Joquianna Aggernisha Bernard v. the State of Texas

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00371-CR ___________________________ JOQUIANNA AGGERNISHA BERNARD, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS On Appeal from the 372nd District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1807750 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Birdwell and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell  MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury convicted Appellant Joquianna Aggernisha Bernard of two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child and one count of indecency with a child by sexual contact stemming from her abuse of her nephew, C.B.1 See Tex. Penal Code §§ 21.11(a)(1) (indecency with a child by sexual contact), 22.021(a)(2)(B) (aggravated sexual assault of a child). The jury assessed her punishment at seventeen years’ confinement for one of the counts of aggravated sexual assault, ten years’ confinement for the other count of aggravated sexual assault, and four years’ confinement for the count of indecency with a child. The trial court sentenced her accordingly with the sentences to run consecutively. In eight issues on appeal, Bernard raises a variety of evidentiary complaints—two based on the admission of alleged backdoor hearsay, one based on the admission of testimony that purportedly violated her Confrontation-Clause rights, and three based on the State’s alleged leading of witnesses; she also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by not including her requested readback testimony in response to a jury note and that the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors deprived her of the fundamental right to a fair trial. We will affirm. 1 To protect his anonymity, we refer to the complainant using his initials. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.10(a)(3); McClendon v. State, 643 S.W.2d 936, 936 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982). 2  I. Background2 Megan Snyder, a former employee of the high school C.B. attended, testified that in October 2021, one of his teachers informed her that he was sleeping in class and would not wake up. Snyder went to the class and awakened C.B. He began crying uncontrollably, so Snyder took him back to her office. While in the office, C.B. told Snyder that he had been “touched inappropriately” in his “private region” by his aunt—Bernard—for many years, beginning when he was “around the age of five or six as well as into middle school.” Snyder contacted Child Protective Services (CPS). Michael Arredondo, a police officer with the Fort Worth Police Department, was assigned to investigate Bernard’s alleged abuse of C.B. Arredondo requested that the Alliance for Children 3 conduct a forensic interview of C.B. Arredondo also testified about the locations Bernard and C.B. were living during the years of the alleged abuse.4 Based on Arredondo’s investigation, Bernard was arrested. 2 While Bernard does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her convictions, her complaints relating to the admission of evidence necessitate that we give a brief recitation of the underlying facts relating to her abuse of C.B. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. While we will be brief in our recitation of those facts, we will be less truncated than Bernard, whose entire “Statement of the facts” consists of the following single sentence: “The complaining witness, C.B., testified that he was sexually abused by Appellant on multiple occasions.” 3 The Alliance for Children is a children’s advocacy center in Tarrant County. 4 C.B.’s mother further testified about the places he and Bernard had been living during the timeframe of the alleged abuse. 3  Cynthia Woosley conducted a forensic interview of C.B. at the Alliance for Children in November 2021. During that interview, C.B. identified Bernard as his abuser. C.B. told Woosley about occasions when Bernard had made him “rub her vagina,” “suck on her boobs,” and put “his penis in her vagina.” At trial, C.B. testified that he was sexually abused by Bernard beginning when he was around six or seven years old.5 He stated that Bernard would make him touch her breasts with his hands and mouth, make him touch her vagina with his hands, and make him put his penis inside her vagina. C.B. said that the abuse occurred when his mother went to work and that it had happened the same way every time. C.B. testified that the abuse had stopped about four or five years before his outcry to Snyder. II. Discussion A. Bernard’s Backdoor-Hearsay Complaints In her first two issues, Bernard argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the admission of backdoor hearsay. 1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at a trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Tex. R. Evid. 801(d). Hearsay is generally inadmissible except as provided by a statute or the rules of evidence. Tex. R. Evid. 802. The prohibition against hearsay cannot be circumvented by eliciting the substance of a statement in indirect form. Moreno v. State, 5 C.B. was nineteen years old at the time of trial. 