Emmanuel Nnanna Chukwujekwu v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 6th District (Texarkana)
Date FiledNovember 12, 2026
Docket06-26-00066-CR
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-26-00066-CR
EMMANUEL NNANNA CHUKWUJEKWU, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 9th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Court No. 25-05-07694
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Emmanuel Nnanna Chukwujekwu entered an open plea of guilty to evading arrest or
detention with a motor vehicle, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04
(Supp.). After a punishment hearing, the trial court entered a deadly weapon finding, found the
State’s habitual offender-punishment allegations true, and sentenced Chukwujekwu to thirty
years’ imprisonment.
In his sole issue on appeal, Chukwujekwu argues that the evidence was legally
insufficient to sustain the trial court’s deadly weapon finding.1 Because we find that
Chukwujekwu used his motor vehicle in a manner capable of causing serious bodily injury or
death, we overrule his point of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The State alleged in its indictment that Chukwujekwu intentionally fled from a peace
officer attempting to lawfully arrest or detain him and that “during the commission of the offense
or immediate flight therefrom, [Chukwujekwu] did then and there use or exhibit a deadly
weapon, to-wit: a motor vehicle.” Even though Chukwujekwu’s written-plea paperwork shows
that he pled true to the underlying offense, the appellate record confirms that he pled not true to
the deadly weapon finding and elected to have that issue tried to the bench.
At the evidentiary hearing, Clemente Duenas, an officer with the Shenandoah Police
Department, testified that he was on patrol on a Saturday when he observed a white BMW that
1
Originally appealed to the Ninth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme
Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Supp.). We follow the
precedent of the Ninth Court of Appeals in deciding the issues presented. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
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was reported as stolen being driven southbound on Highway 45 by a person later determined to
be Chukwujekwu and asked for backup prior to making any traffic stop. Duenas testified that the
traffic stop was initiated in “medium, moderate, not too heavy, not bumper to bumper” traffic
conditions after adequate backup from several law enforcement agencies were in place.
According to Duenas, Chukwujekwu “picked up speed” and led officers on a “high rate[]
of speed” chase spanning two counties. According to Duenas, even though the posted speed
limit was sixty-five miles per hour, Chukwujekwu was traveling “[eighty] miles an hour
whenever it first started, up to [ninety], up to [Duenas says was] 100 miles an hour in the HOV
[(high-occupancy vehicle)] lane.” Duenas testified that as Chukwujekwu sped up, he began
weaving in and out of traffic, drove in a manner Duenas described as “unsafe,” and made “an
evasive maneuver . . . to enter the HOV lane to continue to flee” after passing many vehicles.
Duenas testified that he witnessed Chukwujekwu “pick up his cell phone and . . . begin either
texting or making a phone call” while driving down the highway. Duenas said that, by that time
during the pursuit, traffic was “beginning to get more dense.”
The chase came to an end when an officer on foot deployed spike strips in the HOV lane
that punctured the stolen BMW’s tires. According to Duenas, the deputy deploying the spike
strips “physically had to hop, to jump over the barrier,” “throw out the vehicle spikes,” and
“immediately jump[] back over the barrier,” to avoid being hurt since “there was no cover for
him before he threw the spikes.”
Duenas’s body-camera and dash-camera footage caught the chase, involving at least three
marked patrol units with their lights and sirens activated, and it was played for the trial court.
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The dash-camera footage shows that Chukwujekwu weaved in and out of the four lanes of
southbound traffic without using turn signals on several occasions while evading arrest. In
addition to causing traffic to scatter, the chase caused several vehicles to pull over to the
shoulder of the highway. During the high-speed chase, Chukwujekwu came behind a silver
sports-utility vehicle (SUV), which was following another white vehicle at a safe distance.
Chukwujekwu passed the SUV on the right side, sped up, and crossed back over in front of the
SUV and right behind the white vehicle it was travelling behind before entering the far-left lane
of travel. The recording shows that Chukwujekwu narrowly missed the silver SUV, and Duenas
testified that Chukwujekwu used the motor vehicle in a manner that put others in danger of
serious bodily injury or death. The dash-camera footage also corroborated Duenas’s testimony
about how the deputy deployed the spike strips by jumping over the barrier and on the shoulder
of Chukwujekwu’s lane of travel as Chukwujekwu was approaching him.
