Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS NO. AP-77,091 RONALD LEE HASKELL, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS ON DIRECT APPEAL FROM CAUSE NO. 1434395 IN THE 351ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT HARRIS COUNTY Walker, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which SCHENCK, P.J., and RICHARDSON, YEARY, NEWELL, KEEL, FINLEY, and PARKER, JJ., joined. MCCLURE, J., did not participate. OPINION Appellant Ronald Lee Haskell was indicted for capital murder for fatally shooting Katie and Stephen Stay during the same criminal transaction. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03(a)(7)(A). At trial, Appellant asserted the affirmative defense of insanity. See id. § 8.01(a) (“It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the 2 time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong.”). A Harris County jury rejected Appellant’s insanity defense and convicted him of capital murder as charged in the indictment. Based on the jury’s answers to the punishment phase special issues, the trial court sentenced Appellant to death. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071, § 2(b), (e), (g). Direct appeal to this Court is automatic. Id. § 2(h). Appellant raises seven points of error in the (1) admission of an audio recording; (2) denial of his motion for a mistrial; (3) sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s affirmative finding of future dangerousness; (4) admission of hearsay evidence; (5) admission of impeachment evidence; (6) presentation of false and misleading evidence; and (7) punishment phase jury charge. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction and sentence of death. I — Background 1 Appellant and Melannie Lyon met as children in elementary school while living in San Marcos, California, where both of their families were active in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Appellant and his family later moved to 1 While Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, we provide a detailed background of the offense here as the facts are relevant to his sufficiency challenge to the jury’s affirmative future dangerousness finding. 3 Alaska. He and Melannie reconnected while she was in college. 2 After dating for approximately a year, they married in March 2002. The couple lived briefly with Appellant’s parents in Alaska, then relocated to Logan, Utah, when Melannie was pregnant with the first of their four children. Shortly into the marriage, Appellant became controlling. He would not allow Melannie to work or make any financial decisions. He determined whom she could associate with, and he isolated her from her family. Appellant also began physically abusing Melannie—often in front of their children. The abuse consisted of hitting, kicking, and choking. Appellant left marks, but typically in areas obscured by clothing so no one would know. Melannie was afraid to report Appellant to the police because he repeatedly promised that if she ever did, he would kill her family and then her. 3 In addition, he threatened to take their children from her if she disclosed the abuse or attempted to leave him. Appellant also physically and verbally abused their children. 2 Since several individuals referenced in this opinion share the same surname, we refer to individuals by their first names after introducing them by their full names. 3 Appellant typically took Melannie’s phone when he assaulted her so she could not call for help. However, Melannie described one occasion in 2008 when Appellant “slipped up and left a phone where [she] could get to it,” and she called the police. Appellant was arrested and later convicted of domestic violence assault. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102, 76-5-114(2), 77-36- 1(4)(b)(iii) (Appellant was convicted of both domestic violence assault and “Commission of domestic violence in the presence of a child.” Section 76-5-114(2) is a renumbered version of the statute Appellant was convicted under, formerly § 76-5-109.1(2)(c).). 4 In June 2013, after more than a decade of enduring Appellant’s violent behavior, Melannie left Appellant and went to a women’s shelter with their children. While there, she obtained a protective order, filed for divorce, and contacted her family to tell them about the abuse. After five weeks at the shelter, Melannie and the children returned to the condominium she and Appellant shared. 4 Shortly after her return, the police conducted a welfare check on Melannie because Appellant had threatened to kill her. In November 2013, two of Melannie’s siblings, her sister Katie Stay and her brother Kyle Lyon, traveled from Texas to Utah to help Melannie and the children move to Texas, where most of Melannie’s family (the Lyons) lived. As they were packing, Appellant called their oldest son, eleven-year-old J.H. Apparently, Appellant had learned that Katie was in Utah at the condominium. He told J.H. that if Katie was helping them, he would “make her pay.” Alarmed by Appellant’s threat, Melannie called friends from church to help them pack so that they could leave sooner. They left Utah that day. Once in Texas, Melannie and the children moved in with her parents, Roger and Kelly Lyon. 4 When Melannie fled to the shelter, she and Appellant were living in a condominium and building a house. Appellant was not living in the condominium when Melannie returned from the shelter. The record is unclear about where he was living, but it reflects that, at various times, he lived with his older brother and his parents. 