James Leonard Tansimore v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed September 24, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-24-00250-CR __________ JAMES LEONARD TANSIMORE, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 39th District Court Haskell County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 7144 MEMORANDUM OPINION The jury convicted James Leonard Tansimore of aggravated kidnapping and assessed his punishment at confinement for ninety years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and a fine of $10,000. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20.04(a)(4), (5) (West 2026). Appellant challenges his conviction and sentence in three issues. In his first issue, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. In his second issue, he asserts that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his prior convictions without proper authentication. In his third issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to recuse the Haskell County District Attorney’s Office. We affirm. Background Facts Yvonne Paulette Hagle testified that she and Appellant were “lovers, friends” and at the time of the incident, the two lived together on-and-off for approximately three years in Munday. Hagle had a vehicle, but Appellant did not. When Hagle needed to get to work, Appellant would use her vehicle to drop her off and then take it to “do what he needed to.” On March 23, 2021, Appellant dropped Hagle off for her shift at Haskell Healthcare at 2:00 p.m. She clocked out at 10:00 p.m., the end of her shift, but Appellant did not pick her up until 10:40 p.m. Hagle was angry at Appellant for arriving late because she had a shift that began the next morning at 5:45 a.m. The two had a verbal altercation in the vehicle and Appellant eventually told Hagle that she “wasn’t going to talk s--t to him because [she] had ruined his life.” When Hagle asked how she had ruined his life, Appellant claimed that she had contributed to him having to cut short a court settlement related to a previous lawsuit. Appellant pulled the vehicle onto a dirt road behind Haskell Healthcare and told Hagle to get out. Both she and Appellant got out of the vehicle and continued arguing. Hagle stated that Appellant was drinking Budweiser and smoking Marlboro Menthol cigarettes at that time. Eventually, the two got back in the vehicle and Appellant drove toward Munday. Appellant told Hagle that she was “going to die,” and he continued to make similar threats as they drove down the highway. Hagle testified that this terrified her. Appellant eventually turned off onto a dirt road outside of Weinert, a town between Haskell and Munday, and pulled over. Hagle testified that Appellant told her she was going to die that night. Appellant then told Hagle to get out of the 2 vehicle and get into the trunk. She refused, and Appellant told her that she would either get in willingly or he would force her into the trunk. When she continued to resist, Appellant began trying to force Hagle into the trunk, resulting in several injuries to her face, neck, and chest. Ultimately, Hagle complied and got into the trunk, but when she heard Appellant getting back into the vehicle, she pulled the safety latch inside the trunk and got out. She began running toward the main road looking for passing vehicles, and Appellant put the vehicle in reverse and backed up rapidly, attempting to run her over. Hagle stepped out of the way to avoid being hit, and Appellant got out of the vehicle, chased her down, and hit her in the back of the head. Hagle fell to the ground, and as she was trying to get up, Appellant began pulling her back to the vehicle by her hair and scrubs. As she fell, she sustained injuries to her knee and hand, and Appellant pulled a large amount of hair out of the top of her head as he dragged her back to the vehicle. An intense struggle ensued when Appellant attempted to throw Hagle in the trunk again, and she did everything she could to stay out of the trunk. Hagle hit the left side of her head on the trunk, resulting in a knot, and she incurred bruising to her leg and arm. After getting Hagle into the trunk again, Appellant shut the lid and drove off. Hagle stated that she could hear the difference between the dirt road and when Appellant reached the paved road again, and he continued to drive for an unknown amount of time. She testified that she was terrified that she would die in the trunk, and she feared that someone might not be able to find her. Appellant eventually came to a stop outside of Weinert at a construction site, and when he let Hagle out of the trunk, he told her that the location was “not a good enough place to kill [her].” Appellant then stated that he was going to take her to Spencer, Oklahoma to a “hog farm” where he would cut her into pieces, feed her to the hogs, and burn her vehicle. At that time, Appellant was holding a silver pocketknife. He then made Hagle get 3 back into the vehicle, but he allowed her to ride in the front passenger seat. At that time, she was bleeding from the right side of her face. They continued driving toward Munday, but Appellant kept telling Hagle that he was taking her to Spencer, Oklahoma. At one point, Hagle reached for the door handle, and Appellant said, “[b]---h, you make one more