R C Curtis v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-25-00495-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG R C CURTIS, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. ON APPEAL FROM THE 187TH DISTRICT COURT OF BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Silva and Cron Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina Appellant R C Curtis was convicted of capital murder, a capital felony. 1 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03(A)(2). He was sentenced to life imprisonment. By one issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient. We affirm. 1 This appeal was transferred to this Court from the Fourth Court of Appeals pursuant to a docket- equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001.  I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW In a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence and reasonable inferences from that evidence. Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 898–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). Sufficient evidence exists if “the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable based upon the cumulative force of all the evidence when considered in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The fact finder is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight to be given to their testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. We measure the sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). As charged in this case and under a hypothetically correct jury charge, a person commits capital murder if he commits murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit aggravated sexual assault or robbery. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a)(1); see also Bess v. State, No. AP-76377, 2013 WL 827479, at *9 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 6, 2013) (mem. op., not designated for publication). A person commits the offense of murder if he “intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(a)(1). A person commits aggravated sexual assault when he intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of the person’s mouth with his sexual organ without consent and if “the victim is an elderly individual.” Id. § 22.021(a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(2)(C). A 2 person who is sixty-five years of age or older is an elderly individual. Id. § 22.04, 22.021(b)(2). Aggravated sexual assault is without consent if “the actor compels the other person to submit or participate by the use of physical force” or violence. Id. § 22.021(c); see id. § 22.011(b)(1). “Robbery requires that a person, in the course of committing theft, and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, ‘intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.’” Gatten v. State, 729 S.W.3d 404, 417 (Tex. App.—Austin 2025, pet. ref’d) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE § 29.02(a)). A person commits theft if he unlawfully appropriates property with the intent to deprive the owner of the property. TEX. PENAL CODE § 31.03(a). II. THE EVIDENCE On October 21, 2015, Paula Mendez Boyd was unexpectedly absent from her job at a local grocery store, so her manager went to her residence at approximately 3:00 p.m. Boyd did not answer so another HEB employee, Gracie DeWalt, later went to Boyd’s residence, while DeWalt’s ex-husband called 911 to request a welfare check. Raul Tapia, a detective with the San Antonio Police Department (SAPD), testified that on October 21, 2015, he was a patrol officer and was dispatched to Boyd’s apartment. The door was unlocked, and he did not see any damage to the front door or sign of a struggle. Detective Tapia testified that Boyd was deceased and found “completely naked,” and there was blood on her face. Pictures of Boyd taken by SAPD employee Steven Bratina were admitted during Detective Tapia’s testimony. The medical examiner, William McClain, M.D., concluded that Boyd, who was a seventy-five-year-old individual, died as a result of homicide. During his testimony, the State published pictures of Boyd’s injuries to the jury while Dr. McClain explained them. 3 Dr. McClain stated, “[I]t was obvious that [Boyd] had sustained multiple traumatic injuries to the face and neck.” Dr. McClain noted several injuries including “hemorrhages on each eye.” Boyd had a contusion on her forehead “that sort of appeared at the hairline where the hair and the forehead meet on the upper left side.” Dr. McClain noted, “[S]he’s got the trauma to the eyeball and the eyelid as well indicating a blow that went directly to the eye.” Boyd had a fracture and “a small laceration” to the nasal bridge. Dr. McClain stated, “[T]he left side of the upper lip was split open, a large laceration or tearing of the inside of the lip in what’s called the Vermilion border, sort of where the skin and the lip meet,” which “was just shredded with a large degree of laceration.” According to Dr. McClain, “The lower lip also had full thickness laceration across that Vermilion border and onto the inner surface,” and Boyd had an abrasion on the chin. There were many more abrasions and injuries on her face. Dr. McClain said, “It’s clear that there has been blunt impact to the face,” which means someone either used “a heavy object with more of less dual surface, baseball bat, fist, boots, a variety of objects” to strike Boyd in the face or caused Boyd to strike another object such as the floor. Dr. McClain said, “The skin has been scraped by a blunt object of some sort combined with the bruising on the neck and petechia on the eyes, these are all injuries consistent with a