Full Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo No. 07-26-00114-CR LEE MARVIN RAINS, APPELLANT V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE On Appeal from the 90th District Court Young County, Texas1 Trial Court No. CR12554, Honorable Phillip C. Gregory, Presiding November 16, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER, C.J., and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ. Appellant, Lee Marvin Rains, appeals from his conviction by jury of the offense of compelling prostitution of a person under the age of 182 and the resulting life sentence.3 He challenges his conviction through one issue by which he argues the trial court erred 1 Because this matter was transferred from the Second Court of Appeals, we apply its precedent when it conflicts with that of the Seventh Court of Appeals. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. 2 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 43.05 (describing offense). 3 The indictment included enhancement provisions, both of which were found true. in failing to hold a hearing on his motion for new trial. We affirm the judgment and modify the Bill of Cost. BACKGROUND The underlying case was tried in a small Texas town in which a number of people knew one another. The State’s case relied primarily on the testimony of complainant K.K., a teenager under the age of 17, who testified Appellant provided her drugs in exchange for sex. Other evidence of Appellant’s guilt consisted of Facebook messages between Appellant and K.K. spanning three months, none of which explicitly mentioned sex. Most of the messages indicated K.K. was requesting Percocet pills, snacks, and drinks. Following the guilty verdict, Appellant discovered a seated juror concealed potentially material information during voir dire. The juror ostensibly failed to disclose that: (1) his cousin had dated and lived with K.K.’s mother and (2) the juror knew Appellant because another family member worked with him at an auto parts shop and both Appellant and this relative attended sex offender treatment classes together. When the State asked during voir dire if anyone knew K.K. or her mother, the juror remained silent. After the verdict, the juror confirmed to defense counsel he knew Appellant, noting it was a small town. The juror left and requested that counsel not send an investigator to speak with him. Thereafter, defense counsel asked the judge to question the juror prior to the punishment phase. The judge did not do so, allegedly incorrectly stating she had already questioned the juror about his criminal past during voir dire. Appellant filed a motion for new trial supported by counsel’s affidavit setting forth the juror’s admissions and affidavits 2 from two courtroom observers who saw the juror laugh with other jurors during the punishment phase of trial. The motion was overruled by operation of law without a hearing. ANALYSIS By his sole issue, Appellant argues a defendant is entitled to a hearing on a motion for new trial when the motion, supported by affidavit, raises matters not determinable from the record and shows reasonable grounds for relief. He notes juror concealment of material relationships with parties is a recognized ground for a new trial as it denies a defendant the opportunity to exercise challenges and to obtain an impartial jury. He claims his motion presented extrinsic evidence through affidavits from people with direct knowledge and established reasonable grounds showing he could be entitled to relief. Therefore, he posits, the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing on his motion. By this appeal, he seeks reversal and remand to the trial court to hold such a hearing. Lack of Presentment and Failure to Request a Hearing The State contends, and we agree, Appellant (1) failed to satisfy his burden to show the motion for new trial was actually presented to the trial court and (2) failed to request a hearing on his motion. Appellant’s attorney’s certificate of presentment attached to the motion for new trial provided: By signature above, I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing has been delivered to the Office for the 90th Judicial District Court of Young County, on this the 14th day, of December 2025. 3 The State argues the certificate of presentment in this case is nearly identical to those deemed insufficient in other cases decided by the Second Court of Appeals. Because this case was transferred to this Court from the Second Court of Appeals, we must apply its precedent. See Mitschke v. Borromeo, 645 S.W.3d 251, 258 (Tex. 2002). The Second Court of Appeals has stated that to preserve an issue by motion for new trial, a defendant must present the motion to the trial court. Moore v. State, No. 02- 10-00398-CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 6860, at *12–13 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 25, 2011, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 21.6). The defendant cannot merely file the motion for new trial but must ensure that the trial court has actual notice of the motion. Id. (citing Richardson v. State, 328 S.W.3d 61, 72 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. ref’d)). The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the term “present” in this context means that the record must show the movant for a new trial sustained the burden of actually delivering the motion to the trial court or otherwise bringing the motion to the attention or actual notice of the trial court. Id. (citing Stokes v. State, 277 S.W.3d 20, 21–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)). This can be accomplished in several ways, including, for example, obtaining the trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial. Id. at *13. Presentment may also be shown by indication in the record of “the judge’s signature or notation on a proposed order or by a hearing date set on the docket.” Cox v. State, No. 02-07-00414-CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 8026, at *7–8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 23, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). See also Burrus v. State, 266 S.W.3d 107, 115 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.). The defendant bears the burden to demonstrate proper presentment has occurred. Id. 4 Like in Moore and Cox and other cases in the Second Court, the only indication that the trial court had actual notice of Appellant’s motion for new trial appears on the face of the motion where appellate counsel certified that it was delivered to the trial court. “A party’s certification obviously cannot be attributed to the trial court or to someone authorized by the trial court. Given the precedents from the court of criminal appeals, we cannot rely upon appellate counsel’s certification, standing alone, to show that Appellant has met his burden to prove that the motion was actually presented.” Moore, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 6860, at *14. See also Cox, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 8026, at *10 (finding a self-serving certificate of presentment was insufficient to establish the trial court received actual notice of the appellant’s motion for new trial). The record shows there is no acknowledgement of the motion for new trial in the trial court docket sheet or elsewhere in the record. We note also there is no indication Appellant requested a hearing on his motion for new trial. To preserve a complaint that the trial court erred by not having a hearing, a defendant must first request one. Fields v. State, Nos. 02-24-00066-CR, 02-24-00067- CR, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 2497, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 10, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Appellant’s motion for new trial states: For the foregoing reasons, in the event a reconsideration of the evidence and reconsidering of the Mistrial request or even the reduction of the sentence and for such other reasons that may arise on the hearing of this Motion, Defendant requests a new trial. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant prays that the Court set aside the judgment of conviction entered in this cause and order a new trial on the merits on the issue referenced herein which was improper and learned of following the trial or occurring after the evidence was closed in LEE MARVIN RAINS proceeding. 5 Nothing here or elsewhere in the record includes a request for a hearing on the motion for new trial. And, we find no evidence Appellant attempted to obtain the trial court’s ruling on the motion. See id. (finding complaint not preserved when the appellant failed to show he presented his motion for new trial or that he requested a hearing); Moore, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 6860, at *14 (finding no indication the appellant requested a hearing when there was no fiat for setting a hearing and no other evidence the appellant tried to obtain a ruling on the motion). In his reply brief, Appellant argues the trial court had been apprised of the situation concerning the juror’s failure to acknowledge the relationship with the family and Appellant, had addressed it on the record, and “pointed counsel to the post-verdict investigation that produced the motion.” Therefore, he claims, the purpose of presentment, i.e., to inform the trial court a motion is pending and a defendant desires action on it, was served in this case. However, Appellant does not point this Court to any authority supporting such a position. Further, while the situation here might show the trial court’s actual knowledge of the events leading to the motion, we cannot say this satisfies the rule requiring presentment of the motion for new trial to the trial court, particularly given the stance of the Second Court of Appeals on the issue. To do so would, in effect, negate the presentment rule. We find the record is insufficient to show Appellant presented his motion for new trial to the trial court or that he requested a hearing on his motion. Accordingly, Appellant failed to preserve his issue for our review. Fields, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 2497, at *11. 6 Modification of Bill of Cost While not raised by Appellant, the Bill of Cost shows a time payment fee of $15.00 assessed against him. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that a time payment fee like that imposed here “must indeed be struck for being prematurely assessed because a defendant’s appeal suspends the duty to pay court costs and therefore suspends the running of the clock for the purposes of the time payment fee.” Dulin v. State, 620 S.W.3d 129, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). “As a consequence, even now, assessment of the time payment fee in this case would be premature because appellate proceedings are still pending.” Id. Accordingly, pursuant to Dulin, we strike the time payment fee and modify the Bill of Cost. CONCLUSION We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The Bill of Cost is modified to delete the time payment fee. The district clerk is directed to prepare and file an Amended Bill of Cost reflecting the modification made herein and provide copies to this Court, Appellant, and the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. This modification order extends to any orders to withdraw funds from Appellant’s inmate account. Alex Yarbrough Justice Do not publish. 7