Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00285-CR ___________________________ JAMES WARWICK JONES, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS On Appeal from the 297th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1720722 Before Bassel, Wallach, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel MEMORANDUM OPINION I. Introduction Appellant James Warwick Jones appeals his convictions for one count of sexual assault of a child and one count of indecency with a child by contact for which he was sentenced to twenty years and fifteen years, respectively, with the sentences to run consecutively. See Tex. Penal Code § 21.11(a)(1), (d) (indecency with a child), § 22.011(a)(2) (sexual assault of a child). In a single point, Jones contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting extraneous sexual-offense evidence involving a victim other than the complainant for propensity purposes during the guilt–innocence phase because the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Because we hold that the record demonstrates that the trial court acted well within its broad discretion to admit evidence of the extraneous offenses, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. II. Background Jones does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. However, the challenge he raises to the admission of extraneous-offense evidence requires a truncated description of the underlying evidence of his acts against the complainant for which he was convicted. For purposes of efficiency, we borrow partly from the State’s summary of the evidence regarding the offenses involving the complainant and then supplement with additional details from the record to set that context. 2 Jones met the complainant when the complainant was in fifth or sixth grade. The complainant and his brother played baseball with Jones’s son, and as a result, Jones developed a friendship with the complainant’s father. The complainant’s father was in and out of prison throughout much of the complainant’s childhood. About the time that he became friends with Jones, the complainant’s father resumed using drugs and was eventually arrested. The complainant’s father asked Jones to look after his family while he was in prison, and Jones agreed. Jones started hanging around the complainant’s family, offered to help with the bills, and took the boys flying and on trips. He later began directly contacting the complainant and his brother, which made their mother angry because she felt that her parental authority was being undermined. Jones’s preferred mode of communication was Snapchat because the messages could be deleted after twenty-four hours and kept hidden from the complainant’s mother. Jones encouraged conflict between the complainant and his mother. A series of text messages from December 1, 2020, showed that the complainant’s mother had grounded him due to his behavior toward her and their home. Sometime after the complainant’s family’s trip to Gatlinburg over Thanksgiving 2020, the complainant started going to Jones’s house, and Jones gave him a foot massage. 3 The next time that the complainant went to Jones’s house was around Christmas break 2020, when the complainant was sixteen years old and Jones was fifty-three years old, and Jones gave him “a happy ending massage.” Jones told the complainant that getting undressed is “what you do in a massage,” so the complainant undressed and laid face down on Jones’s bed. The complainant covered his private areas with a towel. Jones began massaging the complainant with oil, 1 which felt slimy and weird to him. At a certain point, Jones began masturbating the complainant’s penis until the complainant ejaculated. He also inserted his finger into the complainant’s anus. Before the complainant left Jones’s house, Jones asked him to keep it a secret. In mid-January 2021, the relationship between the complainant and his mother was so bad that she kicked him out of the house. In the days that followed, the complainant texted his boss and his girlfriend and said that he could live with his grandparents and that he could stay with Jones if his grandparents needed a break. Approximately two weeks later, the complainant told his mother about the sexual assault, and she called the police despite the complainant’s reluctance. 2 That same day, the complainant texted a friend that he was back at home and that “it’s amazing now. LMAOOO. After that it just switched.” The complainant was not questioned about the meaning of “[a]fter that it just switched.” 1 The complainant testified that he saw Jones grab the oil from the nightstand. The police met with the complainant and had him draw a diagram of Jones’s 2 bedroom. 