“[G]iven the high rate of speed and the number of cars that were on the road at the time,”
the trial court entered a deadly weapon finding.
II. Legally Sufficient Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s Deadly Weapon Finding
By statutory definition, a deadly weapon is “anything that in the manner of its use or
intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 1.07(a)(17)(B) (Supp.). Thus, a motor vehicle may be found to have been used or exhibited as
a deadly weapon “if it is used in a manner that is capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury.” Brister v. State, 449 S.W.3d 490, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). In his sole point of error
on appeal, Chukwujekwu argues that the trial court erred by making an affirmative deadly
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weapon finding because he did not drive on the wrong side of the road, “did not lose control of
the motor vehicle he was driving, and no other motor vehicle or person on the road showed signs
of imminent danger of a collision.”
In evaluating Chukwujekwu’s complaint, “we must decide whether, in viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier of fact could have found
beyond a reasonable doubt that [Chukwujekwu] used or exhibited [the motor vehicle] as a deadly
weapon when he was [evading arrest].” Sierra v. State, 280 S.W.3d 250, 255 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009) (citing Cates v. State, 102 S.W.3d 735, 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). In reviewing this
legal-sufficiency complaint, we note that “[t]he factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses’
credibility and weight to be given to their testimony.” Clark v. State, 573 S.W.3d 367, 372 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2019, no pet.) (citing Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App.
2016)). “Accordingly, we are required to defer to the factfinder’s determinations of weight and
credibility of the witnesses.” Id. (citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010)). “Our duty, as a reviewing court, is not to reweigh the evidence from reading a cold
record but to act as a ‘due process safeguard ensuring only the rationality of the factfinder.’” Id.
(quoting Brister v. State, 414 S.W.3d 336, 342 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, pet. granted)
(Brister I), aff’d, 449 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (Brister II) (quoting Williams v. State,
937 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996))).
A deadly weapon finding requires evidence that “(1) the object was something that in the
manner of its use or intended use was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; (2) the
weapon was used or exhibited during the transaction from which the felony conviction was
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obtained; and (3) other people were actually endangered.” Id. (quoting Brister I, 414 S.W.3d at
342). Here, it is the third category that is at issue.
“While the danger to motorists must be actual and not merely hypothetical, it does not
require pursuing officers or other motorists to be in a zone of danger, take evasive action or
require a collision.” Id. Rather, “the State can satisfy its burden by proving the defendant used
the vehicle he was driving in a way that made the vehicle capable of causing a serious bodily
injury or death to others.” Jackson v. State, No. 09-18-00256-CR, 2019 WL 2111830, at *3
(Tex. App.—Beaumont May 15, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing
Moore v. State, 520 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017)). “[W]e consider factors such as
(1) intoxication; (2) speeding; (3) disregarding traffic signs and signals; (4) driving erratically;
and (5) failure to control the vehicle.” Lee v. State, No. 09-22-00163-CR, 2024 WL 3959227, at
*7 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 28, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
Here, the evidence shows that Chukwujekwu was speeding, disregarded traffic signs and
signals, and drove erratically. Chukwujekwu was driving well in excess of the speed limit on a
highway with “medium[ to] moderate” traffic. He disregarded several speed-limit signs and
traffic laws by weaving in and out of the highway lanes while passing traffic without using a turn
signal. Duenas testified, and the dash-camera footage confirms, that Chukwujekwu’s driving
was unsafe and that he narrowly missed a silver SUV while cutting it off to swerve over to the
left lane. Moreover, “[i]t is established that others being placed in actual danger includes peace
officers.” Clark, 573 S.W.3d at 374. Here, Duenas testified, and dash-camera footage shows,
that a deputy jumped over a barrier to deploy a spike strip in the HOV lane and had to
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immediately jump back over to avoid the possibility of getting hurt when the stolen BMW’s
wheels hit the spike strip. That demonstrated that the deputy was in a zone of danger.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that any
rational jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the manner in which Chukwujekwu
used his motor vehicle when evading arrest was capable of causing death or serious bodily
injury. Consequently, we overrule his sole point of error.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Charles van Cleef
Justice
Date Submitted: October 28, 2026
Date Decided: November 12, 2026
Do Not Publish
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