5 Appellant and Melannie’s divorce became final in February 2014. Melannie was awarded their house that was under construction, which she sold because she needed the money to support herself and the children. However, the check for the proceeds of the sale was sent to their old address (the condominium) and then was forwarded to Appellant in California where he was living with his parents. Appellant deposited the check into his account. On July 2, 2014, Melannie called Appellant’s mother Karla Haskell to ask if the check was inadvertently sent to Appellant. When Karla later asked Appellant about the check, he became angry and attacked her. He pushed her down into a chair, duct-taped her to it, and told her, “The next time you see me and what happens next, it’s going to be on Fox News.” Appellant then repeatedly choked his mother until she lost consciousness. He left the house, leaving Karla bound and unconscious. After leaving his parents’ home, Appellant embarked on a six-day journey from California to Texas. Along the way, he:  purchased duct tape, a pillow, and a pillow cover at a Walmart in Mesquite, Nevada;  renewed his truck’s vehicle registration in Logan, Utah;  burglarized the home of a former girlfriend in Willard, Utah, and stole her Springfield XD 9mm semiautomatic handgun;5 5 Appellant later disclosed that he stole the gun because he knew he could not legally purchase a firearm due to his domestic violence assault conviction. 6  purchased 150 rounds of 9mm ammunition (including hollow-point rounds), an extra magazine for the stolen gun, a red laser sight, a holster, and ear plugs at a Cabela’s sporting goods store in Lehi, Utah; 6 and  checked into a La Quinta Inn & Suites hotel in Albuquerque, New Mexico, where he conducted online research on Melannie’s family, searching for directions to Houston and contact information for her family members. Appellant arrived north of Houston late in the morning on July 7, 2014. He checked into a Days Inn & Suites hotel located 2.7 miles from Katie and Stephen Stay’s residence and resumed his online research of Melannie’s family. Two days later, on July 9, 2014, Appellant checked out of the Days Inn hotel and went to a movie. Later that afternoon, he drove to the home of Melannie’s parents intending to kill them, but he reconsidered his plan because he did not want to kill Melannie’s family in front of his children. Instead, he drove to Katie and Stephen’s nearby home. Shortly after 5:00 p.m., Appellant parked his truck several blocks from the Stay residence. Disguised as a delivery person, Appellant knocked on the front door of the home. 7 The Stay children—fifteen-year-old C.S., thirteen-year-old B.S., nine- 6 While in Lehi, Appellant received an alert on his phone revealing that his brother, who was paying for the phone, had activated the family location tracking feature. Appellant turned his phone off and did not use it again. 7 Appellant wore sunglasses and his FedEx shirt and cap from his former employment with the company. He also carried a “package” that he created by rolling up a pillow and wrapping it with duct tape, both of which he had purchased on his journey to Texas. 7 year-old E.S., seven-year-old R.S., and four-year-old Z.S.—were home alone while their parents were running an errand. C.S. opened the door. Appellant asked her if it was the Stay residence, and she confirmed that it was. Appellant then asked her if her parents were home, and C.S. said they were not. She offered to sign for the package, but Appellant informed her that her parents needed to sign for it. C.S. told him that her parents should return home around 7:00 p.m., and then he left. Five or ten minutes later, Appellant knocked on the door again. When C.S. opened the door, he asked if her parents had returned. Confused, since only minutes had passed, C.S. told him, “No.” She then stepped back and turned around to look at the clock in the living room “just kind of for effect” because she was “pretty sure only like five or so minutes had passed.” By the time C.S. turned back to the door, Appellant had moved inside and closed the door. C.S. nervously asked Appellant, “Can I help you?” Appellant told her that he knew her parents from California; she assumed that he knew them from church. To get Appellant to leave, C.S. asked for his name and told him that she would tell her parents that he had stopped by. Appellant removed his sunglasses and informed her that he was “Ron Haskell.” C.S. realized that Appellant was “Uncle Ronnie,” her Aunt Melannie’s ex- husband. She asked him what he was doing there as her siblings, hearing someone inside their home, emerged from other parts of the house. C.S. begged Appellant not 8 to hurt them because she “knew how awful he was.” Appellant suggested that C.S. and the other children go sit in the living room. C.S. refused, and