PHILPOT, PATRICK v. the State of Texas

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS NO. PD-0715-25 PATRICK PHILPOT, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS DALLAS COUNTY Finley, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Richardson, Newell, Keel, Walker, and Parker, JJ., joined. Schenck, P.J., Yeary, and McClure, JJ., concurred. OPINION Appellant was convicted of forgery of a financial instrument for presenting what he represented to be a cashier’s check in the amount of $1,028,000.00 to the Dallas County Jail. The trial court sentenced Appellant to two years’ confinement  PHILPOT — 2 but suspended Appellant’s sentence and placed him on community supervision for a period of five years. On appeal, a divided court of appeals affirmed. Philpot v. State, No. 05-23-01256-CR, 2025 WL 2421355, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 21, 2025) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We granted Appellant’s petition for discretionary review, which challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Appellant’s conviction and the court of appeals’ holding that jury charge error did not cause Appellant egregious harm. 1 We now affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. I. Factual Background In January of 2023, Ryan Glover was in custody at the Dallas County Jail awaiting trial for murder, robbery, and other criminal charges. On January 30, 2023, 1 Appellant’s petition for discretionary review presents four grounds for review: 1. Whether the court of appeals correctly concluded that the cashier’s check purported to be the act of an entity called “PacPhil Bank.” 2. One of the essential elements of forgery is that the writing purports to be the act of another who did not authorize the act. Does the statutory definition of “another” require the person to be a real individual or entity? 3. Whether a cashier’s check embodying the purported act of a fictitious entity is void on its face and, therefore, not a forgery. 4. Whether the court of appeals correctly found that the exclusion of the statutory definition of “another” and the accompanying pertinent statutory definitions of “person,” “individual,” “corporation,” and “association” from the jury charge did not egregiously harm Petitioner when those definitions were critical to the jury’s determination of whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner’s act purported to be the act of another.  PHILPOT — 3 Appellant went to the bond desk at the Dallas County Sheriff’s Office (DCSO) to post bond for Glover. Appellant presented Valson Scariah, the bond clerk, with a document that appeared to be a cashier’s check in the amount of $1,028,000.00. The cashier’s check was payable through PacPhil Bank to the DCSO. We include below a picture of the cashier’s check that Appellant presented to Scariah: Scariah accepted the cashier’s check and, after determining that the check amount covered the total amount of Glover’s bonds, began processing the bonds. About two days later, Mildred Romulado, the processing supervisor for the DCSO, voided the transaction as a precautionary measure after learning about concerns from some of her employees about the check’s validity. She testified at Appellant’s trial that the DCSO could “redo” the transaction if the cashier’s check later turned out to be “good.” Glover was never released from custody.  PHILPOT — 4 An investigation into the cashier’s check followed. A day after Romulado voided the transaction, DCSO Detective Jeffrey Payton was asked to investigate the “suspicious” check. Payton reached out to federal partners in Homeland Security Investigations and received assistance from Lauren Vant, a financial investigator with the Drug Enforcement Administration. Vant determined that the cashier’s check was fraudulent because it lacked a bank account number, a routing number, and a check number. Vant testified at Appellant’s trial that the cashier’s check was not a negotiable instrument and a bank would not accept it. After Appellant was arrested, he told Detective Payton that he created the check and that the cashier’s check’s legitimacy could be confirmed by contacting PacPhil Bank. Detective Payton soon discovered that the phone number and contact information for PacPhil Bank listed on the cashier’s check belonged to Appellant. Appellant was indicted for forgery of a financial instrument. The indictment alleged that Appellant did, with intent to defraud or harm another, forge a writing, in that the defendant did pass, issue, transfer, publish, and otherwise utter, to VALSON SCARIAH AND DALLAS COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE a forged writing, knowing such writing to be forged, and such writing had been so altered, made, completed, executed, and authenticated so that it purported to be the act of another who did not authorize the act, and the writing was or purported to be a commercial instrument: to wit, cashier’s check CC-PPH-10056, in the amount of  PHILPOT — 5 $1,028,000.00, made payable to DALLAS COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE. The case proceeded to trial with Appellant representing himself pro se. In addition to