strangulation or compression of the neck.” Dr. McClain opined that Boyd’s numerous injuries resulted from “[b]lunt impact to the face, to the neck, to the upper chest as well as compression or strangulation with compression of the neck structures.” Dr. McClain noted that Boyd had “lacerations or tears of the . . . internal jugular veins at their interior regions close to where they come out of the neck. Both of those had been torn.” Boyd’s “vertebrae that you can sort of feel, most prominent one 4 there at the bottom of the neck going down your back . . . had been fractured” and “[a]long with that fracture, you have spinal cord that passes through that was also wholly transected or torn completely through,” which would have caused Boyd to “have been paralyzed from the lower neck down . . . from the shoulders down.” Boyd suffered eight rib fractures on the left side of her body and seven on the right side, which would have been caused by “[a] heavy force [that] was directed onto her chest that compressed the center of her chest inward and caused those ribs then to buckle and fracture.” Boyd had hemorrhages on her left hand consistent with “[a] blunt impact of some sort. So either striking an object or a hard object striking the hand,” which “are often referred to as defensive-type wounds or . . . wounds that are sustained when somebody sort of in combat with another person.” The injuries were numerous throughout her body and face. Dr. McClain stated he obtained samples for a sexual assault kit, “which involves pubic hair combings and pulled known pubic hairs, same with scalp hair, and then swabs and smears are created from the oral cavity, the vaginal cavity and the rectal cavity.” Dr. McClain believed that based on the reported level of rigidity and the nature of the lividity, which is the pooling of blood closest to the area that touches the ground, Boyd had been deceased “in the order of an hour, two hours up to maybe six hours to get to this point, maybe even eight hours considering [the conditions]. So that’s the far end but it’s more likely in that six-hour range or even a little less.” Brenda Boyd Perez, Boyd’s daughter, testified that appellant was married to Boyd’s granddaughter, Erica Bustos, whose mother is Boyd’s other daughter, Marissa Bustos. Perez stated that she shared a Wells Fargo Bank (WF) account with Boyd. On October 21, 2015, Perez learned of Boyd’s death. On October 22, 2015, Perez went to 5 Boyd’s apartment and encountered an SAPD detective, Randal Hines, who informed Perez that Boyd had been murdered. When Perez eventually entered Boyd’s apartment to collect her belongings, she discovered that Boyd’s purse was missing. Richard Richardson, a retired detective with the SAPD, testified that he interviewed appellant, and a portion of a video recording of the interview was admitted into evidence. Appellant told Detective Richardson that he last saw Boyd at her apartment on “October 1st or the 2nd,” 2015. Detective Richardson asked if Boyd had ever given anything to appellant. Appellant replied, “Nah, she gave us food and stuff.” Appellant answered, “No” when Detective Richardson asked, “if there was any reason for him to have [Boyd’s] credit or debit cards.” Appellant further stated that there was no reason that his DNA would be on Boyd’s body. In the video, appellant informed Detective Richardson that on October 21, 2015, he drove his wife and children to school in the morning. Appellant stated that at “[t]hree o’clock,” he stopped at a convenience store on the corner of Wurzbach and Huebner, got gas, and went inside to check the balance of his Chase Bank (CB) account “unemployment card.” Appellant explained that he would swipe the card at an ATM to check if he received his benefits. When asked if his CB records would show that he swiped his CB card at the store on Huebner, appellant answered, “Yes, sir.” Detective Richardson testified that State’s Exhibit 62, which includes the records from Boyd’s WF account that she shared with Perez, shows that on October 21, 2015, there was one transaction for “a balance inquiry on the card at an ATM located” on Huebner with “the ATM ID ‘LK 122—29959.” Detective Richardson stated that State’s Exhibit 63, which includes records from appellant’s CB account, confirmed appellant had 6 not made any transactions anywhere on Huebner from his CB account on October 21, 2015. Detective Richardson also took a sample of appellant’s DNA. Detective Hines testified that he was the lead investigator in this case, and he arrived at Boyd’s residence on October 21, 2015, at “around three p.m. give or take a few minutes.” The State reviewed State’s Exhibit 62 with Detective Hines and asked, “[T]he entry here, and what does that say . . . . What does that read?” Detective Hines replied that the entry showed that on October 21, 2015, there was a “non-Wells Fargo ATM balance inquiry fee, [at] 8558 Huebner, San Antonio, Texas, ATM ID Lima kilo 129959” on Boyd’s WF account. Detective Hines reiterated that State’s Exhibit 63 shows that on October 21, 2015, there were no transactions from appellant’s CB account at any store on Huebner. Detective Hines testified that he learned that two individuals, Donald Lee Barnett and David Rocha, had used Boyd’s credit cards on October 22, 2015. Barnett testified that on October 22, 2015, after taking his son to school, he encountered appellant who told him he wanted to buy “[s]ome drugs, methamphetamine.” Barnett stated he then contacted Rocha who provided “a little test sample” of methamphetamine for the men to try, which they did. Barnett said, “[Rocha] asked me if I could take him to Wal-Mart and I was like, ‘Sure.’ So [appellant] gave [Rocha] a [credit] card and we took off.” Barnett testified that appellant stated that the credit card “came from . . . [h]is wife’s purse.” Barnett drove Rocha to Walmart where, according to Barnett, Rocha purchased a television and a watch. Barnett said, “And then I took him to his house and dropped him off and then I went back to [appellant’s] apartment and gave him the card back.” Rocha gave the watch to Barnett “because he couldn’t give [Barnett] no gas money.” Barnett testified he then went to a different Walmart to return the watch, but he 7 did not “receive anything” for the watch because the clerk “put it back on the card that it belonged to.” Barnett then asked appellant for twenty dollars. The State asked, “Did he have the cash?” Barnett said, “No. Shot me the credit card again.” Barnett took the card to a man named “Frank Stacks,” later identified as Frankie Hernandez, who lived in the same vicinity where Rocha lived. Barnett gave Stacks the card for twenty dollars-worth of methamphetamine, and Stacks “said whenever he got done using it [he would] give it back and give [Barnett] a call.” Barnett never saw the card again. Rocha testified that he, Barnett, and appellant used Barnett’s new pipe to inhale some of his “stash” of methamphetamine; Rocha planned to take the stash with him when he left. However, Rocha stated, “[Appellant] grabbed my stash and he didn’t want to let it go. He was like, ‘I need it. I want it’ And he didn’t care how much it was, how much it would cost.” Rocha explained that he did not want to part with the methamphetamine, which was “probably worth 50 bucks.” Nonetheless, appellant agreed to pay Rocha $200. Rocha stated that because appellant did not have money, appellant traded a “debit card that was not in his name” in exchange for the methamphetamine. Rocha testified that at first he was hesitant to take the card. Rocha said, “I told him ‘Bro, I don’t want . . . to sell it,’” and “I asked him about the name. Obviously, it wasn’t his. He said, ‘It’s my mother-in- law’s. It’s all good. There is no problem.’” Rocha said that he took the card and asked appellant for the PIN number, which appellant provided. Rocha testified that Barnett took him to Walmart where he attempted to use the card with the PIN number that appellant provided. However, “it did not work. . . . The PIN” appellant provided “did not work.” According to Rocha, Barnett told him that appellant owed him $100 and asked him to purchase something for him too. After the PIN number did not work, Rocha used it as 8 a credit card to buy a watch for Barnett. He exited the store and gave Barnett the watch. Barnett drove Rocha to another Walmart, where Rocha purchased a TV for $200. Rocha went back to appellant’s residence and did not see the card again. Rocha stated that subsequently he saw that his “face was on the news” in connection to Boyd’s death. Rocha said, “I felt set up. I felt like [appellant] was trying to make me the fall guy by using the card that he had given me, that he had pushed me so hard to use.” Rocha left town in fear for his life. Rocha said, “I feared for my safety and for my family and I skipped town [with my wife and children]” to Florida. Rocha was eventually arrested for using Boyd’s credit card at Walmart. Jamie Pomykal, a forensic scientist with the Bexar County Criminal Investigation Laboratory (BCCIL), testified that she “screen[ed] items of physical evidence for biological material such as blood, semen and saliva, and” she “conduct[ed] DNA analysis on the biological material” to “compare . . . to a strand taken from a person.” Pomykal stated, “So DNA is the protein that codes for all other proteins within your body” that is inherited from the mother and the father, “and it is the transference of all of the protein codes that we have as a human being.” DNA is found in the blood, semen, and saliva. The State asked if it were “possible to develop a profile from a known individual and then compare that known profile . . . to evidence that’s collected out in the field from an unknown person?” Pomykal replied, “Yes.” Pomykal explained, “The purpose of comparison is to inform an agency, or in this case a jury, if someone could potentially be a contributor of the DNA that was found on crime scene evidence.” Pomykal testified that during her examination of the DNA, she generally takes “written or digital notes, so that [she] can keep track of all of [the] testing and items that [are] tested,” and then produces a report from her notes. 9  Pomykal stated that she produced a forensic serology report from “a sexual assault kit” containing oral swabs, oral smears, and fingernail clippings from Boyd. Pomykal also examined buccal swabs taken from appellant. Pomykal also examined buccal swabs from three other men, including Barnett, who were all excluded as contributors of the samples Pomykal tested. Pomykal tested Boyd’s oral swabs for blood and for spermatozoa, “and they were positive for the possible presence of spermatozoa” from an unknown individual. Pomykal tested the sample against appellant’s DNA and said, “R.C. Curtis was not excluded as a source of the human DNA identified on the oral swab tips.” Pomykal acknowledged that based on Detective Hines’s request, she made a supplemental report that the spermatozoa had been found, which had not been included in her initial report. Male DNA was found in Boyd’s fingernail clippings, and Pomykal could not exclude appellant as the contributor of the DNA found under Boyd’s fingernails. Pomykal agreed with the State that in her field, it is consistent “to calculate a probability of finding