4 No. 05-25-00306-CR, 2026 WL 386245, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 11, 2026, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Koury v. State, 684 S.W.3d 537, 548 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, pet. ref’d). Such hearsay-by-inference—often referred to as “backdoor hearsay”—violates the prohibition against hearsay because it presents the content or substance of the out-of-court statement indirectly. Moreno, 2026 WL 386245, at *3; Koury, 684 S.W.3d at 548. “The test for backdoor hearsay is whether the eliciting party’s sole intent in pursuing a line of questioning was to convey to the jury the contents of the out-of-court statements.” Moreno, 2026 WL 386245, at *3 (citing Koury, 684 S.W.3d at 549). We review a trial court’s ruling on a hearsay objection for an abuse of discretion. Green v. State, 713 S.W.3d 865, 882 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025). Under that standard, we will not reverse a trial court’s ruling on a hearsay objection unless it “was so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonable people might disagree.” Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 2. Analysis as to Bernard’s First Issue In her first issue, Bernard complains that the trial court abused its discretion by overruling her hearsay objection in the following exchange during Arredondo’s testimony: Q. Are SANE exams done in every case? A. No, they are not. Q. And was a SANE exam conducted in this case? 5  A. It was not. Q. Do you know why? A. The victim did not feel up to having one done. [Bernard’s Counsel]: Objection, hearsay. [Trial Court]: Overruled to that answer. You may proceed. Bernard contends that Arredondo’s testimony that C.B. did not have a SANE exam because he did not feel up to it constitutes back-door hearsay. She argues that she has been harmed by that testimony because “[t]he elicited statement was used to show that the complaining witness was not purposely trying to get someone into trouble, but did so reluctantly.” According to Bernard, “This had an influence on the jury because it tended to indicate that the complaining witness was telling the truth.” We begin by noting that nothing in the record indicates that the State’s sole intent in pursuing this line of questioning was to convey to the jury that C.B. did not want to submit to a SANE exam. 6 See Moreno, 2026 WL 386245, at *3; Koury, 684 S.W.3d at 549. The State may have asked these questions for another reason, such as to provide the jury with an explanation for why a SANE exam—something commonly done in these types of cases—was not performed. Because we are unable to conclude that the State’s sole intent in asking Arredondo these questions was to convey to the jury that C.B. did not want to submit to a SANE exam, we hold that the 6 And Bernard does not suggest as much in her brief. 6 trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Bernard’s hearsay objection. See Moreno, 2026 WL 386245, at *3 (“We are unable to conclude the State’s sole intent in asking Martinez these two questions was to convey to the jury the contents of D.C.’s out-of-court statements.”); Faglie v. State, No. 03-17-00281-CR, 2019 WL 847812, at *10–11 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 22, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling objection to alleged backdoor hearsay when appellate court could not conclude from the record that State’s sole intent in offering complained-of testimony was to convey the content or substance of out-of-court statements). Even if the trial court had abused its discretion by allowing this testimony, such error would be harmless because similar evidence demonstrating C.B.’s reasons for not attending the SANE exam and for his reluctance to participate in the prosecution was admitted at trial without objection. To that end, Arredondo was later asked during trial whether he was surprised that C.B. had not shown up for his SANE exam. With no objection being lodged, Arredondo testified that he was not surprised that C.B. had failed to show up for the exam, mentioning that victims often do not show up for SANE exams because the exams are “pretty intrusive.” Further, C.B.’s reluctance was shown at the outset of his testimony when he stated, without objection, that he did not want to be there. After examining the entire record, and after considering the cumulative nature of the testimony, we have fair assurance that this alleged error did not have a 7 substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict; thus, even if the trial court had erred by allowing the alleged backdoor hearsay, we hold that the error was harmless. See Bleimeyer v. State, 616 S.W.3d 234, 256 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (“Generally, error in the admission of evidence is harmless if very similar evidence was admitted without objection.”); Lamerand v. State, 540 S.W.3d 252, 259 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d) (holding that the improper admission of hearsay is non-constitutional error that is harmless if the same or similar evidence is admitted without objection at another point in the trial). We overrule Bernard’s first issue. 