the above evidence, the State presented evidence of another incident in which Appellant presented a similar cashier’s check at a BMW dealership to purchase a vehicle. The cashier’s check in that incident is reproduced below: Mostafa Soliman, a finance manager at the BMW Dallas dealership, testified that Appellant tried to purchase two vehicles with the cashier’s check. Soliman testified that the cashier’s check was not verifiable after it was received. Soliman testified that PacPhil Bank was listed as “permanently closed when we tr[ied] to look it up.” Appellant testified in his own defense. He stated that he printed the cashier’s check at Office Max. He claimed that the check was valid under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). He further claimed that PacPhil Bank was a trust  PHILPOT — 6 company operating under Article 3 of the UCC, that he served as its trustee and treasurer, and that “everyone is a bank.” Appellant testified that the instrument qualified as a cashier’s check because PacPhil Bank both issued and drew on the check and argued that only a bank could determine if the instrument was fraudulent. Appellant claimed that PacPhil Bank had the funds to honor the $1,028,000.00 that was written on the cashier’s check. Appellant acknowledged he had no charter but maintained that a charter was unnecessary to establish a bank. At the close of the evidence, the jury convicted Appellant. He timely appealed. On appeal, a divided court of appeals affirmed. Philpot, 2025 WL 2421355, at *6. The court of appeals first held that the evidence was sufficient to show “that the writing purported to be the act of another who did not authorize the act.” Id. at *2– 3. As to Appellant’s alleged jury charge error, the court of appeals held that Appellant was not egregiously harmed by the alleged omissions in the jury charge. Id. at *5. Justice Bonnie Goldstein dissented. Id. at *6 (Goldstein, J., dissenting). She would have held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction for two distinct reasons: (1) Appellant signed his own name, and therefore he was not holding himself out to be a person other than who he was; and (2) the check was void on its face and therefore not a forgery. Id. at *7–9.  PHILPOT — 7 II. Sufficiency of the Evidence a. Applicable Law When assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, reviewing courts consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found that the State has proven the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Baltimore v. State, 689 S.W.3d 331, 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). When drawing inferences, the trier of fact may use common sense, common knowledge, personal experiences, and observations from life. Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). When the record supports conflicting reasonable inferences, we presume that the trier of fact resolved those conflicts in favor of the conviction, and we defer to those resolutions. Dunham v. State, 666 S.W.3d 477, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). This standard applies whether the case was proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 520–21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). This standard gives full responsibility to the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from basic to ultimate facts. Id. at 522. A factfinder may believe all, some, or none of a witness’s  PHILPOT — 8 testimony. Romano v. State, 610 S.W.3d 30, 34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). As the reviewing court, we do not sit as the metaphorical “thirteenth juror.” See McPherson v. State, 677 S.W.3d 663, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence. Id. We must affirm the conviction if the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable based upon the “cumulative force” of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction. Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). “Theorizing or guessing as to the meaning of evidence is never adequate to uphold a conviction.” Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 761, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Nor is speculation. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 15–16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Correct application of the Jackson standard depends on understanding “the difference between a reasonable inference supported by the evidence at trial” and mere speculation. Id. at 16 (referencing Jackson). However, the State is not required to prove an element with direct evidence. See Carroll v. State, 701 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Circumstantial evidence may suffice to establish the elements necessary to sustain a conviction. See id. A determination of evidentiary sufficiency is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d  PHILPOT — 9 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Reviewing courts measure sufficiency by comparing the evidence produced at trial to the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge. Id. A hypothetically correct jury charge accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried. Id. The law authorized by the indictment consists of the statutory elements of the offense as modified by the indictment allegations. Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). b. Analysis A person commits the offense of forgery of a financial instrument “if he forges a writing with intent to defraud or harm another.” Tex. Penal Code § 32.21(b). As relevant here, the word “forges” as used in subsection (b) means “to alter, make, complete, execute, or authenticate any writing so that it purports to be the act of another who did not authorize that act.” Id. § 32.21(a)(1)(A) (cleaned up). The word “another” is statutorily defined as “a person other than the actor.” Id. § 1.07(a)(5). “Actor” means “a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a criminal action.” Id. § 1.07(a)(2). In this case, Appellant is the “actor” for purposes of the forgery offense. “Person” is also statutorily defined as “an individual or a  PHILPOT — 10 corporation, association, limited liability company, or other entity or organization governed by the Business Organizations Code.” Id. § 1.07(a)(38). The evidence at Appellant’s trial was sufficient to show that the cashier’s check purported to be the act of PacPhil Bank, a fictitious entity. We reject both of Appellant’s sufficiency arguments in reaching this conclusion. First, Appellant argues that the cashier’s check was not an act of “another” because he made the cashier’s check. Alternatively, Appellant argues that he and PacPhil bank were “one and the same.” Appellant’s Br. at 15. Second, Appellant argues that Penal Code Section 32.21 does not encompass instruments that purport to be the acts of fictitious persons. 1. The writing purported to be the act of PacPhil Bank, a fictitious entity Keeping in mind that we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, Baltimore, 689 S.W.3d at 341, the evidence at Appellant’s trial showed that the cashier’s check authorized payment of $1,028,000.00 to the DCSO from “PacPhil Bank©” and was signed by “Patrick L. Philpot©.” Appellant testified on his own behalf and explained how a cashier’s check worked: the drawer was the person who, by signing the check, ordered payment on the check, and the drawee was the person who was ordered to make the payment. Because the drawer and drawee are the same on a cashier’s check, PacPhil Bank was both the drawer and  PHILPOT — 11 drawee on the cashier’s check to the DCSO. Appellant testified that he was PacPhil Bank’s trustee and treasurer. Appellant explained that, by signing the cashier’s check, he ordered PacPhil Bank to pay the stated amount to the DCSO: [O]n this check, I identified the drawee, which was the bank. The drawee is ordered to pay. How did I order them you say? With my signature . . . . PacPhil Bank was instructed to pay Dallas County because of Patrick Philpot. Patrick Philpot’s signature is identified on this line as the authorized signature. And by that authorized signature being there, that’s me ordering PacPhil Bank to make the payment. Appellant testified that, as PacPhil Bank’s treasurer, he acted as the bank in issuing the cashier’s check: So once again, according to the law, a cashier’s check means a draft with respect [to] which the drawee and drawer are the same bank and branches. Because I work for PacPhil Bank, I am the treasurer of PacPhil Bank. That means PacPhil Bank ordered PacPhil Bank to make that payment, which validates that it’s a cashier’s check. Because according to definition, it must be that the drawee and the drawer is of the same bank. (Emphasis added). On cross-examination, Appellant testified: Q. [Y]ou made this check, right? A. No. Q. Oh, you didn’t? A. No, it was issued. Q. From where?  PHILPOT — 12 A. It wasn’t made by me personally. Q. It was issued from where? A. The bank. Q. What bank? A. PacPhil. Q. Which is your bank? A. No, ma’am. Q. You just said it was your bank. A. No, I did not. I said I was a trustee because the trust company, which identified as a bank according to Texas Business and Commerce Code. Q. So where did you go to get this check? A. Well, I didn’t necessarily go to the bank. I am the treasurer of the bank, so I worked for the bank, and the bank produced it. Q. So you made it? A. No, I didn’t. The bank did. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the court of appeals was correct to decide that a rational juror could find that the writing—the cashier’s check—purported to be the act of PacPhil Bank, rather than  PHILPOT — 13 Appellant. In fact, Appellant repeatedly disclaimed that he made the check in his own individual capacity (regardless of whether he signed the check). 2 Appellant cites three authorities in support of his position, but each is readily distinguishable. See Appellant’s Br. at 12–13 (citing Young v. State, 529 S.W.2d 542, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Smith v. State, 379 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964); and Dunlap v. State, 332 S.W.2d 727, 728 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960)). In Young, the defendant signed a check as “FLOYD DIXON, Univ. of Texas Recruiting.” 