the profile that you found on those swab tips within a population of individuals of the same racial and ethnic characteristics.” The State asked, “And how is that probability generated?” Pomykal replied, “We generate that probability from a database that has frequencies of genetic markers that have been calculated within a subset of the population. And so we can use that to approximate how often we would expect to observe the profile in the population.” Pomykal said, “So the statistic that’s calculated is based upon the unknown profile that was developed from the oral swab tips. And if I had a population of nine quintillion, 506 quadrillion, I would expect to see that profile one time.” Pomykal explained that a quintillion has “fifteen zeros in the African 10 American statistic.” The State asked, “From all the samples provided, do you have unidentified DNA from your analysis?” Pomykal responded, “No, I don’t.” The State said, “It was either Paula Boyd or [appellant].” Pomykal replied, “That’s correct.” Robert Sailors, a forensic scientist and supervisor in the Forensic Biology Unit of the BCCIL, testified that he performed “what’s called ‘Y-STR analysis’” of the male DNA found on Boyd’s fingernail clippings. Sailors explained that he took DNA extracts created by Pomykal. Sailors said: [A]nd based upon the amount of male DNA that was on those items that she tested, I then subjected those DNA extracts to a process called “PCR” or “polymerase chain reaction” where we use our male Y chromosome- specific primers to target that DNA, and what we’re going to do is we’re going to make copies of each one of those regions from the Y chromosome. And every time we make a copy of it, we’re adding a small fluorescent tag to it so we can detect it. Sailors stated, “My conclusions regarding the left-hand fingernail clippings DNA extract is that [appellant] was not excluded as being a source of the human male DNA identified on that item.” Sailors testified that three other men who provided DNA samples, including Barnett, had been excluded as contributors of the DNA found in the fingernail clippings. Sailors explained how he was “able to assign a certain numerical value as to the amount of people that [he] might see in a certain population that would have the same results” using a database “comprised of 25,643 male individuals” as follows: So since the Y chromosome is passed down from father to son unchanged, it functions as like a lineage marker. You can almost like build a family tree on the male paternal side using the Y chromosome. So, that being said, the—all the males on one paternal line would have the same Y chromosome DNA profile and so it’s different than the other DNA that Ms. Pomykal before me would have testified about which is like unique to each individual with the exception of identical twins. 11  So what we do in this instance is that since the Y chromosome is passed down in its entirety without any shuffling of the DNA and mixing it up, we compare it to a database of male individuals and we look to see how many times have we seen that profile in that database population of individuals. And, you know, based upon the number of observations, that will then get converted into a statistic, even if it’s not ever been observed. If there’s been zero observations in the database, we know the profile exists because I’m looking at it right here in front of me. So we’ll take the number of observations or non-observations and convert it into a—what we call a ’95 percent upper confidence interval number.’” Sailors testified that the DNA profile found on Boyd’s fingernails “was observed zero times in that database.” The State reminded Sailors that he had previously explained that although he had not seen the profile in the database, he knew “it obviously exists” and that he stated that in such circumstance, he still applies “a 95 percent upper confidence interval result.” The State then asked, “[E]xplain how is that calculation done to where you can give a figure in terms of how many times you might see this profile?” Sailors said: So, being that the Y chromosome gets passed down from male—from father to son, it is possible that there are individuals within this database that are related but may not know that. And so to compensate for that and for, you know, sampling—I mean, it’s a sampling of individuals from the population of, you know, 25,000 individuals and we got, you know, a country of, you know, 300 million individuals. So, to account for relatednesses in the database and to account for any issues related to the sampling of the individuals, we apply a 95 percent confidence interval related to how often you would expect to see this profile in a population. And so we would take that zero observations out of 25,643 individuals, convert that into a 95 percent confidence interval, which means that the number that I provide I am 95 percent confident that that is close to the true representation of how often that profile occurs. The State asked, “And based upon that calculation that you did, how often . . . what figure did you come up with?” Sailors replied, “The 99 percent upper confidence interval 12 for this profile compared to the database is equivalent to about one in every 8,621 male individuals.” On cross-examination, Sailors clarified that he “was 95 percent confident that one in every 8,621 individuals is a true representation of that Y chromosome profile that was developed.” The jury found appellant guilty, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. This appeal followed. III. DISCUSSION By his sole issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because the