3. Analysis as to Bernard’s Second Issue In her second issue, Bernard complains that the trial court abused its discretion by overruling her hearsay objection at the end of the following exchange during Arredondo’s testimony: Q. Firstly, you spoke with Dr. Snyder, correct? A. I did. Q. And did Dr. Snyder indicate any other suspect beyond the Defendant, JoQuianna Bernard? [Bernard’s Counsel]: Objection, hearsay. [Prosecutor]: He opened the door, Your Honor. [Trial Court]: Overruled as to identity. You may proceed. Q. Did Dr. Snyder indicate any other suspect beyond the Defendant? 8  A. No. According to Bernard, Arredondo’s testimony that Snyder did not indicate any suspect other than Bernard constitutes back-door hearsay.7 Bernard further contends that she has been harmed by that testimony because “[t]he elicited statement was used to show that there were no other suspects” and that said testimony “clearly had an influence on the jury as it tended to indicate that [she] was the only possible suspect.” Even if the trial court had abused its discretion by allowing this testimony, such error would be harmless because similar evidence demonstrated that Bernard was the only suspect. At an earlier point in the trial, Arredondo testified that Bernard was the only suspect he investigated because her name was the only one provided during the forensic interview. Arredondo also stated that his investigation had yielded no indication that anyone other than Bernard had sexually abused C.B. Moreover, Woosley testified that C.B. unequivocally identified Bernard as the person who had sexually abused him. She stated that C.B. had not identified anyone else as his abuser. Further, C.B. testified that no one besides Bernard had ever touched him inappropriately. After examining the entire record, and after considering the cumulative nature of the testimony, we have fair assurance that this alleged error did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict; thus, 7 In her brief, Bernard mistakenly contends that Snyder did not testify at trial. Snyder, however, was the first witness to testify. 9 even if the trial court had erred by allowing the alleged backdoor hearsay, we hold that the error was harmless. See Bleimeyer, 616 S.W.3d at 256; Lamerand, 540 S.W.3d at 259; see also Bourque v. State, 156 S.W.3d 675, 677 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. ref’d) (holding that any error in admitting counselor’s hearsay testimony was harmless because complainant’s own explicit and detailed testimony of sexual abuse was substantially similar and proved same facts). We overrule Bernard’s second issue. B. Bernard’s Confrontation-Clause Complaint In her third issue, Bernard argues that her Confrontation-Clause 8 rights were violated by Arredondo’s testimony that Snyder did not indicate any other suspect. The State contends that Bernard has not preserved this complaint. We agree with the State. 1. The Law Regarding Preservation To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion sufficiently stating the specific grounds, if not apparent from the context, for the desired ruling. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Montelongo v. State, 623 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Golliday v. State, 560 S.W.3d 664, 669 n.16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Complaints based on the Confrontation The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, which is made applicable to 8 the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against h[er].” U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV. 10 Clause are subject to these preservation requirements. Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Gourley v. State, 710 S.W.3d 368, 373 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2025, pet. ref’d); see Deener v. State, 214 S.W.3d 522, 527 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. ref’d) (“We conclude the right of confrontation is a forfeitable right—not a waivable-only right—and must be preserved by a timely and specific objection at trial.”). While no “hyper-technical or formalistic use of words or phrases” is required to preserve error, the objecting party must still “let the trial judge know what [s]he wants, why [s]he thinks [s]he is entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand h[er] at a time when the judge is in the proper position to do something about it.” Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). An objection preserves only the specific ground cited. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1)(B); Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (op. on reh’g). Moreover, the complaint made on appeal must comport with the complaint made in the trial court or the error is forfeited. Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339; see Lovill v. State, 319 S.W.3d 687, 691–92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“A complaint will not be preserved if the legal basis of the complaint raised on appeal varies from the complaint made at trial.”). To determine whether the complaint on appeal comports with that made at trial, we consider the context in which the complaint was made and the parties’ shared understanding at that time. Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339; Resendez v. State, 306 S.W.3d 308, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). 11  2. Preservation Analysis Here, Bernard did not raise a Confrontation-Clause objection to the complained-of testimony.9 Rather, she made a hearsay objection. That hearsay objection does not comport with Bernard’s Confrontation-Clause complaint on appeal. See Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339; Lovill, 319 S.W.3d at 691–92. Accordingly, we hold that Bernard has not preserved her Confrontation-Clause complaint because she did not raise it in the trial court. See Whitaker v. State, Nos. 02-25-00053-CR, 02-25- 00054-CR, 2025 WL 3683999, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 18, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that appellant’s hearsay objections did nothing to preserve the confrontation complaint he made on appeal); Mitchell v. State, 238 S.W.3d 405, 409 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (holding that appellant’s hearsay objection did not preserve error on his confrontation complaint and stating that “[h]earsay objections and objections to violations of the constitutional right to confront witnesses are neither synonymous nor necessarily coextensive”). We overrule Bernard’s third issue. In her brief, Bernard says nothing with respect to the preservation of her 9 Confrontation-Clause complaint. 12 C. Bernard’s Complaints That the State Asked Leading Questions That Assumed the Abuse Had Occurred In her fourth through sixth issues, Bernard argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to ask leading questions that assumed the abuse had occurred. 1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review The Texas Rules of Evidence generally prohibit leading questions on direct examination except where such questions may be necessary to develop the witness’s testimony. Tex. R. Evid. 611(c). The mere fact that a question may be answered by a simple “yes” or “no” does not render it an impermissibly leading question. Keller v. State, 604 S.W.3d 214, 225 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. ref’d) (citing Newsome v. State, 829 S.W.2d 260, 269 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, no pet.)). A question is leading only when it suggests the desired answer, instructs the witness how to answer, or puts words into the witness’s mouth to be echoed back. Bussuri v. State, Nos. 02-19-00030- CR, 02-19-00031-CR, 2020 WL 370567, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 23, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Wheeler v. State, 433 S.W.3d 650, 655 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d). We review a trial court’s decision to allow a prosector to lead a State’s witness for an abuse of discretion. Rodriguez v. State, No. 05-18-01448-CR, 2020 WL 881008, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 24, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Bussuri, 2020 WL 370567, at *2. An abuse of discretion cannot usually 13 be shown unless a defendant can demonstrate that she was unduly prejudiced by virtue of such questions. Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Rodriguez, 2020 WL 881008, at *5. 2. The Complained-Of Questions Bernard complains about three questions asked by a prosecutor during the State’s examination of C.B. at trial. In her fourth issue, Bernard takes issue with the prosecutor’s question at the end of the following exchange: Q. Let’s talk about what your aunt did to you. Let’s - - first let’s talk about your relationship with your aunt growing up. Okay? How was your relationship with her when you were younger? A. Started off good. Q. What do you mean by that? A. We used to do a lot together. Q. What did y’all do? A. Like used to go for walks. We used to be with the church. We were together all the time. Q. Were you guys alone together a lot? A. Not really but kind of, yes. Q. Now, when did your aunt start doing - - [Bernard’s Counsel]: Your Honor, I’m going to object to the leading nature of the question. [Trial Court]: Finish your question. Q. When was it that your aunt started being inappropriate with you? 14  [Trial Court]: Overruled. Q. You can answer. A. Okay. Can you say the question again? Q. When was it that your aunt first started being inappropriate with you? Do you remember how old you were? A. Not off the bat but I was probably around six or seven, around there. In her fifth issue, Bernard challenges the State’s question at the end of the following colloquy: Q. And was your aunt doing or saying anything when your hands were on her breasts? A. No, but she was like moaning and groaning. Q. And you said that she would make you put your mouth on her breasts? A. Yes. .... Q. And when your mouth was on her breasts, what did you feel? A. Just squishy, something like that. I don’t [know] how to explain it. Q. And, again, was your aunt making any sounds or saying anything when this was happening? [Bernard’s Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor, leading. [Trial Court]: Overruled. You can answer. 