he pulled a gun from his pocket and pointed it at her. C.S. then complied with his demand, and she and her siblings went into the living room. Appellant returned the gun to his pocket, followed the children into the living room, and sat on the brick fireplace ledge with his pretend package. C.S. did not know what to do as they sat in the living room waiting for her parents. Appellant suggested that she turn on a movie for the younger children. She did so, hoping to keep them distracted. Appellant did not interact with the children but asked who Z.S. was. C.S. told Appellant Z.S.’s name and age. She then proceeded to name all her siblings and give their ages. C.S. hoped to appeal to Appellant’s humanity; she did not think he “would hurt kids if [he] knew how old they were and what their names were.” Around 5:40 p.m., B.S. apparently heard Stephen’s car pull up and announced, “Dad’s home.” Afraid that Appellant would shoot her siblings if they got up to greet their parents, C.S. suggested that they “surprise” their parents by waiting quietly for them in the living room. Her siblings agreed and remained in the living room. Appellant walked to the back door. As Stephen unlocked and opened the door, Appellant pulled it further open. He directed Stephen and Katie to come 9 inside, but they resisted and confronted Appellant about being in their home. Appellant then pulled out his gun and pointed it at Stephen. He again commanded the Stay parents to come inside, and they complied. Once they were inside, Appellant requested Stephen’s phone, and Stephen handed it to him.8 Stephen and Katie then joined their children in the living room. Appellant returned the gun to his pocket. Katie asked Appellant what he was doing there, and he said that he had come to get his children. In a placating manner, Katie told Appellant that his youngest daughter would be happy to see him. Appellant then informed the Stay family that he needed to tie them up. At Katie’s prompting, all seven complied with Appellant’s commands and laid face down on the living room floor. Appellant then said that he would need a car, and Stephen offered his. Stephen retrieved his car keys, gave them to Appellant, and returned to the floor. Appellant pocketed Stephen’s keys and grabbed the rolled-up pillow from the fireplace ledge.9 He withdrew the gun from his pocket and began counting softly to himself. When Katie saw Appellant pull out the gun, she screamed, got up, and “started to just fight with [Appellant].” In the struggle, Appellant dropped the pillow but retained control of the gun. He then shot Katie at close range in her face. 8 Katie had thrown her phone into the backyard before entering the home. 9 The State theorized that besides using the rolled-up pillow as a pretend package, Appellant intended to use it as a homemade silencer. 10 She fell to the floor and rolled away, curling up and raising her hand to protect herself. Appellant stepped toward her and shot her again in the back of her head, killing her. As Appellant shot Katie, Stephen grabbed Z.S. from the floor and moved toward the couch, placing Z.S. behind him. Appellant turned and shot Stephen twice on the left side of his head, killing him. Appellant then shot Z.S. once in the shoulder and again in the back of his head, killing him. Appellant next turned to the remaining children lying on the floor. He fired at R.S. twice. The first shot missed, hitting the floor by her head; the second shot struck her on the top of her head but did not immediately kill her. Appellant then shot C.S., who had covered her head with her hands for protection. The bullet hit her finger, which deflected the bullet so that it struck C.S. on the side of her head but did not penetrate her skull. C.S. had been screaming since Appellant shot her mother, but she fell silent and “just went limp,” and pretended to be dead. Appellant next shot E.S. at close range on the side of her head, killing her. Finally, Appellant shot B.S. on the upper side of his head, killing him. In total, Appellant fired thirteen rounds at the seven Stay family members. He then ran out of the house and left in Stephen’s car. When C.S. was certain Appellant was gone, she got up off the floor and called 911 from the landline phone in her father’s office. Police and emergency medical 11 services responded to the Stay residence, where they found C.S. crying, hysterical, and bleeding from her head. They also discovered that R.S. was still alive. C.S. was transported by ambulance to the hospital. R.S. was flown by helicopter to the hospital, where she ultimately died. Meanwhile, after shooting the Stays, Appellant stopped for a drink at a Sonic fast-food restaurant. He then reloaded the gun he had used on the Stay family and drove toward Melannie’s parents’ home. A Harris County deputy constable passed Appellant traveling toward the residence. Noticing that the driver and car matched the suspect and vehicle descriptions that had been broadcasted over the police radio, the deputy turned around to pursue Appellant. He caught up to Appellant and activated his emergency lights to signal Appellant to stop, but Appellant did not stop. Instead, he evaded the deputy by driving through a parking lot. The deputy then activated his siren and continued to pursue Appellant. Other police units joined the pursuit. Appellant pulled into Melannie’s parents’ driveway. 