529 S.W.2d at 542. While the bank on which the check had been written had no account for either Floyd Dixon or the defendant, the evidence at trial did show that Floyd Dixon was a name that the defendant adopted as his own over the years. Id. at 542–44. In Smith, the defendant obtained a driver’s license under the name Charles J. Williams, opened a checking account under that name, and then presented the driver’s license at a store and wrote a check from that account to purchase items. 379 S.W.2d at 328. The check was subsequently returned for insufficient funds. Id. And in Dunlap, the defendant opened a bank account under the name of Elmer Brooks at 413 Hackberry Lane. 332 S.W.2d at 728. The defendant presented himself as Elmer Brooks at a store and wrote a check from the Brooks 2 To the extent that there are conflicts in the testimony, it is the jury’s job to resolve these conflicts, and we must defer to those resolutions. Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).  PHILPOT — 14 account to buy items. Id. The defendant signed the check as Elmer Brooks and wrote down the Hackberry address underneath the signature. Id. The evidence at trial showed that the defendant did really reside at the Hackberry address. Id. To the extent that Appellant argues that by signing his own name, the cashier’s check was “his own act,” we are unpersuaded. In all three cases above, this Court reversed the defendant’s forgery convictions. But the cases are distinguishable from Appellant’s case. Dunlap and Smith involved defendants who wrote personal checks from accounts that they themselves opened under aliases that belonged to them. And in Young, the defendant also wrote and signed a check under his adopted name. But Appellant’s set of facts are different: Appellant created a fictitious bank and wrote a cashier’s check that was purportedly issued by the fictitious bank and signed by the fictitious bank’s treasurer. In sum, we conclude that the court of appeals properly decided that the evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to conclude that the cashier’s check purported to be the act of PacPhil Bank, rather than Appellant. We reject Appellant’s first sufficiency challenge. 2. Penal Code Section 32.21 encompasses fictitious entities Appellant’s argument that Penal Code Section 32.21 does not encompass instruments that purport to be the acts of fictitious persons fails for two reasons.  PHILPOT — 15 First, the forgery statute covers any writing that “purports” to be the act of another. See Tex. Penal Code § 32.21(a)(1)(A). Second, even assuming that the statute is ambiguous, there is nothing in Penal Code Section 32.21 that requires the State to prove that the “another” who purportedly made the writing subject to the forgery prosecution is a real individual or entity. We address each justification in turn. 1. The forgery statute is unambiguous: It covers any writing that “purports” to be the act of another. To start, it does not matter whether the “another” is real or fictitious. The forgery statute criminalizes behavior in which a person “forges a writing with intent to defraud or harm another.” Tex. Penal Code § 32.21(b). “[F]orges” is defined as “to alter, make, complete, execute, or authenticate any writing so that it purports to be the act of another who did not authorize that act.” Id. § 32.21(a)(1)(A) (cleaned up). So long as the altered writing “purports to be the act of another,” the altered writing falls within the ambit of the forgery statute. “Purports” means “to have the often specious appearance of being, intending, or claiming (something implied or inferred).” Purport, https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction- ary/purport (last visited Oct. 7, 2026). Here, the cashier’s check purported—that is, claimed—to be the writing of another: PacPhil Bank. Appellant made the writing intending to pass off PacPhil Bank as a real person, even though the entity was, in  PHILPOT — 16 fact, fictitious. That alone is sufficient for Appellant’s conduct to fall under the ambit of the forgery statute. 2. Even if the forgery statute were ambiguous, the legislative history supports the conclusion that “another” can be a fictitious entity. Next, even if the statute was ambiguous, there is nothing in the forgery statute that prevents the “another” from being a fictitious entity. In his briefing and at oral argument, Appellant posited that the removal of language from the 1925 Penal Code in the enactment of the 1973 Penal Code indicates that “another” now “means a real person or entity.” Appellant’s Br. at 18. The forgery section of the 1925 Penal Code defined “another” to explicitly encompass fictitious persons: The instrument must purport to be the act of “another,” and within the meaning of this word, as used in defining forgery, are included this State, the United States, or either the State or Territories of the Union; all the several branches of the government or either of them; all public or private bodies, politic and corporate; all courts; all officers, public or private, in their official capacity; all partnerships in professions or trades; and all other persons, whether real or fictitious, except the person engaged in the forgery. Tex. Penal Code art. 988 (1925) (emphasis added). This provision of the forgery statute was removed when the Legislature enacted the 1973 Penal Code. But Appellant’s argument is misplaced. The Legislature did not exclude the “whether real or fictitious” language from the forgery statute, it simply removed any definition of “another” from the forgery statute entirely, instead leaving forgery prosecutions  PHILPOT — 17 to rely on the general definitions in Penal Code Section 1.07. To the extent that the current definition of “another”—“a person other than the actor”—is ambiguous in the context of whether “another” can be fictitious, there is nothing in the legislative record undergirding the enactment of the 1973 Penal Code that indicates the Legis- lature intended to alter prior law. See State Bar Committee on Revision of the Penal Code, Texas Penal Code, A Proposed Revision § 32.31 cmt. (1970). Consequently, the Legislature’s use of a broad definition for the terms “another” and “person” in Penal Code Section 1.07 indicates that a writing can be forged for purposes of the forgery statute if the writing purports to be the act of fictitious person. We conclude that the court of appeals did not err by holding that Penal Code Section 32.21 encompasses writings that purport to be the acts of fictitious persons. We reject Appellant’s second sufficiency challenge. c. Facial Voidness In his third ground for review, Appellant contends that “[l]ongstanding caselaw supports the argument that a cashier’s check that is void on its face cannot be the subject of forgery.” Appellant’s Br. at 22. The State responds that the “facial- voidness rule does not apply to current forgery prosecutions.” State’s Br. at 27. This ground for review is based on the dissenting opinion in the court of appeals below, which introduced the argument that the cashier’s check was not a forgery because it  PHILPOT — 18 was facially void. See Philpot, 2025 WL 2421355 at *9 (Goldstein, J., dissenting). We need not resolve whether this Court’s pre-1974 forgery case law concerning facially void instruments remains good law because we agree with the court of appeals that cashier’s check was not facially void. Appellant argues that the check was facially void because it lacked, amongst other things, an MICR line. The MICR line contains information such as a routing number, a bank account number, and a check number. But the missing MICR line did not render the cashier’s check facially void. In fact, the cashier’s check, on its face, met all the requirements to be a valid instrument. A negotiable instrument under the Business and Commerce Code is an unconditional promise or order to pay, payable to bearer or to order, which is payable on demand, and which does not state any other undertaking. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 3.104(a). A check is a type of negotiable instrument, and a cashier’s check is a draft on which the drawer and drawee are the same bank. Id. § 3.014(c), (f). Consequently, the cashier’s check at issue in this case met all the statutory requirements to be a valid cashier’s check. Appellant further argues that the cashier’s check’s voidness was apparent to “all who looked at this instrument.” Appellant’s Br. at 25. But the evidence presented at Appellant’s trial undercuts this assertion. As the record shows, when Appellant presented the cashier’s check to Scariah, she calculated the total bond  PHILPOT — 19 amount for Glover and determined that the cashier’s check covered the required bond amount. Scariah then processed the bonds by completing the required forms, including having Glover sign the bond forms as the principal and payer, a jailer sign each form as a witness, and the Sheriff approve each form. It was not until two days later that there were concerns raised about the check’s validity, instigating an investigation into the suspicious check. And it was not until Vant, a certified fraud examiner, examined the cashier’s check that anybody conclusively determined that the check was fraudulent. Based on the foregoing, we agree with the court of appeals’ assessment that the cashier’s check was not void on its face. III. Jury Charge Challenge The abstract portion of the jury charge included the statutory definitions for the offense of “forgery of a commercial instrument” and “forge,” but it did not define “another,” “person,” “individual,” “corporation,” or “association.” The application paragraph tracked the language of the indictment, which tracked the language of the forgery statute. Appellant did not request the statutory definitions of these terms be added, nor did he otherwise object to the jury charge. In his fourth ground for review, Appellant argues that the omission of these definitions egregiously harmed him by lowering the State’s burden to prove that the instrument  PHILPOT — 20 purported to be the act of “another” as defined by the Penal Code. Appellant specifically argues that these terms were “crucial” at his trial and the definitions were critical to the jury’s determination on whether his act purported to be the act of another. Appellant’s Br. at 28. a. Applicable Law This Court recently set out the applicable law for jury charge