Eddie Ortega v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 11th District (Eastland)
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket11-24-00300-CR
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Opinion filed November 19, 2026
In The
Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________
No. 11-24-00300-CR
__________
EDDIE ORTEGA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 106th District Court
Dawson County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 23-9146
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Eddie Ortega, was indicted for the first-degree felony offense of
possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine in an amount of four grams or
more but less than two-hundred grams. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 481.112(a), (d) (West Supp. 2026). The State further alleged several
enhancements in the indictment.
The jury convicted Appellant of the lesser-included offense of possession of
a controlled substance in the same amount, a second-degree felony. See HEALTH &
SAFETY § 481.115(a), (d). During the punishment phase, the State elected to rely on
only one enhancement allegation, to which Appellant pleaded “not true.” The jury
found the enhancement allegation to be “true,” which increased Appellant’s
punishment range to that of a first-degree felony, and assessed Appellant’s
punishment at twenty-eight years’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice and a $10,000 fine. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 12.42(b) (West Supp. 2026), § 12.32 (West 2019). The trial court sentenced
Appellant accordingly.
In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant argues that the omission of an
application paragraph and/or a “not true” verdict form in the trial court’s punishment
charge permitted the jury to assess an “illegal” sentence, one that exceeded the
applicable maximum punishment range for the second-degree felony offense for
which he was convicted. We affirm.
I. Factual Background
On March 1, 2023, Tricia Moreno, an investigator with the Texas Department
of Family and Protective Services (DFPS), arrived at a residence in Lamesa with
local law enforcement to investigate a complaint of neglectful supervision of a child
and possible methamphetamine use and sale out of the home. Appellant and his
then-romantic partner, Jacinda Annalla, had rented a room from the mother of the
child who was the subject of the DFPS complaint. When law enforcement searched
Appellant’s room, they found various indicia of drug possession and the sale of
drugs—a large glass container that contained a white crystal-like substance, baggies,
scales, stacks of cash, lighters, and documents indicating a methamphetamine-sales
operation.
2
For enhancement purposes, the State alleged in the indictment that Appellant
had previously been finally convicted of the following felony offenses: (1) forgery
in the 106th District Court of Dawson County on May 13, 2015; (2) theft in the
132nd District Court of Scurry County on June 17, 2018; and (3) possession
of a controlled substance in the 106th District Court of Dawson County1 on
December 12, 2022.
Appellant testified during the guilt/innocence phase, and the State presented
evidence of Appellant’s extensive criminal history. During the State’s cross-
examination, Appellant admitted that he had been convicted on December 12, 2022,
in the 106th District Court, of the second-degree felony offense of possession of a
controlled substance—the prior conviction upon which the State elected to rely for
enhancement purposes. The State offered a certified copy of the judgment of
conviction for that offense; however, the judgment identified the county of
conviction as Lynn County, even though the judicial district (the 106th), Appellant’s
first and last name, the date of conviction, and the case number matched the
allegation in the indictment. Furthermore, when asked if he was the same person
who was referenced in this judgment of conviction, Appellant responded
affirmatively. When the State offered the judgment for admission, Appellant’s trial
counsel asked whether there had been any amendments to the indictment. The trial
court stated that Appellant’s inquiries did not affect the admissibility of the
judgment, and it was admitted without objection.
During the punishment phase, the State recited the enhancement allegation to
the jury:
And it is further presented in and to said Court that prior to the
commission of the foregoing offense and after convictions in cause
number 14-7485 and 10544 became final, on the 24th day of December,
1
As will be discussed later in this opinion, the actual county of conviction was Lynn County.
3
2020 defendant committed the felony offense of Possession of cocaine
-- Controlled -- Possession of a Controlled Substance on the 12th day
of December, 2022 and the defendant was convicted of the
felony offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance in Cause
Number 21-3430 in the 106th judicial District Court of Dawson
County, Texas and said conviction became final prior to the
commission of the foregoing offense.
The State conceded that the enhancement allegation in the indictment contained a
typographical error in that it identified Dawson County rather than Lynn County as
the county of conviction for that prior offense. During Appellant’s trial counsel’s
opening statement, his theme focused on the typographical error in the indictment’s
enhancement allegation, and he stated directly: “The reason we pleaded ‘not true’ is
because the enhancement alleges Dawson County.” Appellant testified and
discussed, among other things, his methamphetamine addiction, and his desire to
utilize treatment services and other social programs provided by the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice. During its cross-examination, the State questioned
Appellant about his prior convictions and arrests, of which there were many, dating
as far back as 1999. When questioned about the 2022 felony conviction from Lynn
County that the State relied on for enhancement purposes, Appellant confirmed that
he was the same person who was convicted of that offense.