record only “shows” that appellant used Boyd’s bank card after she died and there is nothing in the record supporting “a reasonable inference that” appellant caused Boyd’s death, as the evidence merely showed that Boyd had been beaten and strangled. Appellant points to evidence he argues contradicts the jury’s finding that he committed the crime such as his “hands drew no attention with recent damage, bruising or cuts readily observable when he arrived as part of the welfare check on the complainant,” “[n]o swabbing for DNA was conducted on the throat of the deceased complainant,” Barnett and Rocha were not charged with murder, Detective Hines ordered the DNA forensic examiner who tested the DNA and compared it with appellant’s DNA “to add the word ‘spermatozoa’ to her report and she did so,” and “possession of recently stolen property does not give rise to a presumption of capital murder.” The evidence at trial established that Boyd, who was seventy-five years old, was found naked and deceased on October 21, 2015; she had been beaten and strangled. Police secured her apartment on that day. On October 22, 2015, Perez discovered that Boyd’s purse was missing. 13  Appellant lied when he said that he did not have Boyd’s credit or debit card. See Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“Attempts to conceal incriminating evidence, inconsistent statements, and implausible explanations to the police are probative of wrongful conduct and are also circumstances of guilt.”). When he gave Boyd’s WF card to Rocha to purchase drugs on October 22, 2015, the day after she had been found deceased, appellant acknowledged that the WF card was not his and told Rocha, “It’s all good. There is no problem.” Appellant lied to police when he stated that on October 21, 2015, he used his CB unemployment card at a convenience store on Huebner, and there was a transaction on Boyd’s WF card at a convenience store on Huebner on October 21, 2015. From the cumulative effect of the evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that it was appellant that made the transaction on Boyd’s WF card at the Huebner convenience store on October 21, 2015. See id. at 49 (“Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative effect of all the incriminating facts are sufficient to support the conviction.”). Additionally, the jury could have determined that appellant showed a consciousness of guilt by lying to police about using his CB card at the Huebner store and was attempting to explain his presence at the store. See Torres v. State, 794 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, no pet.) (“A ‘consciousness of guilt’ is perhaps one of the strongest kinds of evidence of guilt. It is consequently a well accepted principle that any conduct on the part of a person accused of a crime subsequent to its commission, which indicates a ‘consciousness of guilt’ may be received as a circumstance tending to prove that he committed the act with which he is charged.” (citation modified)). Finally, Pomykal testified that she could not exclude appellant as the source of the DNA found in the spermatozoa 14 and that if there is “a population of nine quintillion, 506 quadrillion, [which means fifteen zeros, i.e., 9,000,000,000,000,000, from the African American community, she] would expect to see that profile one time.” Pomykal explained she did not have any samples of unidentified DNA from her analysis, and responded, “That’s correct” when the State asked, “It was either Paula Boyd or [appellant].” Sailors testified that he could not exclude appellant as the contributor of the DNA in Boyd’s fingernail clippings, and he “was 95 percent confident that that one in every 8,621 individuals is a true representation of that Y chromosome profile taken” from Boyd. This evidence considered with the other evidence, including among other things, that appellant lied to police and used Boyd’s credit card after her death, supports the jury’s reasonable inference that the DNA found in the spermatozoa taken from Boyd was appellant’s DNA and that the DNA found in her fingernail clippings belonged to appellant. See Hinojosa v. State, 4 S.W.3d 240, 245 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“Despite one in 19,900,000 odds, appellant’s DNA profile matched the semen found in the victim. Contrary to appellant’s argument, these impressive statistics support the jury’s conclusion that appellant, as opposed to some unidentified ‘suspect’ also sharing the same DNA profile, sexually assaulted, kidnapped, and killed Wright.”); see also Coria-Gonzalez v. State, No. 03-18-00645-CR, 2020 WL 465856, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 29, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (explaining “that DNA evidence alone can be legally sufficient to establish the identity of the perpetrator of a crime” and finding the evidence sufficient to support the conviction even though the forensic scientist testified that she could only state that the defendant “‘cannot be excluded as a possible contributor’ to the DNA profile”). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational fact finder could have 15 found the essential elements of the crime of capital murder beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence and reasonable inferences from that evidence. See Whatley, 445 S.W.3d at 166; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 898–99. We overrule appellant’s sole issue. IV. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s judgment. JAIME TIJERINA Chief Justice Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Delivered and filed on the 13th day of August, 2026. 16