move toward[] that handle and it’ll end right here or I’ll kill you.” Appellant had the knife in his hand at that time, and he continually poked Hagle in her leg with it. Noticing that they were running low on gas, Hagle told Appellant that they would not be able to make it, but he told her to stop telling him what he could and could not do. She testified that when they reached Munday, it first appeared that Appellant was going to continue driving through, but he suddenly turned and began driving toward the Munday Nursing Center, where she had formerly worked. As they approached, Appellant said to Hagle, “B---h, I wonder if I stab you to where you can barely breathe if your ex-coworkers will find you in time to save you.” Hagle testified that Appellant eventually drove to her apartment, and after they arrived, he dragged her out of the vehicle by her hair and took her through the back door of the apartment. Once inside, Appellant stripped Hagle of her clothes, took her to the shower, and washed the blood from her. Appellant told Hagle that he was sorry, and he messed up. When Hagle attempted to get dressed after the shower, Appellant stopped her because “if [she] put clothes on then [she] could just run out the front door.” Hagle testified that she “just sat there with no clothes on.” She was unaware of what time it was because Appellant had her phone. Hagle eventually laid in the bed but did not sleep, and sometime later, Appellant entered the room saying, “those white folks aren’t going to let you leave that job like this” with respect to her appearance from his assault upon her. When Hagle’s alarm went off at 4:45 a.m., she got up, showered, dressed, and left for Haskell at approximately 5:15 a.m. Appellant told Hagle before she left that 4 it was going to be a bad day for him, once again noting that they were not going to let her leave work with all the bruises that she had. After Hagle left, she stopped for gas at an Allsup’s in Munday located approximately four blocks from her apartment. Hagle did not tell the clerk about what had happened because she was unsure if the police could arrive before Appellant, and she knew the doors at the Allsup’s did not lock. She stated that she felt that if she could make it to Haskell, it would be very unlikely that Appellant would be able to reach her without a vehicle or friends to call on. While at Allsup’s, Appellant called and told her to come pick him up. When she declined to do so, he told her that he saw that she was at Allsup’s. Hagle then hung up the phone and drove to her workplace in Haskell. When she arrived, her coworker noticed her condition, asked her to go into a separate room, and inquired about what happened; after Hagle recounted the story, the coworker took photos of her injuries. After her supervisors arrived at the office, she called the police to report the incident. Sheriff David Halliburton and Deputy Christopher Keith responded to Haskell Healthcare after receiving the call regarding a possible assault. When they arrived, Hagle was taken to a room inside the nursing home, where Deputy Keith interviewed her and later obtained a written statement. They observed injuries to her head, including a knot, a scratch, and an abrasion to her right knee, and took photos of her injuries. Hagle told them that Appellant was the person who had assaulted her and recounted the story from the previous night. Hagle described to Sheriff Halliburton and Deputy Keith how Appellant had picked her up from her shift and driven toward Munday before pulling off onto a county road between Haskell and Weinert. Sheriff Halliburton drove from Haskell to Weinert pulling onto each county road to determine where Appellant had stopped. When he pulled onto County Road 266, he observed evidence suggesting that a vehicle had pulled in and stopped, and that the occupants had gotten out. The sheriff 5 took photographs of the scene that showed tire marks, disturbed gravel, and footprints. Sheriff Halliburton also found a Budweiser tall boy and a package of Marlboro cigarettes at the scene on County Road 266, both consistent with what Hagle said Appellant had consumed that night. After leaving the county road, Sheriff Halliburton continued to drive toward Weinert, and he observed construction equipment on a side road. When he investigated the area, he observed tire marks indicating that a vehicle had pulled in and out of that area. The officers also investigated Hagle’s vehicle and found handprints from someone grabbing or pulling away from the trunk. Inside the trunk, they found clothing and other items with droplets of blood on them. They also observed a small smear of blood on the front passenger seat. When Appellant was arrested the day after Hagle’s report, Deputy Keith found a silver pocketknife in his possession. After his arrest, Hagle obtained a protective order against Appellant, and an investigation of his violations of that protective order showed that Appellant had contacted or attempted to contact Hagle on over 200 separate occasions. Hagle testified that Appellant continuously called and “harassed” her because he did not want her to testify in the case. She stated that Appellant’s prior attorney, Jacob Blizzard, 1 called her five or six times requesting to speak with her. Hagle eventually called Blizzard back because she was “tired of being harassed.” An audio recording of the phone call between Hagle and Blizzard was played for the jury. At the beginning of the call, Blizzard stated that Hagle had told his staff member that she did not want Appellant to go to prison, but that she also did not want to get in trouble or lose her nursing license. Hagle confirmed that she had said this. She 1 Jacob Blizzard filed a motion to withdraw as counsel prior to trial, which the trial court granted. The trial court appointed David Stiller to represent Appellant seven days later. Stiller ultimately represented Appellant at trial. 