15  [C.B.]: She was doing the same thing. She was moaning and groaning. In her sixth issue, Bernard complains about the question at the end of the following exchange: Q. Do you remember going to a place called the Alliance for Children? A. Oh, yes. Q. Do you remember doing an interview with another woman? A. Oh, yes. Q. And did you tell that woman the truth that day? A. Yes. Q. And do you remember telling her that your aunt would also make you lick and rub her vagina? [Bernard’s Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor, leading. [The Witness]: I don’t remember. [Trial Court]: Hold on. Overruled. You may answer. [The Witness]: I don’t remember licking, but I remember – I know I remember I said touching. I don’t remember everything, but I know I said touching. I don’t remember saying licking. 3. Analysis On appeal, Bernard argues that each of the complained-of questions was improper because it “assumed [that] the alleged abuse had occurred.” But Bernard’s complaint on appeal—that the questions assumed that the abuse had occurred—is 16 different from the argument she raised at trial—that the State was leading its witness. While Bernard tries to label her appellate complaint as one involving the improper leading of a witness, she does not contend that the questions suggested a desired answer, instructed the witness how to answer, or put words into the witness’s mouth to be echoed back—the hallmarks of a complaint that one is leading a witness. See Bussuri, 2020 WL 370567, at *2; Wheeler, 433 S.W.3d at 655. Because the argument Bernard raises on appeal does not comport with the objections she made at trial, we hold that she has not preserved her fourth through sixth issues. See Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339; Lovill, 319 S.W.3d at 691–92; see also Ramirez v. State, No. 01-96-00857-CR, 1998 WL 751862, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 29, 1998, pet. ref’d) (per curiam) (not designated for publication) (holding that appellant’s objection of “leading” at trial to question relating to his gang involvement did not preserve his complaint made on appeal that the testimony concerned an extraneous offense). Even if Bernard’s trial objections had preserved these complaints, we would still reject them because other testimony came in, without objection, establishing that the abuse had occurred.10 Before the State asked the complained-of questions, the jury had already heard Snyder’s testimony that C.B. had reported that his aunt—Bernard— had touched him inappropriately in his “private region.” The jury had also heard Woosley’s testimony describing her forensic interview of C.B., in which C.B. had The only argument Bernard makes in her brief regarding how she was harmed 10 by the complained-of questions was that the answers supposedly put in the jury’s mind that the alleged abuse had occurred. 17 named Bernard as his abuser and had detailed how she had made him touch her breasts with his hands and mouth, had made him touch her vagina with his hands, and had made him put his penis inside her vagina. And, of course, the jury later heard C.B.’s testimony that Bernard had made him touch her breasts with his hands and mouth, had made him touch her vagina with his hands, and had made him put his penis inside her vagina. Thus, we reject Bernard’s contention that the answers to the complained-of questions put into the jury’s mind that the abuse had occurred and caused her to suffer harm. See Simpson v. State, No. 02-23-00266-CR, 2024 WL 3977222, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 29, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that any error in the admission of leading questions was rendered harmless because “the testimony resulting from [the] challenged evidentiary rulings was cumulative of other, unchallenged evidence”); Petriciolet v. State, 442 S.W.3d 643, 654 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (“Error in the admission of evidence may be rendered harmless when substantially the same evidence is admitted elsewhere without objection.”); see also Johnston v. State, No. 01-01-01218-CR, 2003 WL 562812, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 27, 2003, pet. dism’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that appellant waived objection to leading question when he “elicited substantively the same testimony from the same witness”). And while the jury heard testimony generally establishing that the abuse had occurred—from Synder, Woosley, and C.B.