Full Opinion

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas 10-25-00387-CR Thomas Aaron Lamb, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee On appeal from the 278th District Court of Walker County, Texas Judge Tracy Sorensen, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 32019 JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court. MEMORANDUM OPINION Thomas Aaron Lamb was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a young child. A jury assessed punishment at life in prison. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. BACKGROUND Molly 1 was only seven years old and in the second grade when she made 1 “Molly” is an alias for the child which was used during trial. an outcry of sexual abuse by her mom’s boyfriend, Lamb. Molly lived with her dad for the school year, visiting her mom every other weekend. During the summer, she spent more time with her mom, sometimes weeks at a time. She was nine years old when she testified against Lamb. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE In his first issue, Lamb contends the trial court erred in denying Lamb’s motion for a directed verdict because, he argues, there was no evidence showing the acts of sexual abuse occurred over a period of 30 days or more. We review an issue complaining about a trial court's failure to grant a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Mills v. State, 440 S.W.3d 69, 71 (Tex. App.—Waco 2012, pet. ref'd). The Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed our standard of review of a sufficiency issue as follows: When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). This standard requires the appellate court to defer "to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 Lamb v. State Page 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage in a "divide and conquer" strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa, 514 S.W.3d at 232. Although juries may not speculate about the meaning of facts or evidence, juries are permitted to draw any reasonable inferences from the facts so long as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial. Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319); see also Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences from the evidence in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution. Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). This is because the jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to the testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a conviction by comparing it to "the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case." Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically correct jury charge is one that "accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried." Id.; see also Daugherty v. State, 387 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The "law as authorized by the indictment" includes the statutory elements of the offense and those elements as modified by the indictment. Daugherty, 387 S.W.3d at 665. Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732-33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). To establish the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child, the State Lamb v. State Page 3 must prove the following elements: (1) the defendant committed two or more acts of sexual abuse—which includes as charged in this case, aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by sexual contact, (2) during a period that is 30 or more days in duration, and (3) at the time of the commission of each of the acts of sexual abuse, the defendant was 17 years of age or older and the victim was a child younger than 14 years of age. TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02(b); see also id. §§ 21.11, 22.021. Lamb only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to the 30 day or more duration element, number (2) above. He does not challenge the evidence supporting any other element. Thus, we confine our discussion of this issue to that element. The testimony showed that Molly asserted the sexual abuse by Lamb occurred when she was seven years old. Molly’s mom moved to an RV park/trailer house on May 19, 2023 shortly after Molly’s seventh birthday. Lamb moved in a few months later but had been coming to the residence as soon as the mom moved in. Between her forensic interview and her testimony at trial, Molly disclosed two instances of abuse by Lamb at the RV/trailer. Molly’s mom then moved to a green or white house on December 1, 2023 and lived there until June of 2024. Again, between her forensic interview and her testimony at trial, Molly disclosed seven instances of abuse by Lamb at the Lamb v. State Page 4 green/white house with one more instance disclosed during her SANE exam occurring at an unnamed location. On April 4, 2024, Molly made an outcry of sexual abuse by Lamb to a school employee. Lamb contends the State failed to present any evidence that the acts of sexual abuse occurred over a period of 30 days. He faults the State for failing to obtain testimony from Molly at least as to the time of the year or other “reference point that might be familiar to a nine-year-old child in the fourth grade.” He asserts that the acts could have occurred within 30 days, and because of the State’s failure, the jury inappropriately speculated that the acts occurred beyond the required time period. We agree that the State is required to prove that acts of sexual abuse occurred “during a period that is 30 or more days in duration.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02(b)(1). In other words, there must be some proof, circumstantial or direct, that the last act of sexual abuse occurred on at least the twenty-ninth day after the day of the first act, although the exact dates of the abuse need not be proven. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02(b); Garrett v. State, 693 S.W.3d 490, 496 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, pet. ref'd); Turner v. State, 573 S.W.3d 455, 461 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019, no pet.). However, in this case, Molly was only seven years old and in the second grade when the abuse occurred, and courts “give wide latitude to the testimony of child sexual abuse Lamb v. State Page 5 victims.” Garrett, 693 S.W.3d at 496-97, quoting Turner, 573 S.W.3d at 459. Further, “a child victim's description of what happened and when it occurred need not be expressed with the same level of sophistication and detail that an adult might use.” Id. Further, Lamb’s argument on appeal disregards the applicable standard of review. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Viewed in that light and based on the testimony, the jury could reasonably infer that the first act of sexual abuse occurred as early as May 19, 2023 when Molly and her mom moved to the RV/trailer with Lamb visiting regularly and then moving in a few months later. Likewise, the jury could reasonably infer that the last instance of sexual abuse occurred as late as April 4, 2024, when Molly made her outcry and after she and her mom and Lamb had been living together at the green/white house since December of 2023. This is especially compelling since Lamb had less access to Molly at the green/white house during the school year, which was limited to every other weekend, thus making it less likely that Lamb could have committed all the offenses at that house within 30 days. Further, even if the jury had believed that Molly delayed in her outcry, as Lamb posits, it still could have reasonably determined that the first and last instances of sexual abuse occurred during “a period that is thirty or more days in duration.” See TEX. PENAL CODE Lamb v. State Page 6 § 21.02(b). Accordingly, because the evidence supports a reasonable inference and conclusion by the jury that Lamb committed two or more acts of sexual abuse over a period of thirty or more days, the evidence is sufficient to support Lamb’s conviction. See Garrett v. State, 693 S.W.3d 490, 496 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, pet. ref'd); Turner v. State, 573 S.W.3d 455, 461 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 2019, no pet.). Lamb’s first issue is overruled. PAROLE INSTRUCTION In his second issue, Lamb contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that he was ineligible for parole. Subsection 4(a) of article 37.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that, with certain exceptions, in the punishment phase of a felony trial, a trial court must instruct a jury in writing about a defendant's parole eligibility. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.07, § 4(a); Love v. State, 706 S.W.3d 584, 612 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, pet. ref'd). As one of the noted exceptions, the parole instruction is not required for offenses arising under section 21.02 of the Penal Code, Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Young Child. See id.; TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02. Subsection 508.145(a)(2) of the Texas Government Code also provides that inmates serving sentences for continuous sexual abuse are not eligible for release on parole. See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 508.145(a)(2); Love, 706 S.W.3d at 612. Lamb v. State Page 7 Lamb has not pointed us to any authority, and we have found none, for the proposition that a trial court errs by failing to instruct the jury on parole ineligibility in a trial for continuous sexual abuse of a young child. Accordingly, because there is case authority which holds to the contrary of Lamb’s proposition, we conclude that the trial court's failure to include such an instruction in the written charge was not error. See Love, 706 S.W.3d at 612 (failure to include parole instruction not error). See also Cross v. State, No. 09- 11-00406-CR, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 10487 at *13 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 19, 2012, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same). Lamb’s second issue is overruled. CONCLUSION Having overruled each of Lamb’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. LEE HARRIS Justice OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: October 29, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Harris, and Justice Westerfeld Affirmed Do Not Publish CRPM Lamb v. State Page 8