6 asked Blizzard whether the State could file charges against her for making a false statement, and he told her that they could but generally do not. Hagle stated that she loved Appellant, that he had a special place in her heart, and that she never wished for him to go to prison. When Blizzard asked for “the real deal” regarding what happened, she explained that Appellant would often get upset over small things, and the evening of the incident, they got into an argument. She stated that she attempted to hit Appellant, and when he tried to block her blow, he scratched her on her face. She stated that she could not recall how she got the knot on her head, but it could have been accidentally self-inflicted as she got out of the vehicle. Blizzard asked her about the details of the knife and the trunk, and Hagle responded, “What do you want me to say?” Blizzard said he just wanted her to tell him “the real deal.” To explain how the blood evidence ended up in the trunk, she stated that she bled easily and must have put the coat with the blood on it from the scratch on her face inside the trunk the next day. When asked if Appellant ever threw her in the trunk or tried to run her over with the vehicle, Hagle said “no.” Blizzard asked her about the allegation that Appellant had been driving and poking her with the knife, and Hagle responded that she did not know what to say at that point because she felt like she was going to get in a lot of trouble. When asked what she meant, Hagle stated only that she had “heard so many, so much stuff” and wanted the case to be dropped. She then said that Appellant had the knife out that night, but he never stabbed her with it. When asked about the threats to kill her, Hagle stated that he had just said it once before. Blizzard asked about the “shower business,” and Hagle said she was still bleeding when they made it home, so Appellant was attempting to help her clean it off. When asked about how her report to police was initiated, Hagle stated that her friend from work had known about their argument the previous night, and when 7 she saw Hagle’s injuries the next morning, the friend told her that she needed to call the police. Blizzard asked why she ultimately decided to speak to the police, and Hagle said that her injuries had drawn the attention of many people at work. Blizzard stated, “By that point, I guess you’ve decided to kind of make it bigger than it is,” and Hagle responded, “yes, sir.” At one point during the call, Hagle asked Blizzard if he was recording her, and he said “no” that he was “just taking notes.” Hagle admitted during her testimony at trial that she made statements that gave Blizzard the idea that the incident did not happen. Analysis Sufficiency of the Evidence In his first issue, Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated kidnapping. He asserts that the State failed to present evidence establishing that he secreted or held the victim in a place where she was unlikely to be found. In this regard, the indictment alleged that, with the intent to inflict bodily injury and terrorize Hagle, Appellant intentionally and knowingly abducted her by restricting her movements “without her consent, so as to interfere substantially with her liberty by moving her from one place to another and confining her with intent to prevent her liberation, by secreting or holding her in a place where she was not likely to be found.” Appellant challenges the element of abduction. Additionally, Appellant claims that the victim’s testimony at trial was compromised by the audio recording of her recantation, and therefore, the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all 8 of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, including pieces of evidence that may have been improperly admitted. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the factfinder’s role as the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight witness testimony is to be afforded. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. This standard accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as defined in a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically correct jury charge is one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id. We first address Appellant’s contention that the State did not adduce evidence of the element of abduction to establish aggravated kidnapping. As relevant to this appeal, a person commits the offense of aggravated kidnapping “if he intentionally or knowingly abducts another person with the intent to . . . inflict bodily injury on” or “terrorize” the person. PENAL § 20.04(a)(4), (5). To “[a]bduct” a person “means 9 to restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by secreting or holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found.” Id. § 20.01(2)(a). Appellant contends that the State failed to prove that he secreted or held Hagle in a place where she was not likely to be found because he ultimately took her back to her home. In presenting this argument, Appellant additionally asserts that there is a variance between the indictment and the evidence at trial because the State proved an unalleged method of abduction—restraining a person with the intent to prevent his liberation by “using or threatening to use deadly force.” Id. § 20.01(2)(b). Because we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Appellant secreted or held Hagle in a place where she was not likely to be found, we do not reach Appellant’s contention that there was a variance between the pleading and proof. “‘Restrain’ means to restrict a person’s movements without consent, so as to interfere substantially with the person’s liberty, by moving the person from one place to another or by confining the person.” Id. § 20.01(1). Restraint is “without consent” if “accomplished by . . . force, intimidation, or deception.” Id. § 20.01(1)(A); see Holmes v. State, 873 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, no pet.) (explaining that “[c]onfining is not defined in the Penal Code or by case law; thus, we use its common meaning when reviewing the evidence,” which may include imprisoning, enclosing, detaining, relegating to certain limits, or trapping the victim). Secreting or holding another where they are unlikely to be found is part of the mens rea requirement rather than the actus reus. Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 521 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The State is not required to prove the defendant actually secreted or held another. Id. Instead, the State must prove the defendant restrained another with the specific intent to prevent liberation of the victim. Id. The offense is complete when the defendant, at any time during the restraint, forms 10 the intent to prevent liberation of the victim by secreting or holding them in a place where they are unlikely to be found. Id.; see also Shoetan v. State, No. 08-25-00029- CR, 2026 WL 2096631, at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 10, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized that a rational factfinder can infer the requisite intent “when a defendant isolates a person from anyone who might be of assistance.” Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 522 (citing Fann v. State, 696 S.W.2d 575, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)); see Bertram v. State, 579 S.W.3d 661, 669 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.). In Megas, the court held that “secreting the victim, or holding her in a place where she is not likely to be found, can be established when the defendant forces a victim into a car and moves the victim from one place to another.” Megas v. State, 68 S.W.3d 234, 240 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d). A defendant may also be operating a motor vehicle in public while still intending to secrete the victim or prevent them from being found, which completes the offense of kidnapping. Id.; see Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 522; see also Santos v. State, No. 01-22-00355-CR, 2024 WL 971676, at *6–7 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 7, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Additionally, courts have recognized that, once the defendant forms the intent to secrete or hide the victim inside a vehicle, the offense is complete, and later delivery to a location associated with the victim or occupied by others is irrelevant. See Fann, 696 S.W.2d at 576; see also Rios v. State, 230 S.W.3d 252, 254–55 (Tex. App.— Waco 2007, pet. ref’d); Adkins v. State, No. 01-96-00355-CR, 1998 WL 55267, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 12, 1998, pet. ref’d). Here, there was evidence that Appellant forced Hagle into the trunk of her vehicle multiple times during the duration of their ride from Haskell to Munday. Even when Appellant allowed Hagle to exit the trunk and instructed her to get into the front seat of the vehicle, she testified that he continuously poked her in the leg 11 with a knife during the remainder of the drive. Hagle also testified that, when they finally arrived at her apartment complex, he dragged her from the vehicle, forced her inside, and made her remain naked inside the apartment for the rest of the night to prevent her from leaving. She testified that it was only the next morning that she was permitted to get dressed and leave for work. Upon these facts, a reasonable jury could have found that the element of abduction was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Megas, 68 S.W.3d at 240–41 (holding evidence that the defendant forced complainant into the car and moved them from one place to another supported a finding that defendant intended to secrete or hold the complainant in a place where she was not likely to be found); see also Rios, 230 S.W.3d at 254–55 (holding that evidence the defendant held the complainant in an automobile being driven on city streets was sufficient to support that he intended to secrete or hold her in a place where she was unlikely to be found, even when she was later returned and restrained again in an apartment occupied by her cousin). We also address Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence based on the inconsistent version of events that Hagle recounted during her testimony at trial versus the statements that she made during her recorded phone call with Blizzard. Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient because Hagle’s trial testimony was compromised by the audio recording of her recantation. At trial, Hagle testified to a version of events that was generally consistent with the statement she relayed to the deputy and sheriff on the morning after the incident occurred. Conversely, Appellant presented the audio recording of the phone conversation between Hagle and Blizzard where she stated that the events had not occurred as she had originally told investigating officers. During her trial testimony, Hagle asserted that these statements to Blizzard were lies in an attempt to stop what she felt was harassment from both Blizzard and Appellant. 12  As we have said, we defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the “sole judge” of witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)); see Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. As the sole judge of a witness’s credibility, “the jury can believe all, some, or none of a witness’s testimony.” Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). The jury’s determination to accept Hagle’s version of the events that she described during her trial testimony was a decision based inherently on the jury’s evaluation of her credibility, a decision that is within the jury’s sole province to resolve. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. Under the applicable standard of review, we defer to the jury’s resolution of these questions in support of the conviction. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue. Authentication of Punishment Evidence In his second issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his Oklahoma convictions without appropriate authentication. He asserts that State’s Exhibit No. 39, a document printed from the internet titled “Ok Offender Search,” was not properly authenticated merely because it was shown to be accessible from the Oklahoma Department of Corrections’ website. He further contends that because State’s Exhibit No. 39 was the link tying together Appellant’s alleged prior Oklahoma convictions, State’s Exhibit Nos. 40–42, the corresponding judgments for those convictions, were also not sufficiently linked to Appellant. Ultimately, Appellant’s second issue rests on the admission of State’s Exhibit No. 39 to link the remaining three exhibits demonstrating that the prior convictions belonged to Appellant. 13  To establish that a defendant has been convicted of a prior offense, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a prior conviction exists and that the defendant is linked to that conviction. Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The State may prove a prior conviction in a number of different ways. Id. at 921–23. The State is not required to produce a specific document or specific proof because “[t]here is no ‘best evidence’ rule in Texas that requires that the fact of a prior conviction be proven with any document, much less any specific document.” Id. at 921. The proof that is adduced to establish that the defendant on trial is the same person named in the prior conviction “closely resembles a jigsaw puzzle.” Id. at 923 (quoting Human v. State, 749 S.W.2d 832, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)). Standing alone, the pieces usually have little meaning, but when fitted together, the pieces usually form the picture of the person who committed the alleged prior conviction or convictions. Id. The trier of fact fits the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle together and weighs the credibility of each piece. Id. Whatever form the State’s proof takes, however, it must be sufficient to prove the defendant’s prior conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 923. Although the State may establish the existence of a defendant’s prior conviction by offering a certified copy of a judgment of conviction, this alone is normally insufficient to link the defendant to the prior conviction, even if the name on the judgment and the name of the defendant on trial are the same. Henry v. State, 509 S.W.3d 915, 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Beck v. State, 719 S.W.2d 205, 209– 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Thus, the State bears the burden of proving the necessary links by presenting independent evidence that shows that the defendant on trial and the person previously convicted are the same. Beck, 719 S.W.2d at 210. However, the State may also establish both elements—information to show that a prior conviction exists and the defendant’s identity as the person previously convicted—by other means, including through (1) the defendant’s admission or 14 stipulation, (2) testimony from a witness who was present when the defendant was previously convicted of the specified offense and can identify the defendant as the person who was previously convicted, (3) fingerprints supported by expert testimony