10 However, when officers exited their vehicles to apprehend Appellant, he backed out of the driveway and evaded them by driving quickly in reverse. Appellant managed to turn the car 10 The occupants of the Lyon house (Melannie’s parents, Melannie, her children, her sister Aurielle Lyon, and Aurielle’s son) had already left the residence after receiving a call about the shooting at the Stay’s. 12 around and drive off. He then led more than a dozen police units on a ten-to-twenty- minute chase. The pursuit ended when Appellant drove into a cul-de-sac and stopped outside the residence of Melannie’s brother Drue Lyon. The police blocked Appellant in the cul-de-sac. An hours-long standoff between Appellant and police ensued. Appellant refused to surrender and threatened suicide or violence if officers approached the vehicle. Officers with the Harris County Sheriff’s Office High-Risk Operations Unit (hostage negotiators) were called to the scene. Multiple negotiators spoke to Appellant by phone for several hours attempting to convince him to surrender peacefully. Finally, after speaking by phone with his brother, Appellant surrendered just before 10:00 p.m. and was taken into custody. The day of the slayings, July 9, 2014, was exactly one year from the date Appellant was served with the protective order after Melannie fled to the shelter with their children. II — Admission of Audio Recording In point of error one, Appellant challenges the admission of an audio recording made by Lieutenant George Beck, a patrol officer with the Harris County Precinct 4 Constable’s Office. According to Appellant, the recording was inadmissible under Rule of Evidence 403. See TEX. R. EVID. 403. On the evening of the murders, Beck was on duty attending an HOA meeting 13 a few blocks from the Stay residence. He received a call from a dispatcher about a disturbance at the Stay’s, indicating that “there was possibly a female that was shot.” Beck immediately went to the location. When he arrived at the home, he turned on his pocket audio recorder and knocked on the front door. 11 C.S., still on the phone with 911, answered the door. Beck observed that she was crying, hysterical, and bleeding on the left side of her head. During Beck’s guilt phase testimony, the State offered State’s Exhibit 24, which was a fourteen-minute audio recording of Beck’s interaction with C.S. upon his arrival. The recording captures Beck’s attempt to gather information from C.S.; his communications with dispatch, requesting backup and EMS; his assessment of the scene as he checked for survivors; his discovery that R.S. was still alive; and his attempts to comfort R.S. while awaiting EMS. Appellant objected to the admission of the audio recording: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, this is a recording, obviously, from Lieutenant Beck’s recorder and we suspect that [C.S.] will be on this recording as well. So we object, one, it’s hearsay; and [C.S.] will testify in a certain hearing at another time. I mean, I think it may be taken out of order right now, and also the fact that it’s probably cumulative to what Lieutenant Beck has already testified to. [DEFENSE CO-COUNSEL]: Judge, I also would object to 403, it’s more prejudicial than probative. She’s hysterical. 11 Beck testified that activating the audio recorder was his normal routine on all scenes. Precinct 4 officers did not have body cameras at that time. 14 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And we wouldn’t be able to cross-examine, I guess, on that; and maybe some Crawford issues as well.[12] [DEFENSE CO-COUNSEL]: Yes, so confrontation. The prosecutor responded that C.S. would testify and Appellant would have the opportunity to cross-examine her, so there was no confrontation issue. She further argued that C.S.’s statements were admissible as excited utterances, which are exceptions to the hearsay prohibition. Appellant continued urging his objection: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, it’s based on Crawford. I understand the State’s reply to my objection. As far as Crawford is concerned, I think Crawford addresses this specifically. This recording was made in preparation for trial. I think the Supreme Court has ruled that any kind of recordings that are made in preparation of trial [are] hearsay. I understand we’ll have the opportunity to get into it with [C.S.]; but again, he’s going to testify to his own conversations, at least his part of the conversation. [DEFENSE CO-COUNSEL]: Also, it’s testimonial under Crawford. At this point, the trial court concluded the bench conference and excused the jury for lunch. The Court resumed the discussion, stating, “While they’re out, let’s take one more minute to discuss. We had the Crawford issue prior to the time the jury went out.” The court then suggested that delaying the presentation of the 12 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004) (holding that Confrontation Clause bars admission of out-of-court testimonial statements of witnesses unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant had prior opportunity to cross-examine witness). 