Full Opinion

Opinion filed October 29, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-24-00280-CR __________ MICHAEL LEE LOPEZ, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 118th District Court Howard County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. 16833, 16834, & 16835 MEMORANDUM OPINION In trial court cause no. 16833, the jury convicted Appellant, Michael Lee Lopez, of possession of marihuana in an amount of five pounds or less but more than four ounces, a state jail felony, and assessed his punishment at confinement for ten years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and a fine of $5,000. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.121(b)(3) (West Supp. 2026). In this regard, Appellant pleaded “true” to two prior state jail felony convictions alleged for enhancement purposes thereby elevating the punishment range to that of a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.35(c) (West Supp. 2026). In trial court cause no. 16834, the jury convicted Appellant of possession of methamphetamine in an amount of 200 grams or more but less than 400 grams, a first-degree felony enhanced by a prior felony conviction, and assessed his punishment at confinement for seventy-five years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and a fine of $10,000. See HEALTH & SAFETY § 481.115(e); PENAL § 12.42(c) (1). In trial court cause no. 16835, the jury convicted Appellant of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, a third-degree felony enhanced by a prior felony conviction, and assessed his punishment at confinement for twenty years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and a fine of $7,500. See PENAL §§ 46.04(e), 12.42(a). The trial court sentenced Appellant in accordance with the punishment assessed by the jury and ordered that the three sentences run concurrently. In two issues, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. We affirm. Background Facts Corporal Dustin Wade Thomas of the Big Spring Police Department testified that he was conducting a narcotics investigation for the sale and distribution of methamphetamine in March 2022. The investigation focused on a residence located at 411 North Scurry in Big Spring. Corporal Thomas testified that this residence had been the focus of several narcotics investigations in the past. His investigation involved conducting surveillance of the home and making two controlled buys of methamphetamine through confidential informants. Corporal Thomas testified that the two controlled buys were from Appellant. In this regard, Corporal Thomas 2 testified that he was “[e]xtensively” familiar with Appellant. Corporal Thomas had no doubt that Appellant was the person who sold methamphetamine to the confidential informants at the residence. Based on the evidence derived from the surveillance and controlled buys, Corporal Thomas obtained a search warrant to search the residence. In order to “prevent any aggressions,” Corporal Thomas testified that the police waited for Appellant to leave the residence before executing the search warrant at the residence. Appellant’s elderly grandmother, Yolanda Vela, was the only person in the home at the time of the search. Other officers made a traffic stop of Appellant and Brittany Castillo while the search occurred. In this regard, officers stated that Castillo drove to the residence, picked up Appellant, and then the pair left the residence. Corporal Thomas testified that officers found contraband in a locked white television cabinet located in the northeastern corner bedroom of the home. In this regard, Vela did not have a key to the locked cabinet. The cabinet contained a large quantity of methamphetamine and marihuana and two firearms. Officers also found inside of the locked cabinet a debit card issued to Appellant and his DPS identification card. Additionally, the cabinet contained a receipt from Saks Fifth Avenue in San Antonio issued to Appellant 1 for a pair of expensive sneakers purchased a few days earlier. Corporal Thomas also testified that several pieces of mail addressed to Appellant was located in the bedroom, as well as a legal document and tax document bearing Appellant’s name. From the stop of Appellant and Castillo, officers recovered $836 in cash from the center console of the vehicle, $87 from the glove box, and $1,700 from Appellant’s pocket. 1 Appellant’s name was on the receipt. 3 Former Big Spring Police Officer Julian Ramirez confirmed in his testimony that Appellant was the person that sold methamphetamine from the residence during the two controlled buys. Officer Ramirez also testified that he asked Vela where Appellant stayed when he was at the residence and she “insinuated” that it was the bedroom where the locked cabinet was located. He additionally testified that none of Vela’s clothes appeared to be kept in the bedroom with the locked cabinet. Appellant called some family members as witnesses during his case-in-chief. Briana Jade Mendez is Appellant’s cousin. She testified that the residence belonged to Appellant’s grandmother, Vela, and that no one else lived there. She also testified that no one stayed in the bedroom where the locked cabinet was located, and that Appellant never stayed there. She said that the bedroom with the locked cabinet was a guest room for family that visited Vela. Becky Sue Lopez Mendez is also Appellant’s cousin. She testified that the residence at 411 North Scurry had been owned by her family for almost 100 years and that family frequently visited her grandmother there. She also