that identifies the prints as those of the defendant, or (4) a judgment, pen packet, or other records that contain sufficient information or descriptors that show the defendant’s identity or physical description, such as a photograph of the defendant. Henry, 509 S.W.3d at 918; Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921–22; see, e.g., Beck, 719 S.W.2d at 209; Littles v. State, 726 S.W.2d 26, 31–32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (op. on reh’g); Doby v. State, 454 S.W.2d 411, 413–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970). Here, in an effort to link Appellant to the prior convictions that the State alleged in its notice of enhancement, the State first offered a printed copy of an offender search conducted on the Oklahoma Department of Corrections’ website reflecting a photograph, physical description, name, birth date, and offender number for “James C. Tansimore” with an alias of “James L. Tansimore.” Underneath the description, the document provided a list of convictions alleged to have belonged to the named individual. This document also listed the URL for Oklahoma Department of Corrections’ Offender Search in the upper right corner, and the time and date of the document’s access was listed in the bottom right corner. The State provided the testimony of District Attorney Investigator Bruce Toney with respect to the document. He testified that he had procured the document from the website for the Oklahoma Department of Corrections. Appellant objected to the admission of Investigator Toney’s testimony about the Oklahoma convictions on the basis that “there would be no proof from the State that it connects those judgments to [Appellant].” We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We uphold the trial court’s decision unless it lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 153– 15 54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). We also uphold a trial court’s evidentiary ruling if it is correct on any theory of law that finds support in the record. Gonzalez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 114, 125–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Dering v. State, 465 S.W.3d 668, 670 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, no pet.). Appellant argues on appeal that the presence of the website’s URL on State’s Exhibit No. 39 is insufficient proof that the evidence is trustworthy and, therefore, does not meet the threshold requirement for authentication. However, Texas courts have acknowledged that documents printed from government websites are self- authenticating under Rule 902(5) of the Texas Rules of Evidence. See Williams Farms Produce Sales, Inc. v. R&G Produce Co., 443 S.W.3d 250, 259 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2014, no pet.); see also Gunville v. Gonzales, 508 S.W.3d 547, 559 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.). The printed documents must reflect sufficient indicia that they were obtained from a government website. See Williams Farms Produce Sales, 443 S.W.3d at 259 (reasoning that, because the documents reflected the URL of the government websites and the date and time they were accessed, they were sufficiently self-authenticating under Rule 902(5) of the Texas Rules of Evidence); see also Mendez v. Remanente LLC, No. 13-15-00529-CV, 2017 WL 1380529, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 2, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that the printouts reflecting the USPS website URL and the date upon which the document was accessed were self-authenticating because such was sufficient to indicate they were printed from the website of a governmental entity); Kishor v. TXU Energy Retail Co., LLC, No. 05-10-01496-CV, 2011 WL 5857215, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 17, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that the document was not self-authenticating as a publication issued by a public authority under Rule 902(5) because it did not identify its source or reflect a URL address). In overruling Appellant’s objection to State’s Exhibit No. 39, the trial court acknowledged on the record that the document reflected the government website’s 16 URL. The URL on the document provides access to the Oklahoma Department of Corrections Offender Search Registry. Because State’s Exhibit No. 39 was obtained and printed from a government website and reflects the website’s URL and the date and time of access, it is sufficiently self-authenticated under Rule 902(5). See Williams Farms Produce Sales, 443 S.W.3d at 259. The State introduced: (1) a certified copy of a 1996 judgment of conviction from Caddo County, Oklahoma showing that “James Conrad Tansimore,” with a date of birth of “12-29-77” and a social security number of “XXX-XX-4472,” was convicted of second degree murder; (2) a certified copy of a 1994 sentencing after a plea of guilty showing that “James L Tansimore,” with a date of birth of “12-27-75,” pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery with a firearm and two counts of kidnapping; and (3) a certified copy of a 2015 judgment of conviction from Payne County, Oklahoma showing that “James Leonard Tansimore,” with a date of birth of “12-27- 1975” and a social security number of “XXX-XX-8347,” was convicted of felony possession