During the punishment charge conference, the trial court addressed how the
first proposed charge, which was admitted as an exhibit for record purposes only,
contained an application paragraph, recited that Appellant pled “not true” to the
enhancement allegation, and provided the jury with the option of finding the
enhancement to be “true” or “not true.” However, in the application paragraph of
this charge, the enhancement language identified the county of conviction for the
prior offense as Lynn County; therefore, the trial court did not use this proposed
charge. Appellant’s trial counsel stated that including this language would have
“essentially[] amended the indictment past the trial that has started.”
4
The trial court then discussed a second proposed charge that initially
instructed the jury to find the enhancement to be “true,” however, this language was
later removed. Appellant’s trial counsel objected to this proposed charge because
the jury would be unable to find the enhancement “not true.” However, Appellant’s
trial counsel was clear that he was not claiming surprise as the basis for his objection,
but rather that the indictment was deficient because it incorrectly alleged that the
county of conviction for the enhancement was Dawson County, not Lynn County.
Appellant’s trial counsel also objected to this proposed charge because it would not
permit the jury to assess Appellant’s punishment within the second-degree felony
range in the event it found the enhancement to be “not true.” The trial court
overruled Appellant’s objections and proposed instruction.
In the submitted punishment charge, the jury was informed that Appellant
pled “not true” to the enhancement allegation. However, the charge provided no
instructions regarding the punishment range to be considered if the jury found the
enhancement to be “not true” but instead only recited the punishment range for a
first-degree felony offense. Further, the submitted verdict form did not provide the
option for the jury to find the enhancement to be “not true,” and the charge did not
include an application paragraph describing the conviction that was the basis of the
enhancement allegation.
II. Analysis
Appellant argues that the trial court’s refusal to include an application
paragraph and/or a verdict form in its punishment charge that would have given the
jury the option to find the enhancement allegation to be “not true” resulted in
Appellant receiving an illegal sentence. The State disagrees with Appellant’s
contention. Instead, the State concedes that the trial court only erred when it did not
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include a “not true” instruction and verdict form, and because it did not, the charge
error should be subject to the Almanza 2 harm analysis.
A. Type of Error
First, we note that Appellant and the State are correct—the trial court erred
when it refused to instruct the jury in a manner that would have given them the option
to find the enhancement allegation to be “not true.” Because Appellant pled “not
true” to the enhancement allegation, the State was required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that (1) a prior conviction existed, and (2) Appellant is linked to
that conviction. Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see
also Jordan v. State, 256 S.W.3d 286, 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (holding that
when the State seeks to enhance the defendant’s punishment range based on a prior
conviction and the defendant has pleaded “not true” to the enhancement allegation,
the factfinder must decide whether the State has met its burden). The existence of
the prior conviction can be proved in various ways, including by the defendant’s
admission and documentary proof. Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921–22.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has divided errors of this type into two general
categories—the imposition of an illegal sentence and charge error. See Bell v. State,
635 S.W.3d 641, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (per curiam). “[C]harge error stems
from the denial of a defendant’s right to have the trial court provide the jury with
instructions correctly setting forth the ‘law applicable to the case.’” Id. (first citing
Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57, 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); and then quoting TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14 (West 2007)). On the other hand, “[a]n illegal
sentence is ‘one that is not authorized by law’” because it is beyond the applicable
range of punishment that the factfinder may consider. Id. (quoting Ex parte Pue,
552 S.W.3d 226, 228 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)). Furthermore, an illegal sentence is
2
Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’g).
6
assessed when the “defendant’s range of punishment is improperly enhanced, in the
sense that the prior convictions alleged do not actually support enhancement under
the applicable statutory provision.” Id. (citing Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508, 511–
12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).
In a trial for a second-degree felony, if the defendant has been previously
“finally convicted of a felony other than a state jail felony[,]” the defendant shall be
punished within the range for a first-degree felony. See PENAL § 12.42(b). Here, in
its punishment charge, the trial court omitted two essential matters—an application
section that would have informed the jury of the underlying enhancement allegation
and the applicable sentencing range if the jury found the enhancement allegation to
be “not true,” and a verdict form for the jury to denote, if they so found, that the
enhancement allegation was “not true.” As we have said, the underlying
enhancement allegation concerned a prior, final conviction for the second-degree
felony offense of possession of a controlled substance. Thus, while the punishment
charge omitted the application paragraph and verdict form referenced above,
Appellant’s prior conviction is the type that supports an enhancement under
Section 12.42(b). See id.