15 recording until C.S. testified “might avoid any Crawford issues.” The parties and the court then engaged in an extended discussion about whether C.S.’s statements— some made in response to Beck’s questions—were testimonial. The trial court ultimately ruled that it would allow the recording to be played and advised Appellant to further object if he found “something along the way to be objectionable.” The State played the audio recording for the jury. Appellant did not object further. Appellant now contends on appeal that the trial court erred by admitting “an audio recording that captured the final moments of seven-year-old R.S.’s life” because any probative value of the recording was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. See TEX. R. EVID. 403 (providing that trial court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value “is substantially outweighed” by one of several enumerated risks, including “unfair prejudice”). He argues that the recording was more prejudicial than probative because it contained the “deeply disturbing” sounds of R.S. as she struggled to survive, Beck’s descriptions of R.S. to EMS personnel arriving on the scene, and Beck’s attempts to comfort R.S. The State argues that Appellant did not preserve this complaint for appellate review. We agree. To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must timely object and 16 state the grounds for the objection with “sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context.” TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). While it is not necessary to employ “magic words” or cite to specific statutes or rules, a party must convey the substance of the complaint to the trial court. Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see Laws v. State, 640 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). Further, the complaint on appeal must comport with the complaint made at trial. Bekendam v. State, 441 S.W.3d 295, 300 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). At trial, Appellant objected to the admission of the audio recording on hearsay and confrontation grounds, which related to C.S.’s statements on the recording. It is true that Appellant briefly asserted a Rule 403 objection. 13 But the basis for Appellant’s Rule 403 trial objection was that “[s]he’s hysterical.” He now argues that the recording was inadmissible under Rule 403 because it “capture[d] a child’s last moments on Earth.” His Rule 403 appellate complaint does not comport with his Rule 403 trial objection. “In determining whether a complaint on appeal comports with a complaint made at trial, we look to the context of the objection and the shared understanding 13 We do not find in the record where the trial court addressed or ruled on that objection. We will assume that the court’s admission of the recording implicitly denied Appellant’s Rule 403 objection. 17 of the parties at the time.” Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Before the recording was offered, Beck testified that C.S. was crying and hysterical. It is evident that the Rule 403 “[s]he’s hysterical” objection referred to C.S. Furthermore, the entire lengthy discussion surrounding Appellant’s trial objections focused on C.S. and her statements. Appellant did not once mention R.S. or reference the content of the recording capturing her last moments. Nor did he mention Beck’s statements to EMS or to R.S. It is clear from the context that both the judge and the prosecutors understood Appellant’s objections—including his Rule 403 objection—to be about C.S.’s statements on the recording. We conclude that Appellant’s Rule 403 complaint was not preserved for appellate review because it did not comport with the objections made at trial and it was raised for the first time on appeal. See Hallmark v. State, 541 S.W.3d 167, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“Because the complaint on appeal does not comport with either of the trial objections, nothing is presented for review.”). We overrule point of error one. III — Denial of Mistrial In point of error two, Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for mistrial based on an allegedly inflammatory question posed by the State. During the guilt phase, Sergeant David Johnson, a negotiator with the Harris 18 County Sheriff’s Office High-Risk Operations Unit, testified about his interaction with Appellant during the standoff. He described his observations of Appellant and recounted statements that Appellant made. Johnson opined that Appellant did not appear to be suffering from a mental health crisis. On cross-examination, Appellant questioned Johnson about his knowledge of Appellant’s mental health history, including his various hospitalizations, reported symptoms, and diagnoses. Appellant specifically asked Johnson if he was aware that Stephen Raffle, Appellant’s psychiatric expert, had rendered an opinion that, at the time of the murders, Appellant was suffering from a severe mental illness and, as a result, did not know his conduct was wrong. During the redirect examination of Johnson, the prosecutor sought to ask Johnson if he was aware of Appellant’s other diagnoses: [PROSECUTOR]: Were you aware that the first doctor that went to interview the defendant a few weeks after this happened, a guy named Dr. [Phillip] Resnick, at the Defense’s request, and that he did not find the defendant was suffering from a severe mental illness? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Judge. It’s assuming facts not in evidence. It’s incorrect. It’s a completely improper question. THE COURT: I will overrule the objection based on the fact that some of the questions that you did ask this witness previous were under the same circumstances. I’ll allow you to wrap it up, though. You can continue. But defense counsel asked to approach the bench. The following discussion 19 occurred in the bench conference: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: She’s asserting something that’s, No. 1, false and she has no basis in fact to say that. THE COURT: Have her move on. [PROSECUTOR]: With all due respect, you asked this witness based on your own expert that he was suffering severe mental illness. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Let me cut you off for a second. What is your basis of fact for asserting that Dr. Resnick didn’t give that opinion? [PROSECUTOR]: Because when you gave us the [mitigation] report, you said that your guy said he had suffered mental illness, depression, not schizophrenia, and that if he wasn’t [sic] insane you would have put that in the mitigation report. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So you’re speculating? [PROSECUTOR]: No, sir. Based on information you have given us. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: There’s no opinion in any of what I’ve given you from Dr. Resnick. [PROSECUTOR]: The mitigation report that you gave the State in regards to trying to make this a non-death capital, you stated that he was suffering from major depression. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s different. [SECOND PROSECUTOR]: It’s not schizoaffective. You opened the door to the line of questioning, [Counsel]. I’m sorry. That’s not my fault. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, I disagree, Judge. She’s asserting in the question that Dr. Resnick formed an opinion that he was not insane, and that’s absolutely false. It’s evidence. It’s information given that during 20 the negotiations the whole purpose of [the] mitigation package is to try to plead to life, and so this is information that’s provided to them. [PROSECUTOR]: He opened the door to this line of questioning. I’m trying to clear up any misperception that that question left. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I move for a mistrial because she’s injected false information that’s unsupportable, and it’s very prejudicial. I move for a mistrial. The court asked the prosecutor if she had the information with her, and she confirmed that the mitigation packet was available. The court ruled that it “[would] allow [the State] to continue without asking that question, and we’ll come back to the issue later.” Appellant asked the court to rule on his request for a mistrial, and the court denied it. Appellant then requested an instruction for the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s question. After the bench conference, the court instructed the jury, “I will ask you to disregard not only the last question but any responses. I’m not sure that there were any [responses] to it, but nonetheless disregard that question.” The State proceeded to ask Johnson if he was aware that psychiatrist Mark Moeller and psychologist Timothy Proctor, the State’s experts, had both found that Appellant was not suffering from a severe mental illness and that they both believed that Appellant knew his conduct was wrong. Appellant did not object to these questions. Later that day, outside of the jury’s presence, Appellant reurged his motion 21 for mistrial “based on prosecutorial misconduct,” arguing that the prosecutor’s “fundamentally improper question” violated the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution and the due course of law provision of the Texas Constitution. Appellant claimed that the State’s question included an “absolutely false” statement because the mitigation packet reflected that Resnick diagnosed Appellant with a major depressive disorder with psychotic features, which is a severe mental illness. In response, the prosecutor asserted that Appellant had opened the door with comparable questions to Johnson about his awareness of Raffle’s diagnosis. The prosecutor also informed the court that Appellant had objected in the middle of her question, so it was incomplete. Additionally, the prosecutor noted that Johnson did not answer the question and that the trial court promptly instructed the jury to disregard the question and any answer. The court reserved its ruling, stating its intent to revisit the issue at the end of the day. After testimony concluded that day, the court returned to the issue. The parties reargued their positions, each providing case law to the court. Appellant asserted that the State’s improper question “[told] the jury that the defense experts in effect are saying he’s