of marihuana in a penal institution; the judgment listed murder (1996), robbery (1994), and kidnapping (1994) as his prior felony convictions. Investigator Toney testified that he contacted the Oklahoma Department of Corrections and confirmed that “James L. Tansimore” and “James C. Tansimore” had one offender identification number and were therefore the same individual. He also stated that when he obtained the certified copies of judgments and sentences, he compared the cause numbers with those listed on the offender search report and confirmed they were the same. Investigator Toney identified Appellant as the person in the picture on State’s Exhibit No. 39. Moreover, the State also introduced a printed copy of a document from the NCIC interstate identification index reflecting that the same name and aliases and several varying combinations of those names were associated with the fingerprints 17 of that individual.2 Despite the minor discrepancies between the 1996 judgment and the others upon which the State relied, the document also showed the same birthdates and social security numbers were associated with the fingerprints of that individual. Personal descriptors including hair color, eye color, and tattoos were also listed on the report. Further, the State provided pages of the same report specifically relating to Oklahoma reflecting the same information linked to the individual known to have those fingerprints. He explained that, when an individual is arrested, they are fingerprinted, and the FBI has a specific classification process to identify the characteristics of each fingerprint. Those characteristics are listed on a report which is given an FBI number. The FBI number remains with that set of fingerprints through each arrest that results in the person being fingerprinted. If a different date of birth, social security number, or name is used during the arrest, it is added to the FBI’s report for the individual set of fingerprints. Each piece of evidence offered by the State formed the picture that each alleged conviction belonged to Appellant. See Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 923. The printed document from the Oklahoma Department of Corrections Offender Search provided a photograph of Appellant, his identifying information, and a list of the convictions later shown in the certified copies of judgments offered by the State. The reports from NCIC confirmed that all the different names, dates of birth, and social security numbers reflected by the certified copies of judgments were linked to Appellant. Accordingly, the evidence offered by the State was sufficient to allow the jury to find that each conviction belonged to Appellant. Id. 2 As noted by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex Parte Warren, by consulting computerized criminal histories collected by criminal justice agencies and maintained by the NCIC, “law enforcement officials can gain valuable and useful information about an individual’s criminal history from across the nation, including ‘identifiable descriptions and notations of arrests, detentions, indictments, [...] or other formal criminal charges’, and ‘any disposition arising therefrom [.]’” 353 S.W.3d 490, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (alterations in original) (first quoting TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.082(2) (West Supp. 2025); and then quoting 28 C.F.R. § 20.3(d)). 18  We hold that the admission of State’s Exhibit No. 39 was not improper, and the evidence presented was sufficient to allow the jury to find that Appellant was the person convicted of the offenses alleged in the State’s enhancement paragraphs. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second issue. Disqualification of the District Attorney’s Office In his third issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to recuse the Haskell County District Attorney’s Office. Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion seeking the recusal of the district attorney’s office. In the motion, Appellant alleged that his prior attorney, Blizzard, employed attorney Dax Pueschel and that Pueschel assisted in the preparation of Appellant’s case. Blizzard subsequently withdrew as Appellant’s counsel. After the attorney-client relationship ended, the district attorney hired Pueschel as an assistant district attorney. Because of Pueschel’s participation in Appellant’s case while under the employment of Blizzard, Appellant asserted in the motion that there was no other method of safeguarding Appellant’s right to a fair trial other than for independent counsel to be appointed to represent the State in the upcoming jury trial. At the hearing on the motion, Appellant’s trial counsel noted that Pueschel’s name appeared frequently in the discovery received from Blizzard’s office. He argued that Appellant could not receive a fair trial after Pueschel was employed by the State. Investigator Toney testified that the district attorney’s office was aware of Pueschel’s involvement in certain pending cases in Haskell County, and specifically, they were aware that his employment with Blizzard could have resulted in his involvement with Appellant’s case. He stated that they obtained a list of cases with a possible conflict and removed the case files from the general filing cab