—it also heard specific testimony 18 establishing substantially the same facts as those elicited by the complained-of questions. To that end, as it relates to Bernard’s fourth issue, the jury heard other testimony regarding when Bernard’s abuse of C.B. began. Snyder testified, without objection, that C.B. had told her that the abuse began when he was around five or six years old. C.B. later testified, without objection, that the abuse had started when he was around six or seven years old. As it relates to Bernard’s fifth issue, the jury heard other testimony regarding sounds made by Bernard during the abuse. Woosley testified, without objection, that C.B. had reported that Bernard would “moan[]” when the abuse occurred. During other portions of his testimony, C.B. stated, without objection, that Bernard would “moan[] and groan[]” during the abuse. As it relates to Bernard’s sixth issue, the jury heard other testimony that C.B. had told Woosley that Bernard would make him rub her vagina—namely, Woosley testified, without objection, that C.B. had reported that Bernard had made him rub her vagina. After examining the entire record, and after considering the cumulative nature of the testimony, we have fair assurance that any alleged error caused by the admission of the complained-of questions did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict; thus, even if the trial court had erred by overruling the objections to the allegedly leading questions, we hold that the errors were harmless. See Simpson, 2024 WL 3977222, at *8; Petriciolet, 442 S.W.3d at 654; see also Johnston, 2003 WL 562812, at *1. We overrule Bernard’s fourth through sixth issues. 19 D. Bernard’s Complaint Regarding the Trial Court’s Readback of Testimony In her seventh issue, Bernard argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not including her requested readback testimony to the jury in response to a jury note. 1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review Article 36.28 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent part, “In the trial of a criminal case in a court of record, if the jury disagree as to the statement of any witness they may, upon applying to the court, have read to them from the court reporter’s notes that part of such witness testimony or the particular point in dispute, and no other.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 36.28. When the jury asks the trial court to read back certain disputed testimony, the trial court must first determine if the jury’s inquiry is proper under Article 36.28. Thomas v. State, 505 S.W.3d 916, 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). If it is proper, the trial court must then interpret the communication and decide what portions of the testimony will best answer the inquiry. Id. The trial court is not required to provide a comprehensive readback of all the testimony touching on the subject; instead, “it must identify and provide only that portion of the testimony that resolves the particular point in dispute.” Thomas v. State, Nos. 04-24-00744-CR, 04-24-00745-CR, 2026 WL 686522, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 11, 2026, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The trial court has discretion to decide what portions of the testimony 20 will best answer the query and limit the testimony accordingly. Thomas, 505 S.W.3d at 923. We review a trial court’s decision under Article 36.28 for an abuse of discretion. Thomas, 2026 WL 686522, at *3. “When the jury indicates a specific and limited portion of testimony to be read, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by providing only the requested information.” Ford v. State, 444 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014), aff’d, 477 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); see Horton v. State, 530 S.W.3d 717, 722 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. ref’d). Moreover, “[w]here the trial court’s selection of testimony reasonably corresponds to the jury’s question, the ruling falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Thomas, 2026 WL 686522, at *4. 2. Analysis During deliberations, the jury sent the following note to the trial court: We have a dispute in terms of dates. We are requesting to have read back the testimony of [C.B.’s mother] as well as Officer Arredondo. Specifically, we are in dispute of[:] 1. The date the [d]efendant moved into the second-story apartment[;] 2. the date the [d]efendant moved out of the second-story apartment[;] 3. the date the [d]efendant moved back into the second-story apartment[;] and 4. the age or birth month of the [d]efendant’s second child[.] In response to that note, the trial court stated that the court reporter had read back to the parties the testimony of C.B.’s mother and Arredondo that was in 21 response to the jury note that she planned on reading in front of the jury. Bernard’s counsel indicated that she had additional testimony that she wanted read to the jury in response to the note. Bernard’s counsel referenced the following trial testimony that she wanted read to the jury: • Arredondo’s testimony that he did not recall whether Bernard lived in New Orleans, Louisiana in 2015; • Arredondo’s testimony that he did not know whether Bernard lived in Gonzales, Louisiana in 2016; • Arredondo’s testimony that he was not sure whether Bernard lived in Louisiana in 2015; • Arredondo’s testimony that he did not know whether Bernard lived in Louisiana in 2014; • Arredondo’s testimony that he could not say with any certainty that Bernard lived in Fort Worth, Texas in 2015 