testified that no one lived with Vela, that the bedroom with the locked cabinet was a guest room for visitors, and that Appellant never stayed there. Ismael Juarez is Appellant’s friend. He testified that Castillo is his niece and that Appellant lived with her. Castillo testified that Appellant is the father of her seven children. She indicated that Appellant’s name is on her apartment lease and that he did not live at the 411 North Scurry residence in March 2022. With respect to the cash found in the vehicle that she and Appellant occupied when they were stopped, she testified that it came from her tax refund. She denied that she picked up Appellant from the residence, but rather he rode to the residence with her to drop off a vehicle. On cross examination, Castillo testified that Appellant would “go help” Vela and that Appellant used 411 North Scurry as a mailing address. 4 Analysis We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, including pieces of evidence that may have been improperly admitted. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the factfinder’s role as the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight witness testimony is to be afforded. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. This standard accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. It is not necessary that the evidence directly prove the defendant’s guilt; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing a defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence can alone be sufficient to establish guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). Each fact need not point directly and independently to guilt if the cumulative force of all incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. 5 Because evidence must be considered cumulatively, appellate courts are not permitted to use a “divide and conquer” strategy for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Instead, appellate courts must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). In Appellant’s first issue, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for possession of methamphetamine and marihuana. A person is guilty of possession of a controlled substance if he or she intentionally or knowingly possessed the controlled substance. HEALTH & SAFETY § 481.115(a). Likewise, a person is guilty of possession of marihuana if he intentionally or knowingly possesses marihuana. Id. § 481.121(a). The Health and Safety Code defines “possession” as “actual care, custody, control, or management.” Id. § 481.002(38). To prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must show (1) that the accused exercised control, management, or care over the substance and (2) that the accused knew the matter possessed was contraband. Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), overruled in part on other grounds by Robinson v. State, 466 S.W.3d 166, 173 & n.32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hughitt v. State, 539 S.W.3d 531, 538 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2018), aff’d, 583 S.W.3d 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). The evidence must establish that the accused’s connection with the drugs is more than just her fortuitous proximity to someone else’s drugs. Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 405–06; Hughitt, 539 S.W.3d at 538. Texas courts have formulated the “affirmative links rule,” which provides that, “[w]hen the accused is not in exclusive possession of the place where the substance is found, it cannot be concluded that the accused had knowledge of and control over the contraband unless there are additional independent facts and circumstances which affirmatively link the accused to the contraband.” Poindexter, 6 153 S.W.3d at 406 (alteration in original) (quoting Deshong v. State, 625 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)); see Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (listing affirmative links recognized by courts); see also Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12). The affirmative links rule is routinely employed to establish possession when the accused is not in exclusive possession of the place where the drugs are found. Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406. “This rule simply restates the common-sense notion that a person—such as a father, son, spouse, roommate, or friend—may jointly possess property like a house but not necessarily jointly possess the contraband found in that house.” Id. The following links have been applied to infer knowledge relating to the contraband: (1) the accused’s presence when the search was executed; (2) whether the contraband was in plain view; (3) the accused’s proximity to and the accessibility of the contraband; (4) whether the accused was under the influence of a controlled substance when he was arrested; (5) whether the accused possessed other contraband or narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the accused made incriminating statements; (7) whether the accused attempted to flee; (8) whether the accused made furtive gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of contraband; (10) whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia was present; (11) whether the accused owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs were found; (12) whether the place where the drugs were found was enclosed; (13) whether the accused was found with a large amount of cash; and (14) whether the conduct of the accused indicated a consciousness of guilt. Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 414 (citing Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12). It is not the number of links that is dispositive; rather, it is the logical force of all the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, that is the determining factor. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162. 7 In Appellant’s second issue, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm. As relevant here, a person is guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm if he has been convicted of a felony and he intentionally or knowingly possesses a firearm before the fifth anniversary of his release from confinement following the conviction. PENAL § 46.04(a). The Penal Code defines possession in the same manner as the Health and Safety Code. Id. § 1.07 (a)(39). Thus, the State must prove that (1) the accused exercised actual care, control, or custody of the firearm; (2) he was conscious of his connection with it; and (3) he possessed the firearm knowingly or intentionally. Bollinger v. State, 224 S.W.3d 768, 773 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, pet. ref’d). The affirmative links rule also applies to an offense under Section 46.04. Id. at 774; see Swapsy v. State, 562 S.W.3d 161, 165 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, no pet.). Appellant directs his evidentiary challenges on the element of possession. Appellant relies on the fact that he was not present at the residence when the search occurred. He contends that while some affirmative links exist, they were insufficient “to bridge the gap” and establish Appellant’s possession of the contraband seized by the police. We note at the outset that much of the trial evidence is disputed. For example, whether Appellant lived at the residence. Appellant’s witnesses all testified that he did not live there and that he was not present immediately before officers executed the search warrant. As the sole judge of the credibility of a witness’s testimony and the weight to assign that testimony, the jury can believe all, some, or none of a witness’s testimony. Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (first citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; and then citing Esquivel v. State, 506 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)). It is the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic 8 facts to ultimate facts, and we defer to the jury’s determinations. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. Appellant is correct in his contention that many of the recognized affirmative links are not present in this case. He was not present when the search occurred and the contraband was not in plain view, but rather it was in a locked cabinet. There were little details of his arrest offered at trial. There is no evidence that he was under the influence, made any incriminating statements, possessed any other controlled substances, or attempted to flee or make furtive gestures. Conversely, Corporal Thomas testified that officers had the residence under surveillance for several hours, that they observed Appellant at the residence, and that confidential informants made two controlled buys of methamphetamine at the residence from Appellant. Additionally, he testified that officers observed Appellant leave the residence immediately prior to executing the warrant. The Court of Criminal Appeals recognized in Poindexter that evidence of the sale of a controlled substance to a confidential informant from a location is, in and of itself, an affirmative link between the defendant and the controlled substance. 153 S.W.3d at 407–08. While the contents of the locked cabinet were not in plain view, it contained a large amount of controlled substances, including the methamphetamine linked to Appellant, as well as important documents associated with Appellant, including his debit card and DPS identification card and a receipt from a recent purchase of expensive apparel items. The jury could have logically concluded that the contents of the locked cabinet were affirmatively linked to Appellant because of his personal items in the same cabinet. See id. at 409 n.24 (An affirmative link can be established when the contraband is hidden in a place tied to the accused. (citing Mendoza v. State, 583 S.W.2d 396, 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979))). 9 Additionally, there was testimony that Appellant was in possession of a large amount of cash when arrested. See Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 414. Officers also recovered an additional $772 in cash from the locked cabinet. The jury was free to reject Castillo’s explanation of the source of this money. See Metcalf, 597 S.W.3d at 855. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that there is sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant intentionally or knowingly possessed the methamphetamine, marihuana, and two firearms found in the locked cabinet. See Baltimore v. State, 689 S.W.3d 331, 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024); Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 417–18. Simply put, the cumulative logical force of the evidence could have led a rational juror to believe that Appellant intentionally or knowingly possessed the contraband. See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162. We overrule Appellant’s first and second issues on appeal. This Court’s Ruling We affirm the judgments of the trial court. JOHN M. BAILEY CHIEF JUSTICE October 29, 2026 Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J. 10