4 In February 2021, the complainant underwent a sexual-assault exam. The exam, which occurred several weeks after the sexual abuse, did not reveal any penile or anal injuries. Also in February 2021, a police officer observed the complainant’s forensic interview. The officer testified that the complainant had described “a month or two of grooming from October to December” during which Jones went from giving the complainant massages to masturbating the complainant and putting his finger in the complainant’s anus. The officer obtained “a Snapchat warrant” and was able to confirm that Jones had communicated with the complainant via Snapchat, but the information that was obtained was “minimal”: Out of the approximately 1,000 messages that Snapchat returned, only seventeen of those were between Jones and the complainant, and none of those seventeen messages related to the facts in this case. The officer also secured a search warrant for Jones’s home, and when the officer executed the search, the bedroom matched what the complainant had drawn. The nightstands, however, were completely empty except for some hairpins. Three cell phones were retrieved from Jones’s house, but nothing of “digital evidentiary value” was found on them.3 Throughout the defense’s cross-examination of the officer, the defense 3 (1) emphasized that the only evidence the officer had was the complainant’s story “without any other corroboration” and (2) implied that there were inconsistencies in 5 The officer learned of another victim—M.C.—from Jones’s ex-wife. The officer spoke with M.C. and believed that a separate offense had occurred “back in the ’90s.” Based on the officer’s investigation, he saw similarities between what had happened to M.C. and what had happened to the complainant, including that Jones had spent time grooming them, had separated the boys from their parents, had taken both boys on vacation, had spent time alone with each boy, and had a relationship of authority over the child (i.e., pastor or coach). Additionally, the sex acts performed on M.C. and the complainant were similar. After hearing the testimony, including testimony from M.C., the jury found Jones guilty of the offenses of sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by contact and recommended that he be sentenced to twenty years’ confinement and fifteen years’ confinement, respectively. The trial court sentenced Jones in accordance with the jury’s recommendations and ordered the sentences to run consecutively. This appeal followed. III. Analysis A. We explain why we overrule Jones’s issue. As noted above, Jones’s sole point challenges the admission of “extraneous sexual offense evidence involving M.C. for propensity purposes pursuant to Article 38.37 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure during the guilt[–]innocence phase of his forensic interview, thus arguing that the complainant was not credible and had fabricated the story. 6 [his] trial because the probative value of this evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403.” Though not unassailable, a trial court has broad discretion to strike the Rule 403 balance of probativeness over prejudice. As explained below, we conclude that the trial court acted within the broad limits of that discretion by permitting the jury to hear M.C.’s testimony. B. We set forth the applicable standard of review.4 We generally review a challenge to the admission of an extraneous offense and a concomitant Rule 403 challenge with respect to that decision under an abuse-of- discretion standard. Irsan v. State, 708 S.W.3d 584, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (“[A] trial judge’s ruling on the admissibility of extraneous offenses is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” (quoting De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009))), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 1589 (2026); Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard to Rule 403 analysis). In applying this standard, [w]e will not reverse a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence, and there is no abuse of discretion, unless that decision lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Beham v. State, 559 S.W.3d 474, 478 We borrow our recitation of the standard of review and our explanation of 4 how Article 38.37 broadens the range of admissible evidence in cases involving sexual crimes against children from our recent opinion in Tyson v. State, No. 02-25-00236-CR, 2026 WL 2450728, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 20, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication), which also involved the admission of extraneous sexual-offense evidence, and set forth that citation here once to avoid repetition, but we omit the block-quote format in these two sections for ease of reading. 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343–44; Barron[ v. State], 630 S.W.3d [392,] 410 [(Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d)]. Furthermore, we will uphold a trial court’s evidentiary ruling, even if the trial court’s reasoning is flawed, if it is correct on any legal theory that finds support in the record and is applicable to the case. Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Wishert[ v. State], 654 S.W.3d [317,] 329 [(Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet. ref’d)]; Dering v. State, 465 S.W.3d 668, 670 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, no pet.). Rodriguez v. State, 738 S.W.3d 890, 900 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2026, no pet.). C. We explain that Article 38.37’s effect broadens the range of admissible evidence in cases involving sexual crimes against children. Article 38.37 broadens the range of evidence that may be admitted against a defendant charged with the same crimes for which Jones was charged. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.37, § 1(a)(2), (13)(A). In essence, the statute allows the admission of evidence that might be otherwise inadmissible when a defendant allegedly commits sexual crimes against a child complainant or other children. See Jeansonne v. State, 624 S.W.3d 78, 94–95 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (“Essentially, [A]rticle 38.37 is an evidentiary rule applicable to certain types of sexual[-]abuse cases, including those involving sexual assault of a child, that supersedes the application of Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b), and makes admissible certain extraneous offense evidence that Rule 404(b) does not.”). The statute functions as follows: Article 38.37, Section 2(b) allows for the admission of evidence that the defendant has committed a separate offense of a sexual nature against a child; the “child victim” of the separate offense need not be the victim of the offense for which the defendant is currently on trial. Deggs[ v. State,] 646 S.W.3d [916,] 922[ (Tex. App.—Waco 2022, pet. ref’d)]; Ryder[ v. State], 514 S.W.3d [391,] 398–99[ (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2017, pet. 8 ref’d)]; Harris[ v. State], 475 S.W.3d [395,] 398–400[ (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d)]; see also Belcher v. State, 474 S.W.3d 840, 844–47 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2015, no pet.). Wishert, 654 S.W.3d at 330. Before admitting evidence within the ambit of Article 38.37, the trial court must conduct a hearing outside the jury’s presence to “determine that the evidence likely to be admitted at trial will be adequate to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the separate offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.37, § 2-a(1). D. We set forth the extraneous offenses that Jones allegedly committed. Under the purview of Article 38.37, the State sought to introduce extraneous offenses allegedly committed by Jones. The victim of those offenses, M.C., testified at the Article 38.37 hearing that in 1990, when he was fifteen years old, he had met Jones at church, and Jones was then twenty-three or twenty-four years old and was serving as M.C.’s Sunday school teacher.5 For the remainder of M.C.’s testimony from the hearing, we turn to the summary found in Jones’s brief: A relationship developed between M.C. and [Jones] where they would hang out at [Jones’s] home, play basketball[ at the rec center], watch TV, eat, have biblical talks, discuss family issues, and [go] on trips. M.C. described a Colorado ski trip [during which Jones] became upset when M.C. refused to share a bed with [him]. . . . M.C. went on to describe how [Jones] made biblical comparisons about M.C., [Jones], and M.C.’s father’s relationships to the relationships of David, Jonathan, and King At trial, M.C. testified that Jones co-led a small group of high school boys and 5 did one-on-one discipleship. 9 Saul in the [B]ible – with the point being [that] M.C.’s father was angry, jealous, and felt threatened by the close relationship between M.C. and [Jones]. M.C. further described a deteriorating relationship with his father and [said] that [he had] spent more time at [Jones’s] house and [had] even started spending the night as M.C.’s relationship with his father continued to deteriorate. M.C. also described an escalating physical relationship with [Jones] that started with hugging, then kissing on the cheek, then kissing on the lips, and [then Jones’s] massaging M.C.’s legs before basketball games. M.C. said [that] he started sleeping in [Jones’s] bed when he stayed overnight and would wear [Jones’s] silk boxer shorts to bed at [his] direction. M.C. then described a sexual offense where he woke up in [Jones’s] bed to [his] masturbating M.C.’s penis with [his] hand and [said] that [Jones had] also put M.C.’s penis in [his] mouth. M.C. then described a second sexual offense [during which] he [had] told [Jones that] he had crabs[,] and [Jones] applied ointment or lotion to M.C.’s groin, began masturbating M.C.’s penis with [his] hand, . . . put M.C.’s penis in [his] mouth, and caused M.C. to have an orgasm.[6] M.C. testified [that] he thought these sexual offenses [had] occurred when [he] was in the 10th grade when he was 15 or 16 years old. On cross-examination, M.C. indicated [that] he [had] never told anyone in law enforcement about the sexual offenses until 2021 . . . . M.C. believed [that] these sexual offenses [had] occurred during the 10th grade when he was 15 or 16 years old because he remembered getting his driver’s license, getting more playing time on the basketball team, events from church, and [attending] church camps and [going on] trips that [had] occurred around the same time. M.C. said [that] other sexual offenses [had] occurred after those described above[,] but he [had] “conveniently blocked that out of [his] memory.” The [sexual offenses] with [Jones] ended when M.C. graduated from high school and went to college. M.C. never told anyone about the sexual offenses because he did not want to revisit them[ and] felt guilt, shame, and confusion 6 Specifically, M.C. testified at the hearing that Jones had applied ointment or lotion to his “groin and to that area and then started kind of touching [his] penis and giving [him] a hand job. Eventually, [M.C.] had an orgasm[,] and [Jones] put his mouth down there [on his penis].” During trial, M.C. testified about this incident and said that after the orgasm, Jones “put his mouth on [M.C.’s] penis and swallowed the semen.” 