and 2016. The trial court responded to that request by stating, Okay. I can tell you the reason that was not put in regarding Louisiana, Gonzales, as well as New Orleans and again Louisiana was because it wasn’t specific to the points in dispute regarding the second-story apartment. As to the last thing you stated regarding “can’t say with any certainty in Texas in 2014(sic), 2016,” we can look at that one, but I’ll hear arguments from both sides regarding that. It’s just these are specific points in dispute and it specifically refers to the second-story apartment. After hearing further argument from both sides regarding Bernard’s request, the trial court stated that, after examining the record and seeing “multiple dates and times regarding multiple different locations,” it was denying Bernard’s request. The 22 trial court reasoned that the jury’s note related to “a specific point in dispute” and that it would only allow testimony to be read to the jury that related to the “specific dates regarding the two-story apartment as well as the second child.” On appeal, Bernard argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not including her requested readback testimony. Bernard suggests that the requested readback testimony would have provided additional context for the jury so that they would have the “full picture.” But the law does not require that the trial court give the jury the “full picture” when deciding what portions of testimony will best answer the jury’s note; rather, the law requires that the trial court “identify and provide only that portion of the testimony that resolves the particular point in dispute.” Thomas, 2026 WL 686522, at *3. And the trial court has the discretion to decide what portions of testimony best answer the query and to limit the testimony accordingly. Thomas, 505 S.W.3d at 923. Here, the record reveals that the trial court carefully reviewed the jury’s note and identified only that testimony directly responsive to the jury’s question—limiting the readback testimony to the portions concerning when Bernard moved into and out of a second-story apartment and relating to the age of Bernard’s second child. When a trial court’s selection of testimony reasonably corresponds to the jury’s question, the court’s ruling falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement; accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the readback testimony. See Robison v. State, 888 S.W.2d 473, 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (holding no abuse of discretion 23 when readback testimony was specific and limited to jury’s request); Thomas, 2026 WL 686522, at *3–4 (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by having court reporter read only portion of complainant’s testimony that referenced term “penetration” in response to jury disagreement about whether complainant had testified that penetration had occurred and rejecting appellant’s argument that trial court “should have included additional testimony to avoid presenting a misleading picture of the evidence”); Ford, 444 S.W.3d at 185 (“The testimony proffered by Ford addresses the issue as a broad general principle and not as a response to the jury’s specific question. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion in responding to the jury’s note as it did.”). We overrule Bernard’s seventh issue. E. Bernard’s Cumulative-Error Complaint In her eighth issue, Bernard argues that the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors deprived her of the fundamental right to a fair trial. But her first seven issues are not preserved, do not demonstrate error, or do not show that she was harmed; therefore, there is no error to cumulate. See Jeanty v. State, No. 02-21-00159-CR, 2023 WL 3114342, at *19 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 27, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (overruling appellant’s cumulative-error complaint after first overruling his other fourteen points); Bell v. State, No. 02-18-00244-CR, 2019 WL 1967538, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 2, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Bell argues that even if each of his previous points do 24 not constitute harm sufficient for reversal, their cumulative effect does, undermining the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. But his individual points either do not demonstrate reversible error or do not show that he was harmed. Therefore, there is no error to cumulate.”); Baker v. State, No. 03-18-00240-CR, 2019 WL 1646260, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 17, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Here, Baker’s cumulative-error contention lacks merit because we have concluded, as to his preserved appellate issues, that one complained-of error was harmless and that there was no error as to the remaining complaints.”). We overrule Bernard’s eighth issue. III. Conclusion Having overruled Bernard’s eight issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. /s/ Wade Birdwell Wade Birdwell Justice Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) Delivered: August 31, 2026 25