrate” (emphasis added)). Here, officers did not search the cell phone at issue pursuant to Appellant’s arrest; rather, as discussed, they recovered the phone from the homicide scene after discovering it next to Rhonda’s hand; they later searched it pursuant to their understanding of her mother’s consent. See Martinez, 689 S.W.3d at 35–36 & n.12. 22 that is the subject of the motion to suppress. The trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress as to the search. We overrule Appellant’s second issue. CONCLUSION We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Jennifer Caughey Justice Panel consists of Justices Caughey, Johnson, and Dokupil. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 23