10 because some positive things did come from their relationship. [Record references omitted.] E. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Jones’s objection that M.C.’s testimony should have been excluded because its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Jones raises arguments within his first issue based on the remoteness of the sexual offense involving M.C., the fact that he was never convicted of any crime involving M.C., the differences between his sexual conduct with M.C. and that involved with the complainant, M.C.’s testimony being “not so acutely necessary to [the State to] counter [Jones’s] defensive theory,” and the “graphic nature” of M.C.’s testimony. Jones’s arguments fail to persuade us that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting M.C.’s testimony. 1. We explain the juxtaposition that exists between Article 38.37 and Rule 403 and the trial court’s broad discretion in deciding to overrule a Rule 403 objection. As we did in Tyson, we describe the need to conduct a Rule 403 analysis when analyzing whether to admit evidence under Article 38.37, the presumption that operates when we apply Rule 403, and the factors at play in a Rule 403 analysis as follows: Even if extraneous-offense evidence is relevant and admissible under Article 38.37, that evidence can be excluded under Rule 403 if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the evidence’s probative value. See Wells v. State, 558 S.W.3d 661, 669 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. ref’d); Martin [v. State], 176 S.W.3d [887,] 895 [(Tex. App.— Fort Worth 2005, no pet.)]; see also Tex. R. Evid. 403. A trial court must conduct a Rule 403 analysis upon a proper objection or request. See 11 Belcher . . . , 474 S.W.3d [at] 847 . . . ; Sanders v. State, 255 S.W.3d 754, 760 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref’d). “Rule 403 favors the admission of relevant evidence and carries a presumption that relevant evidence is more probative than prejudicial.” James v. State, 623 S.W.3d 533, 546–47 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, no pet.) (first citing Montgomery[ v. State], 810 S.W.2d [372,] 389[ (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)]; and then citing Emich v. State, No. 02-18-00059-CR, 2019 WL 311153, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 24, 2019, [pet. ref’d]) (mem. op., not designated for publication)). Because of this presumption, it is the burden of the party opposing the admission of the evidence to show that the evidence’s probative value is substantially outweighed by one or more of the dangers listed in Rule 403—including unfair prejudice. James, 623 S.W.3d at 547; Wells, 558 S.W.3d at 669; Sanders, 255 S.W.3d at 760. To determine whether evidence is admissible in the face of a Rule 403 objection, the trial court must conduct a balancing test. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389; see Gigliobianco . . . , 210 S.W.3d [at] 641–42 . . . . The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has instructed that when undertaking a Rule 403 analysis, courts must balance (1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence and (2) the proponent’s need for that evidence against (3) any tendency of the evidence to suggest a decision on an improper basis, (4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues, (5) any tendency that a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the evidence would give it undue weight, and (6) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted. Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641–42. 2026 WL 2450728, at *7–8 (quoting Miranda v. State, No. 02-23-00324-CR, 2025 WL 1782540, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 26, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)). As we have noted, an appellant has a steep hill to climb when challenging a trial court’s exercise of its discretion in balancing the Gigliobianco factors: 12 “If judicial restraint is ever desirable, it is when a Rule 403 analysis of a trial court is reviewed by an appellate tribunal.” Montgomery . . . , 810 S.W.2d [at] 379 . . . (quoting United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 767 (3d Cir. 1978)). Thus, when the balance is close, the reviewing court “should favor admission, in keeping with the presumption of admissibility of relevant evidence.” Sanders[ v. State], 422 S.W.3d [809,] 815[ (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. ref’d)]. We reverse a trial court’s determination under a Rule 403 balancing test “rarely and only after a clear abuse of discretion.” Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 392 . . . (quoting United States v. Maggitt, 784 F.2d 590, 597 (5th Cir. 1986)). “Considering that the trial court has the best view of the evidence, an appellate court will uphold a trial court’s ruling on admissibility so long as it is within the ‘zone of reasonable disagreement.’” Inthalangsy[ v. State], 634 S.W.3d [749,] 754[ (Tex. Crim. App. 2021)]. Tyson, 2026 WL 2450728, at *8 (quoting Transue v. State, No. 02-22-00155-CR, 2023 WL 5114302, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 10, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)). 