Nevertheless, and contrary to Appellant’s contention, the sentence imposed in
this case is not “illegal” because the underlying predicate offense does “not actually”
support the enhancement allegation; instead, the underlying predicate offense
supports the enhancement allegation and the error only concerns the charge, because
the jury was not properly instructed on the law. See Bell, 635 S.W.3d at 645. The
scenario before us mirrors the circumstance that the Court of Criminal Appeals
addressed in Bell. There, the trial court submitted language in its punishment charge
that conflicted with the statutory requirement that prior convictions must be
sequential and “mistakenly instructed the jury to find the enhancement allegations
true if it found that [the defendant]’s second prior felony conviction became final
7
after the commission of the first felony offense.” Id. at 643 (emphasis added). As
the court stated, “[t]he correct statutory language . . . requires a finding that the first
conviction became final prior to the commission of the second felony.” Id.
(emphasis added) (citing PENAL § 12.42(d)). The court ultimately concluded that an
error of this nature should be classified as charge error, not as an illegal sentence.
Id. at 645–47; see also Niles v. State, 555 S.W.3d 562, 572–73 (Tex. Crim. App.
2018) (holding that the omission from the charge, in a prosecution for terroristic
threat of a public servant, of the element that the victim was a public servant did not
result in an illegal sentence but rather was subject to an Almanza analysis).
Appellant attempts to distinguish Bell by arguing that his sentence is illegal
because had a “not true” verdict form and the application section been included in
the punishment charge, the form would have provided the jury with the option to
find the enhancement allegation “not true.” However, the complained-of error in
this case does not differ in any respect with the charge error that the court addressed
in Bell. In fact, the argument advanced by Appellant was expressly rejected by the
court, which held that, instead, this type of error should be analyzed under Almanza.
See Bell, 635 S.W.3d at 645–47; see also Roberts v. State, 321 S.W.3d 545, 553–54
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (conducting an Almanza harm
analysis as opposed to finding the error resulted in an illegal sentence when the
punishment charge instructed the jury to find the allegation “true” despite the
defendant’s plea of “not true”); Kucha v. State, 686 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1985) (analyzing harm under Almanza when the trial court erroneously
included in the charge the punishment range if the enhancement was found true while
omitting the punishment range if the enhancement was found not true when the
defendant pled “not true” to the enhancement). Therefore, consistent with Bell, we
reject Appellant’s contention that the trial court’s error in this case resulted in the
imposition of an illegal sentence.
8
Appellant also argues that the error in the punishment charge is tantamount to
omitting a verdict form that would have allowed the jury to find Appellant “not
guilty” in the guilt/innocence phase. We cannot agree. First, we emphasize, and it
is clear, that the charge of which Appellant challenges on appeal is the punishment
charge, not the guilt/innocence charge. Additionally, while Niles highlighted that
an error in or the omission of the burden-of-proof instruction could result in
structural error, the court instead analyzed the charge as it related to an Apprendi-
type argument regarding the essential element of the crime in the guilt/innocence
phase. See Niles, 555 S.W.3d at 572–73. And as the United States Supreme Court
has made clear, the Sixth Amendment requires that other than because of a prior
conviction, the essential elements of a crime that increase the punishment range must
be proven to the factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 490 (2000); Bell, 635 S.W.3d at 648 (Slaughter, J., concurring) (noting the
distinction that in Niles, the court was looking at an Apprendi-type essential element
issue, but in Bell, the issue addressed punishment).
The Court of Criminal Appeals has clearly held that punishment charge-errors
of this type are subject to the Almanza harm analysis. Bell, 635 S.W.3d at 645–46.
Thus, while the State must prove any enhancement allegation beyond a reasonable
doubt, based on the court’s guidance in Bell and because of the obvious differences
between the guilt/innocence and punishment phases and the effect of the factfinder’s
findings in each phase, we conclude that the omissions of which Appellant
complains in this case are neither a structural error nor did they result in an illegal
sentence. See Rave v. State, No. 03-98-00159-CR, 1999 WL 249418, at *5 n.1 (Tex.
App.—Austin Apr. 29, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (“Though the
reasonable-doubt instruction implicates both state and federal constitutional rights
in the context of conviction, this is not true in the context of punishment, especially
[regarding] extraneous offenses. The State’s burden to prove extraneous offenses
9
beyond a reasonable doubt arises solely from [Article] 37.07.”). As such, and
contrary to Appellant’s contention, the omissions from the punishment charge are
not tantamount to the omission of an instruction that accurately sets forth the State’s
burden in the guilt/innocence phase.