error in Bluntson v. State, 728 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025): A trial court is statutorily obligated to instruct the jury on the “law applicable to the case.” See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.14. That duty exists even when defense counsel fails to object to inclusions or exclusions in the charge. Mendez v. State, 545 S.W.3d 548, 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). The trial court is “ultimately responsible for the accuracy of the jury charge and accompanying instructions.” Id. (quoting Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). We review alleged jury charge error in two steps: first, we determine whether error exists; if so, we then evaluate whether sufficient harm resulted from the error to require reversal. Alcoser v. State, 663 S.W.3d 160, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022); Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The degree of harm required for reversal depends on whether the jury charge error was brought to the trial court’s attention. See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’g) (setting forth standards of appellate review for jury charge error). If the alleged error was raised by an objection or request for an instruction, see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 36.14, 36.15, the record need only show “some harm” to obtain relief; if the alleged error was not raised, reversal is required only if the appellant suffered “egregious harm,” Alcoser, 663 S.W.3d at 165; Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171.  PHILPOT — 21 Id. at 142 (citations cleaned up). In determining whether egregious harm is shown, this Court considers four factors: (1) the entire jury charge, (2) the state of the evidence (including the contested issues and the weight of probative evidence), (3) the arguments of counsel, and (4) any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole. Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). b. Analysis We assume, without deciding, that the trial court erred by failing to define the terms that Appellant challenges on discretionary review. Because Appellant did not object at trial, we review the jury charge error to see if Appellant suffered “egregious harm.” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. Contrary to Appellant’s contention, the element of “another” was not in contention at Appellant’s trial. “A cashier’s check is a bill of exchange drawn by a bank on itself and accepted in advance by the act of its issuance; therefore, it is not subject to countermand by its purchaser or the issuing bank.” Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 655 n.5 (Tex. 1990). And the cashier’s check can only be authorized by an officer of the bank; as Appellant readily admitted, he signed the check as its treasurer. There was no evidence at trial of “another” other than PacPhil Bank. Moreover, this element was not contested by either party  PHILPOT — 22 during jury arguments. The State’s closing arguments focused on how Appellant’s beliefs about various code provisions were unreasonable while Appellant’s closing arguments focused on challenging the qualifications of the State’s witnesses and arguing that the cashier’s check was, in fact, not void and that Appellant lacked the intent to defraud when he presented the cashier’s check to the DCSO. At no point did either side argue about “another.” Moreover, the statutory definition—“a person other than the actor”—does not appear materially different from its ordinary meaning. See Olveda v. State, 650 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (“[W]hen the statutory definition is not included in the charge, it is assumed the jury would consider the commonly understood meaning in its deliberations.”). The jury can be assumed to have looked at the term “another” in the jury charge without its statutory definition and believed that it simply meant anyone or anything other than Appellant. To the extent that the ordinary meaning of “another” might not have been understood to encompass fictional entities, “[a]ny possible misunderstanding of the phrase would have been more restrictive than the statutory definition, and could only have been to [A]ppellant’s benefit.” See id. We have already held that PacPhil Bank could qualify as “another” for purposes of this forgery prosecution. Supra at 16.  PHILPOT — 23 As properly construed, Appellant could not have been harmed by the jury charge’s failure to the define “another” because Appellant’s conduct in this case was sufficient to constitute a forgery regardless of whether the alleged “another” was real or fictitious. See supra at 15. Appellant altered a writing that purported to be from PacPhil Bank and held out PacPhil Bank as a real entity. That alone is sufficient for purposes of the forgery statute. Based on our review of the record, the jury charge as a whole, the arguments of the parties, and any other relevant evidence, we conclude that Appellant was not egregiously harmed from the missing definitions related to “another.” See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. Delivered: November 5, 2026 Publish