2. The remoteness in time and the alleged dissimilarity of Jones’s conduct against M.C. from the offenses that he had committed against the complainant did not render M.C.’s testimony inadmissible. With regard to the first factor pertaining to the inherent probative value of the evidence, Jones concedes at the outset that the extraneous sexual evidence involving M.C. is probative of Jones’s intent to commit the charged conduct and his propensity to commit child sex crimes. He contends, however, that the danger of prejudice as to the extraneous sexual evidence involving M.C. is particularly unfair due to “the extreme remoteness” of the evidence because the conduct against M.C. occurred more than thirty years before the charged conduct. Jones acknowledges that the remoteness of the extraneous sexual evidence involving M.C. “does not per se destroy 13 the probative value of that evidence” and that “‘remarkable similarities’ between [remote extraneous sexual evidence and] the charged conduct [would] strengthen the probative value of the extraneous sexual evidence.” But Jones argues that the remoteness of this extraneous evidence is “so extreme that it should have a dramatic diminishing effect on its probative value” and that though there are some factual similarities, “there are far more differences in the involved sexual conduct.” Jones has correctly summarized the law, but we disagree with his application of the law to these particular facts. As we did in Tyson, we set forth the law on remoteness: “[R]emoteness can significantly lessen the probative value of extraneous- offense evidence . . . because logically, the passage of time allows things and people to change.” See Gaytan v. State, 331 S.W.3d 218, 226 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. ref’d). However, “remoteness alone is not sufficient to render an extraneous offense excludable under Rule 403,” and other factors can bolster the probative value, such as remarkable similarities between the extraneous and charged offenses. Id. at 226–27 (explaining that probative force of “extremely remote event” from over twenty years prior was “significantly bolstered” by extraneous offenses being “remarkably similar” to charged offense and resulting in factor only “somewhat favor[ing] exclusion”). 2026 WL 2450728, at *9 (quoting Martinez v. State, No. 03-24-00354-CR, 2026 WL 899571, at *5 (Tex App.—Austin Apr. 2, 2026, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)); see also Leal v. State, No. 04-15-00552-CR, 2016 WL 4013791, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 27, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“The degree of similarity necessary when the extraneous offense is used to rebut a fabrication defense, however, is not as exacting as when the evidence is 14 being used to show a defendant’s modus operandi.” (citing Newton v. State, 301 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, pet. ref’d))). Here, contrary to Jones’s argument, the events of his assault on the complainant and on M.C. were remarkably similar. Jones claims that although both involved male-on-male hand-to-penis masturbation, the age difference was “far more significant in the charged offense”; the charged sexual-assault offense had no accusation of mouth-to-penis contact, no accusation of ejaculation in Jones’s mouth, and no accusation of his swallowing any semen; and the extraneous-offense evidence had no accusation of digital penetration. Jones’s argument takes a granular view of the charged offenses and the extraneous offenses. In addition to the charged offenses and the extraneous offenses involving male-on-male hand-to-penis masturbation, they shared the following similarities that Jones ignores in his brief: • The complainant and M.C. were both teenage boys (around age sixteen) at the time that Jones assaulted them; • Jones acted in a mentorship role to the complainant and to M.C.; • Jones started spending time with the complainant and M.C. outside of the activities where they had met and taking them on trips; • Jones encouraged enmity between the complainant and his mother and M.C. and his father; • Jones groomed both the complainant and M.C. by gradually progressing from giving them massages to performing sexual acts on them; and • The assaults occurred at Jones’s residence. 15 Even if we impose a standard of “remarkable similarity” to mitigate the remoteness of the acts against M.C., that standard does not make the trial court’s decision to admit evidence involving the acts perpetrated against M.C. an abuse of discretion. Instead, the trial court could have reasonably determined that the remarkable similarities between the extraneous offenses and the charged offenses strengthened the probative force of the evidence. See Robisheaux v. State, 483 S.W.3d 205, 220 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, pet. ref’d); see also West v. State, 554 S.W.3d 234, 239–40 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (concluding that acts of child molestation that had occurred twenty-nine to thirty years prior to the offense were admissible in the face of a Rule 403 objection, especially when the prior act was similar to the offense that was the subject of the trial). 