B. Harm Analysis
Because we have concluded that the trial court’s error in this case is subject
to an Almanza harm analysis, we now must determine whether harm exists under
that standard. Considering the Almanza factors, we conclude that it does not.
When, as in this case, the charge-error complaint is preserved for our review,3
we must reverse if the error caused “some harm.” Reeves v. State, 420 S.W.3d 812,
816 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. “Some harm” means
actual harm and not merely a theoretical complaint. Sanchez v. State, 376 S.W.3d
767, 774–75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
To determine whether the charge error harmed the defendant, we examine and
consider, in light of the entire charge, the evidence presented at trial, including the
contested issues and the weight of the probative evidence, the arguments of counsel,
and any other relevant information in the trial record as a whole that informs our
analysis. Id. (citing Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171). These considerations guide our
analysis, and there is no burden of proof associated with our harm evaluation because
reversal is required only if the error was calculated to injure the defendant’s rights.
Reeves, 420 S.W.3d at 816.
1. The Charge in its Entirety
In this case, the trial court submitted an erroneous punishment charge.
However, as we have said, the omission of the complained-of instructions—a “not
true” verdict form and application section—did not result in the imposition of an
The State concedes that error is preserved and that the proper review is the “some harm” analysis
3
under Almanza.
10
illegal sentence, as Appellant contends on appeal. Nevertheless, we cannot say that
Appellant did not suffer “some harm” because of the error.
Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of finding “some harm.”
2. The Evidence Presented at Trial
The evidence strongly supports a finding that the error did not result in “some
harm” to Appellant. Appellant admitted during the State’s cross-examination,
during both phases of trial, that he was the same person who was convicted of and
referred to in the 2022 judgment of conviction. Then, during the punishment phase,
Appellant’s trial counsel stated in his opening statement that the sole reason they
were asking the jury to find the enhancement allegation to be “not true” was because
the indictment incorrectly alleged that Appellant was convicted of the prior offense
in Dawson County, rather than Lynn County. However, aside from the minor
discrepancy in the county of conviction, the indictment and the judgment of
conviction for this offense bear the same first and last name of the defendant, date
of conviction, and trial court cause number. Furthermore, both documents identify
the same court of conviction—the 106th Judicial District Court—which
encompasses Dawson and Lynn counties. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 24.208(a)
(West 2023) (“The 106th Judicial District is composed of Dawson, Gaines, Garza,
and Lynn counties.”).
In Segovia, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that the defendant did not suffer
“some harm” when the trial court instructed the jury that, despite the defendant’s
pleas of “not true” to the enhancement allegations, they were required to find the
allegations “true.” Segovia v. State, 467 S.W.3d 545, 558–61 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2015, pet. ref’d). The court reasoned that even though the defendant
pled “not true” to the enhancements, the defendant admitted at trial to the accuracy
of the enhancement allegations, the prior convictions were undisputed and seemed
to be conceded by the parties, so “the jury therefore had no other options [and] was
11
compelled to sentence [the defendant] under the enhanced penalty range.” Id. at
561; see PENAL § 12.42(b) (providing that the defendant shall be punished for a first-
degree felony upon conviction of a second-degree offense if it is shown that the
defendant has been previously and finally convicted of a prior felony). Thus, like in
Segovia, Appellant twice admitted that he was the same person who was referred to
in the indictment, enhancement allegation, and the 2022 judgment of conviction, and
based on the argument advanced by Appellant’s trial counsel during the punishment
phase, the basis of this prior conviction itself was also essentially taken as true—
counsel’s only complaint was that the county of conviction was incorrect. 4
Here, the undisputed evidence shows that despite Appellant’s plea of “not
true,” his admissions, and the 2022 judgment of conviction establish that the alleged
enhancement was in fact true. See also Winston v. State, No. 10-14-00139-CR, 2015
WL 6582185, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 29, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (holding that the defendant did not suffer “some harm”
when the trial court instructed the jury to find the enhancement allegations to be
“true” despite the defendant’s plea of “not true” because based on the defendant’s
admissions and other documentary evidence, there was no dispute that the
enhancements were “true”). As such, Appellant could not be harmed by the trial
court’s error when there is no evidence to support a finding that the enhancement
allegation for the prior conviction was “not true.”
While there is a variance between the indictment and the evidence that the
State presented at trial to prove the enhancement, the variance is immaterial because
only if the “variance was such as to mislead the defendant to his prejudice would it
be found material and require reversal.” Freda v. State, 704 S.W.2d 41, 42 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986) (first citing Castro v. State, 60 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Crim. App.
4
As discussed more below, that clerical error is immaterial.