not insane.” He further contended that the question was “so prejudicial” it constituted prosecutorial misconduct that violated his due process and due course of law rights. He insisted that the question was fundamental error 22 that could not be cured by the court’s instruction. The prosecutor emphasized to the court that Appellant’s objection had interrupted her question, which was intended to address the fact that Resnick’s diagnosis did not include schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder. She expressed that “it’s just unfortunately a bit of bad timing in the way the objection went down and not being able to finish the question.” The prosecutor also argued that the court’s instruction to disregard cured any error. The trial court did not rule and expressed its intent to address the matter before trial resumed the next day. Appellant then filed a written motion for mistrial, repeating his claim that prosecutorial misconduct resulted in constitutional violations. The next day, the parties argued the motion before the court, reiterating their previous arguments. The trial court stated that it had reviewed the applicable law and the legal authorities presented by both parties and was “in agreement with the State.” The court denied Appellant’s motion for mistrial. On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial “after the State asked a question of its witness on redirect that was inflammatory and introduced false information before the jury.” He insists that the State effectively “told the jury that [A]ppellant’s own paid expert found that [A]ppellant was not insane because he did not have a serious mental illness.” 23 Appellant’s allegations lack merit. “A mistrial halts trial proceedings when error is so prejudicial that expenditure of further time and expense would be wasteful and futile.” Bluntson v. State, 728 S.W.3d 87, 116 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-6476 (U.S. Mar. 23, 2026) (quoting Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)). It is appropriate only “in ‘extreme circumstances’ for a narrow class of highly prejudicial and incurable errors.” Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at 884 (quoting Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). The denial of a mistrial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Bluntson, 728 S.W.3d at 116. “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s ruling, considering only those arguments before the court at the time of the ruling.” Id.; Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at 884. We review the particular facts of each case and will “uphold the ruling if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Bluntson, 728 S.W.3d at 116. Here, the question at issue did not actually assert, as Appellant suggests, that Appellant’s first retained expert found that he was sane at the time of the offense. The question addressed the expert’s diagnosis, not his opinion of Appellant’s sanity. On cross-examination, Appellant had asked Johnson multiple questions about whether he was aware of various aspects of Appellant’s mental health, including 24 Raffle’s diagnosis. The trial court reasonably could have concluded that Appellant opened the door to questions asking whether Johnson was aware of the first expert’s diagnosis. Further, the court reasonably could have agreed with the prosecutor that the question, interrupted by Appellant’s objection, was intended to address the fact that Appellant’s first retained expert did not diagnose Appellant with a schizoaffective disorder. Thus, the question was not improper. Moreover, even if we construe the State’s interrupted question as an improper question, “[t]he asking of an improper question will seldom call for a mistrial, because, in most cases, any harm can be cured by an instruction to disregard.” Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 871, 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (quoting Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). “A mistrial is required only when the improper question is clearly prejudicial to the defendant and is of such character as to suggest the impossibility of withdrawing the impression produced on the minds of the jurors.” Id. (quoting Ladd, 3 S.W.3d at 567). Here, the interrupted question went unanswered, and the trial court immediately instructed the jury to disregard the question (and any answer). 14 See 14 Appellant criticizes the trial court’s instruction to disregard, complaining that it “reads far more like an optional request than a mandatory court order.” But Appellant did not object to the court’s instruction when it was given. Therefore, he did not preserve any complaint about the court’s instruction for appellate review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). 25 Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (explaining that instructions to jury are usually considered sufficient to cure improprieties that occur during trial, and courts generally presume that juries will follow judge’s instructions). The question at issue, in the context in which the State asked it, was not of such character as to suggest the impossibility of withdrawing any impression l