7 7 Within his brief, Jones also argues that he was never convicted of the offenses involving M.C. and that no evidence of intervening conduct was admitted, thus attempting to further undercut the probative value of M.C.’s testimony. The Waco case that Jones relies on to support his argument reached no such conclusion but instead upheld the trial court’s decision to overrule the appellant’s Rule 403 objection and to allow evidence of an extraneous offense that had occurred twenty-five years prior to the offense on trial because the extraneous offense was sufficiently similar to the charged offense. See Newton, 301 S.W.3d at 320–22. The other case that Jones relies on was decided before the enactment of the rules of evidence—rules that favor the admission of relevant evidence, unlike common-law principles that tended to favor exclusion of evidence. See Bachhofer v. State, 633 S.W.2d 869, 872 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982), superseded by rule as stated in Robisheaux, 483 S.W.3d at 218. Moreover, extraneous offenses are admissible to prove the identity of the perpetrator, including a modus operandi in which the pattern and characteristics of the charged crime and the uncharged misconduct are distinctively similar. Stone v. State, 635 S.W.3d 763, 773 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. ref’d) (citing Segundo v. State, 270 S.W.3d 79, 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). 16 3. The record supports a determination that the State needed M.C.’s testimony. As to the second Gigliobianco factor regarding the State’s need for the evidence, Jones acknowledges that his defense at trial was fabrication as to the charged conduct, that evidence of [the complainant’s] motivation to fabricate his accusation against [Jones] was raised and emphasized at trial, that there was no physical or digital communication evidence that corroborated [the complainant’s] accusations against [Jones], and that therefore[ the complainant’s] credibility was a critical issue in the trial. Jones claims that the complainant “was a strong, non-reluctant, credible witness [who] held up well under cross[-]examination” and argues that if the complainant had testified poorly[ or] had been inconsistent as to [the] type and frequency of the sexual conduct with [Jones] relative to his prior statements, [that] if there had been a significantly delayed outcry, or [that] if there had been any retraction of his outcry[, then the] State’s need for the extraneous sexual evidence involving M.C. would have been far more acute. In the remainder of his argument contending that the State did not need M.C.’s testimony, Jones claims that the State could have presented evidence regarding his intervening sexual misconduct towards another victim, J.F.—an offense for which he entered a nolo contendere plea and received ten years’ deferred-adjudication community supervision in 1994. As explained below, Jones’s arguments fail to diminish the State’s need for M.C.’s testimony. We begin with Jones’s argument regarding the intervening offense with J.F. As the State explains in its brief, the problem with Jones’s suggestion that the State did 17 not need M.C.’s testimony because it could have presented evidence regarding Jones’s sexual misconduct with J.F. is that this sexual misconduct could also be subjected to a remoteness challenge since it also occurred in the 1990s but without th[e] same factual similarities. [Additionally], this evidence’s admission might have created a greater danger of unfair prejudice because J.F. was a person with Down Syndrome. [Furthermore], the fact that J.F. was deceased when this case was tried would have impacted the State’s ability to offer any specific evidence regarding that sexual misconduct and might potentially have subjected this evidence to a confrontation objection. [Record references omitted.] As can be seen from the State’s response, the probative value of the incident involving J.F. likely would not have overcome the prejudice hurdle due to its dissimilarities to the offense involving the complainant, as well as the confrontation- clause hurdle posed by the victim’s death. Moreover, the complainant’s consistent testimony does not alter the facts that there was no physical evidence of the offenses against him and that the offenses were not committed in the view of any third-party witnesses. As we pointed out in Tyson, the need for evidence of extraneous misconduct becomes stronger when the case comes down to the complainant’s word versus the defendant’s word. 2026 WL 2450728, at *8; see also Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 911 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“[I]n sexual assault ‘he said, he said,’ cases such as this one, where the credibility of both the complainant and the defendant is the central, dispositive issue, Rule 403 should be used very sparingly.”); Bradshaw v. State, No. 03-23-00356-CR, 2026 WL 878911, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 31, 2026, no pet.) (citing Hammer v. State, 296 18 S.W.3d 555, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)). And even more so when the appellant attacks the complainant as having fabricated his testimony, as Jones did