12
1933); and then citing Thurman v. State, 167 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 1942)).
In this instance, however, Appellant’s trial counsel clearly stated the nature of his
complaint: “[J]ust for the record, this is not a case where [the] defense is arguing
surprise. This is a case where the defense is arguing that’s just plain wrong.”
In Plessinger, the indictment alleged that the defendant was convicted in the
Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona—the style of the case was “The State
of Texas vs.” the defendant—when it should have been “The State of Arizona vs.”
the defendant. See Plessinger v. State, 536 S.W.2d 380, 381–82 (Tex. Crim. App.
1976). The Court of Criminal Appeals held that a fatal variance did not exist
between the enhancement allegation in the indictment and the proof presented during
the punishment phase. Id. The court reasoned that there was “no question” as to the
identity of the defendant and thus there was no surprise to the defendant. Id.
The same is true here—there is no dispute as to Appellant’s identity and his
connection to the 2022 conviction, especially since Appellant twice responded, in
the affirmative, that he was the same person referenced in the 2022 Lynn County
judgment of conviction, and the judgment included all the other indicia linking the
judgment to Appellant. Further, as with the “style” error in the indictment in
Plessinger, the discrepancy here only concerns the county of conviction and there is
no evidence that disputes Appellant’s identity or that he is the same person who was
convicted of the 2022 offense as alleged in the enhancement. Therefore, Appellant
was not misled or prejudiced because of this clerical error.
Accordingly, this factor weighs heavily in favor of finding that Appellant was
not harmed by the trial court’s error.
3. The Arguments of Counsel
During counsels’ punishment arguments, the State asked the jury to assess a
lengthy prison sentence, described the punishment range as “[f]ive to life” consistent
with the charge, and at one point suggested that a sentence of more than thirty-
13
years—ten years above the second-degree felony maximum—was appropriate.
However, the State’s argument did not focus solely on the 2022 conviction, but
rather on Appellant’s lengthy and sustained criminal history in general which dated
back to 1999. It is proper for the State to make such an argument during the
punishment phase even when it does not assert an enhancement allegation. See
CRIM. PROC. art. 37.07, § 3(a)(1) (West Supp. 2026) (allowing evidence to be
admitted during punishment regarding “any matter the court deems relevant to
sentencing, including but not limited to the prior criminal record of the defendant”).
Furthermore, when the State did mention the 2022 conviction, the prosecutor
focused not so much on the existence of the conviction itself, but rather on the
underlying conduct that resulted in that conviction—how the sentence that Appellant
received was a “gift” and that he resumed using methamphetamine within weeks of
his release from prison.
Appellant’s trial counsel’s argument highlights the lack of any harm to
Appellant when he told the jury that the reason that Appellant pled “not true” to the
enhancement was only because of the discrepancy with the county of conviction in
the judgment. Significantly, Appellant’s trial counsel did not argue that Appellant
pled “not true” because Appellant was not the same person who was named and
identified in the enhancement allegation and the 2022 judgment of conviction. Thus,
Appellant’s only argument—that the actual county of conviction differed from what
was recited in the indictment’s enhancement allegation and the judgment of
conviction—is premised on a fact that, as explained above, is immaterial. Cf.
Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of finding that Appellant was not
harmed.
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4. Any Other Relevant Information
Finally, the fourth Almanza “catch-all” factor requires that we consider any
other relevant information in the record that would assist in our determination of
whether Appellant was harmed by the complained-of charge error. Gelinas v. State,
398 S.W.3d 703, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. Here,
the record does not indicate that the jury, during its punishment deliberations, ever
inquired of or submitted any note or other form of communication to the trial court
concerning the deficiencies in the charge to which Appellant now complains, or how
the charge as submitted would affect him. Thus, the record does not show, or even
suggest, that the jury was influenced, confused, or misled by the instructions in the
punishment charge that Appellant now complains were erroneous. Arevalo v. State,
675 S.W.3d 833, 861 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, no pet.); Alaniz v. State, 648
S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, no pet.) (citing Hooper v. State, 255
S.W.3d 262, 272–73 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. ref’d)).
We have outlined the evidence above that is pertinent to our harm analysis.
Because there is no other information in the record that assists in our analysis or
shows or suggests that the jury’s punishment verdict was influenced or affected by
the charge error, and Appellant has not directed us to any, this factor weighs in favor
of finding that Appellant was not harmed.
5. The Almanza Factors Considered Together
Because of the foregoing considerations and the standard of review that we
must employ, we conclude that Appellant did not suffer “some harm” as a result of
the trial court’s error to justify reversal.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue.
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III. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE
November 19, 2026
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.
16