here. The State’s need to rebut a defensive theory will sustain the trial court’s Rule 403 balancing decision in favor of the admission of an extraneous offense under Article 38.37. See Tyson, 2026 WL 2450728, at *8; Riddle v. State, No. 02-18-00388-CR, 2019 WL 3334429, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 25, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that the State’s need for the evidence was strong due to the lack of physical evidence and due to needing to rebut appellant’s argument that the complainant had fabricated allegations of abuse because she was angry with how she and her family had been treated). Thus, there was a need for M.C.’s testimony that supported the trial court’s decision to admit it. 4. The trial court acted within its discretion in concluding that no overarching prejudice resulted from M.C.’s testimony that rendered it inadmissible. Under the heading “Other Gigliobianco Factors” in his brief, Jones includes an abbreviated attack on most of the remaining Gigliobianco factors. After analyzing the remaining factors, we conclude that the balance struck by the trial court demonstrates that it acted within its broad discretion in admitting M.C.’s testimony. In balancing the third Gigliobianco factor of whether there is any tendency of the evidence to suggest a decision on an improper basis, we ask, as we did in Tyson, whether the extraneous offense is more heinous than the charged offense. 2026 WL 2450728, at *10. Jones argues, in an earlier portion of his brief, that the extraneous 19 sexual evidence involving M.C. is “more heinous” in nature because it went on longer, because it happened more often (as opposed to a one-time event like the charged conduct), and because he used his position in the church and biblical teachings to normalize the conduct and help facilitate the sexual acts. Jones further argues in the “other factors” section of his brief that the extraneous sexual evidence involving M.C. “is of such a graphic nature that it must at a minimum have some tendency, and at most a significant tendency, to cause . . . an indelible impact on the jury when determining [Jones’s] guilt as to the charged conduct.” Here, the trial court could have considered the charged sexual assault, which involved anal penetration, to be slightly more heinous than the sexual assault that M.C. described. See Aviles v. State, No. 01-07-01029-CR, 2008 WL 2611951, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 3, 2008, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (describing appellant’s sexual assault of nineteen-month-old child in which he penetrated her anus as “particularly heinous and brutal”). But even if the trial court considered both the charged offenses and the extraneous offenses involving M.C. to be equally heinous, evidence of the extraneous offenses would not likely cause unfair prejudice. See Tyson, 2026 WL 2450728, at *10; James, 623 S.W.3d at 549 (“[W]e hold that this third factor weighs in favor of admission of the extraneous-offense evidence that is not more heinous than the charged offenses.”); see also Stivers v. State, No. 06-25-00096-CR, 2026 WL 1098131, at *4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Apr. 23, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“When the extraneous offense is ‘no more heinous’ than 20 the charged offense, evidence of the extraneous offense is not likely to cause unfair prejudice.”). Additionally, the trial court gave a limiting instruction both at the time of the introduction of M.C.’s testimony and in the charge, and those instructions acted to ameliorate any prejudicial effect of the extraneous-offense evidence. See Tyson, 2026 WL 2450728, at *10; James, 623 S.W.3d at 549 (“When evidence does tend to suggest a decision on an improper basis, however, a limiting instruction can minimize the risk of the jury improperly relying on it in reaching its verdict.”).8 Jones makes no mention of the limiting instructions until his harm analysis, at 8 which point he claims that the instruction is not a LIMITING instruction at all. Quite the opposite. It is a license to use that extraneous evidence for highly prejudicial propensity purposes to convict [Jones] of the charged conduct – as opposed to convicting him based upon a fair and impartial judg[]ment of the direct evidence [that he] committed the charged conduct. [Record references omitted.] We note that Jones requested a limiting instruction; that the trial court gave an oral instruction; and that afterwards when the trial court asked if the defense was satisfied with the instruction, Jones’s counsel responded, “We are.” If Jones had some objection to the terms of the instruction given, he forfeited it. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A) (requiring objection to preserve error); Vitello v. State, No. 01-03-00669- CR, 2004 WL 1119948, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 20, 2004, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that error was forfeited because “appellant never objected that the trial court’s limiting instruction was insufficient”). On appeal, Jones concedes that the trial court provided a proper oral instruction prior to the admission of M.C.’s testimony but argues, without citing authority, that the instruction did the opposite of wha